ties of great value. If a small draught of water be desired, it can only be obtained at the expense of that concentration of power which is a great and almost characteristic quality of naval armament.

It might not be strictly true to say that as much would be lost in one respect as would be gained in another; but, though modifications of this floating force, made with a view to adapt it to peculiar services, will somewhat disturb the equilibrium of the several kinds, there will still be no great disparity when acting in their appropriate way; and a little superadded force to the weaker party will restore the balance. None of these modifications, it should be observed, touch, on the one hand, the means whereby injury is inflicted; nor, on the other, the susceptibility to injury: all are still timber structures, carrying a common armament.

The necessity of having at each point a force at least equal to the attacking force, will require large preparations, on any supposition. With the navy proper, however, with gun-boats and floating batteries, something has already been done: the existing navy will be an important contribution. Small vessels supplied by commerce would afford tolerable substitutes for gun-boats; and from the class of merchant ships many vessels might be drawn for service as floating batteries: still there will remain great efforts to be made, and great amounts to be expended, to complete the defensive array. But a reliance on steam batteries would lead to expenditure vastly greater, because, with them, all has yet to be provided. Having at present no force of this kind on hand, (or next to none,) the preparation by the enemy of (say) twenty steam frigates would require the construction of two hundred, of equal force, on our part, supposing that we design to cover but ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy.

Having shown that steam batteries cannot be substituted for shore defences, we will here add that they will, on the other hand, in certain cases, necessarily increase the number of these defences, and, in other cases, aug. ment their force. Channels which admitted only small vessels of war, would, in peculiar positions, need no defence; in other positions, their defence might be safely trusted to works of moderate force. The introduction of these vessels of small draught and great power requires, however, that these passages should be defended, and defended adequately.

We should not have gone so much at length into a branch of our subject, wherein the general conclusions appear to be so obvious and incontrovertible, but for the prevalence of opinions which we consider, not erroneous merely, but highly dangerous, and which, we think, must give way before a full exhibition of the truth. We do not anticipate any formidable objections to the positions assumed, nor to the illustrations; but, even should all these, in the form we have presented them, be objected to, we may still challenge opposition to the following broad propositions, namely:

1st. If the seacoast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the defensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be, at least, equal in power to the attacking force.

2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting an attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring our state of preparation from one to another, after an attack has been declared, each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means; and,

3d. Consequently, this system demands a power in the defence as many times greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered.

Believing that a well digested system of fortifications will save the country from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the intolerable expense of a full provision of those means, we will now endeavor to show that such a system is worthy of all reliance.

There has been but one practice among nations, as to the defence of ports and harbors; and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experience that history exhibits is on one side only: it is the opposition of forts, or other works comprehended by the term fortification, to attacks by ves. sels; and, although history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that the resort is still the same. No nation omits covering the exposed points upon her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them.

In opposition to this mode of defence, much stress is laid on certain successful attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. We have no doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent of the naked question of relative strength; but, at any rate, when carefully considered, how little do these results prove, in comparison with numerous other instances, in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of vessels that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinds of force; not, certainly, because they were successful, but because the smaller the work, its armament, its garrison, the less the probability that any extraneous influence has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its position be a fair one, and the parapet be proof, need, as regards its contest with ships, owe nothing else to the art of fortification; and its effect will be the same whether the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age, or were erected at the dawn of the art. The gun is in a position to be used with effect; the men are as fully protected by the parapet as the service of the gun will allow; they are brave and skilful, and there is nothing to prevent their doing their duty to the utmost. These are all conditions easily fulfilled, and, therefore, likely to be so. The state of things is not less just and fair toward the vessel : she chooses her time and opportunity; the battery goes not to the ship, but the ship to the battery; taking the wind, the tide, the sea-all, as she would have them; her condition and discipline are perfect, and her crew courageous and adroit. Nothing, under such circumstances, can prevent the just issue of battle, but some extraordinary accident-possible, indeed, to either party, but easily recognised when occurring.

