States, or which have not been granted by the people, the sovereignties of the States would be annihilated, and a consolidated government, a despotism, would be erected upon their ruins. The undue preponderance of either government would destroy those relations between them, which must be vigilantly guarded, in order to retain them within their proper spheres. It is not now to be debated, whether the Constitution of the United States could not have been made more perfect; it was the work of humanity, and, therefore, it contains imperfections: of this, its framers were not insensible; but amidst the passions and the prejudices and the interests, which so often menaced the abortion of their efforts, and which, with difficulty, were reconciled by mutual compromises and concessions, they rejoiced at having effected what they did. They believed that the Constitution was capable of accomplishing the objects for which the Convention had assembled; and if increasing wealth and population, and individual happiness, and internal security and protection from foreign aggression, be proofs of the correctness of their conclusions, they were not mistaken. It is true, that party spirit has not been banished from our counsels, but this is inseparable from free institutions: that we have not escaped the calamities of war, to be averted by no prudence or forbearance, but we passed through them with reputation; that the execution of the laws has been opposed, but the resistance was transient, and yielded not to the bayonet of the regular, but to the arms of the people themselves. We have recently witnessed the display of strong dissatisfaction at some of the measures of the government, which is charged with the injurious exercise of a power, by many believed not to be possessed by it. Nevertheless, summing up the good and the evil which have been our lot, and which is the inevitable portion of our species, the people of the United States have reason to hail the great moral and political experiment of their Constitution, as one of the proudest monuments of enlightened, practical wisdom, which the annals of history can furnish.

When infidelity to their trust is alleged against the administrators of the Government, opinions differ as to the organ by which the public disapprobation is to be conveyed. Some think that the people alone have a right to complain; others that the Legislatures of the States are also entitled to express their sentiments; but there is a third class which regards a decision of the majority of the Senators and Representatives of the United States to be final, and to exclude the interference both of the people and of the Legislatures of the States. There is, likewise, a want of accordance upon other topics relating to this

interesting subject-such as, whether an usurpation of power by the General Government, does not, ipso facto, amount to a dissolution of the Union; and if not, whether that state of things does not render it an imperious duty upon the people of the United States, formally to withdraw from the federal compact. It seems to us, that a little reflection upon the political history of the country, would be sufficient to convince those of their error, who deny the right of the State Legislatures to express their disapprobation of the measures of the government. The foundation of the American States was laid in their colonial charters. With the Revolution they ceased to be colonies, and became independent States represented in a general Congress. That the powers to be exercised by Congress might be ascertained and defined, articles of confederation were entered into "between the Sates of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay," &c. By these articles, "each State retained its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right not expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." Delegates were to be annually appointed, in such manner as the Legislature of each State should direct, "with a power reserved to each State, to recall its delegates or any of them, and to send others in their stead, for the remainder of the year." In deciding questions, each State had one vote; and in the last of the Articles of Confederation, it is declared, "that the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State." The Articles of Confederation being found by experience to be inefficient, Congress, at the suggestion of a majority of the States, resolved that it was expedient, that a Convention of delegates appointed by the several States, should be held at Philadelphia, to "revise the Articles of Confederation, and to report to Congress and the several Legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government, and the preservation of the Union." In In pursuance of this resolution, a Convention, composed of delegates appointed by the several States, did meet at Philadelphia, and reported the present Constitution. To give it validity, according to the original resolution, the assent of the Legislatures of the States was requisite: they never directly gave that assent, but submitted the Constitution to conventions of the people, by whom it was considered and finally ratified. From this brief sketch, it is evident, that to every form of government which has prevailed among us, since the declaration of Independence, the States, in their collective capacities-that is, the State Legis

latures representing the people of the States, have been parties. The old Congress formed by the pressure of circumstances, was the mere temporary organ of the States, and passed its laws more in the style of recommendations than of mandates. The Confederation was expressly a league between the States: in its acts, each State had an equal vote; and no alteration in it could be made without the assent of the Legislatures of all the States. By the present Constitution, the President of the United States cannot be appointed without the intervention of the State Legislatures: they elect the United States Senators; they may require Congress to call conventions to amend the Constitution; and amendments ratified by three-fourths of the State Legislatures, may become obligatory upon the Union. Being thus essential parties to the Constitution, the State Legislatures not only have the right, but it would be a duty incumbent upon them, whenever they disapproved of federal measures, to express their opinions accordingly. The doctrine is recent, that the State Legislatures must be silent, when they witness, what they regard to be, infractions of the national compact. Mr. Hamilton, in The Federalist, says, if the Federal Government should exercise powers not warranted by the Constitution, "the State Legislatures, whose rights will be invaded by any such act, will be ready to mark the innovation, and sound the alarm to the people." In page 251, of the same celebrated work, the language is, "the State Governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the Federal Government; whilst the latter is no wise essential to the operation or organization of the former." Mr. Rawle, in his Views of the Constitution of the United States, when examining the composition of the Federal Government, describes it to be "a society formed not only out of the people of other societies, but in certain parts formed by the societies themselves. The State is as much a member of the Union, and forms as much a part of the greater society as the people themselves." p. 26.

