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Sixth. That such debtor is about fraudulently to remove, convey, or dispose of his property or effects, so as to hinder or delay his creditor.

In the five last cases, the party must satisfy the officer of the truth of the fact alleged. Why the legislature made the distinction in the cases, no good reason appears; but the distinction is made, and it must be observed. In the first case, the party, his agent or attorney, must file his affidavit in writing, that his debtor has absconded, as he verily believes, and this entitles him to the writ. What evidence is necessary to satisfy the officer, or in what form it must be made, is not set forth in the statute, other than the party must file the same with the clerk of the district court, when he shall issue the writ.-An affidavit of the party, his agent or attorney, or some disinterested person, containing one of the above causes, is certainly necessary; and the officer must indorse thereon his satisfaction of the truth of the facts alleged. The satisfaction of the officer must affirmatively appear on the record, before the writ can be properly issued by the clerk, and cannot be inferred or presumed from circumstances. In the case of Mayhew and Dudley vs. Mayhew, decided at the last term of this court, it appeared that the affidavit was made before the clerk, who filed the same and issued the writ; from which as strong a presumption of his satisfaction arose as can in this case, from the order of Seymour to the clerk; but the court there unanimously decided, "that the satisfaction of the officer is an indispensable pre-requisite; and that can regularly appear in no other way than by his own indorsement of the fact." In all cases of the kind, courts uniformy confine plaintiffs to strict practice, and require them strictly to comply with the requisites of the statute. There is nothing left to inference; all the facts made necessary and requisite by the legislature must appear affirmatively. Nothing more is required by this rule than appears to be the universal practice of courts upon similar proceedings. In some of the cases, fraud is alleged against a party who has no way of traversing it; which renders it necessary that a creditor, who is anxious to secure his debt, should satisfy the officer of the fact, and that the officer should so certify. It is an

ex parte proceeding, that ought to be carefully guarded, or a door is opened to oppression and perjury. A responsibility is properly thrown on the officer, as well as the party, which is not to be evaded.

Although no error in the affidavit is specified in the exception, yet we have examined it, and find that it sets forth, literally, one of the cases of attachment contained in the statute. We find it to be practised in the territory, to set out this cause in the disjunctive as set out here, and we are not disposed to change it. We are not disposed to confine the party to the use of one of the words, remove, convey or dispose, but he may use one, or all, at his pleasure: also the words property, or effects. In a case of fraud, it may be difficult to obtain satisfactory information, whether a man is removing or disposing of his property. Clearly, a party cannot set out two of the cases of attachment in the disjunctive. Both these points seem to be settled in 3 Watts' Reports, 144.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the district court of Dane county be affirmed with costs.

D. BRIGHAM, for pltff. in error.

J. CATLIN, for deft, in error.

JAMES JACKSON, ex. dem.
ROBERT GRIGNON,
PETER B. GRIGNON, and
MORGAN L. MARTIN,

vs.

JOHN JACOB ASTOR,
RAMSEY CROOKS,
ROBERT STUART, and

LINUS THOMPSON.

Error to the District Court for Brown Co.

The judgment of a court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, is conclusive upon all the world, until such judgment shall be reversed by the proper superior tribunal, and cannot be questioned or impeached in any collateral issue.

Under the laws of the territory of Michigan, an order of the county court, and a license of the clerk under such order, empowering the administrator to sell the real estate of the intestate for the payment of debts, is conclusive upon the subject; and the presumption of law is, that the court had all the necessary evidence before it to authorize such order and license; and the heirs at law of the intestate cannot, in a collateral suit, contest the validity of the order and license, for the purpose of setting aside a sale and convey. ance made by the administrator under such order and license.

Such an order of the county court is valid and effectual, although it au

thorize the administrator to sell the real estate of the intestate, in general terms, without specifying what part or describing the lands to be sold.

The administrator, under such authority, must advertise and sell the lands according to the directions of the statute; and whether he did so or not, is a question of fact to be left to the jury; and in an action between the heirs at law and the vendee of the administrator, proof of a substantial compliance with the requisitions of the statute will be sufficient.

The minutes of the county court as it existed under the laws of Michigan, signed by the clerk, are to be received and considered as the record of the acts and decisions of the court, although there may be no complete record of the case formally made up as required by the statute.

The minutes and records of the county court which were deposited with the clerk of the district court of the county upon the organization of the territory of Wisconsin, and the abolition of the county courts, as the minutes and records of the county court, are to be received and considered as legal evidence of the orders and decisions of the county court, which they purport to record.

