Capua by Casilinum. Hannibal proceeded towards Tarentum, but found his passage barred by Centenius and the force he had collected to replace that of Gracchus. Centenius was killed, and his army destroyed in the engagement he so rashly sought; and Hannibal then marched against the prætor Fulvius, who lay near Herdonea, being induced to do so by a knowledge of the vain and indolent character of that general, and of the loose discipline he maintained among his troops. Fulvius had about 18,000 men, and though far inferior in numbers to the enemy, his soldiers were eager to fight. Hannibal, informed of the spirit they were in, knew that he might choose his own field of battle, secure of being attacked. He accordingly posted 3000 light infantry in ambush behind the brushwood and hedges in the neighbourhood of the field of battle, and ordered Mago to place himself with 2000 Numidian cavalry during the action on the enemy's line of retreat. At day-break he then formed his army in front of his camp. Fulvius marched out immediately and formed opposite in one thin line, in order not to be outflanked by Hannibal, who was still very superior in numbers, notwithstanding the detachments he had made. The Romans hardly sustained the first shock; surrounded by Hannibal's ambuscade, and their retreat cut off by Mago's horse, their army was destroyed, and hardly 2000 men escaped from the field.

Thus within a few weeks three armies were lost to Rome, viz. that of Gracchus and the two which Hannibal had defeated; and her hold on Southern Italy was gone.

Notwithstanding these successes, we are told that Hannibal returned to Tarentum *, and being disappointed in his expectation of the surrender of the citadel, as well as in a belief that Brundisium would be betrayed into his hands, he remained inactive in Apulia during the remainder of the year, while the consuls resumed their operations against Capua. Three great magazines had been formed for the supply of the besieging force at Casilinum, Puteoli, and the fort of Vulturnum, at the mouth of the Vulturnus river, all of which were conveniently replenished by sea with corn brought from Ostia, whither it had previously been collected from Sardinia and Etruria. The disbanded infantry of Gracchus too was re-assembled and added to the armies of the consuls; Claudius Nero was summoned from his camp at Suessula, and the three armies began the great work of surrounding Capua with double continuous lines of contra and circumvallation, to repel the sorties of the garrison, and the attempts Hannibal might make to relieve it. The works were not completed till late in the winter; all the attempts of the Capuans to delay them were unavailing; and early in the year 211 B.C. they sent out a Numidian, who succeeded in passing the lines and reaching Hannibal with a pressing entreaty for help.

Towards the end of the year 212 B.C., Syracuse was taken by Marcellus, and a Roman fleet surprised in the port of Utica 130 corn ships, the capture of which afforded a seasonable supply to the Roman forces in Sicily, which were beginning to suffer from want.

* See Observation 7.

The war in Spain was marked during the same year by the defeat and death of the two Scipios, and by the withdrawal of the Roman forces behind the Ebro, whither they were pursued by the victorious Carthaginians commanded by Hasdrubal; who were, however, compelled to recross the Ebro by the valour and ability of a young Roman knight, L. Marcius, who had been raised to the command of the Roman army on the death of their leaders by the unanimous voice of the soldiers.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE THREE PRECEDING CAMPAIGNS.

1. In all of these campaigns the policy of the Roman commanders was to keep Hannibal constantly watched by two, sometimes three, armies, while others were employed in opposing his lieutenants in Lucania and Bruttium. Thus, on the opening of the campaign of 214, Hannibal, in his camp on Mount Tifata, had Marcellus on the one hand at Suessula, Fabius on the other at Cales, while Gracchus opposed Hanno in Lucania, and the prætor, Fabius the younger, was with another army in Apulia. It will be observed that the policy which was steadily pursued by the Roman generals to the end of the war, with the exception of two rash and incapable men, was to wear out Hannibal's troops with fatiguing marches and continued petty skirmishes, and never to engage in any combat unless the chances of success were greatly in their favour.

By such a warfare, Hannibal, abandoned by the suicidal folly of Carthage to his own resources, saw his troops melting from him by degrees. His own force was constantly diminishing, while that opposed to him never numbered less than 80,000 men. That he should have been able to maintain the struggle so long is due solely to his personal genius; and it is indeed wonderful to see him not merely maintaining the struggle, but marching and encamping where he pleased without let

or hindrance, his presence being the signal either for the total destruction of the opposing armies or for their hurried retreat.

2. The march of Gracchus to Beneventum was a fine strategical movement, ordered by Fabius to prevent Hannibal from being reinforced by Hanno. Thus both the roads from Lucania to Capua were blocked up, that by the sea coast being barred by the garrison of Nola. The movement of Gracchus and consequent defeat of Hanno obliged Hannibal to change all his plans.

It is true that even when reinforced by Hanno Hannibal's force would have been far inferior to the aggregate number of the Romans, but he would have been able to employ one army in siege operations, and to cover it with the other, quite secure that his great and unfailing superiority in cavalry would in that plain country enable him to defy all the attempts of the united forces of the enemy.

It will be observed that from this time the Romans maintained a force in Lucania to hold Hanno in check.

3. It cannot be believed that the numerous Roman armies should have been so unprofitably directed by the sagacity of Fabius as appears from the only existing accounts of this campaign. Hannibal, according to those accounts, lingered in the neighbourhood of Tarentum; yet the armies of Fabius and Emilius, in Apulia, neither attempted to impede his operations against Tarentum nor to besiege Capua which was left to its own resources. Gracchus, with a third army, was unprofitably employed in Lucania, while Cn. Fulvius lay

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