Master assigning an hour to hear you on different occasions, when, perhaps, an hour and a half, if followed up consecutively by the Judge, would decide the business? It is competent now to the Master, and they do so frequently, to grant consecutive warrants. "1582. Is not it the ordinary rule for the Master to fix how many cases he will hear in the course of the day, and when the hour comes and the other parties are waiting, is not he obliged to suspend that particular business? - Constantly.

"1583. Is not that a considerable interruption to business? It is.

"1951. Is there any thing else respecting the Master's Office which you wish to state? Mr. M'Leod: I can state a cause of delay. In some of the Masters' Offices they have this practice; they refuse warrants which extend over the holidays; for instance, supposing the office closes from Monday to Monday, in some offices they will not issue a warrant on the Saturday returnable on the Tuesday; the effect of that is, that the Master and his clerks when the office opens, have nothing to do; there are three descriptions of warrants which the Master issues, warrants to proceed de die in diem, returnable one day for the next; warrants under the general practice of the Court, in which a clear day intervenes; and warrants under the Act of Parliament, in which two clear days intervene, therefore where the Master will not issue his warrants to extend over the holidays, he gets one, two, or three days' holiday in addition; that does not prevail in all the offices, but in some of them it is a practice which I think wholly unjustifiable, and causes very great delay."

This system of hourly warrants, so utterly indefensible, is surely doomed. It is rather strange that, with the strong opinions existing against it, the new Taxing Masters should have adopted this very system for the regulation of their business. It cannot be wondered at that it does not give satisfaction even in their hands.

"1679. Chairman: What is the cause of the delay in the Taxing Masters' Office? — Mr. M'Leod: The delay arises from the taxing officers not granting warrants before eleven nor after three, and they go with extreme slowness through the business.

"1684. Some of them, namely, four of them, are compensated officers besides having 2000l. a-year? Yes, two are not.

"1690. Do I understand you that the hours of business are 1 Report, 1847.

from eleven to three? - Generally so; the warrants issued at three extends to four; warrants made returnable earlier than eleven or later than three, are exceptions, and the instances very

rare.

"1692. Chairman: How long does a warrant endure? - For an hour. The reason why the bills are so long in taxing is, that we cannot get appointments; sometimes an appointment will extend over three weeks or a fortnight.

"1698. Mr. Henley: With respect to the delay which you say takes place in the Master's Office in taxing the bill, is there any occasion of the delay, except the shortness of the time which is given? The delay arises from the difficulty of getting appointments, in consequence of the taxing officers being too few in number.

"1699. Are they too few in number, or do they give too small a number of hours? I should say the taxing officers ought to sit, at least, from ten till five or six."

So much for the officers of the Court. Now as to the solicitors themselves. That the fault is frequently with them is thus admitted by Mr. Gregory. The remarks of Mr. Farrer in extenuation (pp. 4, 5.), are well worthy of attention; but we have no doubt that cause for great blame does really exist.

"1646. There is great complaint made by the Masters at present, that they cannot induce the solicitors to go on with the work, and that a large portion of the delays which are complained of in the Masters' Offices arises from this, that they have no means of compelling solicitors to go on with their work? —Mr. Gregory: I have no doubt that that is the case.

"1650. The result of that is, that if parties do not choose to proceed for two or three years, the Master cannot compel them; and it may create intervals, may it not, between the different parts of the same business?—Yes.

"1651. That is a great evil, is it not? Yes; I do not see how that could be remedied, except by giving the Masters power to compel parties to proceed.

"1652. And then in the absence of parties? ceed exparte.1

As to the difficulty of proceeding exparte, see M

He might pro

Farrer's remark,

pp. 6, 7.

"1653. In many cases it would be difficult, and scarcely possible, to proceed exparte; in cases, for instance, where it was upon a reference to the Master to know whether it was for the benefit of an infant that certain proceedings should be adopted ?— Generally speaking, that is not the class of cases where the delay arises: I think those are prosecuted generally with great efficacy.

"1654. You suggest that the Master should have a compulsory power? - Yes; to fix a day. Which power he might exercise at his own discretion; he should have the power of adjourning the matter if he chose. I am afraid, practically speaking, that that is not attended to, though the Master does it. He asks, I believe, universally, when the parties will undertake to do so and so; ten days are named, and they go by, and perhaps ten days more.

"1655. Mr. Hume: Are there any means of protecting an individual whose suit ought to come on, against these delays; suppose them to be intentional on the part of the solicitor ? — I do not think in general that they are intentional; they arise from the difficulty of obtaining evidence or information required; any intentional delay cannot be for the interest of the solicitor.

"1656. It appears that you have no means, then, of compelling a consecutive proceeding in a suit, until it is settled? I think to a great extent it might be done. There is another thing, when you have to get evidence from parties, you cannot compel them to make affidavits; you have a great objection to bring them by subpœna, or to send out commissions to examine them, on account of the very heavy expense."

So far the solicitor. Now let us hear what Mr. Farrer says as to this:

"As to delay, no one of the existing Orders, nor of the plans yet proposed, applies a sufficient remedy. The Order enabling the Master 'to fix times for proceeding' approaches it. If the Masters are considered to be responsible for the diligent working of decrees, &c., the authority thereby vested in them must be enlarged; a general power must be given to them to control or superintend the proceedings; they must be authorised to direct warrants to be taken for the attendance of all parties, or any one party, for the purpose of inquiring into causes of delay, where proceedings are dilatory, and directing the time within which the reference shall be worked, so that the Master may either keep the parties active, or ascertain the causes of delay and record them. Under existing regulations the Masters make an annual return of

all causes and matters in their respective offices, showing the state of proceeding upon references to them; but very little if any benefit results from these returns. Although it may appear, that in certain causes no proceedings for a long time have been taken, there the matter ends; it is the duty of no one, it is not within the authority of any one, unless of the Judges of the Superior Courts, to inquire into the causes of the delay.

"Great objection will justly be made to such interference as is here suggested with the principle that the parties know best how to conduct their own causes;' but the interference is suggested upon no other ground than that it appears to be the only means by which the public can be satisfied that the alleged delay either does not exist, or, if it does exist, that the cause is not to be found in any dilatoriness on the part of the Master; to which may be added the probability, that if such power of control or superintendence be given to the Masters, the parties themselves will be influenced by it, and will be stimulated to diligence in prosecuting references in their Offices, and the exercise of any power that may be vested in the Master will probably be but little called for in practice." (Observations, pp. 27, 28.)

Having thus proved, from unquestionable authority, the great evils that exist, and that there is no sufficient power for their remedy, we proceed to consider the plans which have been recently proposed with this view.

We have for some time devoted considerable space to this subject. In May 1847 (6 L. R. 122.) we opened it and stated how the main questions then stood, giving a short history of the more recent attempts at Chancery Reform, and we showed that all plans of reform ranged themselves under one of the following heads: -I. Plans which go to the improvement of the Master's Office. II. Plans which transfer the duties of the Master, either wholly or partially, to some other judicial power; and we then briefly noticed what had been done under both of these heads. It is to be observed, that one of the suggestions under the former head, the abolishing the attendance in the public office, has been attended to.1 Since this period we have laid before our readers various reports, papers, and articles on this subject, and have en

110 & 11 Vict. c. 97.

deavoured (keeping up the same division) to give some materials for forming an opinion. The Report of the Equity Committee of the Law Amendment Society, on the Master's Office (6 L. R. 308.); the Proposed Report on the extended reference (6 L. R. 315.); the Report actually adopted on such reference (7 L. R. 55.); and the Report on the Management of Property intrusted to the Court of Chancery (8 L. R. 87.): these reports and papers all throw light on the important question, whether it be better to make the Chancery Judges act as Masters, or whether it be better in some cases to clothe the Masters with the authority of Judges. This question is now brought prominently forward by Mr. Farrer in his valuable pamphlet, more especially in connection with two of the reports to which we have alluded, that called the Proposed Report (6 L. R. 315.) and the Report actually adopted (7 L. R. 55.). There is no more important subject within the range of juridical controversy.

Let us again briefly state the nature of the two propositions. The one gives the Master in certain cases an original jurisdiction, allowing the parties to commence proceedings in the Master's Office under certain regulations. The other substitutes the Judge for the Master, leaving the staff and machinery of the Master untouched, but gives the Judge the same authority over and connection with them, as the Master now has. It would in no respect diminish any power or authority now enjoyed by the Master. "The Master," says Mr. Farrer, p. Mr. Farrer, p. 127 n. " has larger powers of inquisition than any other judicial officer. He can proceed upon affidavits, examination of witnesses by written interrogatories or viva voce; he can examine parties to the record upon written interrogatories, and compel them to produce books, papers, &c. relating to the matters before him." These powers it is proposed, of course, to continue to the Judge-Master. Both plans resemble each other to a great extent. They assume, so far as they go, that one judicial person, properly assisted, is to have the direction and disposal of the matter brought before him, subject to appeal. The only difference is, that that person is to be in the one case a Master, and in the other a Judge.