an epoch is at hand, in which the art of war, in whatever regards the attack and defence of seaports, has undergone an unparalleled revolution.

Hitherto, the transition from peace to war, between neighboring nations, though sometimes sudden and unexpected, was usually preceded by some significant note of preparation not easily mistaken; and after the actual commencement of hostilities, there were frequent opportunities and ample time for the belligerants, and more particularly for the nation acting upon the unerring principle of self-defence, to complete the work of preparation for war before the work of destruction upon her principal seaport towns had been begun by the invading foe. Hitherto, the enemy's fleets were to be seen for weeks, often indeed for months in succession, "standing off and on," waiting for suitable winds and weather to enable them to enter and attack the destined port, and then, in case of accident, to carry them safely out again winds such as could never be calculated on with any thing like certainty. Hence the great and unavoidable delay in the attack by fleets propelled by wind and sails has often enabled the people of the threatened seaports to throw up works of defence; and after slowly marching their interior volunteers and other forces, at the rate of 20 miles a day, they would in time be so well prepared for action, that the menacing invaders have but seldom ventured to attack places of much importance, but have usually condescended to vent their prowess in a petty border war against villages and private habitations, as upon the Chesapeake bay and the Georgia seacoast in the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814.

If the obvious effect of steam-power in the rapid movement of every thing to which it has been applied around us, has not been sufficient to convince us of the expediency and transcendent advantages, in war and in peace, of the proposed immediate work of preparation by steam-power, to guard against the incalculable disasters that must otherwise attend the sudden outbreak of war with any of the great nations of Europe able to send against us even a small fleet propelled by steam-power, it would seem obvious that the late naval and military operations in the harbor of Vera Cruz were sufficient to prove clearly, that to bring a hostile fleet inside the breakers of a seaport of the country invaded, and within the desired range of the best of cannon and mortars for red-hot shot and shells of one of the strongest castles in America, was the work of but two hours; and that the utter destruction of that castle by three small ships of war required but four hours more.

To provide for the defence of our seaports, and thus effectually to obviate the possibility of a sudden calamity like that which has befallen the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, and to enable us to repel by the agency of steam-power every invasion suddenly forced upon us by fleets propelled by steam-power, I now submit for the consideration of the National Legislature the project and explanatory views which follow:

ART. I. Floating batteries-for the defence of the seaports and harbors of the United States.

1. Your memorialist proposes the immediate construction of from two to four large floating batteries, for the defence of each navigable pass into the Mississippi river; and from two to five others, for the defence of every other navigable inlet leading into any of the principal seaports of the United States. Each floating battery to be from 200 to 300 feet long, and from 90 to 150 feet wide-the bottom to be as nearly flat as the best tested principles of naval architecture will allow, consistently with the great weight of timber and metal to be provided for, with the requisite facility of the movement that will

be required over shoal water. Each floating battery to be secured in the bottom and sides with copper sheeting, and copper or iron bolts; and on the upper parts, exposed to the enemy's shot and shells, with the thickest sheet iron, and iron bolts; and otherwise made capable of sustaining a heavier broadside than the largest of our ships of war is capable of sustaining; to carry from one hundred and twenty to two hundred heavy cannon-say long 24 and 32-pounders, with some 80 pounders for carrying hollow shot, together with some mortars for throwing shells; with a furnace for heating red-hot shot for illuminating the enemy's fleets and transports. Each floating battery to have state-rooms for the comfortable accommodation of from 600 to 1,000 men, with store rooms for all the munitions of war requisite for that force for six to eight months service. Each floating battery to be attended and propelled by such number of tow-boats as the exigencies of the service shall from time to time demand-to be permanently stationed in each harbor in time of peace, and in war as many tow-boats to be chartered as the commanding officer may deem necessary to render the floating batteries in the highest degree efficient. As in war tow boats will seldom be needed for the merchant service, an ample supply of them, particularly in our large seaports, may be chartered on moderate terms: for example, in the harbor of New Orleans it is believed that 12 tow-boats, with several steamboats having the best of engines, to be converted into tow-boats, would be thrown out of employment during a state of war. These could be usefully employed in the United States service, in aid of the public tow-boats and floating batteries. But should this reliance be deemed unsafe, we can readily adopt the obvious alternative, of having each floating battery supplied with two tow-boats of great power, as in war they would be needed near the batteries, ready to wield them in the event of an attack, and at other times to act as tenders, in supplying them with men and munitions of war. In a state of peace, the floating batteries, it is believed, would require but one tow-boat each, excepting when employed in deepening the ship channels-a work which may be accomplished with the most perfect ease, and to any desirable extent, wherever the bottom of the channel consists of mud and sand, as in all the outlets of the Mississippi. This important work will be done by attaching to the bottom of each floating battery a framework of ploughs and scrapers of iron, made to let down and raise up at pleasure, according to the hardness or softness of the clay and sand, or mud, of which the bar or bottom of the channel may be composed. If very hard or tough, the ploughs and scrapers might not break up and take off more than two to four inches in depth at one movement; but where the bar is composed entirely of soft mud, as that at Balize and the Northeast and Southwest passes have often been, from four to six inches in depth, it is believed, may be carried off at once wherever the bar is very narrow, and in the immediate vicinity of very deep water, which would be the reservoir, or place of deposite to which the mud and sand would be removed. But in a state of peace, when the batteries should not be employed in deepening the ship channels, their extra tow-boats might be advantageously employed in the merchant service.

2. Floating batteries, such as are here proposed, constitute, as your memorialist verily believes, the only sure means of defence of the passes into our seaports, against ships of war propelled by steam power-means of defence, without which it is in the power of any nation or community of men, or pirates, capable of fitting out ten or even five such steamships of war as those employed in the destruction of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, to destroy the

city of New York or New Orleans, by fire, with the newly invented 80 lb. cannon shot and shells, in a single day, at any season of the year; approaching them in the night, and taking them by surprise as with such a fleet, well manned and supplied, either city could be fired in 500 places in one hour; and in a few hours more, thousands of the most splendid edifices, by which these magnificent cities are embellished, would be reduced to ruin and desolation.

3. This opinion has not been formed without a full knowledge of the fact that both New York and New Orleans number among their citizens many men and volunteer corps of military science, patriotism, and unsurpassed chivalry. But these fine volunteer corps, attacked by means and by weapons hitherto unknown to them, or unprovided for, and thus taken by surprise, may share the fate of the heroic Danes at Copenhagen, when attacked by Nelson; with this striking difference in their favor, and against us: the Danes were not taken by surprise. A protracted negotiation with England preceded the attack; and after the British fleet had made its appearance on the coast of Denmark, and in sight of their harbor, they had some three or four days for preparation; they had a fleet nearly equal to that brought into action against them by Nelson, together with an army of some thousands of men, seamen, soldiers and volunteers, with several fortifications on land, aided by some floating batteries-presenting altogether an armament of upwards of 1,000 cannon, with an immense supply of small arms and every requisite munition of war. In this state of preparation, the harbor of Copenhagen was entered in open day by twelve ships of the line--three of which were rendered nearly useless by having got aground: with nine ships of the line, therefore, Nelson sustained a close action for four hours; during which time his loss was less than one thousand, while the loss of the Danes was near six thousand men, together with their fleet-to say nothing of the losses sustained by the inhabitants of the city. This was the result of an attack with nine ships of the line, propelled by wind and sails, upon the seaport of Copenhagen, when strongly fortified and defended by large naval and land forces. What then must be the fate of such a city as New York, or New Orleans, without any effective means of defence, attacked by ten, or even five ships of war, armed with the newly-invented 80-pounders, and propelled by steam-power? We know that a fleet consisting of this description of ships of war may cross the Atlantic from a European port to New York in the short space of fourteen days' time; and that it may enter our harbors in the night, and be seen at our wharves, with matches lighted ready for action, at daylight in the morning-ready to take or destroy money or property amounting to ten times as much as all the floating batteries and railroads embraced in the proposed system of national defence would cost. In the outrageous attack on Copenhagen, England was fighting for the dominion of Denmark and Sweden, with Russia, and France, were then nobly opposing that lawless pretension, as we, the United States, have long opposed it. Nelson, on embarking in the expedition, is reported to have said to his commander, Admiral Parker: "I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hailstorm of bullets, which gives our dear country the dominion of the sea. We have it, and all the devils in the north cannot take it from us, if our wooden walls have fair play." This is the language of a truehearted British seaman and soldier. Such was the noble bearing of our own Decatur, when he exclaimed: "Our country! in her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right; but in war may she always triumphright or wrong!"

In the memorable attack on Copenhagen, it is worthy of remark here, that the experienced Admiral Nelson, who had won more great naval victories than any other commander had, previous to the action stated to the commander-in-chief the following opinion: "If the wind is fair, and you determine to attack the ships and Crown islands, you must expect the natural issue of such a battle-ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost; for the wind which carries you in, will most probably not bring out a crippled ship." Nelson, however, had the good fortune, after taking and destroying a fleet nearly equal to his own, and killing six times as many men as he lost in action, to sail out of the harbor which he had filled with wrecks, without the loss of a single British vessel, though he had several greatly damaged.

