qualities. Hence, he decided "to trust to the resources of the expedition for the rest," while for his own personal baggage he used no less than "thirty carts." Most of his provisions had to be brought from England, a distance of 3,600 miles; some from Canada; and for the rest he relied upon the meagre resources of the hostile country he was to traverse. Consequently his army was often on reduced rations, sometimes nearly starving, and finally, to secure its existence, he undertook his disastrous raid upon Bennington.

After the pursuit of St. Clair, Burgoyne should have returned with his army to Ticonderoga, and taken the water route by Lake George, instead of forcing his way through an obstructed wilderness to Fort Edward, which he did not reach till July 30th, nor leave till August 14th. Had Schuyler directed Burgoyne's operations he could not have planned measures more conducive to his own advantage. On the Lake George route were only two small armed schooners to oppose any resistance, and from the head of the lake was a direct road to Albany, which had been followed by Abercrombie and Amherst. As it was, Burgoyne was compelled to send his supplies and artillery by the lake, and then carry them over the portage to Fort Edward, which consumed more time than would have been necessary to move in light marching order direct to Albany. General De Peyster, a careful student of this campaign, says: "Burgoyne could have been reassembled at Old Ty' by the 10th July; could have been transported to Fort George by the 12th; and, having left his heavy guns and all but his light artillery and indispensable materials there or at Ty, in depot, with a sufficient guard, could have reached Fort Edward on the evening of the 13th July. From this point to Albany is about fifty miles. With six or ten days' rations and an extra supply of ammunition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and, allowing one day's delay for a fight, could have occupied Albany on the 16th July." But the British commander had proclaimed, "This army must not retreat." Though he subsequently tried to palliate his mistake, all his correspondence shows that pride in carrying out his declaration, not military principles, made him persevere in the false movement which lost him the campaign, and secured in the end American independence.

Burgoyne, after his brilliant success at the opening of the campaign, suddenly relapsed into the sluggishness of his German allies. Instead of rapidly pursuing his demoralized foe, he tarried at Skenesborough till his pathway was thoroughly obstructed and the fugitives had recovered from their panic. After he had lost his prestige and the Americans had gained confidence by success at Stanwix and Bennington, he attempted with diminished forces to cope with the growing strength of his opponent. Thus, by delay, he lost in September what he might have achieved in July. From his arrival at Skenesborough till he had reached his southernmost point at Freeman's Farm, he moved only fifty miles in seventy-four days.

Slow in all his movements, Burgoyne's tardiness was increased by his large and superfluous train of artillery which accompanied all his toilsome marches. Even when he required the greatest celerity, he chose for his raid upon Bennington, not the nimble-footed light infantry under the dashing Fraser, but cumbrous dismounted German dragoons moving only a mile and a third an hour.

Burgoyne was not only slow, but he was irresolute. After his disastrous defeat at Bemis's Heights he lost five precious days in fatal indecision while retreat was possible. On October 12th his last chance had passed, he then being completely invested by the Americans, and nothing was left to him but surrender. According to Madame Riedesel, he had given in this crisis of his fate more attention to his mistress than to his army. Aspasia had triumphed over Mars.

While Burgoyne committed many blunders, his opponents had their shortcomings also. The fortifications of Ticonderoga, after falling into the hands of the Americans, were too much extended for their defence by a moderate garrison; but the most fatal error was the failure to occupy Mount Defiance, which completely commanded all the American works, and, when seized by the British, left St. Clair no alternative but hasty retreat and the abandonment of much artillery and considerable supplies. The fugitives then counted largely on the delay of their pursuers, who followed them with celerity, severely punishing them at Skenesborough and Hubbardton.

Congress committed the most criminal error, outweighing all others, in substituting, at the most critical moment of the campaign, a military charlatan for an accomplished soldier, in supplanting Schuyler, who was the organizer of the victories, by Gates, who "had no fitness for command and wanted personal courage." To say nothing of the difference in merit of the two commanders, the time for making the change was most inopportune.

Putnam, a brave officer but no general, managed things so badly in the Highlands that Forts Montgomery and Clinton were lost, and the Hudson. was opened to the enemy whenever he chose to advance.1

1 Captain John Montressor, a British "Chief Engineer of America" in the Revolution, who was with Putnam under Colonel Bradstreet in 1764, goes so far as to intimate (very likely without warrant) a still stronger reason for the general's inefficiency at Long Island and in the

Hudson Highlands. In his journal (page 136), published by the New York Historical Society, 1882, speaking of the venality of the American "Rebel Generals," he says: "Even Israel Putnam, of Connecticut, might have been bought, to my certain knowledge, for one dollar per day."

THE

CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

HE titles alone of the numerous works which have been consulted in the preparation of the foregoing narratives would fill many of these pages. Therefore, to avoid repetition, as most of them are common to all the chapters of this History of the American Revolution, reference will be made only to those authorities which have a bearing upon disputed points, or to newly discovered facts respecting the "Struggle for the Hudson."

