his real plans to the enemy. He showed himself wanting in invention. He should have sent off a messenger every day until he received word that one of them had arrived, and each messenger should have had a letter containing a false plan, to mislead, but the real plan should have been entrusted to the brain of the messenger alone. By this means the Romans would have been misled, while Hannibal would have received the information he required to enable him to act.

The catastrophe of the campaign was principally owing to the unskilful arrangements of Hasdrubal in this particular, for Nero would have remained as ignorant as Hannibal of the plans of Hasdrubal if no letter had been found on the messengers. And, on the other hand, if Hannibal had received the information he waited for, he would have instantly attacked Nero; and, judging by what was past, he might have disabled the consul from interfering with his northward march.

3. The march of Nero is one of the finest strategical movements on record. Objections have been made that he ran a great risk of Hannibal discovering his absence and following in his rear. It is true he did so; but Hannibal, marching through a hostile country with the army of Apulia, which Nero had left, hanging on his rear, could not have gone very fast. The distance 270 miles, which, by dint of the assistance of the entire population, Nero accomplished in seven days, would, under the most favourable circumstances, have taken Hannibal fourteen, more probably twenty. Nero's calculations were based on the suddenness of his appearance in the north, and probably on confidence in his

own military genius: he hoped to destroy Hasdrubal by one blow, sudden and decisive, and to return to Apulia in time to oppose Hannibal. War is a game of chances, and a general who risks nothing will gain nothing; his business is to reduce the risks to a minimum. Nero had time on his side, and time is a more valuable ally than any other. He took every possible precaution, particularly as regards secrecy, even keeping his own soldiers ignorant of their destination.*

The march of Nero is as perfect an example as can be afforded of the advantage of interior lines of operation.

The obstacles which existed to the junction of the two brothers were created by the fact that they were operating on exterior lines. The obstacles themselves

were:

No. 1. The numerous armies interposed between them.

No. 2. The want of concert between them from the absence of communication.

No. 1 might have been overcome if No. 2 had been removed, but No. 2 was fatal.t

4. There is something in Hasdrubal's conduct it is difficult to understand. If he was advancing confidently to attack 40,000 men, it does not clearly appear why he so suddenly changed his resolution. It is supposed that it was the knowledge that Nero was in the hostile camp, and the belief that therefore some disaster must have

* See page 24, "Theory of War," on the Value of Secrecy.
† See "Theory of War,” Lines of Operation, page 77.

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happened to his brother. Hasdrubal could only know of the arrival of Roman reinforcements either from the report of spies, or from the results of his own observation. If from spies, they would certainly tell him that the Consul Nero had arrived, but they would also tell him of the very small force by which he was accompanied, which would show that he had left his army to watch Hannibal in the south, and dispel the idea of any great disaster to his brother.

If he learnt the presence of a third Roman general in the hostile camp from observation, from the sounding of trumpets as some say, or otherwise, how could he know that the new arrival was Nero at all? It was much more probable to conclude that it was Varro, who might have been called up with his army from Etruria.

It seems probable enough that Hasdrubal retreated with the design of gaining the Flaminian road, which led from the north side of the Metaurus over the Apennines directly into Umbria, where he expected to meet Hannibal. The advance to the Sena River was therefore a false movement, for the great object was not to beat a single Roman army, but to unite with Hannibal. Having followed Livius to the Sena however, Hasdrubal did not sufficiently weigh the effect of a retreat, both on his own troops and on the malcontents of Etruria and Umbria, who were anxiously watching his progress. In his place probably Hannibal, Turenne, or Condé, would have fought on the Sena, trusting to the prestige which attended a son of Hamilcar.

Compare Hasdrubal's conduct with that of Turenne, when, in command of 16,000 men, he was surprised by

the approach of a hostile force of 30,000. Instead of retreating Turenne advanced.*

5. Hasdrubal's method of occupying his position is an example of Maxim 19 (page 151) of the "Theory of War." And the reader is referred to the description of the battle of Ramillies, at page 339 of the same book. He will find that the manœuvre by which Marlborough won the battle is identical with that of Nero, in withdrawing troops from the right wing to reinforce the decisive point on the left. He will also find that Marlborough's movement was made under precisely the same circumstances relative to the enemy, viz. the existence between the opposing wings of the hostile armies at that point of obstacles which prevented either from attacking the other.

6. The victories of Scipio in Spain were in all probability the salvation of Rome. Had he not deprived Hasdrubal of the south coast of Spain, and of the harbours there situated, Hasdrubal with his army would have proceeded to the southern coast of Italy by sea, there to disembark under the protection of Hannibal. The chances of the obstruction of the expedition by a Roman fleet were much fewer than were the chances against the brothers being able to effect a junction when separated by the whole length of Italy, and when six Roman armies were interposed between them.

We know that at a later period, when, owing to the continued successes of Scipio in Spain, the power of Rome relative to Carthage had greatly increased, Han

* See page 199, "Theory of War," on the Moral Effect of Boldness in War.

nibal effected the much more difficult operation of embarking his whole force in the face of hostile armies at a port in Bruttium, and that he arrived safely at Leptis in Africa.

The unsettled state of Cisalpine Gaul and Etruria had for some time past required the constant presence of a Roman army in each, and the same would still be necessary although Hasdrubal should land in Bruttium. It would have sufficed to send Carthaginian officers of experience to excite the Gauls and Etrurians to rise by the information of Hasdrubal's expedition and to organise their efforts.