his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as soon as he was fully prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz.

On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to belong, in a pre eminent degree, to the naval profession in this country, this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which to do at all seems impossible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him, in spite of fogs and darkness. Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, and all difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war; having no resource or hope beyond.

It may here be alleged that the term navy, as applied to the defence of the country, means more than the sea-going vessels we have enumerated ; that it means, also, gun-boats, floating batteries, and steam batteries; and that the true system of defence for the coast requires us to provide all our harbors with some or all of these vessels, according to local circumstances; leaving to the sea-going vessels the duty of destroying the enemy's commerce, carrying the war into the enemy's seas, and contending for the mastery of the ocean.

But such a proposition is totally distinct from that we have been considering. This is one that we regard as, in part, perfectly sound; as containing, though not true throughout, the great principle on which the present glory of the navy proper has been built, and its future glory will depend.

We are aware that some of our ships have been blockaded within our harbors, but we are not aware that any of the high distinction achieved by that service has been gained in these blockaded ships.

On the other hand, we know that, instead of lying in harbor and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number-instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our own commerce without countenance or aid-they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of enemy's property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels-ships, evaded if superior, and beaten if equal-they rendered benefits a thousand fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors.

Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will, in the future, be acted on as it has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement.

In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active and energetic deportment in offensive operations, which is at the same time so consistent with its functions and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence.

But if the navy is to be relieved from this home duty, some other reliance must be substituted; the navy itself requiring, for its own establishments, not less than the towns and harbors, that the defence be complete. And this brings us to consider whether the floating defences mentioned above, namely, gun-boats, floating batteries, and steam batteries, constitute the best reliance.

After considering these defensive means, we will examine the properties of forts and land batteries, these being the only other well-tried resort; and, that a comparison may be instituted, we will confine ourselves to cases where the latter are properly applicable.

There are, doubtless, situations where it may be necessary for us to present a defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be impracticable; and it is not, therefore, prejudging the question we are about to examine: it is neither underrating fortifications, nor overrating these floating defences, to say that these last are, some or all of them, indispensable in such positions.

Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance from the shores greater than effective guu-range, and where no insular spot, natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will present such a situation; and we may take some of our great bays as examples.

Broad sounds, and wide roadsteads, affording secure anchorage beyond good gun-range from the shores, will afford examples of another sort; and harbors with very wide entrances, and large surface, exhibit examples of still another kind.

As, in all such cases, fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, nevertheless, recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a recommendation in the several reports on the defence of the coast, since 1818, that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating defences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be resorted to; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable.

In the circumstances just referred to, there is no alternative, and therefore no point to be discussed. The remaining question is, whether these floating defences are to be relied on in cases that admit of defence by fortifications.

And, first, as to gun-boats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar circumstances, it will hardly contended that gun-boats afford a safe reliance in harbors that can be entered by vessels of magnitude. Ships becalmed, or aground, might be sorely harassed, if not destroyed, by a spirited attack from this force; and there are other situations wherein it would be very effective. But harbors defended by gun-boats will not be attacked in calms,

nor with adverse winds; and it is not easy to believe that any probable array of these craft would impede or hinder for a moment the advance of a hostile fleet. Nelson, at Trafalgar, bore down in two divisions upon the combined fleet, each division being exposed to a raking fire; and, although suffering considerably from that fire, he was able, notwithstanding, to break the hostile line and defeat his superior adversary. What, comparatively with the raking fire of the combined fleet, would be the fire of a fleet of gunboats? Opposing no effectual obstacle to approach or entrance, these small vessels, scattered and driven upon the shoals, would be kept, by the broadsides of a few active vessels, at too great a distance to produce any serious effect upon the main attack, by their desultory fire.

Although they might afford useful means of annoyance during a protracted occupation by the enemy of harbors that contained extensive shoal grounds and shallow bays and inlets, they would be nearly useless in resisting the first assault, and in preventing the brief operation of levying contributions, or burning or spoiling national establishments.

The true reason of this feeble defence must not, however, be misunderstood. It is not that the boats do not carry guns enough, or men enough, for the object; but it is because, from the comparative weakness of the vessels, the guns and the men cannot be kept in an effective position.

There are, moreover, many harbors requiring defence, in which there are no shoals whereon these boats could take refuge; and in such, their capture or destruction would be inevitable, should there be, at the same time, no river up which they might fly, or lateral issue through which they could escape, to a safe distance.

Floating batteries, of which good use might be sometimes made in peculiar situations, would, we suppose, differ from gun-boats, in being larger; containing many guns; and in being stronger--that is to say, having thicker sides or bulwarks; and it has sometimes even been proposed to construct them with ball proof parapets, and with platforms open above; like, in these respects, batteries upon the shore. But, in whatever way formed, it is necessarily a part of the idea that they be strong and massive; and, consequently, that they be unwieldy, incapable of sudden change of place, and incapacitated either to advance upon a defeated foe, or to evade a victorious one. We are not, of course, now speaking of batteries moved by steam.

