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1st. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, to Buffalo or Plattsburg, New York, with branches to Detroit, Albany, and Boston.

2d. One principal railroad from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Norfolk, Virginia, or Baltimore, Maryland, with branches to Richmond, Virginia, and Newbern, North Carolina.

3d. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to Charleston, South Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia, with branches to Milledgeville, Georgia, and East Florida.

4th. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, to Mobile, Alabama, with a branch to Pensacola, Florida.

5th. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, via Nashville, to New Orleans.

6th. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to the Sabine ridge, with branches to Fort Towson and Fort Gibson, Arkansas.

7th. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, or Albany, Indiana, to St. Louis, Missouri; and thence to the Missouri river, north of the mouth of the Big Platte, with branches from Albany, Indiana, to Chicago, and from the northwest angle of the State of Missouri to the upper crossing of the river Des Moines.

As the General has given no precise indication of the courses which these routes would pursue, or of that of their branches, I find it difficult to determine the method by which he has ascertained the whole distance. But, taking Tanner's map of the United States as a basis, drawing straight lines from point to point, without reference to the physical peculiarities of the country, and involving but once in the consideration those parts which may be common to more than one principal route or branch, I make the distance of the whole system equal to 5,260 miles.

This is a distance of air-lines, and of course is much less than what would be the actual distance of the roads. Their windings and sinuosities would much increase that length, to an extent which I think may, with propriety, be assumed as equal to 20 per cent., and which would make the entire length of roads and branches equal to 6,310 miles.

Until surveys are made and the roads located, it is impossible to make an accurate estimate of the cost. But, in the absence of these, by reasoning from probabilities and from experience in cases somewhat similar, one may arrive at a result which may be considered as a probable minimum. The General reasons upon the supposition of a double track throughout; but I doubt if this be necessary. A single track, with suitable turn-outs, and double lines of some extent in particular localities, will probably be found adequate to all the objects of the roads. As the roads are intended for great speed as well as great weights, and are to be national roads, they must be made of great strength as well as of durable materials; and as they will cross the country in so many directions, they will no doubt encounter all the causes of great expenses in such structures-rock excavation, deep-cuts, tunnels, heavy embankments, extensive bridges, &c.

Under these considerations, and after having, in addition to my own investigations and observations, consulted some of the most experienced and most eminent railroad engineers of our country, I find myself obliged to differ with the General in reference to probable cost. He states the average, on the supposition of a double track, at $15,000 per mile. I cannot, consistently with my own views, state it at less than $20,000 the mile, for a single

track and its requisite accessories; and this amount I desire also to be understood as my opinion of a probable minimum.

6,310 miles, at $20,000 the mile, will amount to one hundred and twenty-six million two hundred thousand dollars.

There is no doubt that many advantages may be taken of the railroads already made and being made by States and incorporated companies, in adopting them as parts of the Major General's system; but one cannot say to what extent, until the same shall be shown by the surveys. If we suppose it, however, to be equal to 1,000 miles, it will reduce the cost before stated to one hundred and six millions two hundred thousand dollars.

The objects of these various roads being to transport masses of troops and munitions of war, with great speed and to great distances, means of transporting will have to be provided, and will also have to be under the exclusive control of the Government; which last condition makes it necessary that these means should be owned by the Government. They become, then, an essential part of Government expense belonging to the system.

These means are locomotives and cars. A car that would properly accommodate 50 men, with their arms and necessary baggage, would probably not cost less than $500. To transport 10,000 men, then, would require 200 cars. We will now suppose that to move these cars with the anticipated speed will require one locomotive to each train of ten cars. 'There must, then, be twenty locomotives, which, with the requisite tender to each, will not cost less than $8,000 apiece. It will, therefore, be necessary for the transportation of 10,000 men, to have 20 locomotives and tenders, and 200 cars. This may be considered as an equipment for one of the principal lines. But as there are seven principal lines, and as each should be supplied with an equipment adequate to the transportation of 10,000 men, there will have to be, for the whole system of roads, not less than 140 locomotives and tenders, and 1,400 cars. Applying to these the prices which we have stated, it will make the cost of the means of transportation equal to To which add the cost of the roads

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$1,820,000 106,200,000

And the whole will be

$108,020,000

I have, in the foregoing, supposed the plan to be practicable-that is, that railroads may be made in the several directions as required by the system; but it is proper to add, that this is a point which cannot be determined except by accurate surveys.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

J. J. ABERT,

Colonel Topographical Engineers.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT,
Secretary of War.

NAVY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE,

April 25, 1840.

SIR: The Beard of Navy Commissioners have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from the honorable Secretary of War to you

of the 16th instant, requesting your reference to them of the memorial of General E. P. Gaines to Congress, submitting a system of national defence, "for a report as to the practicability, expediency, and expense of the plan, so far as it relates to floating batteries, and other naval defences;" and, in compliance with your endorsement, respectfully state:

That, in relation to the "expense," the board called upon the chief naval constructor for the probable cost of one of the floating batteries and a towboat, as described in the memorial, a copy of whose report is herewith enclosed. These estimates form the best data which the commissioners can furnish for ascertaining the aggregate expense which might be necessary to carry into effect the recommendations of General Gaines. No definite number is specified in the memorial, nor any other information given by which that number can be ascertained with any probable certainty; and no attempt has been made to supply the want of this information by conjec

ture.

There appears to be no cause for doubting that the approaches of an enemy by water to any of our cities and seaports might be prevented by the employment of a sufficient number of floating batteries and tow-boats, prepared, armed, and manned, as are proposed by General Gaines; and, consequently, that the plan is "practicable," provided the expense can be met, and a sufficient number of men be obtained.

In considering the "expediency" of adopting the floating batteries which are proposed in the memorial, it is necessary to estimate their comparative efficiency with other means which may be provided, manned, and supported with an equal expenditure of money, and an equal number of troops or other persons.

The Board of Navy Commissioners, when presenting their views upon. the general defences of the country, upon former occasions, have expressed the opinion, that, upon a subject so important and evidently requiring the best combinations of military and naval force, it was very desirable, if not indispensable, that it should be considered and reported upon by a board which should comprise officers of both branches of the service. This belief has not been changed by any subsequent information or reflec tion upon the subject, and, consequently, they can only offer opinions upon the relative advantages and disadvantages of the floating batteries and fixed fortifications, which are based upon facts that appear to be too well established, or so obvious as not to be questioned.

The system presented in the memorial is intended "to provide for the defence of our seaports," and "to enable us to repel, by the agency of steampower, every invasion suddenly forced upon us by fleets propelled by steampower." To effect this object, the memorialist proposes floating batteries and attendant tow-boats, which he has described in very general terms, and considers them preferable to fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of rivers or inlets; because, with such fortifications only, it would be utterly impracticable to lock up a navigable river or inlet, or to arrest the movement of a fleet thereon. He also prefers the floating batteries to steamships of war, unless such ships should be prohibited from leaving the vicinity of the ports or harbors to which they may be assigned. From these general views, it appears to be the intention of the memorialist that each and every port or harbor shall have, at all times, all the means for defence against a naval force which may be necessary to resist attacks until reinforcements can be obtained from the interior; and that no reliance is to

be placed upon the concentration of these separate floating defences from contiguous ports, for temporary purposes.

There can be no doubt that such a perfect system of defence would be very desirable, if it could be obtained with a proper regard to its cost and its demands upon the population of the country. But if the probable expense of the construction and maintenance of the floating batteries and towboats which would be required, and the number of persons necessary for their advantageous use, are considered and compared with the resources of the country, reasonable doubts may be entertained whether an attempt to obtain complete security in this manner would be expedient.

That floating batteries of some kind will be necessary as component parts of the defences for several of our harbors, is generally admitted, and, it is believed, formed a part of the plan of defence as proposed by the board which had that subject under examination shortly after the close of the last war, for those passages to important points which could not be well and thoroughly commanded by the fortifications on the land.

One of the strongest objections which is usually made to fixed fortifications, is, that they must of necessity await an attack, and leave the choice of time and circumstances to an enemy. The greatest advantage of a floating force over fixed fortifications consists in the greater power which they possess of choice of position, with facility and promptitude to meet, in the best manner, any form of attack with which any point may be threatened. All varieties of floating force are liable to greater danger from shells and hot shot, and require much larger amounts, in proportion to their original cost, to keep them in repair, than fixed fortifications.

In considering the defence of a coast so extensive as that of the United States, and upon which there are so many positions which are important either for their commercial, military, or political relations, the Board of Navy Commissioners, when they refer to the probable nature and force of the attacks which may be expected from a naval enemy, and the physical, fiscal, and personal resources of the country to meet them, are led to the conclusion that many points must be left more or less exposed for many years; and that, while permanent arrangements are made for giving security to others, in proportion to their importance, the best policy for the whole country will be to extend those moveable defences which can advantageously meet an enemy at the greatest distance from his meditated points of attack, or be soonest concentrated to retard his progress, or to repel him from our shores.

This force, if composed of steam and ordinary ships of war, employed separately, or in combination, as circumstances may require, might, it is believed, be used (except at some few points) with at least equal advantage as the floating batteries which are proposed in the memorial; and would possess the further advantage of being able to meet and annoy an enemy in his progress; to concentrate where it should be most required; to retire, if necessary, before a superior force, and be held ready to take advantage of any accidents to the enemy, or of any mistakes which he might commit. Its powers would be active-aggressive, if necessary; whilst that of the batteries proposed must necessarily be almost wholly passive and strictly defensive.

Without entering more particularly into the general subject of national defence, after a careful consideration of the employment of such floating batteries as are proposed in the memorial, the board are of opinion that,

although a few such or similar batteries might, perhaps, be useful in particular places, it would not be expedient to adopt them generally as substitutes for fixed fortifications, or for a floating force which should be adapted to more extensive use, and capable of quicker and more rapid combinations. The papers are herewith respectfully returned.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant, C. MORRIS,

For the Board of Navy Commissioners.

Hon. JAMES K. PAULDING,
Secretary of the Navy.

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1840.

SIR: I have read the memorial presented by Major General Gaines to Congress, on the defence of the coast. A part of the system proposed by the General is the construction of heavy floating batteries; the probable cost of which, with their tow-boats, you require me to state. It is difficult to form an opinion on the cost of vessels of such unusual dimensions as those proposed by General Gaines; and, in addition to this difficulty, there are no data given on which to ground an estimate, excepting length and breadth; but it is believed that the largest battery, with her tow-boats, will cost about 1,400,000 dollars, and the smallest about 700,000 dollars. This estimate includes copper-fastening, and coppering, cables, anchors, boats, and water-casks; but does not embrace masts, spars, sails, armament, nor stores of any description.

I am, sir, respectfully, &c.

SAMUEL HUMPHREYS.

Com. CHARLES MORRIS,

President of the Navy Board.

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