That the decision of a majority of Congress is to exclude the interference both of the States and of the people, is a position so glaringly inconsistent with every notion of a republican government, that we shall offer a very few remarks upon it. In the ordinary and regular administration of affairs, the assertion of the right of the majority to bind the people, is a mere truism; but a majority as well as a minority may be a faction; and where the Executive or the Legislature is accused of oppression or corruption, to contend that the will of a prevailing majority should alone be evidence of the legality of its proceedings, would render hopeless all possibility of relief: that majo

rity might pass laws perpetuating its own power, and subverting every principle of freedom aud of the Constitution. We shall not, formally, endeavour to confute a proposition deduced from the slavish doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance; but we cannot refrain from expressing our surprise that it should have found open supporters in the United States.

Equally destructive of the stability of our institutions, is the contrary opinion, that the dissolution of the Union ought to be the necessary consequence of every usurpation of power by the Federal Government. Between an abstract right and a practical duty, the difference is incalculable. If we strip from our contemplation, whatever relates to human actions, and interests and affections, and substitute for them a metaphysical abstraction, it might not be difficult to establish, that the breach of any of the stipulations of a national compact, by one party, absolves, the other from all the obligations which it imposes upon him; but if it operates beneficially; if it answer the purposes for which men, desirous of advancing their happiness, enter into society, and submit themselves to laws and constitutions, shall its destruction be advised, because all its conditions have not been observed? The general sentiment entertained of the Constitution of the United States is, that it is eminently fitted to accomplish the great objects for which it was framed. Are we not then interested in its preservation? Is it so simple an undertaking to digest a wise Constitution? Obvious as the replies to these inquiries would appear, nevertheless, it has repeatedly been asserted, that the exercise by Congress of a power, with which, in the judgment of the people of a State, it is not clothed by the Constitution, not only justifies a dissolution of the Union, but calls upon the people to dissolve it. Let us see upon what foundation this principle stands. Sovereignty, or the supreme power of making all laws, is differently vested in different nations. In Spain and Russia, it is in the monarchin Great Britain, in the parliament-in the United States, in the people. The people of the United States might, therefore, establish such a government for themselves, as they thought proper. Exercising this power, they have established two governments-one federal, for the United States-the other municipal, for each State. To the former, they have, principally, confided the management of their external interests-to the latter, that of their internal. Neither of these governments are taken from, or carved out of the other-neither of them are superior or subordinate. Each is intended to promote different ends, for which they are entrusted with appropriate powers; and both are equally derived from the same source of authority—the

expressed will of the people. Although the people may abolish the existing governments, and substitute others for them, yet so long as they remain, to the extent of the powers they contain, they are the law of the land. From the unavoidable ambiguity of language, and from the different meaning annexed by different minds to the same language, it was to be anticipated, that the Constitution of the United States, whatever philological skill might be exercised in the composition of it, could not escape contradictory interpretations. To remedy the evils which this might produce, by the second section of the first article of the Federal Constitution, "the judicial power" is extended "to all cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States," &c. If then, an act of Congress, or a stipulation in a treaty, be alleged to be unconstitutional, it is to be submitted to the Judiciary; if it be either prohibited by the Constitution, or be not warranted by any of its enumerated powers, it must be pronounced illegitimate and void: if, on the contrary, it be not prohibited, and be warranted by the Constitution, it is legitimate and binding.

It has, we know, been strenuously contended, that a sovereign State, acknowledging no superior, cannot be controlled by the Federal Judiciary: that being sovereign, it must be the sole judge whether any of its sovereign and inherent rights have been invaded; and that to permit the Federal Court to decide upon any of its sovereign and inherent rights, would be an abandonment of its sovereignty. Should this reasoning prevail, the provision of the Constitution which we have cited, would be nugatory. Where there were no doubts, no questions would arise. When questions did arise, the tribunal appointed by the people of all the States, to solve them, could not act; but for it, would be substituted the separate judgment of any of the twenty-four States, according as the sovereignty of one or more of them might be supposed to be encroached upon. If this argument be tenable, every difference of opinion between the General Government and a State, relating to the sovereign right of a State, would cause a dissolution of the Union; for a government which cannot enforce its laws, is no longer a government.

What is meant by the phraseology "sovereign and inherent state rights," in contradistinction from any others belonging to the people of the States, we do not comprehend. All their rights are equally sovereign and inherent, and would continue in them, unless they had themselves granted jurisdiction over them to some government. We can conceive no rights of the people of a State, more sovereign and inherent, than those of life, liberty and property; and yet, in many cases, the people