The contest between larger works and heavy squadrons may be much more complicated affairs; the cause of disaster to the former being often traceable to potent, though not always obvious, influences. The fortifications may have been absurdly planned originally, or badly executed; for there has at all times been in this profession, as in others, much scope given to quackery-they may have been erected at a time when the ships of war, against which they were provided, were very different things from the lofty line-of-battle ships of modern times-a long peace, or long impunity, may have left them in a state wholly unprepared for the sudden use of their strength-the command may have been intrusted to persons ignorant alike of the amount of power in their hands, and of the mode of exercising itthe garrison may have been undisciplined or mutinous--the populace discontented or disloyal-the clamor of frightened citizens may have caused a premature surrender: all these, or any of them, may have produced the issue, leaving the question of relative power untouched,

While there can be no doubt that these and other deteriorating influences may have occasionally operated to the prejudice of fortifications, and that these were likely to be more numerous and more controlling as the works were more extensive, it is certain that there can be no influence acting in a reverse direction upon them; that is to say, none making them stronger and more efficient than they ought to be. There can be no favorable influence of such a nature, for example, as to make the simple one-gun battery before mentioned equivalent to a battery (say) ten times as large.

It must not be supposed, from what we have said in relation to larger fortifications, that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or weakness; nor, because we have considered small and simple works as affording the best solution to the question of relative force, must it be inferred that small works are suited to all circumstances. We speak here in reference merely to the judgment we are entitled to form of the relative power of these antagonist forces, from their contests, as exhibited in history. In instances of the latter sort, there cannot, from the nature of the case, be any important influence operating, of which we are ignorant, or for which we cannot make due allowances; while, in examples of the former kind, we may be in the dark as to many vital matters.

'These observations have been deemed necessary, because, in judging of this matter, it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be more natural to turn to Copenhagen and Algiers, as indicating where the power lies, than to Charleston and Stonington; and yet these latter, as indices, would be true, and the former false.

We will now turn to certain examples:

"The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good defence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the year 1794, which, although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two British ships of war, without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But this circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on shore must always, in certain situations, possess over those of shipping, no matter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not. That this is a just decision, will perhaps be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the following equally remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred about twelve years afterwards, in the same part of the world."

*

"Sir Sidney Smith, in the Pompée, an eighty gun ship, the Hydra, of thirty-eight guns, Captain Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred yards from a battery of two guns, situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and protected from assault by a tower in which were fiveand-twenty French soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant.

"The line of-battle ship and the frigates fired successive broadsides till their ammunition was nearly expended; the battery continually replying with a slow but destructive effect. The Pompée, at which ship alone it directed its fire, had forty shot in her hull; her mizen topmast carried away; a lieutenant, midshipman, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and, after some hours parley, the officer, a Corsican, and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the carriage of one of the two guns had failed

* Pasley's Course, vol. iii.

on the second shot, and the gun had subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure: so that, in fact, the attack of an eighty-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single piece of ordnance." (Journal of Sieges, by Col. John T. Jones.)

The Corsican tower above mentioned, which had, in like manner, completely baffled a naval cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attacked by land; not, however, before a small battery had been made [erected] to reduce it." (Pasley's Course, vol. iii.)

Here are two examples:

1st. A single heavy gun, mounted on a tower, beat off one or two British ships.

2d. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat off a British eighty gun ship, supported by two frigates.

It would seem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance, as trials of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one side or the other; nothing to confuse or mislead; all is perfectly simple and plain. A small body of artillery, judiciously posted on the shore, is attacked by armed vessels bearing forty or fifty times as many guns; and the ships, unable to produce any effect of consequence, are beaten off with loss.

The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries either as regards position or quality; for both works were immediately reduced by a land attack; that which the eighty gun ship and two frigates were unable to effect, being immediately accomplished by landing two fieldpieces, with a very small portion of the crew of one of the vessels.

On the other hand, there was no peculiar disadvantage on the part of the ships, as the time and mode of atack were of their own choice.

In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessels, in the manner of representing the affairs, the language of British military writers (the ships being British) has been exactly quoted. (See Pasley's Course of Elementary Fortifications, vol. iii; and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.)

Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victorious party, the result would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of the ships.

The circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, in April, 1801, seem to have been the following:

On the northeast side of the city, (the only side exposed to attack from heavy ships,) there lies a shoal spreading outward from the walls, about threequarters of a mile in the narrowest part. Through this shoal there runs, in a northeast and-by north direction, a narrow channel, connecting the basin, in the heart of the city, with deep water. Were it not for this shoal, vesels might approach even to the walls of the city, on a length of about one anda half mile; as it is, they can get no nearer, in any place, than about threequarters of a mile, without following the channel just mentioned. As the edge of the shoal lies nearly north and south, and the channel passes through it in a northeast-by-north direction, the great mass of the shoal is to the south ward, or on the right-hand side of the channel. We will call this the southern shoal. The "Three crown battery" is situated upon this southern shoal, and near the channel.

The Danish defences consisted

1st. Of the fortifications on this side of the city, including the Threecrown battery, Nelson estimated the batteries supporting the Danish vessels at about ninety guns.

2d. Of four sail of the line, mounting 282 guns, and one frigate and two sloops, mounting 76 guns; making 358 guns. All these vessels lying in the channel before mentioned, and some of them near its mouth; they constituted the left of the Danish floating defences, and were thus posted to defend the entrance to the inner harbor or basin.

3d. Of a line of floating defences, of various kinds, moored near the edge of the southern shoal. They were eighteen in number, as follows, counting from the right or southern extremity: 1st, a block ship of 56 guns; 2d, a block-ship of 48 guns; 3d, a praam of 20 guns; 4th, a praam of 20 guns; 5th, a block-ship of 48 guns; 6th, a raft of 20 guns; 7th, a block-ship of 22 guns; 8th, a raft of 20 guns; 9th, a block-ship of 62 guns; 10th, a small vessel of 6 guns; 11th, a raft of 24 guns; 12th, a praam of 20 guns; 13th, a ship of the line of 74 guns; 14th, a block-ship of 26 guus; 15th, a raft of 18 guns; 16th, a ship of the line of 60 guns; 17th, a block-ship of 64 guns; 18th, a "frigate" of 20 guns: total in this line 628 guns. These vessels were moored in a line extending south from a point outside and a little to the southward of the Three-crown battery; and the part of the line nearest the walls was not less than three quarters of a mile distant.

Lord Nelson carried to the attack the Elephant, 74 guns; Defiance, 74; Monarch, 74; Bellona, 74; Edgar, 74; Russell, 74; Ganges, 74; Glutton, 54; Isis, 50; Agamemnon, 64; Polyphemus, 74; Ardent, 64; Amazon, 38; Desirée, 38; Blanche, 36; Alcmene, 32; Dart, 30; Arrow, 18; Cruiser, 18; Harpy, 18; Zephyr, 14; Otter, 14; Discovery, 16; Sulphur, 10; Hecla, 10; Explosion, 8; Zebra, 16; Terror, 10; Volcano, 8: making a total of 1,074 guns, besides a few in gun-boats. The Agamemnon did not get into action; which reduces the force employed to 1,010 guns. The Bellona and Russell grounded; but Lord Nelson says, "although not in the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of good service."

With this force Lord Nelson engaged the line of floating defences that was moored near the edge of the southern shoal. He approached from the south, with a fair wind; and as his leading vessel got abreast of the most southern of the Danish line, she anchored by the stern. The second English vessel passed on until she had reached the next position, when she anchored, also, in the same way; and thus, inverting his line as he extended it, he brought his whole force against the outer and southern part of the Danish force. His line did not reach as far northward as the Threecrown battery, and mouth of the channel; for he says, in speaking of the grounding of the Bellona, Russell, and Agamemnon: "These accidents prevented the extension of our line by the three ships before mentioned, who would, I am confident, have silenced the Crown islands, (Three-crown battery,) the outer ships in the harbor's mouth, and prevented the heavy loss in the Defiance and Monarch."

Concentrating, as he did, the force of 1,010 guns upon a portion of the Danish array, not only inferior to him by 382 guns, but so situated as to be beyond the scope of succor, and without a chance of escape, Lord Nelson had no reason to doubt that signal success would crown his able arrangement. Every vessel in this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed,