ply, necessary to lock up our seaports, and render the whole of our national frontier invulnerable.

Steam power on railroads, as we now understand its use and application, will enable us, without animal power, and at a comparatively trifling expense, to transport with one locomotive, at the rate of twenty to twenty-five miles an hour, or three hundred miles a day, mortars or cannon weighing one hundred and thirty tons, to a distance which it would require five hundred good draught horses fifteen days; or, in other words, $50,000 worth of draught horses fifteen days to convey this supply of heavy ordnance over our common roads the same distance; whereas, the railroad steam engine, worth but $6,000, would require but twelve dollars worth of fuel, and fifteen dollars worth of oil, &c., whilst the five hundred horses would require for this fifteen days' trip at least $2,000 worth of forage; and, moreover, a floating battery that would cost not one-fourth as much as a seventy-four gun ship-a floating battery that would carry two hundred heavy cannon, and would require less depth of water than a sloop of war of the largest class, might be wielded at the rate of eight to ten miles an hour by a towboat, such as those employed daily on the Mississippi river, between New Orleans and the Balize.

The wisest men of all nations to whose history we have access, have deemed it to be a dictate of political prudence, whenever a subject or citizen had discovered any evident improvement in any branch of the art of war, whether in the construction of a weapon, in a fortification, or in tactics, and especially in the means of facilitating or reducing expense in the movement of troops or munitions of war, to obtain without loss of time any and every such improvement. Much pains have been -taken, and great expense incurred, to obtain models of improved firearms, and gun-carriages, and caissons, with fixed ammunition and implements of various kinds; an improvement in these by which our arm may be rendered more destructive, or in other words, more useful; or by which a larger quantity of ordnance or ammunition may be moved with increased celerity or safety, without increasing the expense of animal or other power usually employed, has been deemed a meritorious service; and for such improvements or discoveries, distinguished tokens of public approbation have been awarded to the fortunate subject or citizen who made the discovery. Periods of peace are always most propitious to the attainment of these objects. The proposed improvement in the national defence, by the application of steam power on railroads to vehicles of -land transportation, will be found to surpass any other, if not every other, improvement or discovery known to military history. It is in every possible view of the subject so transcendent as to carry conviction to every military mind embracing its manifest bearings and tendencies, that all such will admit that it is destined soon to produce an entire change in the mode and manner of military operations, both in the attack and defence of nations and of places; and that it will produce a more memorable epoch in the art of war than has ever occurred in any one century, if not in any ten centuries, since the earliest dawn of the civilization of man. Railroads leading from the central States to the national frontier of a country like this, with steam power applied to vehicles of land transportation, aided by large floating batteries, constitute the first and only discovery known to man, whereby such a country,

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acting on the principle of self-defence, can, without doubt, and at a moderate expense, and by means that will fill the public coffers, and in a few years of peace repay that expense with compound interest, hold in her own hands forever, under favor of an overruling Providence, the incontestable issue of war; any nation of our numerical strength, and military character and resources, availing herself of this discovery, may, if she "be just and fear not," safely assume the attitude of honest defiance towards the armies and navies of Europe, if not of every other quarter of the globe; whilst the most warlike nations, neglecting the use of steam power, with the proposed means of defence, will be found wholly unable to maintain their independence. In this view of the subject, it presses itself upon our attention, not as a matter of choice, but as a matter of necessity, as a measure of self-preservation.

Some nations have been supposed to excel their neighbors in the science of fortification; but experience has proved that to excel in this branch of the art of war has contributed but little, and only for a very short period of time, to give the nation possessing it any very decided or permanent advantage over her enterprising antagonist or rival neighbors. It has been found that the ablest engineers, with the most perfect system of fortification, have failed in the construction of works that could long withstand the regular approaches and the vigorous assaults of a veteran and determined foe, without the assailed having constantly the means of obtaining timely re-enforcements, with supplies of subsistence and ammunition from his interior depots. It is obvious, from the military history of Europe, that those nations who have taken care to construct the most approved fortifications have frequently suffered the greatest losses in their wars with nations of equal or nearly equal numerical strength. The strongly fortified nation, or commander, confiding overmuch in the supposed invulnerability of his works of defence, has too often committed the fault of relying for his security, not on the skill and disciplined prowess of his troops, but mainly upon the supposed perfection of his fortifications, and the imagined inability of his adversary to reduce them. He thus commits the great fault of remaining within his cordon of fortifications. His country thus becomes the theatre of war, which compels him to incur the expense of keeping in service double or triple, if not ten times more force than his antagonist; because he (the assailant) is left to choose the point of attack and the time of attack, (two immense advantages,) whilst the assailed, without railroads, must be always ready for action at every point, and at all times. His splendid fortifications must all be expensively armed, amply supplied with subsistence and ammunition, and strongly garrisoned. He is constantly anxious, lest his enemy should attack some vulnerable point, and his apprehensions are as constantly realized. war progresses; his weak points are seen and taken. His prosperous agricultural and manufacturing districts are overrun and laid waste. is finally compelled to patch up a peace, pay the expense of the war, after having suffered the deep mortification of seeing the war continued for years without the invader having ever once deigned to visit any of the splendid fortifications so much relied on for his destruction.

