fatigued with struggling through the deep cold water, fasting and nearly frozen, were launched against Hannibal's troops in the full vigour of their strength. This was "taking the bull by the horns" with a vengeance; and the river, which the Romans crossed to engage the enemy, added immensely to their losses when they recrossed it to escape from him. It is a maxim that you should never fight with a river or defile in your rear, because, although you may be victorious, in such a position defeat would be ruin; and it is conceivable that even your chances of success would be diminished thereby, as men are not likely to fight so freely when they know their retreat is not secure.

7. The bravery and discipline of the Roman infantry, which broke through the enemy and marched clear off the field to Placentia, were admirable. With Hannibal's numerous cavalry it is difficult to understand how he allowed this body to reach Placentia-it certainly seems that he should have prevented its doing so. A parallel to this march is to be found in the magnificent retreat of the three regiments of the light division under Crawford, across the plain of Fuentes Onoro, in the face of an overwhelming French force of 5000 cavalry, 15 guns, and a large body of infantry in support.

8. The confidence Hannibal felt in the superiority of his own genius, is manifested by his plan for fighting at the Trebbia.

In judging of ordinary men we should be inclined to censure the inactivity which permitted the Roman army to cross the river and to form leisurely on the bank, without taking advantage of the confusion necessarily

occasioned by such an operation, to attack and defeat it when landing before it could recover from that confusion. A general less self-confident than Hannibal, when about to engage his troops against an untried enemy, would have availed himself of the above most obvious and certain method of inflicting defeat. But Hannibal's policy was not only to defeat but to destroy, and by the moral effect of the annihilation of his foe to intimidate the Romans, at the same time that he thereby confirmed his new found allies in the belief that they would consult their best interests by remaining faithful to him. Had Hannibal attacked the Romans during their passage of the river their defeat would not have been less certain, but it would have been less decisive both in fact and in its moral effect. A much smaller number of Romans would have fallen; and both they and Hannibal's allies might have entertained, the one the boast, the other the reflection, that had the terrible Roman legions been arrayed against Hannibal on a fair field the result might have been very different.

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CHAP. II.

SECOND CAMPAIGN.

AFTER the defeat of the Trebbia the remnant of the Roman army shut itself up in Placentia, and left the open country to Hannibal, who cut off all communication with Etruria and Ariminum. The Romans could only obtain supplies by the Po, east of Placentia, the navigation of which was secured to them by the small town of Emparium, well fortified and strongly garrisoned. This place Hannibal endeavoured to take by a night surprise, but the defenders were on the alert, and having warned the garrison of Placentia by signals previously agreed upon, Scipio marched out of that town at the head of his cavalry followed as closely as possible by his infantry, and attacked the Carthaginians, who, discouraged by a slight wound received by Hannibal, retreated.

To remove the unfavourable moral effect of this failure Hannibal now undertook an expedition against Vicumviæ, a town on the frontiers of Liguria, which the Romans had fortified during the Gaulish war, both for the purposes of a depôt and to act as a check upon the Ligurians. Although he was in possession of Clas

tidium which served him as a place d'armes, Vicumviæ impeded his communications with Liguria, and he therefore took that place by assault.

The consuls despairing of maintaining themselves on the Po, where they were isolated in the midst of a hostile population, took advantage of Hannibal's absence to withdraw from Placentia; and, having separated their forces, Scipio retired to Ariminum, Sempronius across the Apennines into Etruria, where he established his winter-quarters in the neighbourhood of Lucca.* By this measure they hoped to cover both the roads which led from Cisalpine Gaul into the heart of Italy, the one by Ariminum and Ancona, the other through Etruria.

Hannibal remained undisputed master of Cisalpine Gaul; but the season and his want of siege artillery did not admit of his besieging the posts of Placentia and Cremona, which were still held by Roman garrisons.† He was very desirous to relieve the Gauls from the burthens imposed on them by the presence of his army, and knowing that his first step upon the Roman territory would convert them from doubtful and impatient hosts, into active and zealous allies thirsting for the rich plunder of Italy, he attempted to lead his army across the Apennines into Etruria, but was met by so violent a storm, and his troops suffered so dreadfully from the cold, that he was compelled to return to winter in Gaul. Polybius relates how Hannibal, distrusting the innate treachery and fickleness of the inhabitants, had recourse to various disguises which he changed

*See Observation 1.

See Observation 2.

frequently during the winter to baffle the attempts he suspected might be made against his life by some Gaulish assassin.

Meanwhile the new Roman consuls chosen for the year 217 were, –

Servilius, who belonged to the aristocratic party, and Flaminius, who, although himself of a patrician family, had procured the passage of an agrarian law, and was on that account very unacceptable to the aristocracy.

A few words may properly be devoted to the character of Flaminius, because we cannot rightly appreciate the greatness of Hannibal without estimating at their real worth the character and abilities of those generals whom he overcame.

Flaminius has been described as a violent wrongheaded man, listening to no counsel, presumptuous and ignorant to excess. But this is the picture drawn by his enemies the Roman aristocracy, who hated him because he espoused the cause of the oppressed and opposed the interests of the moneyed class.

A greater man, the late General Sir Charles Napier, was painted in much the same colours and from the same motives by a powerful moneyed aristocratic Company-whose misgovernment he exposed, and whose favour he disdained to conciliate.

Flaminius was a remarkable man, far in advance of his time, of high principle, and of great public virtue. Seventeen years before the period of which we now speak he was chosen one of the tribunes of the people, and in that capacity carried an agrarian law for the

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