possess; the wholesome temperament of our climate; the luxu. riance and fertility of our soil; the variety of our products; the rapidity of our population; the industry of our countrymen; and the commodiousness of our ports; naturally lead to a suspicion of independence, and would always have an influence per. nicious to us. Jealousy is a predominant passion of human na ture, and is a source of the greatest evils. Whenever it takes place between rulers and their subjects, it proves the bane of civil society.

The experience of past ages may inform us, that when the circumstances of a people render them distressed, their rulers generally recur to severe, cruel, and oppressive measures. Instead of endeavoring to establish their authority in the affection of their subjects, they think they have no security but in their fear. They do not aim at gaining their fidelity and obedience, by making them flourishing, prosperous, and happy; but by rendering them abject and dispirited. They think it necessary to intimidate and awe them; to make every accession to their own power, and to impair the people's as much as possible.

One great engine to effect this in America, would be a large standing army, maintained out of our own pockets, to be at the devotion of our oppressors. This would be introduced under pretext of defending us; but, in fact, to make our bondage and misery complete.

We might soon expect the martial law, universally prevalent to the abolition of trials by juries, the Habeas Corpus act, and every other bulwark of personal safety, in order to overawe the honest assertors of their country's cause. A numerous train of court dependents would be created and supported at our expense. The value of all our possessions, by a complication of extorsive measures, would be gradually depreciated, till it became a mere shadow.

This will be called too high wrought a picture, a phantom of my own deluded imagination. The highest eulogies will be lavished on the wisdom and justice of the British nation. But deplorable is the condition of that people, who have nothing else than the wisdom and justice of another to depend upon.

"Political writers," says a celebrated author,* "have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave; and to have no other end, in all his actions, but private interest. By this interest we must govern him; and, by means of it, make him co-operate to public good, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition. Without this, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution; and shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties and possessions, except the good will of our rulers; that is, we should have no security at all.

"It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave. Though, at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics which is false in fact. But to satisfy us on this head, we may consider that men are generally more honest in a private than in a public capacity; and will go greater lengths to serve a party than when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honor is a great check upon mankind. But, where a considerable body of men act together, this check is in a great measure removed, since a man is sure to be approved by his own party for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamors of adversaries. To this we may add, that every court or senate is determined by the greater number of voices; so that, if self-interest influences only the majority (as it will always do), the whole senate follows the allurements of this separate interest; and acts as if it contained not one member who had any regard to public interest and liberty." What additional force do these observations acquire, when applied to the dominion of one community over another!

From what has been said, it is plain, that we are without those checks upon the representatives of Great Britain which alone can make them answer the end of their appointment with respect to us; which is the preservation of the rights, and the advancement of the happiness of the governed. The direct and inevitable consequence is, they have no right to govern us.

*Hume, vol. 1. Essay 5.

Let us examine it in another light. The House of Commons receives all its authority from its electors, in consequence of the right they have to a share in the legislature. Its electors are freeholders, citizens, and others, in Great Britain. It follows, therefore, that all its authority is confined to Great Britain. This is demonstrative. Sophistry, by an artful play of ambiguous terms, may perplex and obscure it; but reason can never confute it. The power which one society bestows upon any man, or body of men, can never extend beyond its own limits. The people of Great Britain may confer an authority over themselves, but they can never confer any over the people of America, because it is impossible for them to give that to another which they never possessed themselves. Now, I should be glad to see an attempt to prove that a freeholder, citizen, or any other man in Great Britain, has any inherent right to the life, property, or liberty, of a freeholder, citizen, or any other man in America. He can have no original and intrinsic right, because nature has distributed an equality of rights to every man. He can have no secondary or derivative. right, because the only thing which could give him that is wanting-the consent of the natural proprietor. It is incumbent upon you to demonstrate the existence of such a right, or any thing else you may produce will be of little avail. I do not expect you will be discouraged at the apparent difficulty. It is the peculiar province of an enterprising genius to surmount the greatest obstacles, and you have discovered an admirable dexterity in this way. You have put to flight some of my best arguments, with no greater pains than a few positive assertions, and as many paltry witticisms; and you become altogether irresistible by adding, with a proper degree of confidence, You know the case to be as I state it.

When I say that the authority of Parliament is confined to Great Britain, I speak of it in its primitive and original state. Parliament may acquire an incidental influence over others, but this must be by their own free consent; for, without this, any power it might exercise would be mere usurpation, and by no means a just authority.

The best way of determining disputes, and of investigating

truth, is by descending to elementary principles. Any other method may only bewilder and misguide the understanding, but this will soon lead to a convincing and satisfactory crisis. By observing this method, we shall learn the following truths.

That the existence of the House of Commons depends upon the people's right to a share in the legislature, which is exercised by means of electing the members of that house. That the end and intention of this right is to preserve the life, property, and liberty of the subject, from the encroachments of oppression and tyranny.

That this end is accomplished, by means of the intimate connection of interest, between those members and their constituents, the people of Great Britain.·

That with respect to the people of America, there is no such intimate connection of interest, but the contrary; and therefore that end could not be answered to them; consequently, the end ceasing, the means must cease also.

The House of Commons derives all its power from its own real constituents, who are the people of Great Britain; and that, therefore, it has no power but what they originally had in themselves.

That they had no original right to the life, property, or liberty, of Americans; nor any acquired from their own consent; and of course could give no authority over them.

That, therefore, the House of Commons has no such authority.

What need is there of a multiplicity of arguments, or a long chain of reasoning, to inculcate these luminous principles? They speak the plainest language to every man of common sense; and must carry conviction where the mental eye is not bedimmed by the mist of prejudice, partiality, ambition, or avarice. Let us now see what has been offered in opposition. to them.

But, by the way, let me remark, that I have levelled my battery chiefly against the authority of the House of Commons over America; because, if that be proved not to exist, the dispute is at an end. The efficacy of Acts of Parliament, de

pends upon the due authority of the respective branches, to bind the different orders and ranks of the nation.

It is said, that "in every government there must be a supreme absolute authority lodged somewhere. In arbitrary governments, this power is in the monarch; in aristocratical governments, in the nobles; in democratical, in the people, or the deputies of their electing. Our own government, being a mixture of all these kinds, the supreme authority is vested in the king, nobles, and people; i. e., the King, House of Lords, and House of Commons elected by the people. The supreme authority extends as far as the British dominions extend. To suppose a part of the British dominions, which is not subject to the power of the British legislature, is no better sense than to suppose a country, at one and the same time, to be, and not to be, a part of the British dominions. If, therefore, the colony of New-York is a part of the British dominions, the colony of NewYork is subject to, and dependent on, the supreme legislative authority of Great Britain."

This argument is the most specious of any the advocates for parliamentary supremacy are able to produce; but when we come to anatomize, and closely examine, every part of it, we shall discover, that it is entirely composed of distorted and misapplied principles, together with ambiguous and equivocal

terms.

The first branch is, That "in every government, there must be a supreme, absolute authority lodged somewhere." This position, when properly explained, is evidently just. In every civil society, there must be a supreme power, to which all the members of that society are subject; for, otherwise, there could be no supremacy, or subordination; that is, no government at all. But no use can be made of this principle beyond matter of fact. To infer from thence, that unless a supreme absolute authority be vested in one part of an empire over all the other parts, there can be no government in the whole, is false and absurd. Each branch may enjoy a distinct, complete legislature, and still good government may be preserved every where. It is in vain to assert, that two or more distinct legislatures cannot