more probable than that Hannibal should have crossed the river in person with his Numidians the day before the battle to reconnoitre the ground, and, finding it so advantageous, that he should have led his army next day over to the northern bank. The Romans might naturally believe that the small camp, which was only insulted on the previous day, was now to be attacked in earnest; and Varro, impatient to fight and destitute of military talent, was just the general to follow the initiative of his great opponent.

It may be objected to this view of the subject that Hannibal would never have taken up a position with the river in his rear; but the fact is that in the harvest season the Aufidus is everywhere fordable at that distance from the sea; and, even supposing it not to have been so, a decisive defeat would in his circumstances have been certain ruin to the Carthaginian cause in Italy, however open his retreat might have been.

3. Hannibal had probably two objects in view in posting such a large proportion of his cavalry on the left flank; viz.:

1st. To insure the speedy overthrow of the Roman cavalry of the right wing, so that his victorious horsemen might influence decisively the other events of the day.

2nd. If the Romans were defeated, he would thereby be enabled to intercept their fugitives, who would naturally make for the camps which lay to the right of their line of battle, and for Canusium which was distant about five miles in the same direction.

In his orders to the cavalry, Hannibal observed the

Maxim No. 19 of the "Theory of War;"

inasmuch

as the Numidians on the right, only 2000 strong, held in check 4800 of the enemy's cavalry by demonstrations, and so enabled the 8000 Carthaginian horse on the left to overwhelm the few squadrons there opposed to them.

It is worthy of remark that Maharbal acted the part of a consummate cavalry officer. Not drawn away by the excitement of pursuit too far from the field, he returned after each success to influence decisively the fate of the day; whereas, had he pursued the Roman horse of the right wing off the field of battle, his success would have had no effect on the general issue; the cavalry of one wing of both armies would have been absent, nothing more. But Maharbal returned to overthrow the Roman cavalry of the left wing also, and leaving them to be pursued by the Numidians, he then made that charge on the rear of the Roman infantry which decided the day. His conduct stands in honourable contrast to that of Rupert at Naseby, of Jean de Vert at Nordlingen, and of too many cavalry commanders; but it must be remembered that the power of a cavalry officer to arrest his troopers while in the headlong pursuit of a flying enemy, depends fully as much on the general discipline of the men as on the will of their officer at the moment. Unless cavalry is always well in hand, the force is well nigh useless; and without previous discipline, the trumpets during a pursuit will sound the recall in vain.

*Page 151, "Theory of War."

The Roman infantry present on the field exceeded 60,000 men, and their formation in such deep masses rendered their very numbers a source of weakness. If 40,000 had been formed in the usual manner, and the remainder been kept in reserve, the result would probably have been very different. The Roman infantry was fully equal to that of Hannibal in a hand to hand fight. The struggle between the two lines would have been doubtful, and if the Africans wheeled inwards (as they actually did), to charge the flanks of the Roman mass, the Roman reserve would have turned the tables, and charged the Africans in flank and rear.

It was a terrible mistake of the Roman general to oppose 2400 of the élite of his cavalry to 8000 of the enemy. It would have been better, if he was determined to fight in the plain, to extend his infantry on one flank to the river, in the order best calculated to resist cavalry; to post the 4800 allied horse on the other flank; and to hold his 2400 Roman horsemen in rear with the reserve infantry, ready to reinforce the allied horse, or to act wherever their presence might be most necessary. He could not insure his being superior in cavalry at the decisive point, because the enemy was the stronger in that arm; but he should have acted so as to be as strong as possible at that point, and to remedy his inferiority by rapidity of movement and manoeuvring.

The 4800 Roman cavalry of the left wing ought to have gained a decided success in that quarter. They should have advanced against the Numidians, charged them if they resisted, and driven them off the field;

then, leaving 1000 to hold the Numidians in check, the remainder should have fallen on the flank and rear of Hannibal's Africans of the right wing, uncovered by the retreat of the cavalry; while the Roman infantry of the left wing, regardless of the fight in the centre, should have charged them in front. Hannibal's right wing must have been defeated before his heavy cavalry could have come to its support, for the line of battle was two miles long. Meanwhile, the centre of Hannibal's line would have been forced back (as it actually was); and it would have been hard if, with such troops as the Romans, their reserve of 20,000 infantry and 2400 cavalry, coming into action at this moment, had not been able to complete the victory even against Hannibal.

4. Most historians and commentators have blamed Hannibal for not marching on Rome the day after Cannæ. Even Napoleon has added his voice to the general condemnation.

If Hannibal was likely to find the citizens in such abject fear and despondency that they would open their gates to him, he may justly be blamed; but is it likely such would have been the case? Even though the Romans had not been a people whose courage and constancy under reverses have never been surpassed, hardly ever equalled, it is well known how great is the courage of despair. The Romans were a much greater people than the Carthaginians, and yet if we consider the example of Carthage, when, denuded of almost all power of resistance, every man, woman, and child united to defend their city to the last, we may estimate the re

sistance Hannibal might expect to meet with at the gates of Rome.

Such a

There was however no cause for despair. movement of Hannibal was the very one his enemies ought to desire. Behind walls, that discipline which is everything in the field is comparatively unnecessary, and natural courage equalises the untrained defender with the veteran assailant. The population of Rome was essentially warlike, and there was no lack of arms. The two city legions formed the regular garrison of the capital, numbering 10,000 men. The levy en masse of all above seventeen years of age provided two additional legions and 1000 cavalry. Eight thousand slaves who were willing to serve were enlisted and armed, and, besides these, a number of criminals and debtors were glad to purchase pardon by taking up arms in defence of the State. The prætor Marcellus was at Ostia with 10,000 men about to embark for Sicily. Thus, the force which could have been assembled to oppose Hannibal, four days after the arrival of the news of Cannæ, amounted to

Cannæ to Rome was, for the Carthaginian army encumbered with spoil, at least twelve days' march; and this distance excluded all possibility of a surprise, the hope