ment, and it has immemorially constituted a privilege of both houses of the British parliament. It seems absolutely indispensable for the just exercise of the legislative power, in every nation purporting to possess a free constitution of government, and it cannot be surrendered without endangering the public liberties, as well as the private indepenence of the members. This privilege from arrest, privileges them, of course, against all process, the disobedi ence to which is punishable by attachment of the person, such as a subpena ad respondendum, ad testificandum, or a summons to serve on a jury, and with reason, because a member has superior duties to perform in another place. When a representative is withdrawn from his seat by a summons, the people whom he represents, lose their voice in debate and vote, as they do in his voluntary absence. When a senator is withdrawn by summons, his state loses half its voice in debate and vote, as it does in his voluntary absence. enormous disparity of the evil admits of no comparison. The privilege, indeed, is deemed not merely the privilege of the member or his constituents, but the privilege of the house also; and every man must, at his peril, take notice who are the members of the house returned of record." The Judge Story refers to Jefferson's Manual, and to the case of Bolton vs. Martin, in 1 Dallas' Rep. 296. From the book, it appears that Martin was sued by summons, while attending, as a member from Bedford county, a convention held at Philadelphia in 1788, for the purpose of accepting the federal constitution; and that he was discharged from the suit, although the summons was not returnable for some time afterwards, and probably subsequent to the adjournment of the convention, on the ground, that the importance and dignity of his office, entitled him to the common law privilege from arrest or suit. This suit would have required him to neglect his public duties, while he was employing counsel, probably as much as to give bail on an arrest, and if founded on a just claim, would have entitled the plaintiff to an execution, not only against his goods but his body. In 1790, the supreme court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Geyer's Lessee, vs. Irvin, 4 Dallas' Rep. 107, decided, that a member of the General Assembly is un doubtedly privileged from arrest, summons, citation, or other civil process, during his attendance on the public business, confided to him; and upon principle, his suits could not be forced to a trial and decision while the session of the legislature continues. The constitution of the state contains a similar clause to that in the constitution of the United States, on which judge Story commented as above. The members of the legislative assembly of this territory being elected by the people, and empowered by the organic law, to legislate on all rightful subject of legislation, while assembled for the purpose of legislation, and for a reasonable time to go to, and return home from the seat of government, ought to be considered în reason, and from the nature and dignity of their office, as invested with equal immunities with the members of any other representative body. As judge Story says, this privilege belonged to every legislative body that existed in America since its settlement; it belonged to the assemblies of the colonies before the revolution; then why not belong to the legislative assembly of Wisconsin? It is the legislative branch of the government of this territory, and its members are legally and inherently possessed of all such privileges as are necessary to enable them, with freedom and safety, to execute the trust reposed in them by the people who elected them. This is a parliamentary trust which entitles them to this immunity, that they may not be diverted from the public business, by law suits brought against them during the session, which though not attended with the arrest of their persons, might oblige them to attend to these law suits, and to bring witnesses from a distant county to a place whither they came, perhaps solely on account of that public business. There is a statute in the state of New York, that every member of the legislature shall be privileged from arrest on civil process during his attendance at the session of the house to which he shall belong, except on process issued on any suit brought against him for any forfeiture, misdemeanor, breach of trust, &c. and for fourteen days previous to any such session, and also, while going to and returning from such session, provided the time of such go ing to or returning do not exceed the fourteen days. There are no reported cases in New York, giving a construction of this statute, or defining this privilege, by the courts; but the legislature, in the enactment of the statute of limitations, gives us to understand, that they construed the privilege from arrest to extend to a privilege from suit. In that statute it is provided that whenever the commencement of any suit shall be prevented, by reason of any privilege of any member of either house of the legislature of this state, or of any member of either house of the congress of the United States, the time during which the same have been prevented, shall not be deemed any portion of the time limited for the commencement of any suit, &c. All the statute law we have on the subject of this privilege, is an act of the territorial legislature, on page 157 of the Statues of Wisconsin. It