Of the many authors who have written of the New York campaign of 1776, nearly all have followed the narrations given in Sparks's Washington and in the official despatches of the various officers engaged. For topographical details we have relied upon Des Barres' Atlantic Neptune (1780–81), with its plans of battles, sieges, etc., and maps of the seat of war, and upon the recent Coast Survey charts. Local historians have supplied many minor particulars, which need not be enumerated, except, perhaps, the one relating to the treason of William Demont, already referred to in the text. Much new light has been thrown upon the Burgoyne campaign by works published within the last few years.1

One of the most earnestly disputed points of Burgoyne's campaign is whether Arnold was personally engaged with the enemy at the battle of Freeman's Farm, on Sept. 19, 1777. Some authorities, notably Bancroft, while admitting that Arnold's troops were in the thickest of the fray, deny that the general himself was on the battlefield; while Stedman, Irving, Stone, and many others, equally competent to weigh the facts, maintain that Arnold was the conquering hero of the fight, and that, but for him, Burgoyne would have marched straight on to Albany.

Just after Gates had superseded Schuyler in the command of the Northern army, Arnold had returned from the Mohawk valley flushed with success and impatient to win new laurels. He was incessantly engaged in skirmishing with the enemy and adding to his reputation as a brilliant, dashing officer. Gates was envious of Arnold's growing fame, and resentful of his partiality for Schuyler. Hence arose a coolness towards Arnold, which rapidly ripened into bitter hostility. That the action of Freeman's Farm, a five hours' battle, full of skilful movements, was purely a series of chance operations without a guiding spirit, is utterly preposterous. As Gates was not engaged, whose was the directing mind but Arnold's, the second in command?

It seems impossible that one devoid of fear, brave even to rashness, who even courted danger at the risk of death, and one too who was filled with ambition and love of military glory, could possibly have allowed his command to go into action without leading its movements and sharing its perils. His subsequent heroism amid the carnage of battle at Bemis's Heights would seem a sufficient refutation of the charge that he who was always in the thickest of the fight was only a looker-on while the conflict of September 19th was raging around Freeman's Farm.

1 Life and Times of General Philip Schuyler, by Benson J. Lossing, N. Y., 1872; Battles of the American Revolution, by General Henry B. Carrington, N. Y., 1876; Life and Correspondence of Lieutenant-General John Burgoyne, by Edward B. de Fonblanque, London, 1876; Burgoyne and the Northern Campaign, by Ellen Hardin Walworth, 1877; The Campaign of Lieutenant-General John Burgoyne and the Expedition of Lieut.-Col. Barry St. Leger, by William L. Stone, 1877; Addresses and Papers upon Major-General Philip Schuyler and the Burgoyne Campaign, by General J. Watts de Peyster, published

variously, 1877-83; Centennial Celebration of the State of New York, 1879; Life of Major-General Benedict Arnold-his Patriotism and Treason, by Isaac N. Arnold, 1880; Sir John Johnson's Orderly Book, annotated by William L. Stone, with an introduction on his Life by General J. Watts de Peyster, and Sketch of the Tories or Loyalists by Colonel T. Bailey Myers, 1882; Hadden's Journal and Orderly Book, annotated by General Horatio Rogers, Providence, 1881; The Hessians in the Revolution, by Edward J. Lowell, 1884.

Gates, in his official report of the battle of Freeman's Farm, makes no mention of Arnold being engaged; and his adjutant-general, Wilkinson, in his Memoirs, written long after Arnold's good name had been blasted by his treason, says: "Not a single general officer was on the field of battle on the 19th of September, until evening, when General Learned was ordered out."

Under ordinary circumstances, the testimony of the commander-in-chief and his adjutantgeneral would be considered conclusive; but it must be borne in mind that both of these officers were inimical to Arnold, that neither was personally engaged in the battle, and that the wooded character of the ground precluded either from following any one's movements through the conflict.

On the other side, we have the contemporary testimony of officers present on the battlefield, newspaper accounts of the time, and Arnold's own division order of the day after the battle, in which he speaks of the zeal and spirit of the company officers engaged, in a manner which none but a close observer could notice. Besides, we have the direct evidence of two of Arnold's staff officers - Colonels Livingston and Varick — that their chief was the hero of the battle of Freeman's Farm; the former warmly lauding "his conduct during the late action," and declaring that "to him alone is due the honor of our late victory." Even the enemy's chief, Burgoyne, said in the British House of Commons: "Mr. Gates had determined to receive the attack in his lines. Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, foreseeing the danger of being turned, advanced without consultation with his general, and gave instead of receiving battle."

