follow. Hannibal himself marched into Samnium to take possession of Compsa, which was delivered up to him by the popular party, and having there stored his plunder and heavy baggage, he sent his brother Mago with one division of his army into Bruttium to take possession of such towns as might submit, and to organise the efforts of his partisans in that province.

Hanno, with another division, was sent into Lucania, to act the same part; while Hannibal, with his main body, descended into Campania, and attempted to surprise Neapolis and Cannæ on the coast, the possession of which would have placed him in short and easy communication with Carthage by sea; but finding those places too strongly garrisoned, he marched upon Capua, which concluded an alliance with him, and received the Carthaginian army within its walls.

Meanwhile, Marcellus had withdrawn from Canusium when Hannibal moved towards Compsa, and, marching by the shorter route of Beneventum, took post at Casilinum, between Capua and Rome, to cover the passage of the Vulturnus; while the dictator, M. Junius, with 25,000 men, advanced from Rome and occupied a position at Teanum, about twelve miles in his rear.

Mago now embarked at one of the ports of Bruttium, to carry the news of his brother's success to Carthage, and to demand reinforcements. During the progress of this great struggle, neither Rome nor Carthage could be said to have the mastery of the sea. A constant stream of reinforcements from Africa might have landed in Bruttium, and fortunate was it for Rome at this time

that Hannibal's bitterest enemies were to be found, not in Italy, but in the Carthaginian senate, where the intrigues of Hanno and his faction, joined to the demands made on Carthage by the war in Spain, withheld those succours from Italy which might have enabled Hannibal to terminate the struggle by the conquest of Rome.

The accession of Capua was the greatest result, short of the submission of Rome itself, which could have followed from the battle of Cannæ, and the Campanian towns of Calatia, Atella, Acerræ, and Nuceria soon followed its example, by submitting to the conqueror. Nola, about midway between Capua and Niceria, was held by a Roman garrison; but the popular party in that town favoured Hannibal, and Marcellus, having learnt the existence of a plot to deliver it into his hands, marched round from Casilinum by the hills suddenly to Nola, where he overawed the disaffected and repulsed Hannibal in an assault with considerable loss.

The place of Marcellus at Casilinum was to have been filled by the advance of M. Junius from Teanum; but the movements of the latter were too slow, and Hannibal anticipating him, laid siege to Casilinum. The obstinate resistance of the garrison however obliged him to convert the siege into a blockade *; and, leaving a part of his force to guard his lines of circumvallation, he withdrew the remainder to winter quarters in Capua.†

The dictator remained at Teanum, and Marcellus in a fortified camp on the hills above Nola.

In Cisalpine Gaul, the prætor L. Postumius, early in † See Observation 4.

*See Observation 3.

the following year (215 B.C.), fell into an ambuscade, in which himself was slain, and his army destroyed.*

Meanwhile in Spain, during the year 216 B.C., the two Scipios had defeated two Carthaginian armies under Hanno and Hasdrubal, and driven them beyond the Iberus; and these successes not only cooled the native Spaniards towards the alliance of Carthage, thereby depriving that city of the best nursery of soldiers for the reinforcement of Hannibal, but occupied moreover a large body of African troops which might otherwise have been sent to Italy.

The pressing necessities of Rome prevented any supplies of money being sent during the winter to the Roman forces in Sicily and Sardinia. In Sicily, the friendship of Hiero supplied the deficiency; but in Sardinia contributions were levied on the inhabitants, who applied for assistance to Carthage, and, in the following year, openly revolted against Rome.

Before the end of the winter, the garrison of Casilinum reduced to the last extremity by famine, capitulated, without any vigorous effort appearing to have been made by the Romans to relieve it. But the relation of these operations is confused, and it is impossible to understand how a town, situated as Casilinum was, astride on the Vulturnus, and possessing a bridge, could have been blockaded by Hannibal effectually, as his army must in that case have been cut in two by the river, and the portion on the right bank exposed to destruction from the army of the dictator at Teanum.

* See Observation 5.

I

However that may be, Hannibal obtained possession of the town; and its important position, covering Capua and commanding a bridge over the Vulturnus, induced him to place there a garrison of 700 of his best troops.

FIFTH CAMPAIGN.

The consuls elected for the year 215 were Fabius Maximus, formerly dictator, and Tiberius Gracchus. Rome made gigantic efforts to carry on the war, and the forces for the year were distributed as follows :

Fabius succeeded the late dictator in the command of his army,
which moved from Teanum to Cales, and consisted of
Tib. Gracchus commanded new levies of volunteer slaves. He
took post at Sinuessa on the coast for the purpose of pro-
tecting Cuma and Neapolis, and his force amounted to
Marcellus, still in his camp above Nola, continued in com-
mand of

Marcus Valerius, prætor, commanded in Apulia
Appius Claudius, prætor, had in Sicily

Qu. Mucius, prætor, in Sardinia

The Garrison of Tarentum consisted of.
Publius Scipio commanded in Spain

:

Legions.

2

2

The army which Postumius lost in Cisalpine Gaul was not replaced; but Varro was sent to Picenum to raise soldiers, and to intercept any Gaulish reinforcements which might attempt to join Hannibal by the coast road.

To meet the extraordinary demands on the treasury for the maintenance of the above force, which, including

allies, represented a grand total of 140,000 men, the government had recourse to the simple expedient of doubling the year's taxes; and although the destruction of so many sources of wealth by the war, and particularly the ruin of the agricultural interest, must have caused this measure to press with great severity on the poorer classes, the people were in no mood to refuse any sacrifice however costly, and the money was paid.

Even in the revolted provinces, a guerilla warfare was organised against the Carthaginians and the revolted. Italians, from among the peasants and slaves who were employed on the public domains: and most of the principal towns of Southern Italy continued faithful to the Romans, because they had long since converted them into Latin colonies.*

In Apulia, Brundisium on the sea-coast, and Luceria and Venusia inland; in Lucania, the town of Pæstum on the coast; in Samnium, that of Beneventum on the great Appian road,-were so many fortresses held by Latin garrisons in the very heart of the revolted districts; while the Greek cities of Cuma and Neapolis, in Campania, were held for Rome by their citizens with no less devotion.

We have unfortunately no reliable statement of the

*The Latins were to be depended on the same as the Romans themselves. Their connection with Rome was more intimate than that of any other state, and although they did not, of right, enjoy the Roman franchise, they yet possessed many valuable privileges, and hoped to obtain more. All the cities of ancient Latium were long since become Roman, that is to say, colonised by Roman citizens. Unfaithfulness to Rome was thought impossible in her Latin allies; Samnium and Capua might revolt, but the fidelity of the Latin name was not to be shaken.