is there provided that "no member of the legislative assembly shall be liable to arrest on a service of any civil process issued by any of the courts of this territory, during any such session of the legislative assembly, or for ten days previous to the commencement, or subsequent to the termination of any session; and any member in arrest during the period of such exemption, shall be entitled to an immediate discharge, on any application to any judge, supreme court commissioner, or justice, in any county in which such an arrest may have been made." The first clause of this statute is the same, in substance, as the articles in the constitutions above referred to, and to the statute of the state of New York, and must be construed in the same manner. Whether the privilege is of the common law, or created by this statute, is immaterial, as we have seen satisfactorily, that it extends to an exemption from suit. If, of the common law, there is nothing in this statute that does restrict its legal meaning, and operation. There is no doubt but that the legislature may, in its discretion, abridge.or take away a privilege of its own members, and whenever the legislative will is to be ascertained with perfect certainty, either from the express words, or manifest intent of the statute, the court will so consider it. It is a principle of the common law, that privileges are not to be taken away by the general comprehensive words of a statute, 9 Johnson's Rep. 347. There is no expres sion in this statute, having a greater tendency to confine the privilege of the members to arrest merely, than is contained in the constitutions, and statute of New York, referred to; consequently we cannot do by construction what is not clearly authorized by the legislature. The second clause in the statute merely provides for the immediate discharge of a member actually in arrest. This suit having been brought against this defendant the next day after the adjournment of the assembly, and within the ten days allowed for returning home, the district court was right in sustaining his plea of privilege: It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the district court of Dane county be and the same is hereaffirmed with costs. DAVID BRIGHAM, for plff. in error. MAU-ZAU-MAU-NE-KAH, Error to the Dirtrict Court for Brown THE UNITED STATES. county. An indictment must state a day certain when the offence was committed. There are no circuit courts in the territory; and prosecution instituted in a district court should not be styled as being had in the circuit court. An indictment must show that the jurors of the grand jury were impannelled for the proper county and not "for the territory." Any matter that would be good on a general demurrer to an indictment, is equally available in arrest of judgment. This was an indictment against the plaintiff in error, an Indian of the Winnebago tribe, for the murder of Pierre Paquette. The indictment was found, and the prisoner tried in the district court for Brown county, in which court a verdict of guilty was rendered against him. After verdict, the prisoner's counsel moved in arrest of judgment on the ground of the errors assigned in arrest, which are stated in the opinion of this court; but the district court overruled the motion, and pronounced judgment of death upon the prisoner, and the cause has been brought, by writ of error, into this court to reverse that judgment. Judge Irvin delivered the opinion of the court upon the errors assigned in arrest of judgment, as they appear in the record. At the May term, 1837, of the district court for Brown county, Mau-zau-mau-ne-kah, (an Indian of the Winnebago tribe) was indicted for the murder of Pierre Paquette, and at the same term was tried and convicted, and judgment pronounced; to stay and reverse which, a writ of error was sued out of this court, and the cause brought up. After verdict, and before judgment, the prisoner made a motion in arrest of judgment, upon the following grounds: 1. Because the time laid in said indictment when said offence was committed, is not laid with sufficient and legal certainty. 2. Because said indictment alleges said offence charged in said indictment, to have been committed on lands owned by the tribe of the Menomonee nation of Indians, and under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 3. Because said indictment alleges 'the jurors' to be 'for said territory,' and does not allege them to be jurors of either Brown county, or of the counties composing the third judicial district. 4. Because said indictment does not truly state the name and style of this court. 5. That said indictment does not allege said offence to have been committed against a statute or act of congress;" which were all overruled by the court. In the order of the indictment it is best to notice the fourth objection first. By the organic law, the proper style of the court would be the district court, whilst in the indictment it is styled "a circuit court of the said territory of Wisconsin." Now, as there is no such court as a circuit court of the territory of Wisconsin, it occurs to this court that the objection is a good one, as it is a principle of law that such a degree of certainty should be observed, as to leave no difficulty in the way of the accused, in the event of an acquittal and subsequent prosecution, in showing a former acquittal. By the third objection, it is further urged against the indictment, |