formed an unbroken barrier, steep and wooded, with very few passes, and these strongly guarded by the Romans; Cales, on the north, was a Latin colony which closed the outlet by the Latin road; and a passage by the Appian road was shut up by several fortified places, and particularly by the difficult and strongly guarded pass of Terracina.

The Roman main body encamped on the hills between Casilinum and Cales, whence all the movements of the enemy could be easily observed.

With all the resources of Samnium in his rear, and on his right in communication with Rome by the Latin colonies of Cales, Casinum, and Fregellæ, Fabius designed to wait patiently until Hannibal's army, having consumed its supplies and possessing not a single town or magazine in Campania, must either starve or endeavour to break its net, and this at such a disadvantage as would, he hoped, insure a defeat which would in Hannibal's position have been total ruin.

Hannibal was aware of the difficulty of wintering in Campania, and had no intention of doing so. He had carefully husbanded his plunder, and he desired now to store it in some safe place, and to get his troops under cover for the ensuing winter in some district which was as yet untouched by the ravages of war. The greatest difficulty against which this great man had to contend, was the necessity of encumbering his movements with the accumulated plunder of Italy, both as a precaution against want and to gratify his soldiers. And, in judging of Hannibal's genius, this great difference between his circumstances and those of his opponents must not be

lost sight of; for it was as though a horse weighted with bags of lead ran against another unencumbered, and yet won the race.

Of the two outlets from the Campanian plain by the Appian and Latin roads which led to Rome, neither could safely be attempted by Hannibal, because the Roman army would have followed in his rear, and would have attacked him while endeavouring to force the obstacles in his front.

The same objection applied to his crossing the Vulturnus; for the only bridge over that river was in possession of the Roman garrison of Casilinum, and the passage of so deep and rapid a stream elsewhere could not possibly be safely effected in the presence of the Roman army.

The part of the line offering the best chance of success was that which to a non-military judge appeared the most difficult, viz. the mountains between Cales and the Vulturnus, the passes over which were few, difficult, and strongly guarded. Hannibal designed by a stratagem to entice the Roman troops to quit the passes they were left to guard, and he accomplished his object in the following manner.

Among the plunder were many thousand cattle; and having caused 2000 of the stoutest oxen to be selected, and pieces of split pine or vine branches to be fastened to their horns, these were shortly before midnight driven by the light troops straight to the hills, avoiding the passes guarded by the enemy. The torches about the heads of the poor animals having been previously lighted, the oxen maddened by fear and pain, scattered

in all directions over the summit of the hills, and presented to the astonished defenders of the passes the appearance of an army moving over the heights. As soon as the light troops had driven the oxen sufficiently far in the direction they wished them to take, they assembled at the point of the hills above the pass Hannibal designed to force, and, by annoying the Roman troops there posted, confirmed them in the belief that Hannibal's army, in despair of forcing the road, was attempting to break out over the mountains. The Roman troops thereupon quitted the pass, and scaled the heights to interrupt or harass the retreating foe.

As soon as Hannibal saw the lights moving on the top of the heights he commenced his march. The African infantry led the way; they were followed by the cavalry; then came the baggage and booty, and the rear was covered by the Spaniards and Gauls. In this order he followed the road to the defile by which he was to get out into the upper valley of the Vulturnus, and, the pass being deserted by its defenders, his march was unopposed.

Meanwhile Fabius with his main body, confounded by the strangeness of the sight, and dreading lest Hannibal was tempting him to his ruin as he had tempted Flaminius, kept close within his camp until morning. Day broke only to show him his own troops, who should have guarded the passes, engaged on the hills above with Hannibal's light infantry; and presently the Spaniards who formed Hannibal's rearguard (his main body having already cleared the defiles) were seen scaling the heights to reinforce their comrades. The Romans were then

driven down towards the plain, and the Spaniards and light troops having thoroughly done their work descended the hills on their side and followed their main

body.

Hannibal's design was to winter in Apulia, but he knew that he might safely take advantage of the discouragement of his enemies to extend his devastations before the termination of the season. He accordingly mounted the valley of the Vulturnus towards Venafrum, marched from thence into Samnium, crossed the Apennines, and descended by Sulmo into the Pelignian plain which yielded him a rich harvest of plunder: thence retracing his steps into Samnium, he finally returned to the neighbourhood of his old quarters in Apulia.

The summer was now far advanced: Hannibal had overrun the greater part of Italy, and had invariably been successful in his operations against the enemy; but the allegiance of the Italian states to Rome was yet unshaken, and not a single town had opened its gates to the invader.

That patience in waiting for results, without being depressed by disappointment and without being disheartened by delay, which is a conspicuous mark of a great commander, was possessed by Hannibal in an eminent degree. His great experiment had hitherto failed. He knew that his single army without the aid of allies within the country might overrun, but could not conquer, Italy; and six months had apparently brought him no nearer to such aid than he was after his victory at the Trebbia.

Yet Hannibal was not discouraged. Alone in the midst of enemies, his firm heart resolved that the fidelity of the Roman allies, which his victories during the closing year had been unable to shake, should be tried in the ensuing year by successes still more astounding. Meanwhile he chose the richest part of Apulia for his winter quarters, and took by storm the town of Geronium, where he stored his supplies and sheltered his sick; his army occupied an entrenched camp outside the town.

Fabius, notwithstanding his mortifying failure, followed Hannibal into Apulia, and, being still determined to play the same cautious game, encamped on high ground in his neighbourhood. Fabius was soon after summoned to Rome on business connected with his office. He left the command of the army in his absence to Minucius, strongly enjoining that general to continue to observe his system strictly, and not on any account to risk a general battle.

Minucius immediately approached to within five miles of the Carthaginians and then encamped on a hill (A). Hannibal was in the habit of sending out daily two thirds of his force to forage, keeping the remainder under arms to be ready to succour the foragers if attacked or to defend the camp. Aware of the departure of Fabius, he had little doubt of being able to tempt the impatient disposition of Minucius to hazard a general action. He accordingly drew nearer to the Romans, and encamped on a hill (B) about three miles from their camp, and two miles from Geronium. Between the two armies was a hill (c) which Hannibal