$120,000. (Statement 1, table E.) And to repair Fort Jackson, $50,000. (Statement 1, table A.)

Wassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, St. Catharine's sound, at the mouth of Medway river; Sapelo sound, Doby inlet, Altamaha sound, at the mouth of Altamaha river; St. Simon's sound, at the mouth of Buffulo creek; St. Andrew's sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla rivers; and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of St. Mary's river.-All these communications with the ocean are highly important, as regards the line of interior navigation, and several of them as affording access to excellent harbors. The last, and one or two others, are known to be navigable to the largest sloops of war and merchantmen; and some of the others are but little inferior, as regards depth of entrance or safety of anchorage.

All these openings have yet to be surveyed. Some of them are probably easily defensible by forts and batteries, while others may require the aid of floating defences.

It is an important principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole southern coast, that, on a shore possessing few harbors, it is at the same time more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and more easy to deprive an enemy of that shelter, without which a close blockade cannot be maintained. This principle is enforced, in the instance of our southern coast, by the two following weighty considerations, namely: first, its remoteness from the nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is, on a mean, 600 miles distant, and to leeward both as to wind and current; and, second, its being close upon the larboard hand, as they enter the Atlantic, of the great concourse of vessels passing, at all seasons, through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy.

Accurate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether pursued by an enemy or suffering by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which beset the navigation of these harbors, and properly arranged defences to cover them when arrived, seen to be indispensable.

When these harbors shall be fortified, the operation of investing the coast, and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage, will be a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy, to whom no perseverance or skill can avail to maintain a continuous blockade; while, on the part of our small vessels of war, steam-frigates, and privateers, the same sort of supervision will be at all times easy and safe.

Nothing better can now be done, than to assume $200,000 as the average cost of defending each of the nine entrances; giving a total of $1,800,000. (Statement 1, tables E and F.)

St. Augustine, Florida.-This, the most southern of the harbors on the Atlantic, and the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible to the smaller class of merchantinen, to privateers, and to steam vessels; and requires a certain amount of protection from attacks by water. It is, therefore, proposed to put that part of the old Spanish fort (Fort Marion) that commands the harbor in a serviceable state, which will require $50,000. (Statement 1, table A.)

Having now passed along the whole Atlantic coast, from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida, pointed out every harbor of any consequence, and specified every work that a thorough system of defence will require, we will, in

order to give a comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrisons of the works, refer to statement 1, accompanying this report. In that statement the works are divided into tables, showing, separately, 1st, (table A,) the old works already repaired, and those proposed to be repaired and retained in the system of defence; 2d, (table B.) new works completed; 3d, (table C,) works under construction; 4th, (table D,) works to be first commenced; 5th, (table E,) works to be commenced next after those in table D; 6th, (table F,) works to be last commenced.

The most essential works on the Atlantic coast are included in the first five tables; and it appears from the recapitulation, that for these there will be required, for garrisons in time of war, 28,720 men; for the armament, 5,748 pieces of ordnance of every kind; and for the expense yet to be incurred, $9,476,767.

We consider it to be our duty to estimate for the last class of works also, (table F,) although it must be a long time before permanent works for these positions can be commenced. For these there will be required, in addition, for war garrisons, 25,545 men; for armament, 4,790 pieces of ordnance; and for the expense of erection, $14,241,824.

It must be here stated, that, as to a few of the works in table F, fuller information may require them to be elevated into some of the earlier classes.

SEACOAST FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE MOUTH OF THE SABINE.

The first positions that present themselves, on doubling around Cape Florida into the Gulf of Mexico, are Key West and the Dry Tortugas. This board concur in the opinions heretofore expressed in favor of these fine harbors; and they beg leave to refer for very interesting statements, in relation to the latter harbor especially, to a letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, July 3, 1829, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, vol. 1, No. 1, page 236;) and letter from the Secretary of the Navy, March 25, 1830, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, vol. 2, No. 111, page 1.)

A naval force, designed to control the navigation of the Gulf could desire no better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside of the only path through the Gulf, it is, at the same time, well situated as to all the great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the mouths of the Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of the Gulf.

The Tortugas harbors, in particular, are said to afford perfect shelter for vessels of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would, with great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort, and his point of general rendezvous and concentration for all operations on this sea. With an enemy thus posted, the navigation of the Gulf, by us, would be imminently hazardous, if not impossible; and nothing but absolute naval superiority would avail any thing against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer than the nearest shore of the continent.

It is believed that there are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable with these, that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To deprive him of these, would, therefore, be interfering materially with any organized system of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would, however, do much more than this. It would transfer to our

own squadron, even should it be inferior, these most valuable positions: and it would afford a point of refuge to our navy and our commerce, at the very spot where it would be most necessary and useful.

In this report, already too much extended, we forbear to enlarge on this topic, merely adding that the complete and certain defence will not be difficult. By occupying two, or at most three, small islands, the harbors of the Dry Tortugas (there being an inner and an outer harbor) may be thoroughly protected. The works must be adequate to resist escalade, bombardment, and cannonade from vessels, and to sustain a protracted investment; but as they will not be exposed to any operation resembling a siege, there can be no difficulty in fulfilling the conditions. They must have capacious store-rooms, be thoroughly bomb-proof, and be heavily armed.

The fortification of Key West should be of a similar character.

No details can be given until all these positions have been minutely surveyed with reference to defence.

The sum of $3,000,000 was, some years ago, assumed by the Engineer Department as necessary to provide defences for the Tortugas and for Key West and this estimate may now be taken as ample. (Statement 2, table F.)