Being denied the power of locomotion, at least for any purpose of manoeuvering in face of the enemy, we are to consider these batteries as moored in position, and awaiting his advance. Should the batteries be large, requiring deep water to float them; or should they be placed across or near the channel, for the sake of proximity to the track of ships; the enemy would engage them at close quarters. All advantages of mobilityof concentrating his whole fleet upon one or two points, to which, under these circumstances, no relief can be sent-of greater elevation and com. mand, would be on the side of the assailant; with no countervailing advantage to the batteries, but greater thickness of bulwarks. Whether this excess of thickness should be considered a material advantage, since the introduction of large bomb-cannon into the armament of ships, is a doubtful matter. The batteries, if anchored across the channel, would have the further advantage of a raking fire; but we have seen that the raking fire of one squadron of ships upon another advancing is by no means decisive. The power of throwing the whole assailing force upon one or two points,

of pouring upon the decks of the batteries a greatly superior force of boarders, would, of themselves, seem to leave little room to doubt as to the issue.

If, now, we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that, having a lighter draught, they might be placed near the shores, or upon the shoals, they might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would prove so fatal if anchored more boldly in deep water; but they would, at the same time, lose much of their efficiency, from their remoteness; and positions, wherein they would be secure from being laid alongside, while they would be in a proper attitude to contribute materially to the defence of the harbor, are afforded but rarely. It is doubtful whether, as a general rule, these smaller floating batteries, notwithstanding their greater capability of endurance, would afford a better defence, gun for gun, than gun-boats; or, in other words, whether this capability of endurance in the one, would be more than a compensation for the power of locomotion in the other.

But, whether near the shore or in the channel, whether large or small, this description of defence, owing to its fixedness, connected with the destructibility of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed to attacks analogous to those made by gun-boats on ships aground. The enemy, knowing of what the defensive arrangements consist, will come provided with the requisite number of sailing or steam vessels, armed with bomb-cannon, against which the thicker bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing. He would, besides, hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with heavy sea-mortars; and, as there could be no guarding against the effects of the long ranges of these, a few such vessels would, with great certainty, constrain the floating batteries to quit their position, abandoning every disposition approaching to a concentrated array. Not to mention other modes of attack, which would seem to leave the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed that this kind of defence, whether by gun-boats or floating batteries, has the same intrinsic fault that an inactive defence by the navy proper has; that is to say, the enemy has it in his power to bring to the attack a force of the same nature, and at least as efficacious, as that relied on for defence: hence the neces sity not of mere equality, but of superiority, on the part of the detence, at every point liable to be attacked; and hence, also, the necessity of having an aggregate force as many times larger than that disposable by the enemy as we have important places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten such places, and the enemy threaten us with twenty ships of the line, we must have, in all these places, an aggregate of gun-boats and floating batteries more than equivalent to two hundred ships of the line; for, it will hardly be contended that these defences can be transported from one place to another, as they may be respectively in danger.

But what will be the relative state of the parties, if, instead of gun-boats or floating batteries, we resort to steam batteries? Although much has been said, of late, of the great advantage that defence is to derive from this description of force, we have not been able to discover the advantages; nor do we see that seacoast defence has been benefited, in any particular, by the recent improvement in steam-vessels, except that, in the case before adverted to, where, from the breadth of the waters, defence from the shore would be unavailing, a more active and formidable floating defence than by gun-boats and floating batteries is provided. It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam-vessels consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation; and one inevitable consequence of this

improvement will be, that, if the defence of harbors by steam batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships of the line and frigates, or, at least, of placing the defence quite above that kind of attack, they will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vessels, similar, in all warlike properties, to those relied on for defence.

Not only is there no impediment to transferring these vessels across the ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enjoin a state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times; and, also, a complete independence of arrangement at each particular point-both the state of preparation, and the independence of arrangement, being much more important than when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of winds and weather.

It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging to steam batteries acting defensively, that the attacking steam-vessels may not bring with them, or, at least, may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon the coast; unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thickness of bulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vessels.

But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the facility of moving with promptitude and rapidity; and any attempts to strengthen the harbor vessels, by thickening their bulwarks considerably, would unavoidably lessen their mobility, thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the same time, it is extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from the thicker sides. It is probable that the best kind of bulwark for these vessels, and all others, is that which will be just proof against grape and canister shot fired from moderate distances; because, with such bulwarks, a shell fired from a bomb cannon within a reasonable distance would pierce both sides; that is to say, would go in on one side of the ship and out at the opposite, producing no greater effect than a solid shot of the same calibre; while, with thickened sides, every shell would lodge in the timbers, and produce terrible ravages by bursting.

In the practice with these missiles in this country, it has been found difficult to lodge a shell in thin targets, even when the load of the gun was so reduced as to increase materially the uncertainty of aim. As it is prob able, therefore, that the protection from solid shot afforded by massive bulwarks would be more than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal shells would inflict by means of these bulwarks, we may conclude that the harbor steam-battery will not differ, in this respect, materially, from the attacking steamships; and, if they do differ in having more solid and impervious bulwarks, that no advantage over the enemy will result therefrom. We come, therefore, to the same result as when considering the application of the other kinds of floating force to the defence of harbors; and this result is, that there is no way of placing the coast in a condition of reasonable security but by having, at any point the enemy may happen to select, a force in perfect readiness which shall be superior to that brought to the attack.

The reason of this coincidence of result is, that no peculiarity in form or details can disguise the difficulties, or essentially modify the conditions, inseparable from the nature of a floating force.

Buoyancy is a condition necessary to every variety of the force; and, to observe this condition, a common material must be used in each-a material that is combustible, weak, and penetrable to missiles. If the weakness and penetrability be, in part, remedied by an increase of the quantity of the material, it must be at the sacrifice of buoyancy, activity, and speed-proper