cers; 6 Binney 496. A substantive compliance with the statute is sufficient. If it appear to the court that the debts cannot be paid but by a sale of the land, and they are fully satisfied on these points, their jurisdiction has attached; 11 Serg. & Rawle, 432. If the purchasers were responsible for the mistake of a court in point of fact, or the loss of a paper, or the neglect of an officer, all judicial sales would be at an end, no prudent man would run the risk. In Massachusetts, under a law similar to the statute of Michigan, a title, under a sale by an administrator, by virtue of a license from the court of common pleas, was holden good against the heirs of the intestate, although the license was granted upon a certificate from the judge of probate, not authorized by the circumstances of the case, and the administrator had never filed the original oath; 11 Mass. Rep. 226. The purchaser was not bound to look further back than the order of the court. It was said, the license was granted by a court having competent jurisdiction of the subject. If the jurisdiction was improvidently exercised, it is not to be corrected at the expense of the purchaser, who had a right to rely on the order of the court, as an authority emanating from a competent jurisdiction. It would be tedious to refer to all the decisions on the subject. The case of Thompson vs. Tolmie; 2 Peters 157, refers to the above cases in 11 Serg. & Rawle, and in 11 Mass. Rep. See also, 4 Cranch 328; 4 Wheaton 506; 1 Peters 340; 5 Peters 370; 6 Peters 729; 1 Yates 118; 2 Serg. and Rawle 377; 2 Cranch 458; 2 Ch. Rep. 405; 3 Serg. & Rawle 234. Sale held good where it was made by one administrator while there were two in office; 7 Serg. & Rawle 166; 1 Conn. Rep. 7; Trumbull Justice says, "a judgment, decree, or sentence or order, passed by a competent jurisdiction, which creates or changes a title, or any interest, or estate, real or personal, or which settles and determines a contested right, or fixes a duty on one of the parties litigant, is not only final as to the parties themselves and all claiming under them, but furnishes conclusive evidence to all mankind, that the right, interest or duty belongs to the party in whom the court adjudged it;" 1 Nott and McC. South Car: Rep 329; 13 Mass. Rep. 162; 6 John. Ch. Rep. 387; Chancellor Kent refers to 7 Wheaton 60. The only charge of the district court, appears in the answers annexed to the different points presented on behalf of the lessors of the plaintiff. These answers on points of law, appear in the main, to correspond with the doctrines above advanced on the conclusiveness of the order and license of the county court, and the presumptions that should be raised in favor of the purchaser to quiet titles. The point respecting the advertisement of the sale by the administrator, was properly left to the jury as a matter of fact, with instructions that a substantial compliance with the statute was sufficient. There was but one township in the county of Brown, and consequently impossible for the administrator to comply, literally, with the requisites of the statute in that particular. It could not be expected that a purchaser, after such a lapse of time, should have the duty imposed on him, of proving that advertisements were properly put up. It cannot be that the title of a fair purchaser should depend on such perishable testimony. If it were so, heirs would gain in all instances, by procrastinating their suit until witnesses should die, or be removed beyond the reach of the purchaser. The question, should the lessors of the plaintiff recover by virtue of the patent to Pierre Grignon? remains to be considered. It will be borne in mind, that this land was confirmed to Pierre Grignon by act of congress, on the twenty-first day of February, 1823, and, that by the same act a patent was directed to be issued to him for the same in the usual manner; and that he died on the fourth day of March, in the same year. It also appears, that this land was sold by the administrator of said Pierre, in pursuance of a license issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the year 1826, and a deed made by said administrator for the same to Augustine Grignon, the purchaser at said sale. This deed was made by virtue of the authority contained in the statute of Michigan, above referred to. An act of congress entitled "An act to give effect to patents for public lands issued in the name of deceased persons," approved May 20, 1836, provides, that "in all cases any where patents for public lands have been or may hereafter be issued, in pursuance of law of the United States, to a person who had died, or who may hereafter die, before the date of such patent, the title to the land designated therein shall inure to, and become vested in the heirs, devisees, or assigns of such deceased patentee, as if the patent had issued to the deceased person during life." Although this patent was issued in 1829, yet, if Pierre Grignon had sold this land in his life time, after its confirmation to him by congress, under this act of congress, the patent would inure to the benefit of his vendee. By the act of Michigan, the administrator was authorized to convey the same title that Pierre Grignon had and held in his life time, or could have conveyed, if living in 1826. We must give effect to these acts, and consider the alienee of the legal representative of Pierre Grignon, under this act, the same as if he were the alienee of said Pierre Grignon himself, and entitled to the same rights and title. In either case, the alienee might have obtained this patent from the land office, on producing his deed, or assignment of the land. This patent, therefore, although issued in 1829, to Pierre Grignon, cannot give his heirs any right or title to the land, to enable them to recover the possession of the premises of a purchaser of the same, from the administrator of said Pierre, but it must inure to his benefit and those claiming under him. It is the opinion of this court, that the decisions of the district court on the various points submitted, and the judgment on the verdict of the jury, be affirmed with costs in favor of the defendants. M. L. MARTIN, for plfts. in error. H. N. WELLS, for defts. in error. |