Another much-disputed point is whether to Schuyler or Gates is chiefly due the triumph of our arms in the Burgoyne campaign. Bancroft, in his History of the United States (vol. ix. ch. 21, orig. ed.), states that Schuyler lacked military talents, failed to harry the advance of Burgoyne, wanted personal courage, and had no influence with the people. All these charges have been triumphantly refuted by his grandson and by his biographer.1

General Schuyler's zeal, energy, ability, and sterling virtues have been so fully set forth in the preceding narrative of the Burgoyne campaign that any amplification here is needless; but it may be proper to add the testimony of some of our most distinguished countrymen as to the merits of this true gentleman, noble soldier, and patriotic Fabian hero. Chief Justice Marshall says: "In this gloomy state of things no officer could have exerted more diligence and skill than Schuyler." Chancellor Kent writes: "In acuteness of intellect, profound thought, indefatigable activity, exhaustless energy, pure patriotism, and persevering and intrepid public efforts, Schuyler had no superior." Daniel Webster said: "I consider Schuyler as second only to Washington in the services he rendered to the country in the war of the Revolution. His zeal and devotion to the cause under difficulties which would have paralyzed the efforts of most men, and his fortitude and courage when assailed by malicious attacks upon his public and private character, every one of which was proved to be false, have impressed me with a strong desire to express publicly my sense of his great qualities."

Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Jefferson, and most of the great men of the Revolution had unbounded confidence in Schuyler; and modern historians, such as Irving, Sparks, Lossing, and others, bear like testimony to his virtues and services. Even Congress, which had so unjustly removed Schuyler from his command, when convinced of its error, would not consent to his resignation from the army till he persistently demanded it.

Though Schuyler's military career did not sparkle with "feats of broil and battle," he exhibited those great qualities which are as conducive to the success of war as "the magnificently stern array" of arms in the heady fight. He was ready in expedients to foil the enemy, skilful and persevering in executing them, and resolute and untiring till his end was obtained. Never discouraged by disaster, and stimulated to higher effort as fortune

1 Correspondence and Remarks upon Bancroft's History of the Northern Campaign of 1777, and the Character of Major-General Philip Schuyler,

by George L. Schuyler; The Life and Times of Major-General Philip Schuyler, by Benson J Lossing, LL. D.

frowned, he continued sanguine of success in the darkest hour of adversity. Every assault upon his reputation fell harmless before his invulnerable patriotism; no injustice could swerve him from the path of honor; and to him, as to all true men, the meaning of life was concentrated in the single word DUTY.

Ger. I. Cullum

Bot. Maj. Ben't, 1. S. Arney.

NOTE BY GENERAL CULLUM.

DISPOSAL OF THE CONVENTION TROOPS.1 In accordance with Article IV. of the convention, the captured army was marched, under guard of General Glover, to the neighborhood

of Boston, where it arrived about Nov. 6th. The British troops were barracked on Prospect Hill and the German troops on Winter Hill, the officers being quartered in Cambridge and the

1 The ARTICLES of Oct. 16, 1777, were as follows, viz. :— "I. The troops, under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, to march out of their camp with the honors of war and the artillery of the intrenchments, to the verge of the river where the old fort stood, where the arms and artillery are to be left; the arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers.

"II. A free passage to be granted to the army, under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, to Great Britain, on condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest; and the port of Boston is assigned for the entry of transports to receive the troops whenever General Howe shall so order.

"III. Should any cartel take place, by which the army under General Burgoyne, or any part of it, may be exchanged, the foregoing article to be void as far as such exchange shall be made.

"IV. The army under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to march to Massachusetts Bay, by the easiest, most expeditious, and convenient route; and to be quartered in, near, or as convenient as possible to Boston, that the march of the troops may not be delayed when transports arrive to receive them.

"V. The troops to be supplied on their march, and during their being in quarters, with provisions by General Gates's orders, at the same rate of rations as the troops of his own army; and if possible, the officers' horses and cattle are to be supplied with forage at the usual rates.

"VI. All officers to retain their carriages, bat-horses, and other cattle, and no baggage to be molested or searched; Lieutenant-General Burgoyne giving his honor that there are no public stores secreted therein. Major-General Gates will of course take the necessary measures for the due performance of this article. Should any carriages be wanted during the march, for the transportation of officers' baggage, they are, if possible, to be supplied by the country at the usual rates.

"VII. Upon the march, and during the time the army shall remain in quarters in Massachusetts Bay, the officers are not, as far as circumstances will admit, to be separated from their men. The officers are to be quartered according to rank, and are not to be hindered from assembling their men for roll-call and other necessary purposes of regularity.

"VIII. All corps whatever of General Burgoyne's army, whether composed of sailors, bateau-men, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and followers of the army, of whatever country, shall be included in the fallest sense and utmost extent of the above articles, and comprehended in every respect as British subjects.

"IX. All Canadians, and persons belonging to the Canadian establishment, consisting of sailors, bateaumen, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and many other followers of the army, who come under no particular description, are to be permitted to return there; they are to be conducted immediately by the shortest route to the first British port on Lake George, are to be supplied with provisions in the same manner as the other troops, and are to be bound by the same condition of not serving during the present contest in North America.

"X. Passports to be immediately granted for three officers, not exceeding the rank of captains, who shall be appointed by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, to carry despatches to Sir William Howe. Sir Guy Carleton, and to Great Britain by way of New York; and Major-General Gates engages the public faith that these