An act of congress confirming a private land claim, vests in the donee such an interest in the land as may, under the proper order of court, be sold by the administrator for the payment of the just debts of the intestate, before any patent issues for the land, and the county court had jurisdiction of the subject matter so far as to order such sale for the payment of debts.

An order of the county court, empowering the administrator in general terms to dispose of the real estate of the intestate, is sufficient to authorize the administrator to sell and convey a particular tract of land confirmed to the intestate by congress, but for which a patent had not issued.

A patent for the land confirmed, which issued to the donee and his heirs subsequent to the sale and conveyance by the administrator, does not vest the legal title in the heirs at law of the intestate so as to enable them to maintain an action of ejectment, but inures to the benefit of the vendee of the administrator.

This was an action of ejectment, brought in the Brown district court, to recover the premises in dispute. Robert Grignon and Peter B. Grignon, two of the lessors of the plaintiff, claimed the land as sons and heirs at law of Pierre Grignon, deceased, to whom the tract of land including the disputed premises, was confirmed by act of congress, and for which a patent issued several years after his death, and after the sale of the land by his administrator. Morgan L. Martin, the other lessor of the plaintiff, claimed jointly with them, by virtue of a deed from said Robert and Peter, conveying to him an undivided interest in the same premises.

The defendants claimed title by virtue of a sale and conveyance from Paul Grignon, administrator of the estate of Pierre Grignon, deceased, under an order of the Brown county court, in 1826, and a license of the clerk under said order, to Augustine Grignon, fromwhom they derive their title.

Testimony and authorities were produced to establish the heirship of Robert and Peter B. Grignon; but the point seems not to

have been contested, or at least not brought into review before this

court.

Upon the trial in the district court, the plaintiff objected to the evidence offered by the defendants, to show the order of the Brown county court, and the license of the clerk, empowering the said administrator to sell the real estate of the intestate for the payment of debts, and the sale and conveyance by said administrator under such authority; but the objection was overruled by the court. Various instructions to the jury were asked for by the plaintiffs and refused by the court, which are set out in the opinion delivered. The plaintiff excepted to the decisions of the court, in admitting the evidence offered by the defendants, in refusing the instructions asked for by the plaintiffs, and in the instructions which the court gave to the jury. Under the decisions of the court upon the various points of law submitted during the progress of the cause, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, and the court rendered judgment accordingly upon the verdict. The lessors of the plaintiff have prosecuted this writ of error to reverse that judgment, and have assigned the following errors in the record of the proceedings in the court below:

First. That the said district court admitted the minutes of the county court of Brown county, not under seal, as evidence of a judgment, or order of the court, in the absence of any record of such order, or of its loss or destruction.

Second. That the said district court admitted the said minutes of the county court as evidence, it not appearing on their face or otherwise, to present a case of which the county court had jurisdiction, or which had been brought before that court in accordance with the several provisions of the act of the territory of Michigan, entitled "An act directing the settlement of the estates of persons deceased, and for the conveyance of real estate in certain cases;" adopted July 27, 1818.

Third.

That the said district court admitted the said minutes without evidence on their face or otherwise, that the order entered therein involved the title or had reference to the lands now in

dispute.

Fourth. That the said district court admitted the license issued by the clerk of the county court, and the several deeds offered by the defendants as evidence, and directed the jury that they were conclusive to vest the title to the premises in question, in the defendants.

Fifth. That the said district court decided that Pierre Grignon, at the time of his death, was seized in fee of the premises in question.

Sixth. That the said district court admitted a notification of the sale of the premises in question, purporting to be signed by the administrator on the estate of Pierre Grignon, and printed in a paper purporting to be a newspaper, to be read in evidence, without further proof than its production in court.

Seventh. That the said district court presumed all the facts necessary to give the county court jurisdiction to make an order of sale, and presumed all the facts necessary to show that such order was made in reference to the lands in question, and all the facts to show that the proceedings of the administrator before and at the sale, were regular and in accordance with the act of Michigan herein before referred to; and that the said court directed the jury that upon the facts and the law of the case, the title to the' lands in question was vested in the defendants by the administra- ' tor's sale.

Eighth. That the said district court directed the jury upon points of evidence, and particularly one point, to wit: the posting a notification of sale by an administrator, which it was the peculiar province of the jury to determine.

Ninth. That the said district court refused to give the jury the instructions requested by the lessors of the plaintiff.

Tenth. That the said district court did not properly direct the jury in regard to the 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th instructions requested by the lessors of the plaintiff.

Eleventh. That the said district court gave judgment for the said defendants against the said plaintiff, whereas, by the law of the land, judgment ought to have been given for the said plaintiff against the said defendants.

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