1. Had Pierre Grignon, at the time of his death, such an interest in the lands in controversy, as was the subject of sale by his administrator, for the payment of his just debts?

2. Had the county court of Brown county jurisdiction of the subject matter so far as to order the sale of a decedent's lands for the payment of debts? If so, should the sale made in this case be disturbed by this collateral suit, if it does not appear that all the facts and evidence required by the statute were laid before the county court; that previous notice to all concerned had been given, and that the record of the court had been made up as directed by statute?

3. Did the court err in its instructions and charge to the jury? 4. Should the plaintiffs recover by virtue of the patent to Pierre Grignon?

The patent sets forth that the tract of land, of which the lot of land in dispute is part, was confirmed to Pierre Grignon by the act of congress above referred to, on the 21st day of Feb. 1823, and the proof is that he died on the 4th day of March after. It is under this act of confirmation that both parties claim. The act of confirmation was founded on the actual possession, occupancy and improvements of said lands by said Pierre. The words of the act are "that such persons are hereby confirmed in their claims, agreeably to any surveys heretofore made, or the lines and boundaries established by the claimants respectively;" and directs "that patents shall be issued in the mode pointed out by law in other cases, &c." The license shows, that the lines and boundaries of the tract were established with sufficient certainty; it being there described as "lot number three, on the east side of Fox river, bounded north by land claimed by Domitille Languivin, south by Augustine Grignon, and four and one-half arpents in front, and eighty arpents rear." It may not be necessary to decide whether the legal title to this land was vested in Pierre Grignon before his death, as the statute of Michigan authorized the sale of a decedent's houses, lunds and tenements, for the payment of his debts. It is true, that in ordinary cases, the legal title remains in the government, until divested by patent; but the act of confirmation

vested in Pierre Grignon, certainly, such title, as by the general terms of the statute referred to, could be sold and transferred, in pursuance of the statute, for the payment of his debts. By the act of confirmation, he became instantly entitled to a patent, to be issued by the government as in ordinary cases. The land was, after the date of the act, as much his against all the world, except possibly the government, as if the patent had been issued. No one could dispute his claim, his possession, his grant, or the confirmation thereof. He could have mortgaged or sold the land previous to his death, for the payment of his debts, and it would certainly be a singular construction of his title under the confirmation and the statute mentioned, that his creditors could not effect a sale of the same for the same purpose, after his death.

The statute of Michigan authorizes application to be made to the supreme judicial court, or to the county court in the county where the deceased person last dwelt, or in the county where the real estate lies, for a license to sell. It is apparent that this county court had jurisdiction of the subject matter. The deceased person last dwelt, and the real estate lay in Brown county. The difficulty arises out of the imperfect record of the proceedings of said court. It is not apparent, that the records and papers produced shew fully, that all the pre-requisites of the statute were before the county court when the sale was ordered. All we have, is the short entry of proceedings above copied from the record book, the license under seal, and the record of the bond and oath of the administrator. From these exhibits, it appears that the sale was ordered for the payment of the debts of the decedent, of which matter the county court had jurisdiction. The plaintiffs allege that this sale is void against them, because the representation of the administrator to the court does not appear to be accompanied by a certificate of the judge of probate, certifying the value of the real estate, and of the personal estate of the deceased, and the amount of his debts, and his opinion, &c.; and that the court did not, previous to passing upon said representation, order notice to be given to all persons concerned, and the guardian of the minors, who did not signify their assent to such sale, to show

cause, &c. If the court had followed the directions of the statute then in force, in making up the record of its proceedings, and attested the same, it may be that their proceedings would now present a different aspect. But the statute was only directory, for the purpose of preventing errors; and it would be against all precedent to declare all the proceedings of that court void, because their records were not made out in proper form, examined and attested by the judge, more particularly, fourteen years after the proceedings took place; and after the court has gone out of existence, and the property passed into the hands of innocent purchasers. If the certificate of the judge of probate were indispensable to give the county court jurisdiction, and the records of that court do not show its presence or production in court, then the sale would be void. But the statute requires that it should be produced to the court with the representation of the administrator, to enable it to decree for the interest of all concerned. It might have been before the court, although no mention is made of it. All the heirs might have appeared before the court and consented to the sale, which would have dispensed with notice, although no mention is made of it. The proper court would set aside the sale on appeal, if taken in time, if all the pre-requisites and conditions precedent to the order of sale had not been complied with strictly by the administrator and the county court. But as the county court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, the presumption of law is, that all the necessary pre-requisites and evidence had been before that court, to authorize the granting the order and license, and are not now to be inquired into in this collateral issue. The orders, judgments and decrees, of a court of competent jurisdiction, are not to be avoided in a collateral issue: 2 Rawle 206; 14 Serg. and Rawle 173. A judgment of an inferior court, although erroneous, is not void, if the court has jurisdiction; 5 Cranch 173. A judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive whenever the same matter is again brought in controversy; 6 Wheaton 109. A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, while unreversed, concludes the subject matter of it, as between the same parties; 9 Peters 8. So long as a judgment remains in

