imagine such grounds for their Lordships' decision as may be consistent with former cases, or the general principles of equity (to which we have already ventured to refer it), rather than as operating to overturn not only the decision reversed, but the observations leading to it. The decision of the House merely establishes that the assumption of the name was not sufficient to earn the legacy, but does not decide that the defendant had not acquired the name of Barlow; and, moreover, it does not show that either act of parliament or licence would have made him "a Barlow" within the meaning of the will. The observations of the Master of the Rolls (Sir Joseph Jekyll) are much to the general point, and we shall show are fully borne out by subsequent decisions. His Honour said, "I am of opinion the condition is complied with by the defendant taking the name of Barlow. Surnames are not of very great antiquity, for in ancient times the appellation of persons were by their Christian names, as Thomas, of Dale, viz. the place where he lived. I am satisfied the usage of passing acts of parliament for taking upon one a surname, is but modern; and any one may take upon him what surname, and as many surnames as he pleases, without an act of parliament.”1

The leading case upon this subject may be considered to be that of Doe dem. Luscombe v. Yates 2, which embraced the consideration of a condition clogged with some of the detail of means we have before deprecated, but which was rendered useless and harmless by the additional direction that

1 The report of this case is somewhat inaccurate, as the condition is stated to be the marrying of a person who bore the surname " and arms" of Barlow. It is quite clear if it had been so there would have been little doubt that the condition had not been complied with. The extract from the will at the foot of the report, and the statements on the appeal (4 Bro. P. C.) amply disprove the addition of the arms. We may remark, as to the third volume of Peere William's reports, that some damage is done to it as an authority by the observation of the Vice-Chancellor of England in Gervis v. Gervis, 14 Sim. 655. "On 12th November, 1821 (his Honour remarked), Lord Eldon said, and I noted it down at the time, that the cases in the third volume of P. Wms. were not of equal authority with the cases in the two first volumes. He published those two volumes during his lifetime, but he did not publish the cases in the third volume, because he did not think them of equal authority."

2 1 Dow. & Ry. 187. S. C. 5 B. Ald. 544,

the change was to be accomplished by "some other effectual way for that purpose." The testator John Luscombe devised certain estates to John Luscombe Manning for life, he taking and using the testator's surname of Luscombe, as for and instead of his own name. The express proviso was, that the devisees under the will should take the name of Luscombe, and use the same as for and instead of their own surname; and should within three years then next after, get and procure their own names to be altered and changed to Luscombe by act or acts of parliament or some other effectual way for that purpose; and should for ever after have, use, and bear on all occasions the surname of Luscombe. John Luscombe Manning, the devisee, before he became of age or entered into possession of the estate, took upon himself, used and bore the surname of Luscombe, but did not within the three years obtain any act of parliament or royal licence for that purpose. The question for the Court was, whether by the simple assumption of the name he had complied with the condition. The opinion of the judges was, that he had effectually complied with it. The Lord Chief Justice Abbott: "It is said that the devisee did not comply with the terms of the proviso, because although he had taken and used the surname of Luscombe before he came to the estates, yet he did not within three years after he took possession take that name by virtue of any act of parliament or other authority for that purpose. A name assumed by the voluntary act of a young man on his entrance into life, adopted by all who knew him, and by which he is constantly called, becomes for all purposes that occur to my mind, as much and as effectually his name as if he had obtained an act of parliament conferring it on him. We would not be understood to say, that where a testator requires a name to be taken by act of parliament or other specified mode, any mode falling short of the specified mode may be substituted for it. A bearing de facto answers every useful purpose that could be obtained under an act of parliament."

The above case has also the confirmation of the Lord Chief Justice Tindal in the case of Davies v. Lowndes.1

VOL. IX.

1 Bing, N. C. 597. S. C. 2 Scott, 102.

S

The

devise was to William Lowndes (if no heir of the testator could be found), on condition that he changed his name to Selby. The real question at issue was, whether a particular person was not the heir entitled. The validity of the mode by which William Lowndes effected the change of name could hardly come in question, and it was but slightly touched on by the claimant. The facts seemed to be, that William Lowndes for two or three years after the testator's death continued the name of Lowndes, and was appointed receiver by that name.

He afterwards used the name of Selby as an addition to his former name, and eventually substituted Selby for Lowndes, but never obtained either act of parliament or royal licence. The popular notion that one of these modes could alone effect the change, seemed very strong in the mind of one of the gentlemen of the grand assize (it was a trial on a writ of right), and he pressed it on the attention of the Court. His lordship in his charge, (as we hope) set his mind at rest. He said, "It has been more than once asked by a learned gentleman of the grand assize, whether the name has been changed in the way which the law prescribes. There is nothing in the will purporting that the condition is to be executed in a very limited or precise time, neither does the law point out any mode by which such change is to be effected; therefore, though he took it a little later, and though in some particular acts he might use the other name, it would not at all interfere with the general act of changing his name, and there is no necessity for a royal sign manual to change a name. It is true that it is by no means an uncommon thing for parties, in order to give a greater apparent sanction and a more extensive notoriety to the fact, to obtain a royal licence for changing the name; but a man may if he pleases, and it is not for any fraudulent purpose, take a name and work his way in the world with his new name as well as he can."

We trust these authorities abundantly prove that any one who is dissatisfied with his present name, or desires another added to it, or is directed to take or add a name, may legally and effectually do so by simply commencing and continuing the use of such desired name, without resorting to the

And

Legislature or invoking the assistance of the Crown. further, that as we cannot imagine it to be the intention of testators that their gifts should be burdened with unnecessary expenses, but that the valid and effectual change of name is all they wish, it is a breach of duty in the framer of the clause, and, in any event, unnecessary verbiage, that an act of parliament or royal licence should be specified as the means; and that the necessity for resorting to any one of those means is created by the language of the condition, and not otherwise.1

In conclusion, we would not hesitate to recommend all those who, from any of the causes we have before alluded to, may feel dissatisfied with names they now possess, to change them for such as they may deem more inviting, or less offensive in sound or sense; and as to those who are required to adopt any surname by a condition annexed to a gift, we think there can be no hesitation in adopting such name by the simple mode we have before pointed out. As to others who are so unfortunate as to find the course of procedure chalked out for them, we fear there is no help but pursuing it, and purchasing either the pompous Act of Parliament or her Majesty's signature to a licence accordingly. We think that, although not necessary, yet it is advisable, to make the change as public as possible, and also to preserve a record of it, and therefore suggest that the change of name should be notified in the "London Gazette," and such other public papers as he may think proper.2

Our view is somewhat strengthened by a precedent in Sir Orlando Bridgman's Conveyancing (vol. ii. p. 8.) for enforcing the taking of a particular name. The clause was by way of penalty, and this was to be incurred "if the husband of the lady should use any surname immediately after his name of baptism, other than the name of P- or should not within a year after the marriage and entry into possession either procure an act of parliament that such husband and the Lady A. and the heirs and issues of their bodies should at all times have and bear the surname of P—, or otherwise give such security unto the trustees that such husband, &c. should in all writings by them to be made and subscribed by their names, write and cause to be written their surname by the name of P-~. This latter part shows the opinion of the learned conveyancer to be, that the obtaining an act of parliament was not necessary for the real object of the clause, but happened to be, or was made to appear, the express wish of the settlor.

* We submit some simple forms of such notification in the case of change of

Its Basis, its constituent Parts, their distinctive Characters, its Records.

In our Article on this subject in our last Number, we endeavoured to point out the boundaries of the subject of our inquiries as being properly and strictly International Law, not the ethics or morality of nations, but compulsory or coercive law, unfolding rights and obligations susceptible of physical enforcement; and we also endeavoured to trace the different sources of that law; meaning by that term the scientific sources of the rights and obligations of which International Law is composed as existing in nature, or arising in the natural or ordinary course of events taking place on this earth; not the mere record of those international rights and obligations. In investigating these sources, we found ourselves constrained and authorised to recognise and admit three of them - First, the co-existence and co-existent position and mode of communication among nations as established by physical material causes or laws in the construction

name from some general causes or in compliance with the direction in a will.— "I, the undersigned, formerly John Rawbones of in the county of

–, gentleman, hereby give notice that I have abandoned the surname of Rawbones, and have taken and assumed, and shall continue to use and bear, the surname of Mortimer, in lieu of my said former surname. Dated, &c.

"I, the undersigned, formerly Henry Smith of, &c., hereby give notice that in compliance with the direction in that behalf contained in the will of Thomas Harcourt of, &c., deceased [I have abandoned the surname of Smith and] have taken and assumed, and shall continue to use and bear, the surname of Harcourt in lieu of my said former name of Smith. Dated, &c.

If the name be an additional one, omit the words within brackets, and substitute

"I have taken and assumed, and shall continue to use and bear, the name of Harcourt in addition to my said surname of Smith. Dated, &c.