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The proposed system of railroads, on the contrary, will contribute so much altogether to favor the assailed and to oppose to the assailant the insurmountable obstacles of having hurled against him, with a rapidity not

to be evaded, all the vital power of the heart of the republic, to the extremities; or, in other words, all the military men and resources of the vast body of the interior States and districts of the country, to the frontiers; that this means of defence will be found to be ten times better adapted than any other hitherto discovered to favor the country whose policy or disposition may induce her to confine herself exclusively to defensive war.

The only sure means of preventing wr is to be prepared for it; not with additional fortifications, which are always expensive, and are useful only in war, but with railroads from the centre to the frontier. These in war will do incalculably more for the national defence than fortifications, whilst the railroads will, both in war and in peace, enrich every State and Territory through which they shall be constructed; and be more especially a perpetual blessing to the agriculturists, and all who are in any manner employed in cultivating and subduing the earth and developing its countless resources, most of which requires the application of steam power and railroads to convey with cheapness and rapidity productions of unwieldly bulk, or great weight, to profitable markets.

I may be asked, if indeed railroads, with steam power, are destined to be so transcendently formidable in the hands of a nation or an army acting on the defensive, what is to hinder the invading foe, when the fortune of war favors him, from occasionally taking our railroads and other means of conveyance, and turning them against us? I answer, that we may sometimes expect such a reverse of fortune, particularly upon sections of our railroads near the seaboard. I contend, however, that, as means of defence, steam power, applied to vehicles of land transportation on railroads extending from the centre to the frontier of a country like ours, with large floating batteries in our seaports, is incalculably more certain to benefit the nation acting on the principle of self-defence than the invader. But to meet the question more directly, I say, let the invader come; let him for once take possession of our railroads, leading, for example, from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, or Georgia, to this place, or to Lexington, Kentucky; let him come as far as he possibly can towards the interior, and he will find himself, as he approaches, surrounded with constantly accumulating difficulties and dangers, from which he will find no means of escape. He will not have cleared the western limit of either of those States before he will find in every hour's march a pass which, if not equal in strength to that of Thermopylæ, will not be without a Leonidas, with a force quite equal, man to man, and with weapons better adapted to command success than those of the ancient Grecian hero.

Let the experiment of turning our railroads against us, and thus penetrating the heart of our country, be once attempted, and, my life upon it, the effort will never be repeated.

The capture of Burgoyne, in the State of New York, when principally a wilderness, or with little more than a tenth of its present population, has contributed to relieve us of any similar intrusion. An enemy thus approaching our centre cannot but be morally and physically weakened by every step he takes, until he finds himself surrounded and overpowered by men whose numbers and whose prowess, increasing in an inverse ratio to the panic and despondency of the enemy, must soon tend inevitably to his annihilation.

Upon the organization and employment of the army and militia of the United States, I take leave to refer to my communication of the 2d December, 1826, addressed to Major General Brown, and to another upon the same subject, which I addressed to the Secretary of War, dated November, 1830; and I request they may be considered in connexion with this report. The close and inseparable connexion between the army and the militia of the United States precludes the possibility of any constitutional law or regulation being so framed as to apply exclusively to either, without affecting very materially, if not equally, the other. Their interests can no more be separated than can the privileges and duties of self-government be separated from the privileges and duties of self-defence, on the part of the citizens of the United States in their national character. Hence, I hold it to be my duty to keep in view the militia, as well as the army, in whatever regards the Government or interests of either; being perfectly satisfied that a book of regulations, to be perfect or useful, or to be in accordance with the law of the land, must be appli cable as well to the militia as the army; and more especially adapted in all respects to a state of war.

Deeply impressed as I am with the melancholy reflection that we have suffered half a century to pass away without doing any thing for the militia, other than to praise them and content ourselves with the reflection that it certainly is practicable to render them in fact what we have long deemed them to be in theory, and what they must be, "the bulwark of our liberty and national independence," and as well qualified for defending as for governing the republic, I hold it to be the bounden duty of every public functionary, and every citizen, to unite in urging the adoption of measures to render the militia as efficient in the national defence, as they are or can be in the discharge of their civil duties. Their organization is without symmetry or efficiency, as is that of the army; they are not fit for war on the sudden approach of war; they are not fitted by proper instruction to measure, in the open field, their strength with a veteran foe, battalion to battalion, or army to army, with a prospect of success; nor can they, without an improved system, calculate on success until they shall have been taught in the school of adversity the most essential duties of the art of war, which should, if possible, be acquired preparatory to the day of battle.

The history of the war of 1812 and 1813, with the known condition of the militia and army at this time, with the impossibility of any considerable improvement under existing laws and regulations, will, I apprehend, bear me out in my present views of the subject. Our system of instruction, as it respects officers of the line of the army, is not calculated to call forth once a month a single effort of the body or the mind, such as should habitually occupy both, in order to familiarize them to the necessary action and effort of physical and mental preparation for war. If this kind of action or effort is not rendered habitual, the officer whose elementary education may have been sufficient to qualify him for the speedy attainment of every kind of knowledge for all the practical duties of a field marshal, (and I am convinced that we have many, probably hundreds of officers, thus promising,) he will be found, on the approach of war, unprepared or but little better prepared for the practical duties of his station on an active campaign than if he had been half his time, since he reft

West Point, locked up in a miscellaneous library. He who now devotes his time and attention, month after month, and year after year, only to the showy routine of garrison duty, with reason to apprehend that he may grow gray in the continued performance of garrison duty, will never, except in the absence of the last new novel, and to "kill time," take the trouble to awaken his recollection of the transcendental powers of mathematical science, with which his mind and his library had been stored; and upon which possibly his most important duties in a coming war may be found mainly to depend. These recollections will but seldom, if ever, be awakened in the dull routine of garrison duty, at a military post where there may be but one or two companies, with room and constant occasion for a battalion or a regiment, as is now the case with many of our large forts on the seaboard. But when the little detached post happens to be in a wilderness, some 500 or 1,000 miles distant from the probable theatre of any future war in which the regular officer of artillery or infantry would be likely to participate, in a war against any civilized nation, it must be evident that the officer thus situated might honestly and faithfully devote a quarter of a century of his lifetime to such duties, without being prepared for the field of battle against an experienced veteran foe.

I therefore propose that the infantry regiments may be drawn from their present positions on the western frontier, and placed on artillery as well as infantry duty, in the new fortifications on the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic seacoast, and the northern frontier.

And in order to perfect the officers and instruct non-commissioned officers and private soldiers in all the practical duties of the service, including every arm, with field fortifications and the construction of railroad and railroad equipments, I propose that one of the principal fortifications within each of the five grand divisions of the national frontier, as proposed in the report, be converted into a military labor school, with the requisite laboratory, foundry, tilt-hammer, and other work-shops adapted to the service.

I propose, moreover, that measures be taken to draw to those military labor schools, by regular details from the junior classes of the militia of the United States, as many students as the laws authorize, or the apparent exigencies of the service may require, with all applicants for office to serve for 3 or 4 years' time, and to do garrison and other duty as a part of their military instruction; and thus, in time, we should be enabled to abandon our present recruiting system, which we have borrowed from England, and too long employed in obtaining drunkards and idlers to fight our battles, and in place of these we should have an army worthy of our institutions.

I propose that these students should be examined and placed on meritrolls, as at West Point; and assured that they will be called on to fill vacancies, as cadets and non-commissioned officers, as often as such vacancies occur at West Point, as well as in the several regiments throughout the army.

These military labor schools, in addition to filling the vacancies as they occur at West Point and in every company in the army, would in a few years contribute to supply every State and district in the Union with practical military men and scientific mechanics, qualified to extend