4. With floating batteries, such as are here proposed, it is more than probable that the brave Danes would have destroyed the whole of Nelson's fleet, without sustaining the loss of a vessel, a battery, or one hundred men. The floating batteries of the Danes, like those of the French and Spaniards at the siege of Gibraltar in the year 1783, were inefficient, simply because they were unwieldy. No effective means for wielding floating batteries, when large enough to be formidable, had ever been discovered, previous to the discovery by Robert Fulton of that developement of steampower applicable to ships and all other floating structures. With regard to the ten great floating batteries, especially constructed for the memorable siege against Gibraltar, it is obvious to every man of military mind that, however formidable such batteries might have been, even without tow-boats, or steam-power in any other form, employed in the defence of a high rock fort like that of Gibraltar, such floating batteries could never be relied on as effective means of attack, upon a high rock fort of that description; as the immense strength of the position and of the work, with the great elevation of the cannon of the work attacked, would insure the destruction of floating batteries, or render an attack by them unavailing. It is a well-ascertained fact, however, not generally known, as but few historians have noticed it, that the floating batteries employed in the siege of Gibraltar were manned principally with convicts. This fact may be considered as the most conclusive among the principal causes of their failure, as well as of the opinion entertained and expressed by the French and Spanish commanders, that most of these batteries were set on fire by the men on board, whose duty it was to defend them. Be this as it may, a minute examination of the military history of the terrible siege of Gibraltar is respectfully referred to by your memorialist, as evidence in favor of his proposition for the immediate construction of floating batteries for the defence of our ports and harbors; inasmuch as it is obvious that, if the commander of Gibraltar had been supplied with ten floating batteries, such as are here proposed, with our present means of tow-boats, with steam-power to wield them, he would have destroyed the whole of the combined fleets employed against him, or at least have kept them out of the bay or harbor of Gibraltar. To the siege of Gibraltar and the attack on Copenhagen, two of the most terrible and extraordinary events known to niodern history, in reference to the attack and defence of seaports, an event known to your memorialist and many other officers now in service will be added, to show the utter impracticability of locking up a navigable river or inlet, or of arresting the movement of a fleet thereon, by fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of such river or inlet. On the night of the 6th of November, 1813, the flotilla,

under the command of Major General Wilkinson, consisting of nearly 300 boats, sloops, and schooners, passed the fort of Prescott, upon the Canada side of the river St. Lawrence, under a constant fire of the cannon of the • fort, manned by the best of British artillerists, without the loss of a boat or other vessel, and with the loss of but one man killed and two wounded; notwithstanding the flotilla was nearly one hour in the act of passing the fort, during the whole of which time the fire of the enemy's cannon was incessant, and the line formed by the flotilla in its movement was deemed to be within point-blank shot of the fort-say from 600 to 800 yards' distance! This fact was proven by the whistling of the enemy's shot; many, probably hundreds, of which passed apparently from 20 to 50 feet above our heads, while on board the boats in their slow passage; for they were propelled by oars, upon a gentle current, which enabled us to move at the rate of not more than three miles an hour. This movement was effected in the night, tolerably clear, but without moonlight. With the history of these three events before us, it would seem to be the height of imprudence in us to persevere in the construction of costly forts, with the vain hope of protecting our seaports against fleets propelled by steam-power, without the employment of floating batteries, such as are here recommended, with railroads to sustain them by timely reinforcements.

5. But it has been contended by men of high pretensions in theory, if not in the practical science of war, that, in place of the floating batteries here proposed as means of harbor defence, we should direct our attention. mainly to the construction of steamships of war. In reply to this theoretical suggestion, it is only necessary to say that we must, indeed, ultimately have steamships of war, or we must give up the whole of our foreign commerce; but, if we desire to preserve our seaports and commercial emporiums, we must have for their protection floating batteries; which consti. tute, in the present state of the arts, the natural link in the great chain of national defence between the land and naval means of service: and, as these floating batteries are not designed for going to sea, (excepting near our ports and harbors, in calm weather,) they properly belong to the land service. The fact that our seaports are rendered more than ever liable to sudden and unlooked for attacks by fleets propelled by steam-power, renders it all-important to their security that our means of harbor defence should never, even for a single day, be left exposed to an assault, when that assault may, in all human probability, result in the destruction of one of our most vital points of military and commercial operations. If, however, steamships of war should be preferred to the proposed floating batteries, a solemn act of Congress should be passed, forbidding any officer from removing them beyond the immediate vicinity of the harbor to which they may be assigned; as it must be obvious that our seaports cannot be protected without every requisite means of protection is held ready for action within our harbors, respectively. The floating batteries, it is believed, will cost but little more than the timber, iron, copper, and other materials for their construction, if they are built, as they should be, by the troops intended to defend them, aided by some ship carpenters to give them tight bottoms.

6. With three to five of the proposed floating batteries placed in the form of a crescent across the Mississippi river, with the concave side of the crescent down the river, and this curved line of floating batteries flanked by a small temporary fort on each bank of the river, so as to bring the cannon of each fort or battery to bear on any fleet or vessel ascending the river