Another prætor, L. Postumius, with one legion, was to watch the frontier of Cisalpine Gaul.

On the arrival of spring the Roman army was still in the neighbourhood of Geronium, and Hannibal in his entrenched camp covering that town. His genius for command had been signally displayed during the winter in governing the heterogeneous materials of which his army was composed. Gauls, the most uncertain and fickle race in the world; Spaniards, the natives of a newly conquered country; and Africans, themselves alien subjects to Carthage, and harshly governed; all remained contented and submissive under his sway during the long inactivity of winter-quarters, which is proverbially trying to the best disciplined troops.

The spring advanced, and Hannibal's supplies were nearly exhausted; the neighbouring country, completely ruined by the presence of the two armies, could no longer furnish provisions. It became therefore necessary to shift his position to provide for the sustenance of his soldiers. Hannibal's circumstances now urgently required that he should gain some signal success, both to encourage his own troops and to intimidate the Roman allies. The great advantage the Romans had over him, consisted in the large magazines of provisions and munitions of war they had formed in various places, which dispensed them from the necessity of scattering their force to seek supplies, and enabled them always to remain united and ready to fall upon the detachments which Hannibal was compelled to make to enable his army to exist. This was the greatest danger to which he was exposed, and was one which, so long as he him

self did not possess some towns wherein to store his provisions, it was impossible to remove.

The great Roman magazine of Apulia was at Cannæ, a town near the river Aufidus; and Hannibal suddenly descending into the plains, turned the Roman position and reaching Canna by forced marches, captured that town with all its accumulated stores.* He thus not only obtained possession of his enemy's supplies, but interposed between the Romans and the low district of Southern Apulia, where alone at this early season the corn was fully ripe.

By this move the Romans were reduced to choose one of the three following courses, viz.

1st. To retire and leave Hannibal undisputed master of Apulia.

2nd. To remain in the neighbourhood of Hannibal, but avoiding a battle in continuance of the Fabian policy which would compel them to draw their supplies from a great distance.

3rd. To fight a battle for the recovery of their magazines.

The newly elected consuls now assumed the command of the Roman army in Apulia which was increased by the addition of new levies to eight legions complete, so that the force which was immediately opposed to Hannibal in this memorable campaign amounted to 80,000 infantry and 7200 cavalry.

The army of Hannibal consisted of 40,000 infantry and of 10,000 excellent trained cavalry of whom 2000 were Numidians. His inferiority to the Romans in

*See Observation 1.

actual numbers was very great, but a large proportion of the latter were raw troops, while those of Hannibal were for the most part veterans; and above all he had on his side the immense advantage of a divided command in the army opposed to him, which he well knew was of itself sufficient to balance the disparity of force.

Of the three courses presented to the choice of the Romans, as above stated, the first was not to be thought of for one moment; because the Apulians, already impatient of the burthen imposed on them by the ravages of the Carthaginians, would certainly declare for the invader if the Romans by retiring confessed their inability to oppose him.

The same reasoning, though in a less degree, applied to the adoption of the second course; besides which the difficulty of feeding so large á force from a distance for any length of time, would have been nearly insuperable.

The Roman government, actuated by the above considerations, determined to adopt the third alternative, and sent orders to the consuls to fight a general action. They accordingly broke up from Geronium and approached Hannibal who occupied an entrenched camp in the immediate neighbourhood of Canna, at A (see diagram.)

On the second day the Romans encamped at a distance of six miles from the Carthaginians. Here a difference of opinion, as might easily have been foreseen, arose between the consuls, who commanded the Roman army on alternate days. Varro wished to march against

the enemy without delay, while Emilius was averse to risk an engagement in a country which, being level and open, was favourable to the action of Hannibal's superior cavalry.

On the following day Varro, whose turn it was to command, marched towards the hostile camp. Hannibal attacked the Roman advanced guard on the march with his cavalry and light infantry; but the Romans had a decided advantage in the engagement which lasted for several hours, principally, it is said, owing to the fact that Varro remedied the inferiority of his cavalry by the support of a strong body of his heavy armed infantry, besides that of his light troops.

The same evening the Roman army encamped at B (see diagram) about three miles from Cannæ, on the right bank of the Aufidus.

Next morning Emilius, who commanded on that day, detached one-third of his force across the river to encamp at c, for the purpose of supporting the Roman foraging parties on that side and of interrupting those of the enemy.

Two days afterwards Hannibal quitted his camp, and formed his army in order of battle to tempt the Romans to attack; but Emilius, sensible that the nature of the ground was against him, would not move, contenting

himself with strengthening his camps and with the establishment of outposts.

Hannibal, after waiting for some time in his position, at length returned to his camp, whence he detached his Numidians to the other side of the Aufidus to cut off the Roman foraging parties, and to prevent the troops in the small camp on that side from getting water, which at this particular season was an almost intolerable hardship. On the next morning Hannibal, who always made it his particular business to acquaint himself with the characters of his opponents, knowing that Varro was in command, and feeling sure that he was burning with impatience to avenge the insult of the previous day, led his army over the river, and formed it in order of battle, having previously left 8000 men to guard his camp. He probably effected this change of position because the ground on the left bank of the Aufidus presented a wider plain for the action of his cavalry, and because he thought that the surest way to induce the Romans to engage was to threaten their camp on that side.

The situation of the field of battle is a disputed point. Some writers have placed it on one bank of the river, some on the other. But Swinburne tells us that "immediately opposite to the Carthaginian camp, and exactly in that part of the plain where we know with moral certainty that the main effort of the battle lay, the Aufidus, after running due east for some time, makes a sudden turn to the south and describes a very large semicircle." Niebuhr is of opinion that Hannibal formed his army in the loop between d and e; and