column of march, and encumbered by the rich plunder of the valley of the Arno.

It is supposed that the head of the Roman column, pressing eagerly forward and suspecting no danger, was attacked in front by Hannibal's infantry, and on the left flank by his cavalry, as it emerged from the Perusia end of the pass; while the Roman main body, still committed in the defile, was overwhelmed by huge stones rolled down from above, and charged by the Gaulish infantry and Numidian cavalry in the rear.

Of the Roman army only 6000 men cut their way through their opponents and escaped off the field to Perusia. Of the remainder, 9000 were made prisoners, the rest were slain; and among the latter was Flaminius himself. In the words of Arnold, "He died bravely, sword in hand, having committed no greater military error than many an impetuous soldier, whose death in his country's cause has been felt to throw a veil over his rashness, and whose memory is pitied and honoured. The party feelings which have so coloured the language of the ancient writers respecting him need not be shared by a modern historian. Flaminius was indeed an unequal antagonist to Hannibal; but in his previous life, as consul and as censor, he had served his country well: and if the defile of Thrasymenus witnessed his rashness, it also contains his honourable grave.

The 6000 fugitives invested in Perusia, destitute of provisions and cut off from all hope of succour, surrendered at discretion. Hannibal retained such of his prisoners as were Roman citizens or of the Latin name; but he allowed the remainder to depart, with the assurance

that, far from being their enemy, he had invaded Italy for the purpose of liberating its oppressed peoples from the tyranny of Roman dominion.

The road to Rome now seemed open to the conqueror, whose loss in the late battle was only 1500 men. The army of Servilius was still at Ariminum, and no regular force existed between Hannibal and Rome. But he knew he could not hope to subdue that city so long as she was surrounded by faithful allies.* He must first detach the neighbouring provinces from their allegiance; and the only way to do so was to make their inhabitants personal witnesses of the frequent defeat of the Roman armies, and personal sufferers by the calamities of war, from which they might think they could only escape by deserting the cause of a city which was apparently already deserted by fortune. Hannibal therefore, after ravaging the rich plains of Umbria, and having failed in an attempt to surprise Spoletum, crossed the Apennines in the direction of Ancona, invaded Picenum, and, levying contributions in every direction, marched by the coast-road into Apulia, where he hoped to form for himself a secure base of operations which should be in communication with Carthage by sea.

The Roman spirit rose with disaster; the word "Peace" was not even whispered in the city, nor was it proposed to recall a single soldier from Spain. To remedy the evils of divided command, Fabius was appointed dictator and Minucius his master of the horse or lieutenant.

*See Observation 4.

Quintus Fabius Maximus, chosen dictator in this emergency, belonged to one of the noblest and at the same time most moderate families of the aristocracy, and he was himself of a nature no less gentle than wise. Although probably not a strong believer in the religion of the state, he was a consistent observer of its rites and obligations; because he was convinced that without a reverence for the gods the character of a nation must assuredly degenerate, and that a false religion was therefore far better for its professors than none at all. He knew also what a powerful engine religion or superstition was to influence the masses; and therefore, on the very day of his inauguration as dictator, he summoned the senate, and, dwelling on the importance of propitiating the gods, moved that the Sibylline books should forthwith be consulted: and, having observed the directions of the oracle, he now turned to oppose the invader.

In anticipation of Hannibal's advance upon Rome, stringent orders were issued to the inhabitants of the districts through which he might be expected to march, to destroy the corn, to burn the houses, to lay waste the lands, and to remove themselves and families and cattle into fortified towns. Bridges were everywhere broken down, and the defences of the city were strengthened.

Meanwhile the army of Servilius was withdrawn from Ariminum and reinforced by two newly raised legions. Of this force, numbering about 50,000 men, Fabius now took the command, and having led it through Campania and Samnium into Apulia, he encamped at the distance of six miles from the Carthaginian army.

The consul Servilius was appointed to command the

Roman fleet and to oppose the Carthaginians at sea, who had just intercepted some reinforcements destined for Spain.

The Romans had now the advantage of general numbers, although very inferior to Hannibal both in number and description of cavalry; they were likewise regularly and plentifully provisioned, and had no occasion to scatter their forces to obtain subsistence, as Hannibal was obliged to do. This last was an immense advantage, for the details of feeding an army require far more study and forethought on the part of a general than the mere fighting.

Fabius kept his army well in hand, following Hannibal when he moved, at a safe distance, and cutting off his foraging parties; being careful always to encamp on ground where cavalry could not act with advantage: so that at length Hannibal, unable to provoke his cautious antagonist to a battle, and disappointed in the hope he had entertained of being joined by the Apulians, once more crossed the Apennines and entered Samnium, where, finding the gates of Beneventum shut against him, he wasted the neighbouring lands and took possession of Telesia; thence descending the Calor to its junction with the Vulturnus, and ascending the latter river till he found a convenient spot, he crossed it near Allifæ, and passing over the hills which separate Samnium from Campania descended by Cales into the Falernian plain.

This district, the richest in Italy, promised an immense booty. Hannibal hoped by his move into Campania either to oblige Fabius to risk a battle to protect it; or, should the dictator continue to avoid an engage

ment, to induce some of its cities to espouse the Carthaginian cause by furnishing them with so plain a confession on the part of the Romans of their inability to protect their allies.

Fabius steadily followed Hannibal, never descending into the plain, but watching him from the hills. Again the Numidian marauders were seen scouring the country in every direction, and the smoke of burning houses marked their track. The Roman soldiers beheld the sight with the greatest impatience; they were burning to attack, and Minucius, the master of the horse, encouraged the feeling. The character of Minucius was fiery and impatient; he could not tolerate the prudent policy of Fabius, blamed his incapacity or timidity, and constantly urged him to attack Hannibal and by one great stroke to terminate the war. We may be sure likewise that, as in modern armies, there was no lack of self-sufficient young gentlemen (and old gentlemen too, for that matter) to echo the sentiments of Minucius, and to criticise freely, and probably with plentiful ignorance, the measures of their general. But in the words of Sir Walter Raleigh," All stirred not this well-advised commander; for wise men are no more moved with such noise, than with wind bruised out of a bladder.” *

Fabius now conceived the design of enclosing Hannibal in a net. The Campanian plain, which the Carthaginians were plundering, was enclosed on the south by the Vulturnus river, over which the only bridge was at Casilinum and was defended by the Roman garrison of that town; on the east, the hills from Casilinum to Cales

* See Observation 5.

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