had actually entered Gaul, is not to be excused. No pains should have been spared by him to discover the position of the enemy, and the probable line of his advance. He should have sent out his light cavalry to scour the country on the western bank of the Rhone, to bring him intelligence of the approach of Hannibal in sufficient time to enable him to co-operate with the friendly tribes of the eastern bank, in defending the passage of the river. To facilitate this object it was necessary to occupy as central a position as possible. Probably one about midway between the sea and the Isara would have been best chosen.

When it is required to defend a long line, suppose the line of a river, and the point at which an enemy may approach it is uncertain, the general of the defensive force should not attempt to guard every practicable point of passage, for that would be impossible; and, even though it were possible, such a proceeding would too much disseminate his force, and would expose the separated fractions to be beaten in detail, supposing the enemy to succeed, as it is most probable he would do, in effecting his passage somewhere. In such a case the general of the defensive force should keep his troops well in hand in some central position, lining the banks with his light troops to observe the approach and the intentions of the enemy. It should then be his aim to come down suddenly on the enemy while in the act of forming his bridge, or, better still, after a part only of his force should have crossed.

Failing in this, he should previously have named some convenient point of concentration in rear of his

general line, commanding the line by which the enemy must advance, where the defensive army, in a strong position, might successfully dispute the further advance of the enemy, and defeat him with the river in his

rear.

Had Scipio occupied such a central position as has been supposed in the first instance, and failing thereby to prevent the Carthaginian army from crossing the Rhone, had he concentrated his force in a strong position in the rear, Hannibal could not have reached the Alps without fighting a battle. It was the Roman game to oblige Hannibal to fight as often as possible at a distance from Italy, and thereby to cripple him before he could reach the theatre of his intended operations.

The passage of a great river in presence of an enemy is a great military operation. It may be effected either by main force, or by stratagem in deceiving the enemy as to the intended point of passage; or, as Hannibal here exemplified, by a combination of both.

In general, the passage of a great river which is defended by an enemy, is effected either by stratagem, or by force and stratagem combined.

In such a case, having divided the enemy's attention. by demonstrations made by your light troops at various points along the river front, and having attracted his particular notice to some false point by manœuvres calculated to that end, you should then direct your columns as rapidly as possible on the real point previously selected, and throw your bridge across.

Alexander's passage of the Hydaspes is a striking illustration of these remarks; and there is a resemblance

between that operation and Hannibal's passage of the Rhone, inasmuch as, in both cases, the first passage was won by troops detached to a distance from the main body, which afterwards moved down on the flank of the defensive force.

4. The resolution which Scipio took to send his army to Spain, its original destination, instead of carrying it back with him to Italy, shows that he was possessed of some of the qualities which go to make up a great general; particularly of that enlarged general view without which a man may be an excellent tactician, but can never become a great commander. It is probably one of the rarest qualities of a general, the power of classifying in his own mind the various events and circumstances which may influence the fate of a campaign, and giving to each no more than its due weight. It is to this faculty the great Napoleon alludes, when he says: "The first quality of a general-in-chief is to have a cool head which receives only a just impression of objects; he should not allow himself to be dazzled either by good or bad news. The sensations which he receives successively or simultaneously in the course of a day, should be classed in his memory so as only to occupy the just place due to each; for reason and judgment are the resultant of the correct comparison of many sensations. There are some men who, on account of their physical and moral condition, make a single picture to themselves of every event; whatever knowledge, wit, courage, and other qualities they may possess, nature has not called them to the command of armies and the direction of great military operations.”

Scipio foresaw that if the Carthaginians were unopposed in Spain and had leisure to consolidate and to organise their conquests there, the safety of Rome would always be threatened, notwithstanding that Hannibal's army might be expelled from Italy; for the productive gold and silver mines of the Peninsula would constantly replenish the Carthaginian treasury; while the inhabitants, the best and bravest of barbarians, who were capable of becoming under the training of Hannibal and his brother equal to the best soldiers in the world, would afford a constant supply of recruits to the Carthaginian armies.

Arnold says, "Had Publius Scipio, at this critical. juncture, not sent his army to Spain instead of carrying it back with him to Italy, his son would in all probability never have won the battle of Zama."

And indeed the progress of this narrative will demonstrate it to be more than probable that if the Carthaginian forces, which were occupied in withstanding the Roman legions in Spain, had been at liberty to reinforce Hannibal in Italy, Rome could not have maintained the contest.

5. The position which Hannibal took up to the southeast of Placentia, between the Roman army and Ariminum, would have been in violation of the rules of war, if Hannibal had not been in a friendly country, and therefore able to march and encamp in any direction, secure of obtaining supplies from the country people. The violation of military rules would have consisted in this, that, although Hannibal had placed himself on the enemy's communications with Rome, the Roman army

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was based on Placentia, and had moreover several magazines in the neighbourhood from which it could draw its subsistence, while its position intercepted Hannibal's communications with the country of the Insubrian Gauls, to which he must have looked as his base if the country south of the Po had not been also friendly.

But under the circumstances it was a masterly manœuvre, for Hannibal thereby placed himself between Scipio and the advancing army of Sempronius; and he doubtless did so with the intention of intercepting the latter and of destroying him before he could unite with Scipio. Why he did not execute that intention it is impossible to explain. We learn that Sempronius marched from Ariminum and effected his junction with Scipio near Placentia. We know that Hannibal could not have been restrained by the weakness of his force, because he shortly after engaged the two consuls united; and he ought not to have failed from ignorance of the march of Sempronius, for he possessed a numerous and excellent light cavalry in the Numidians, who were the best scouts in the world. Whatever the explanation may be of his permitting Sempronius to pass him and to join Scipio, if it proceeded from any fault of his, which is very improbable, he speedily redeemed it.

6. The conduct of Sempronius at the battle of the Trebbia is a remarkable instance of military incapacity. In war it is an axiom that every possible chance should be enlisted on your side. But the generalship of Sempronius arrayed every chance against him. Instead of leading into action men fresh and vigorous, his soldiers