It is altogether inland, until it reaches the St. Croix, where the principles that have been applied to other portions of the frontier similarly situated will again become applicable. Running on a parallel of latitude to the Connecticut river, and thence along a chain of highlands, not yet clearly defined, to the Province of New Brunswick, the board are not aware that there are any points immediately on the frontier suffi ciently commanding, of themselves, to call for the establishment and maintenance of fortifications, or works of defence. Should it ever become necessary to sustain, by force, our title to the territory now in dispute, it must be done, not by isolated forts along the frontier, commanding, probably, nothing beyond the range of their own guns, but by an active army, competent not only to occupy the country and hold it, but also to assume the offensive, if necessary, and carry the war beyond our borders. But while it is not deemed expedient to construct a chain of forts along this portion of the frontier, the board consider it a proper measure of precaution, in the present state of our relations with the British Provinces, that positions should be selected, and preparatory arrangements made, for the estab lishment of depots of supplies at the head of navigation on the Kennebunk and Penobscot. In the event of movements in that quarter, these would be proper points for the concentration of troops, and would serve as a base of operations, whether these should be offensive or defensive in their character. Estimated expense of storehouses and other accommoda 13. Fort at Calais, on the St. Croix river.-A work here, while it will serve to cover that part of the State of Maine from the attacks to which it would otherwise be exposed, may, from its advanced position, be made to act an important though indirect part in the defence of the more northern. portion of the frontier. Calais appears to be a very eligible. point for the concentration of troops, with reference to existing circumstances. A strong force stationed here, threatening the enemy's posts on the lower St. John's, and held ready to strike in that direction, in case of movements from New Brunswick towards the disputed territory, could not fail to have a decisive influence on such movements; since it is obvious that they could not be made with safety, while exposed to attack in flank and rear, and to have their line of communication intercepted, and their depots seized, by a prompt movement on our part from the St. Croix. Estimated expense of fort and barracks 14. In reference to the northern frontier, generally, it is the decided opinion of the board, that, besides the defences which have been suggested along the border, chiefly for purposes of local protection, there should be a great central station at some position in the interior, at which troops might be assembled for instruction, and where they would still be $150,000 100,000 within supporting distance of the more exposed parts of the frontier. Turning our views inland in search of some single position at which preparations might be made for extended operations on this frontier, and from which aid and succor could always be speedily derived, some position which, while it shall be equally near to many important points of the enemy's possessions, shall afford, at no time, any indication of the direction in which our efforts are to be made; which will, if it be possible, unite the opposite qualities of being at the same time remote and proximate, far as to distance, but near as to time; which, while it brings a portion of the military resources of the country to the support of the inland frontier, and places them in the best attitude for operations. in that quarter, whether defensive or offensive, at the same time takes them not away from the seacoast. Looking for these various properties, we find them all united, in a remarkable degree, in the position of Albany. From this place, by steamboat, canal-boat, or railroad car, troops and munitions could be transported, in a short time, to Buffalo, or onward to Detroit, to Oswego, to Sackett's Harbor, to Plattsburg, to Boston, and along the coast of New England; to New York by steamboat now, and soon by railroad also; and thence onward to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and the heart of the southern country, if necessary. In a word, Albany is a great central position, from which radiate the principal lines of communication to the north, to the south, to the east, and to the west; and combines so many advantages for a military depot, that the expediency of occupying it, and thus availing ourselves of those advantages, would seem to be manifest. Estimated expense of the purchase of land, and the construction of barracks and other buildings Total for northern frontier $300,000 $2,160,000 The board beg leave to observe, in conclusion, that, in the preparation of the estimates submitted, they have not attempted to aim at precision. Hence the amounts stated for the various objects are to be regarded only as approximations. They could not be any thing more, on the data used, which, for want of minute surveys and reconnoissances, were necessarily vague. It is believed, however, that the results presented will be found sufficiently accurate for the general purposes contemplated by the resolution under which this report has been prepared. For the Board: JOS. G. TOTTEN, Col. Engineers. and one hundred rounds of ammunition for each piece, Estimated cost of ordnance of all kinds, required for the armament of the northern frontier, embracing cannon mounted, 132 40 68 9 48 72 40 24 36 16 16 39 16 555 132 40 38 WASHINGTON, April 23, 1840. 13,200 10,800 5,700 7,200 5,400 1,600 8,000 3,600 197,600 106,400 145,030 51,372 39,520 342,322 8,000 For the Board: JOSEPH G. TOTTEN, REPORT ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER, FROM THE SABINE BAY TO LAKE SUPERIOR. The principles which should govern in fortifying the seaboard are not considered applicable to our inland frontiers, which will very rarely be found to call for regular fortifications. Hence, in relation to that portion of the frontier now under consideration, the duty of the board will be performed by indicating the military positions or stations which should, in their opinion, be occupied by troops, in order to accomplish the objects in view, and in presenting estimates of the probable cost of constructing the necessary barracks, quarters, and storehouses, combined with such works of defence as circumstances may appear to require, to insure their protection against the attacks to which they may be exposed. The want of personal knowledge, on the part of the board, of our extensive western frontier, and the very limited surveys which have been made in that quarter, have somewhat embarrassed them in the selection of positions; but they desire to be understood as merely designating places in a geographical sense, leaving the particular sites on which the works should be erected to be determined hereafter, by minute examinations of the country at and around those positions; which become the more important, inasmuch as the original locations of some of the places that will be recommended to be retained have been considered faulty. The southern section of this frontier, extending from the Sabine bay to the Red river, borders all the way on Texas, and has, it is believed, little or nothing to apprehend from Indian aggressions. The Cumanches, the only tribe of any power in that quarter, are represented as gradually receding to the westward, and the progress of the Texian settlements will tend to push them farther from our border. But our relations with the Texian republic, however amicable they may be at present, would seem to require that some military force should be stationed on or near the boundary-line; and the board therefore recommend the establishment of two small posts on the Sabine river, suppressing Fort Jesup, which is considered too far within the frontier, or retaining it merely as a healthy cantonment. As these would be posts of observation, having reference to national police more than to military defence, they ought to be established on the river where the principal roads cross it, by which we should be enabled to supervise the chief intercourse with our neighbors by land, and, at the same time, control the navigation of the Sabine. The points where the Opelousas and Natchitoches roads, leading to Texas, strike the river, are therefore recommended as the positions which should be occupied, and at which barracks for two or three companies, defended by light works, should be constructed. The middle section, which extends from the Red river to the Missouri, is by far the most important portion of the whole of our western frontier. It is along this line that the numerous tribes of Indians who have emigrated from the east have been located; thus adding to the indigenous force already in that region, an immense mass of emigrants, some of whom have been sent thither by coercion, with smothered feelings of hostility rankling in their bosoms, which, probably, waits but for an occasion to burst forth |