force, it is of itself evidence of the right of the plaintiff to the thing adjudged, and gives him a right to process to execute the judgment. The errors of a court, however apparent, can be examined only by a court of appellate power; and by the laws of every country, a time is limited for such examination, whether int rendering judgment, issuing execution, or enforcing it by process of sale and imprisonment. No rule can be more reasonable than that the person who complains of an injury done him, should avail himself of his legal rights in a limited time; and every act of a court of competent jurisdiction is presumed to have been rightly done; 10 Peters 449. There is no difference between the conclusiveness of a judgment at law and the decree of a court of chancery; 6 Wheaton 109. The judgments of a court of competent jurisdiction, although obtained by fraud, have never been considered absolutely void, and therefore all acts done under them are valid, as third persons are effected; 3 Cranch 300. The presumption is, that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, is proper; 13 Peters 436. It is a general rule of our law, that where any matter belongs to the jurisdiction of any court, so peculiarly, that other courts can only take cognizance of the same, subject incidentally and indirectly, the latter are bound by the sentence of the former, and must give credit to it. The decree or order we are now considering is definite; it passes in rem judicatam; the thing is finally judged, but not without appeal. We are not reviewing an appeal from this order or decree, but as a court of error, the decision of the district court, which had not direct cognizance of it. This case is similar to the case of McPherson vs. Cunliff, in 11 Serg. & Rawle. Here it appears, by the license, to have been represented to the county court by the administrator, that the personal estate of said decedent was insufficient to pay all his just debts, but that the estate will be insolvent, when for the causes aforesaid, and for divers other good and sufficient reasons, the court thereunto moving, they authorize and empower the administrator to dispose of all the estate of the deceased, in the lands therein mentioned. There is no mention made of, or reference to the certificate of the judge of probate, or whether the

heirs appeared and consented to the sale, or that notice had been given to them. The law of Pennsylvania provides, "that no orphan's court shall allow or order any intestate's land or tenements to be sold before the administrator requesting the same, shall exhibit a true and perfect inventory, and conscionable appraisement of all the intestate's personal estate whatsoever; as also, a just and true account, upon his solemn oath, of all the intestate's debts which shall have then come to his knowledge." The case of McPherson vs. Cunliff was a suit brought by the legal heirs against the purchaser, and the sale was attempted to be set aside, because no written statement of the debts was exhibited under oath by the administrator, and decided in favor of the defendant. This was a

sale made in an old settled country, where the practice should be well settled; and the heirs assailed it twenty years after. The sale in this case was made in a new country, shortly after the introduction of law, and before correct practice could have been settled; and the heirs now, after a lapse of some fourteen years, attempt to set aside the sale, on a collateral issue. Enough appears on the record and papers to show that the court had jurisdiction in both cases. In this case a sale was made under the order and license referred to, and a conveyance to the purchaser by the administrator in pursuance of the sale; the purchaser enters into possession of the premises, which he and his alienees enjoy, undisturbed, for fourteen years; and after an extraordinary rise in the value of the property, the court cannot encourage the claim of the heirs, more particularly, as the brothers and sisters were of full age, and the sons claiming under them, or as heirs, were about the age of twenty-one at the time of the sale. If such a purchaser is not protected, sales of this kind are only traps for honest men, particularly when we consider the loose manner in which all such business has been transacted in all courts vested with similar jurisdiction. Whenever the sales are called in question, we find the courts deciding that these irregularities must be overlooked. That after a lapse of many years, all must be presumed to have been solemnly transacted, and presumptions made in favor of what does not appear; 4 Binney 105. The presumption is always, that the proceedings are regular, on account of purchasers, who are not to be effected by the unskilfulness or negligence of the proper offi