CHAP.

XXII.

matter of doubt how far the captious terms of expression by which the Sceptics thought to parry the attacks of their opponents, come from Pyrrho's School. The greater part, it is clear, came into use in the struggle with the Dogmatists, which is not older than the Stoical theory of knowledge as taught by Chrysippus, and the criticism of Carneades to which it gave rise. In this despairing of anything like certain conviction consists αφασία, ἀκαταληψία or mox, the withholding of judgment or state of indecision which Pyrrho and Timon regard as the only true attitude in speculation,' and from which the whole School derived its distinctive name.2

(3) Mental From this state of indecision, Timon, in reply to impertur the third question, argues that mental imperturbabability. bility or ȧrapatía proceeds, which can alone conduct to true happiness. Men are disturbed by opinions and prejudices which mislead them into efforts of passion. Only the Sceptic who has suspended all judgment is in a condition to regard things with absolute calmness, unruffled by passion or desire."

He knows that it is a fond delusion to suppose
that
one state is preferable to another.' In reality only
tone of mind or virtue possesses value. Thus, by
withdrawing within himself, man reaches happiness,
which is the goal of all philosophy. Absolute in-
activity being, however, impossible, the Sceptic will
act on probabilities and hence follow custom; but
at the same time he will be conscious that this con-
duct does not rest on a basis of firm conviction.
To this province of uncertain opinion all positive
judgments respecting good and evil belong. Only
in this conditional form will Timon allow of good-
ness and divine goodness as the standards of conduct.
The real object of Scepticism is therefore a purely
negative one-indifference. Nor can it be proved 5

Id. in Sext. Math. xi. 1: The 43; iii. 4, 12.
Sceptic lives

ῥῇστα μεθ ̓ ἡσυχίης
αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ

ταὐτὰ

μὴ προσέχων δειλοῖς ἡδυλόγου σοφίης.

Id. in Diog. 65.

1 Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Quæ quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime agrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse. iii. 3, 11: Cum Pyrrhone et Aristone qui omnia exæquent. Acad. ii. 42, 130 : Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quæ ἀπάθεια nominatur. Epictet. Fragm. 93 : Πύῤῥων ἔλεγεν μηδὲν διαφέρειν ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι.

2 Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho qui virtute constituta nihil omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same Ibid. ii. 13,

3

Diog. 105: ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι [τὸν Πύῤῥωνα] τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει· ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον παντὶ σθένει οὗπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ. Ibid. 106, of Pyrrho : τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν.

Κ Κ

CHAP.

XXII.

СНАР. XXII.

that Pyrrho's School so far accommodated itself to
life, as to make moderation rather than indifference
the regulating principle for unavoidable actions and
desires. On this point the School seems to have
been extremely vague.

rystus (Aristocl. in c. 18, 19; is difficult to lay aside humanity
Diog. ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised altogether.
for being agitated by saying: It

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE NEW ACADEMY.

PLATO'S School was the first to lay down a solid groundwork for Scepticism, and to pursue Scepticism as a system. It is already known that under Xenocrates this School gradually deserted speculative enquiries, and limited itself to Ethics; and this new tendency was consistently adhered to, when shortly after the beginning of the third century B.C. the School took a fresh lease of life. Instead, however, of simply ignoring theoretical knowledge, as had been its previous practice, the School assumed towards knowledge the attitude of opposition, hoping to arrive at security and happiness in life by being persuaded of the impossibility of knowledge. How far this result was due to the example set by Pyrrho it is impossible to establish authoritatively. But it is not in itself probable that the learned originator of this line of thought in the Academy should have ignored the views of a philosopher whose work had been carried on at Elis in his own lifetime, and whose most distinguished pupil, a personal acquaintance of his own, was then working at Athens as a

CHAP. XXIII.

prolific writer. The whole tone and character, moreover, of the Scepticism of the New Academy betrays everywhere the presence of Stoic influences; by the confidence of its assertions it provokes contradiction and doubt, without ever necessarily suggesting relations otherwise improbable between Arcesilaus and Zeno.2

This connection of the New Academy with Stoicism can be proved in the case of its first founder,3 Arcesilaus. The doubts of this philosopher are directed

1 Conf. Diog. ix. 114. Tenne-
mann's view (Gesch. d. Phil. iv.
190), that Arcesilaus arrived at
his conclusions independently of
Pyrrho, does not appear to be
tenable.

2 Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.
5, 10; 6, 5, says that Zeno and
Arcesilaus were fellow-pupils
under Polemo, and that their
rivalry whilst at school was the
origin of the later quarrels be-
tween the Stoa and the Academy.
Conf. Cic. Acad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24,
76, who appeals to Antiochus.
There can be no doubt that both
Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils
of Polemo, but it is hardly pos-
sible that they can have been
under him at the same time. If
they were, how would their re-
lations affect their Schools?

3 Cic. De Orat. ii. 18, 68;
Diog. iv. 28; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4,
16; Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220. Clemens,
Strom. i. 301, c, calls Arcesilaus
the founder of the New (second
or middle) Academy.

4 Arcesilaus (see Geffers, De
Arcesila. Gött. 1842, Gymn.
Prog.) was born at Pitane, in
Æolia (Strabo, xiii. 1, 67; Diog.

iv. 28). His birth year is not stated; but as Lacydes (Diog. iv. 61) was his successor in 240 B.C., and he was then 75 years of age, it must have been about 315 B.C. Having enjoyed the instruction of the mathematician Autolycus in his native town, he repaired to Athens, where he was first a pupil of Theophrastus, but was gained for the Academy by Crantor (Diog. 29; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor he lived on the most intimate terms; but as Polemo was the president of the Academy, he is usually called a pupil of Polemo (Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Fin. v. 31, 94; Strabo). On the death of Polemo, he was probably a pupil of Crates; but it is not asserted by Diog. 33, or Numen. in Eus. 1. c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was a pupil of Pyrrho, Menedemus, or Diodorus. If the latter seems to imply it, it would seem to be a mistake for his having used their teaching. Fortified with extraordinary acuteness, penetrating wit, and ready speech (Diog. 30; 34; 37; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2;