unknown country, whose inhabitants, as Gauls, probably hated the Roman name, would have been madness; for it must be remembered that the tribes which opposed him on the Rhone were in the neighbourhood and under the influence of Massilia.

Scipio, therefore, perceiving it was no longer possible to prevent Hannibal from reaching the Alps, resolved to meet him in Italy on his descent from those mountains, when he hoped that the Carthaginian army, exhausted by the fatigues and privations inseparable from such a march, and diminished in numbers, would be easily vanquished by the Roman forces which were already assembled in Cisalpine Gaul.*

Scipio accordingly again descended the Rhone, and having despatched his army to Spain under the command of his brother, Cnæus Scipio, as his lieutenant, sailed himself to Pisa, whence he proceeded across the Apennines to take command of the Roman legions which were stationed on the Po under the Prætors Manlius and Atilius, whose force amounted to about 25,000 men.

Meanwhile, on the day after the sudden apparition of the Roman cavalry, Hannibal, having with some difficulty effected the passage of the elephants, broke up his camp and marched northwards, covering the rear of his line of march with his cavalry and elephants; for he believed Scipio to be in his immediate neighbourhood, and expected to be pursued.

The precise direction of his march is uncertain, but it appears probable that after having espoused the cause of one of two brothers near Valance who contended for

*See Observation 4.

the chieftainship of their tribe, and having received. from the successful competitor in return important succours, in the shape of provisions, arms, clothing, and above all of shoes,-the Carthaginian army crossed the Isère, and still proceeding for some distance up the left bank of the Rhone, at length struck off to the right across the plains of Dauphiné and reached the first ascent of the Alps.

This was near the northern extremity of that ridge of limestone mountains which, rising suddenly out of the plains to a height of 5000 feet, fills up the space between the Rhone at Belley and the Isère below Grenoble, and separates the plains of Dauphiné from the rich and wide valley extending from the Lake of Bourget to the Isère at Montmeillan. At the place where Hannibal crossed this ridge, it is of no great width. His progress was opposed by the natives, who guarded the defiles through which he must pass; but, learning that these only guarded them during the day, and at night withdrew to their homes in the valley beyond, he seized the defiles after nightfall, and on the next day effected the passage of his army, not without being attacked, however, and penetrated into the valley of Montmeillan. This town he took by storm. It was the principal stronghold of the barbarians, and in it he found large supplies of provisions and cattle.

Halting there for one day to rest his men, he then proceeded for three days up the right bank of the Isère. He was now met by a deputation of the natives who professed to be friendly, and having received from them supplies and hostages for their good behaviour, he was

induced, by their plausible conduct, to accept of their guidance through a difficult part of the mountains to which he was approaching. Here he narrowly escaped destruction from an attack made upon him by his treacherous friends at the most difficult part of the way; but at length all obstacles were surmounted, and on the ninth day after quitting the plains of Dauphiné, Hannibal and his army stood on the summit of the central ridge of the Alps, supposed to be the summit of the little St. Bernard Pass.

The period of the year was about the end of October; the first winter snows had already fallen; and the climate of the country being far more severe than at present, owing to the dense forests which at that time. covered the face of Germany, Hannibal's southern soldiers must have been in dreary quarters. It is probable that great numbers perished from cold, and certain that all must have been much worn and disheartened; for many mountain peaks still rose between them and Italy, through which their descent was likely to be both perilous and painful. But Hannibal's ascendancy over his men was complete; and, after a rest of two days, he resumed his march.

No more open hostility was manifested by the natives, but the natural difficulties of the route were greater than ever. The snow concealed the track, so that many losing it, fell over frightful precipices. At last the army came to a place where the track had been carried away by an avalanche for a distance of 300 yards. It was impossible to turn this obstacle by scaling the

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heights above, on account of the great depth of snow; and nothing remained but to reconstruct the road.

A summit of some extent was found and cleared of snow, on which the army encamped, and all, working for their lives, succeeded in completing in one day a practicable road for the cavalry and baggage animals, which were immediately sent on to encamp in a valley beyond; but for the passage of the elephants a wider and more solid way was required, and its construction occupied two days more, during which both men and elephants suffered terribly from cold and want.

At length all passed safely, and after a further toilsome march of three days, the army cleared the mountains and entered the territory of the Insubrian Gauls, messengers from whom had previously met Hannibal on the Rhone, to assure him of a friendly reception in their country.

The valley by which Hannibal is supposed to have descended into Italy, is the Dorea Baltea, the same by which Napoleon penetrated with his famous army of reserve in the Marengo campaign.

The principal difficulties of this march arose from the lateness of the season. Had the summit of the little St. Bernard been reached a month earlier, no fresh snow would have fallen, and fodder might have been procured for the cattle without difficulty. The commissariat labours must have been very great, as provisions had to be carried for about 30,000 men and 8000 cavalry horses, besides what was required for the baggage and pack animals, which could not have numbered less than 5000 or 6000.

Hannibal carried with him out of the mountains only 12,000 African and 8000 Spanish infantry, the remnant of 50,000 with which he quitted Spain. His cavalry, too, had dwindled from 9000 to 6000 horses.

He gave his army the rest its exhausted condition required, and having recruited its strength, his first expedition was undertaken against the Taurinians of Liguria who were hostile to the Insubrians, and would not on that account listen to the proposals of Hannibal to join him against the Romans. He took and sacked. their chief city, Augusta (the same as modern Turin), and struck such terror into the neighbouring tribes that they submitted and became his allies.

It is now time to turn our attention to the preparations the Romans had been making in the interval between Hannibal's departure from Spain and his arrival in Italy, and to the forces they had assembled to oppose their great enemy.

The two consuls of the year were, P. Scipio and Ti. Sempronius. Scipio's province was Spain, and it has been already related how, after his unsuccessful endeavour to stop Hannibal on the Rhone, he despatched his army to that province, while he himself went to command on the Po.

Sempronius, with another consular army, was destined to cross over into Sicily, and thence, if circumstances were favourable, to make a descent on Africa, in the hope by threatening Carthage to recall Hannibal to its defence. But Hannibal had not neglected among his other preparations to provide against such a contingency. Before he quitted Spain, fresh troops were, at