Turning now to the shore of the Gulf, we find a portion, namely, from Cape Florida to Pensacola, that has never been examined with particular reference to the defence of the harbors. Within this space there are Charlotte harbor, Espiritu Santo bay, Appalachicola bay, Appalachie bay, St. Joseph's bay, and Santa Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assume for these the estimate formerly presented by the Engineer Department, viz: $1,000,000 for all. (Statement 2, table F.)

It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the relative geographical position of this part of the seaboard, and the country interested in its safety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before that portion within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an enemy, will be competent, of itself, to sustain a serious attack from without. Upon the Atlantic seaboard, the Alleganies crowd the people down upon the shore; every important point on the coast being surrounded by a population dense now, and every day rapidly increasing in numbers; while the ocean and the interior paralle! communications transmit rapid aid to the right and left. The coast of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled in itself, is remote from succor from behind, and is almost inaccessible to lateral assistance. Those reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, permanent, and timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United States, apply to this part of it with peculiar force.

We now pass on to the remaining points of defence on the Gulf.

Pensacola bay-The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow-water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river. The tributaries of the last, interlocking with the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, seem to mark the routes whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola; while the qualities and position of the harbor, and the favorable nature of the country, have already marked out lines of railroad communication with a vast interior region.

Santa Rosa sound extends eastward, from the lower part of the bay, into Santa Rosa bay. On the west, the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few

miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last. named bay, and thence, through an existing interior water communication, to the city of New Orleans.

Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to frigates, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deepened,

The bar is near the coast, and the channel across it straight and easily hit. The harbor is perfectly land locked, and the roadstead very capacious. There are excellent positions within, for repairing, building, and launching vessels, and for docks and dock-yards, in healthy situations. The supply of good water is abundant. The harbor is perfectly defensible. These properties, in connexion with the position of the harbor, as regards the coast, have induced the Government to select it as a haval station and place of rendezvous and repair.

An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to form the scheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as an important naval station, and place of rendezvous and repair, which it now is, further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, delineating accurately the face of the country, and showing the several av enues by land and water, are found to be necessary.

The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly complete, $22,000 being asked to finish them. A work is just begun at the position of the Barrancas. It is indispensable, in connexion with one or two other small works designed to cover the navy yard from a lateral attack through the western bays. The Barrancas work may require $100,000, and the others $200,000; making a total for Pensacola of $322,000, (Statement 2, tables A, C, and F.)

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Perdido bay. This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully surveyed with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be $200,000. (Statement 2, table F.)

Mobile bay. The plan of defence for this bay comprises a fort, now needing some repairs, for Mobile point. Another fort is projected for Dauphin island, and a tower for the defence of Pass au Heron. The estimates for all require $915,000. (Statement 2, tables A, E, and F.)

New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi.-The most northern water communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next is the pass of Chef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these passages, an enemy, entering Lake Pontchartrain, would, at the same time that he intercepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake; or he might continue onward, through Lake Maurepas, Amité river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the Mississippi at the very head of the delta: or, landing within the mouths of the Chef Menteur, he might move against the city along the ridge of the Gentilly road.

To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou Bienvenue, a navigable channel, (the one followed by the English army in the last war,) not running quite to the Mississippi, but bounded by shores of such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarcation to the city.

These avenues are defended by Fort Pike, at the Rigolets; by Fort Wood, at Chef Menteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue; and by a tower at Bayou Dupré.

The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about seventy miles below New Orleans-the lowest position that can be occupied. Fort Jackson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip, a little lower down, on the left.

All these forts have been abandoned for several years; and, having received no attention in the way of timely repairs, now require repairs somewhat extensive-especially Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi. The following sums, it is believed, will be required to place all these works in perfect order, viz: Fort Pike, $5,000; Fort Wood, $3,580; fort on Bayou Bienvenue, $2,500; Tower Dupré, $400; Fort Jackson, $20,000; and Fort St. Philip, $3,300. (Statement 2, table A.)

The most western avenue by which New Orleans is approachable from the sea, passes on the west side of the island of Grande Terre into Barrataria bay, which is an excellent harbor for a floating force, guarding the coasting trade on that side of the Mississippi. From this bay there are several passages leading to New Orleans. The estimate for a work which is now about to be begun on Grande Terre island is $325,000. (Statement 2, table C.)

Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which would demand the employment of floating defences, in addition to fixed defences upon the shore. We have here an instance in which that kind of defence would be very useful. Fortifications will enable us to protect New Orleans even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy; but, owing to the great width of some of the exterior passages, we cannot, by fortification alone, deprive an enemy of anchorages, (especially that of Chandeleur island,) nor cover entirely the exterior water communication between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must, therefore, either quietly submit to the annoyance and injury that an enemy in possession of these passages may inflict, or avert them by a timely preparation of a floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the enemy. Our examination of the coast, from Cape Florida to the Sabine, having now been completed, we will, as in the case of the Atlantic coast, refer, for a comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrison of the works, to statement 2, wherein the works are divided into tables similar to those of statement 1.

The more essential works on the Gulf coast, included in the first five tables, will require for garrison, in time of war, 4,420 men; for the armament, 794 pieces of ordnance of every kind; and for the expense yet to be incurred, $516,780.

The works comprised in the last table (F) are generally such as may be postponed to a late day. But among them have been placed some (as, for example, those for Tortugas and Key West) as to which the examination has not been sufficiently minute to decide to what class they really appertain.

In this age of great improvements in the means of locomotion, it would be unwise to decide, without pressing need, on the details of the floating force required at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts