JAN. 6, 1837.] Reprinting Documents. [H. OF R. ample. I hope, however, to be more successful than sider fair game. If I have done injustice to any individthe opposition have been for the last eight or ten years.ual, I shall be ready to make such explanations as the My prediction is, that the next administration will pursue circumstances may require; but to what I have said of a calm, prudent, and wise policy, both at home and parties, their conduct and principles, I shall firmly ad. abroad; that it will bear about the same relation to Gen-here, until convinced that I have been mistaken. eral Jackson's that Mr. Madison's did to Mr. Jefferson's administration, with the exception that there will be no national bank chartered. And if Mr. Van Buren should be a candidate for re-election, he will get all the States he did at the late election, and the votes of Georgia, Ohio, Indiana, and I believe Tennessee, in addition. The country will proceed in its career of prosperity; and the close of his administration will see him one of the most popular Presidents that has ever occupied the execu tive chair of this great republic. FRIDAY, JANUARY 6. Mr. GILLET, from the Committee on Commerce, offered a resolution for the reprinting of sundry documents in relation to the reorganization of the Treasury Department, and the number and compensation of custom-house officers, &c., and for the printing of certain manuscript documents thereto appended. Mr. ADAMS said he did not know that he had any great objection to reprinting these documents, but he would like to hear some reason given by a member of the Committee on Commerce why they should be reprinted. He would like to know whether the documents were large or small, what the expense would be, and whether any good was to result from reprinting them. The document was not intended for circulation among the people, but merely for the use of the members of the House. He believed it was not customary to reprint documents which had been already published, for the use With regard to the resolution now before the House I have but little to say. I am in favor of a thorough examination of any department where there is reason to believe that either fraud, corruption, or dishonesty exists. Let there be some evidence to warrant the House in adopting the resolution; some definite charge, some distinct statement, to warrant the procedure, and I will go as far as any gentleman to ferret out the fraud, and drag the culprits to light. But I do not like the language of the original resolution. It is too general, too sweeping in its phraseology. It includes all the transactions of all men with the departments, whether direct or indirect, official or unofficial. The contracts and dealings of every private citizen, who has ever had any thing to do with any department of the Government, may be thus subject-gether the information requisite to the understanding of ed to the inspection of a committee of this House. It is to that I object. Still, sir, I do not know but I shall vote for it as it is if I cannot get it altered. I have not heretofore voted for such propositions; but, after all that has been said by the opposition, I think it is due to the President, to ourselves, and to the coming administration, that we should throw open the doors, and let these gentlemen examine for the corruption about which so much has been said. It is due to the President, whose term of service is drawing to a close, that the condition of the departments be made known to the country; and, if fraud be found there, that the innocent should be justified and the guilty pun ished. It is due to ourselves, because we have been indirectly charged with a desire to smother and conceal the maleadministration of public affairs. And it is due to the President elect that we should deliver the executive departments into his hands thoroughly purified from all iniquity, so as to make him responsible only for the misdeeds of his own subordinates, committed whilst he is in power. For these reasons I shall vote for a strict and general scrutiny, such as shall be satisfactory to all reasonable men, of every political party. of the members. Mr. GILLET explained that the documents were of inconsiderable size, and that his object was to collect to the particular subjects to which the documents had reference, with a view to place that information collectedly in the possession of members. As to the expense, he had not examined the question. He felt no personal solicitude about the reprinting; and his sole object had been to lay before the members, in a compact form, the information which was requisite to their action on the subjects embraced. Mr. E. WHITTLESEY called for a division of the question; that was to say, on the printing of so much of the documents as now remained in manuscript; so far he had no objection; but the other portion of the documents had been twice printed already, and the question presented was to reprint all the business documents on the calendar, which had not been acted on at the last session of Congress-whether documents were to be printed a third time. This was economy with a vengeance! It was a species of reform to which he hoped the attention of every member would be turned. He cared nothing for any amount of necessary expend. iture in printing; that he was at all times willing to vote for. The charge which had been made by the gentle. man from New York, [Mr. GILLET,] against the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. DAVIS,] could not be made against him, (Mr. W.,) because he had raised his voice against these expenses, and the House had not sustained him. However voluminous the documents might be, if it was actually necessary he would go to the full extent, whatever the expense might be. Mr. GILLET explained that these documents were not to be reprinted for the purpose of being bound up, but merely to put the House in possession of information which it was indispensable they should have before act One word, Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, with respect to this kind of discussion in which we are now engaged. No one dislikes it more than I do. What I have said has been absolutely provoked by the course which gentlemen on the other side of the House have pursued. I have listened to their attacks upon the administration and upon its friends for a long time, in hopes that some one of more age and experience, and of greater ability, would meet these assaults, and repel them as they deserved. No one did so, and i considered it my duty to assume the position I have taken. I am aware that 1ing on the bills to which the documents related. He rehave subjected myself to violent attacks, here and elsewhere. I surveyed the whole ground before I com. menced, and having come to the conclusion that it was my duty to take the field, I am not the man to be deterred by consequences. I have endeavored throughout the discussion to confine myself within the rules prescribed by parliamentary law. I have avoided all personalities, striking at masses of men, their movements and principles. These I con minded the member from Ohio of the vote which he [Mr. WHITTLESEY] had given at a former session, in favor of printing a very useless document, which served the purpose only of wrapping paper for merchants, &c.; he alluded to the Post Office report. Mr. E. WHITTLESEY said he had nothing to do with the number of the Post Office document which the House had ordered. But he did not raise his voice against the printing of that document, because he thought H. OF R.] R. P. Letcher and T. P. Moore-- William Anderson. then, and he still continued to think, that that document should be disseminated through every nook and corner of the United States; and he pledged himself that if the gentleman from New York would now bring forward a document equally important, he (Mr. W.) would not stop at any number short of twenty thousand. That doc ument had developed one of the most stupendous frauds that had ever been brought to light under any Government on earth; and the reports of the majority and minority of that committee were so essentially alike, that the best friends of the administration in this House could no longer sustain the Post Office Department. Had the gentleman from New York ever read that report? Mr. W. apprehended he had not, or he [Mr. GILLET] never would have risen and pronounced the document Useless. Was it not shown by that report that the Department was insolvent? And had not its debts to be paid out of the public Treasury? What was the fact now? Notwithstanding the Department at that time was in debt some seven or eight hundred thousand dollars, there was now a surplus on hand of some two or three hundred thousand dollars. This great and advantageous change had been brought about under the present administration of the Department; but it had been achieved under the auspices of the Post Office Committee, without whose untiring exertions and fidelity in that investigation the Department would have been in a state of the most deplorable bankruptcy. And yet such a document was useless. After a few explanatory observations from Mr. CONNOR and Mr. GILLET, Mr. SUTHERLAND said he thought this was a matter which did not require much speaking, and that the question had better be decided one way or the other. The only question was, did the House want the information or not? If they thought it was worth printing, let them have it; if not, let it pass. The Committee on Commerce did not want it; the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILLET] did not want it. But he (Mr. S.) would say, let us have it, if the unenlightened gentlemen of the House did want it. Mr. D. J. PEARCE spoke in favor of the motion to print, and said that the rejection of it would not be extending towards the Committee on Commerce the courtesy usually manifested in such cases. After some further remarks from Mr. ADAMS, [JAN. 6, 1837. Mr. WILLIAMS, of North Carolina, called for the yeas and nays on the question of recommitment. After a few remarks from Mr. MANN, of New York, Mr. ANTHONY called for the previous question. Mr. RENCHER moved to lay the bill on the table, and called for the yeas and nays; which were ordered; and, being taken, were: Yeas 35, nays 157. So the motion to lay the bill on the table was lost. The question then recurring on seconding the previ ous question, the House seconded the same: Yeas 83, nays 46. Mr. WILLIAMS, of North Carolina, called for the yeas and nays on the question of taking the main ques tion; but the House refused to order them. And the main question was ordered to be now put. Mr. WILLIAMS, of North Carolina, called for the yeas and nays on the main question; which were ordered. And the main question, "shall the bill pass?" was then taken, and decided in the affirmative: Yeas 125, nays 64, as follows: YEAS-Messrs. Adams, C. Allan, H. Allen, Anthony, Ash, Bailey, Barton, Beale, Bean, Beaumont, Bell, Bockee, Borden, Bovee, Boyd, Briggs, Brown, Buchanan, Bunch, Burns, Bynum, J. Calhoon, Carr, Casey, Chaney, Chetwood, J. F. H. Claiborne, Clark, Cleveland, Craig, Cramer, Cushing, Cushman, Darlington, Davis, Dawson, Doubleday, Efner, Elmore, Fairfield, Fowler, Fry, Gal braith, R. Garland, Gillet, Granger, Grantland, Haley, Hamer, Hannegan, Hardin, Harlan, S. S. Harrison, A. G. Harrison, Haynes, Henderson, Hoar, Holt, Howard, Hubley, Hunt, Huntington, Huntsman, Ingersoll, Ing. ham, William Jackson, Joseph Johnson, R. M. Johnson, Henry Johnson, Benjamin Jones, Kennon, Kilgore, Laporte, Lawrence, J. Lee, Leonard, Lewis, Lincoln, A. Mann, J. Mann, Martin, M. Mason, May, McKennan, McKeon, McKim, Moore, Morgan, Muhlenberg, Page, Patterson, D. J. Pearce, Pearson, Pettigrew, Phelps, Phillips, Pickens, Pinckney, Potts, Reed, Joseph Reyn olds, Schenck, Shields, Shinn, Sickles, Slade, Sloane, Smith, Spangler, Sprague, Storer, Sutherland, Taylor, Thomas, John Thomson, Waddy Thompson, Turrill, Vanderpoel, Wagener, Washington, Webster, Weeks, White, T. T. Whittlesey, Yell--125. NAYS--Messrs. Ashley, Black, Bond, W. B. Calhoun, Campbell, Carter, G. Chambers, Chapman, N. H. Claiborne, Connor, Corwin, Crane, Deberry, Dromgoole, Mr. GIDEON LEE said that, upon the calculation that Dunlap, Evans, Everett, Forester, French, Fuller, J. every five hours of the time of the House was worth Garland, Graham, Graves, Griffin, J. Hall, 9. Hall, Har $3,000, a portion of time had been expended in the deper, Hazeltine, Hiester, Hopkins, Howell, Jarvis, C. bate which would pay the expense of printing these docu-Johnson, Lane, Lawler, Gideon Lee, Love, Loyall, Ly ments many times over. He was under the necessity, therefore, of invoking the aid of that labor-saving ma chine, the previous question. And the House seconded the call. And the main question was ordered to be now put. And the main question, in part, being on the reprinting of documents other than those in manuscript, was taken, and lost. And the second portion of the main question, being on the printing of the manuscript document, was taken, and decided in the affirmative. So the manuscript document alone was ordered to be printed. R. P. LETCHER AND T. P. MOORE. The bill for the relief of Robert P. Letcher and Thomas P. Moore coming up, on its final passage-Mr. LANE called for the yeas and nays on that ques on, Samson Mason, McCarty, McLene, Milligan, Montgomery, Owens, Parker, Rencher, Richardson, Robert son, Rogers, Russell, Seymour, W. B. Shepard, A. H. Shepperd, Standefer, Steele, Taliaferro, Turner, Un derwood, Vinton, Wardwell, E. Whittlesey, L. Williams, S. Williams--64. So the bill was passed. WILLIAM ANDERSON, The bill for the relief of the legal representatives of William Anderson coming up- After some remarks by Messrs. UNDERWOOD, VIN. TON, PARKER, BELL, HUNTSMAN, BRIGGS, and CAVE JOHNSON, Mr. SHIELDS said that, at the commencement of this discussion, he had been improperly impressed with the belief that the Cherokee Indians and the United States were in a state of partial war at the time the loss was sustained for which these claimants are now seeking indemnity; but, upon a careful examination of the history of the times, and the circumstances immediately connected with this claim, (said be,) I find that, at that pe riod, a state of perfect peace existed between that tribe of Indians and this country. It will not, therefore, be necessary to consider, in the argument which I now propose to submit, whether this Government should or should not indemnify her citizens for depredations committed upon their property by the enemies of the country, when in a state of actual war with another Power. The Commiton Indian Affairs, by which this bill was reported, state, in its accompanying report, that this claim rests upon the same facts and circumstances, or, rather, that it is identical in point of proof, with the claim of the heirs of James Brown, which was allowed at a former session of Congress. I shall, therefore, in this discussion, refer to the facts in that case, as reported by the Committee on Indian Affairs in 1832, and shall take the facts as reported by that committee, at least, as prima facie true. These claimants allege that they should be indemnified as the legal representatives of William Anderson, deceased, for the loss of property plundered from their ancestor, James Brown, by the Cherokee Indians, in 1788. It will be recollected by every one that, by the terms of the treaty of Hopewell, concluded in 1785, that portion of territory which now composes a considerable part of Middle Tennessee was ceded to this country by the Cherokees, and was immediately thrown open for the reception and occupation of our citizens. Among the early adventurers who manifested a disposition to establish a permanent home in this part of the Western wilderness was James Brown, the ancestor of these claimants. In the fall of 1787, he and his family, carrying with them all their valuable property, arrived on the banks of the Holston, more than two hundred miles distant, by land, from the place of their destination. Believing that a passage down the Tennessee river could be more easily effected, and be, at the same time, less perilous, than a trip across the mountains, early in the following May (1788) they embarked, with a considerable amount of property, on board a boat, which they had prepared in the mean time, and descended the Tennessee river. While floating down this river, after they had reached the limits of the Indian territory, through which they had necessarily to pass, by an act of the ba sest perfidy, under the disguise of friendship, they were suddenly surrounded by upwards of seventy Cherokee warriors. Mr. Brown himself, two of his sons, and five boatmen, "the only adult males on board the boat," were instantly slain, Mrs. Brown, her three daughters, and two minor sons, made captives, and their property plundered and carried off by the Indians. It is for the loss of a small portion of this property, thus violently seized, that one of these captive girls who afterwards became Mrs. Anderson, and her orphan children, now ask an indemnity from the Government. Can the Government, consistently with its past policy, its future interest, and the justice of this individual application, allow the sought-for indemnity? It is, in the first place, I believe, admitted that, in time of peace, there is a claim on our Government for the protection of the person and property of the citizen, and for spoliations committed by any other than our own citizens. But it is contended, in argument, that we have not sufficiently shown that a state of peace then existed, and that the very act of hostility of which we complain is evidence of the want of a state of actual peace; and that a state of peace or war with an Indian tribe can only be determined by the character of the acts of one or both of the parties! I infer, however, that a state of peace existed at that period, from the history of the times, the cotemporary conduct of a large community of our citizens who resided in the vicinity of this tribe of Indians, the conduct of James Brown him. self, and from direct and unequivocal declarations of the Congress of the United States, contained in a proclamation of that year on this very subject. [H. OF R. ston, the ancestor of the petitioners obtained a permit from one of the headmen of the tribe to pass on his contemplated voyage through the Indian territory, accom panied with every assurance of protection and safety. The community in which he had resided from the fall of 1787 until May, 1788, were on terms of perfect amity, and indeed had been from the treaty of Hopewell up to that time. And, further, this treaty of Hopewell, it should not be forgotten, contained the following remark. able provisions, with regard to our relations towards the Cherokees, in articles 9 and 10, to wit: That "the United States in Congress assembled shall have the exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs, in such manner as they think proper;" and, again: "Until the pleasure of Congress be made known respecting the 9th article, all traders, citizens of the United States, shall have liberty to go to any of the tribes or towns of the Cherokees, to trade with them; and they shall be protected in their persons and property, and kindly treated." No other intercourse regulations had been entered into with this tribe previous to 1788, and none, except one or two of a very partial bearing, up to the general intercourse law of 1802, which has regulated our intercourse with all the Indian tribes from that to the present time. It is true there were other stipulations in the several treaties concluded, respectively, at Holston in 1791, at Philadelphia in 1792 and 1794, and at Tellico in October, 1798, but none of a general nature touching this point. There is still stronger evidence of our peaceable relations to be found in the proclamation of Congress to which I have already alluded. This proclamation was issued, by a resolution of Congress, the 2d day of September, 1788, in four or five months after the plunder of the boat and murder of Brown and the crew. This proclamation, a copy of which I now hold in my hand, recognises and reaffirms the obligations and binding efficacy of the treaty of Hopewell, without the slightest complaint with regard to any breach of the treaty, or of any depredations on the part of the Indi ans; in which, also, they threaten heavy penalties against any of the citizens of the United States who should dare to infringe any of the articles of that treaty. It is evident, from the language of this proclamation, that Con. gress regarded the Cherokees in a state of amity at that time; and, from what we have stated already, it is equally evident that our citizens who resided on the borders of that tribe so regarded our relations at the same period. These considerations seem to me to exclude the idea of the existence of a state of war at the date of the loss sustained by the petitioners. The several reports of the Committee on Indian Affairs on this subject, in summing up the testimony on this point, fully concur in the same opinion. "This is an application," says the able chairman of this committee, "to be paid the value of property taken with force by the Cherokee Indians prior to the enactment of laws regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and in time of peace between the Cherokees and the United States." Then the act of which we complain has not been regarded by the committee, and I think cannot be looked upon as creating a state of partial war, or, as some of the gen tlemen have styled it, a state of quasi war, so as to exclude this claim from a favorable consideration by Congress, under the established policy of the Govern ment. If this position were correct, you cannot conceive of any possible case in which those who had sustained an injury in time of peace by Indian treachery and violence could obtain redress for the loss and outrage; for the obvious answer would be ever ready, that the Government does not indemnify her citizens against the depre Prior to his departure from the settlement on the Hol-dations of an enemy committed in time of war. The act of hostility complained of creates a state of Indian war, because Indians never make formal declarations of war, like civilized nations; therefore the indemnity in this particular case cannot be allowed. This position cannot be sustained in any point of view. Nor is it conceived that the risk and hazard which Brown encountered by descending the river through the Cherokee country is such a departure from a course of due propriety, and from the obvious sense of the existing treaty regulations, as to exclude these claimants from relief. His object the settlement of the newly acquired territory-was lawful, and even commendable. He had obtained a permit from the nation to pass through their grounds, and the proof is, that his conduct towards the Indians was unexceptionable in all things. This is altogether unlike the case of a trader, whose object is to gain by traffic. He surely, then, had not, by his own conduct, put his person and property without the pale of the protection of his Government. It will be seen, by inspecting the sev eral treaties with the Cherokees, that no provisions were made in any of them to satisfy such claims as the present. But in the 9th article of the treaty of Tellico, or, as it is more familiarly called, the treaty of 1798, the usual remedy between the Indians and border settlers, which is that of reprisal, was expressly taken away, leaving the party injured without any summary redress, and, indeed, without any redress at all, unless this Government shall interpose its protection. It is provided in the article of the treaty of 1798 just quoted, that "all animosities, aggressions, thefts, and plunderings," prior to the date of the first conferences in that year, "shall cease, and be no longer remembered or demanded on either side."-(Laws of the United States, vol. 1, p. 334.) By this treaty stipulation, even the privilege to demand their rights of the Cherokees was expressly taken away from our citizens. And, much more, the ordinary remedy, so much practised on the Western frontier, of reprisal. It does seem to me most clear that the Government, by this act, became liable, in good faith, to satisfy all bona fide claims of private citizens against the Cherokees that existed prior to the treaty of 1798, on account of "aggressions, thefts, and plunderings, of that nation." But it is argued, that if this claim should be allowed, a new policy will be established and introduced into our legislation, which will prove in the end onerous to the Government. This position is so far from being correct, that, if this claim be rejected, it will change the whole policy of this Government with regard to such claims, for the last ten or fifteen years. I do not pretend, said Mr. S., to have that profound information as to our Indian relations, or as to precedent generally, as many honorable gentlemen who have addressed the House on this subject. I have neither had the experience nor the means necessary to such attainments. But, in examining the past course of the Government on this subject, I find the aggregate sum of twenty-one thousand and eighty-six dollars appropriated, by act of Congress "approved 25th March, 1830," as full compensation to certain individuals named in said act, for horses stolen and property destroyed and taken by the Osage Indians, in the years 1816, 1817, 1823.—(Vol. 8, Laws of U. S. 294.) And again, in the year 1832, I find the sum of nine thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars appropriated by act of Congress of that year, to be paid to the legal representatives of John and James Pettigrew, for depredations committed on the private property of the Pettigrews, while navigating the Tennessee river in 1794, with interest upon that sum at the rate of six per centum per annum, from the date of the loss sustained, until the same should be paid-[Here Mr. SHIELDS asked the favor of the Clerk to read the report of the committee in the case of the Pettigrews, which he did]—and which Mr. S. said [JAN. 6, 1837. was similar, in all its material circumstances, to the claim now under consideration. The loss was sustained by private individuals, while descending the Tennessee riv. er, in the Cherokee territory, by the act of that tribe of Indians, while in a state of peace. Mr. S. said, I might cite many other cases in point, from Missouri and elsewhere, which I have before me, but I will not con sume the time of the House by reciting them. I shall desist, after again directing the attention of honorable members to the case of the heirs of James Brown, of which this claim is a counterpart, a duplicate, which in fact is identical with it in all its circumstances. [He bere sent the report of the committee in Brown's case to the Clerk, a part of which was then read.] I am satis fied, after this explanation, that it must be apparent to all, that whatever may be done hereafter, Congress bas repeatedly heretofore granted relief in many cases pre cisely similar to the one made out in this application; and, indeed, that it has been the policy of the Government, for a number of years past, without exception, up to this time, to do so. I cannot, therefore, see why this claim of the widow and orphans of William Anderson should be made an exception to a rule so well established. But I am apprehensive that the prospective claims from Flor ida may have an undue weight upon the minds of some, in deciding upon this claim. Still I hope they will not; it will be time enough to consider the justice of those claims when they shall have been presented. If, how ever, the policy of the Government, heretofore pursued with regard to the Cherokee depredations committed prior to the treaty of 1798, should appear to be obvious. ly unjust, I grant it should be abandoned. But I cannot see how any one can come to this conclusion, so as to make this small claim, which is perhaps the last of that class, an exception to a rule which has so long pre vailed. Mr. EVERETT, in reply to the arguments in favor of the bill, [of Mr. BELL, Mr. ASHLEY, and Mr. SHIELDS, said that, since the debate of yesterday, he had ex amined this case, and was satisfied there was no found ation in principle for the claim. He was aware of the difficulty of engaging the attention of the House to an argument dry and uninteresting in itself, more especially in opposition to a claim of so trifling an amount. In addition to this, he was asking the House to reverse its own decision in a case identical with this, (the bill for the relief of Joseph Brown, passed in 1834.) It was reported in 1832, and sanctioned by a second re port in 1834. The report in the present case, made at the last session, refers to that case, and relies on it as a precedent. He did not reccollect whether the case of Brown underwent a discussion. It was reported and passed while he was engaged elsewhere on another com mittee, and was now for the first time brought to his notice; and the importance of the principles assumed was his apology for addressing the House, and constituted his only claim to their attention. If the aggression complained of was an act of war, the principle assumed would extend to all aggressions of the enemy in time of war. This principle has not been adopted by any Government. The decisions of Congress have been uniform, on claims for such aggressions during the revolutionary and late wars. If a distinction is taken in favor of Indian aggressions, the principle will extend to those of the West down to the treaty of Green ville (1795,) to those of the Black Hawk war, and to those committed and committing by the Creeks and Seminoles. At the time of this aggression (1788) there was but little ground for a distinction between Indian and foreign wars. The Indians were then regarded as foreign and independent nations; they were not surround ed by our settlements nor under our control. He would refer the House to the report of the Committee on In dian Affairs, in 1834, on the case of Alfred Stewart.* If the aggression was to be taken as committed in time of peace, the principle assumed would extend to aggressions in all time before recognised war. It would be an authority for the allowance of the claims for the French spoliations prior to 1800. Mr. E. said he should meet the claim on its strongest ground; that, for the purpose of the argument, he would give the claim the benefit of the admission of a fact left doubtful in the report-that the aggression was committed in time of peace, and was not in itself an act of war. I will here remark (continued Mr. E.) that the claim is for an aggression committed not on the person but on the property of the claimant, and that the claim derives no aid from the hostile character of the aggression. The case, then, is simply this: The claimant, in 1788, with the assent of the Cherokee nation, was passing down the Tennessee river, within the Cherokee country, with his property, not for the purpose of trade, but with the sole view of passing through their country, to make a settlement below it, when his property was forcibly taken from him by the Cherokees; and for the property so taken he claims compensation. On what principle? Upon the assumed principle that the Government were bound to protect its citizens against Indian depredations, committed even in the Cherokee country; that it is bound to seek redress for such depredations; that it having made a treaty without securing such redress, or having by treaty released the claim, they are bound to indemnify the sufferers. To lay a foundation even for the assumption of these principles, it should appear that some right, secured to the claimant by treaty, had been violated, and that the Government had in fact released a subsisting claim for indemnity. I shall endeavor to show that the aggression was not in violation of any right secured to the claimant by treaty; that no subsisting claim has been released; and that the Government are not bound, by any adopted principle of right or policy, to indemnify the claimant. The treaty of Hopewell, of 1785, was the first treaty with the Cherokees, and established our first relation of peace with that tribe. By the 9th article of this treaty we secured the right to regulate the Indian trade; and the 10th article provides that, "until the pleasure of Congress be known respecting the 9th article, all traders, citizens of the United States, shall have liberty to go to any of the tribes or towns of the Cherokees, to trade with them, and shall be protected in their persons and property, and kindly treated." The 5th article provides that if any citizen of the United States, or other person, not being an Indian, shall attempt to settle on "The committee find the facts stated to be true. They are, however, of opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. The injury complained of was, in itself, an act of war, committed while the United States were at war with the Cherokees, and to which the party voluntarily subjected himself by entering the territory of a hostile nation. Though the acts of war may have been occasional only, yet, until relations of peace were established by the Government, the hazard must rest on those who undertake it; so much so that no obligation is imposed on the Government even to demand redress, much less to indemnify the sufferers." [H. OF R. their hunting grounds, &c., such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States. No rights were secured to citizens to go into the Cherokee country for any purpose except that of trading with the Cherokees; protection was secured by the treaty to the property of traders only. The right of navigating the Tennessee river was not secured by this treaty, as was supposed by the gentleman from Tennessee, [Mr. BELL,] but by the treaty of 1791. The claimant was not a trader; he was not passing through the Cherokee country for that purpose. At that day the Indian tribes were treated with as foreign nations; and it is somewhat singular that in this treaty there is a provision relating to retaliation or reprisals, in case of a violation of the treaty: "that retaliation shall not be practised on either side, except where there is a manifest violation of this treaty, and then it shall be preceded first by a demand of justice; and, if refused, then by a declaration of hostilities." Persons going into the Cherokee country had no other security than the treaty. In every other respect they submitted themselves to such usage as might befall them, without having any claim to call on the Government to seek redress for any injury either to their per sons or property. The Cherokees may have violated their faith pledged to Anderson, but not the treaty. It is not intended to say that for any outrage the Government might not, if it chose, demand satisfaction; but that an individual has no right to demand this of Government, except for the violation of a right secured by treaty. It may here be proper to refer to the case of Pettigrew and Scott.-(Report of March 22, 1832.) The report in that case is based on two facts, which are wanting in this case: that the aggression was committed in 1794, when descending the Tennessee river, in violation of a right secured by the treaty of 1791; and that the treaty of 1798 ceded lands in satisfaction of that aggression. They appear to have inferred the last fact rather from evidence of what occurred pending the treaty than from the treaty itself. It will be remembered that the aggression was in 1788. The next material fact is that war immediately succeeded, and continued until 1791. Whatever claims the Government might have had against the Cherokees, even for violations of the treaty, were merged in the war. It is the remedy sought by the parties for the redress of all injuries. Admit, then, for the sake of the argument, that a right of the claimant, secured by treaty, had been violated, and that the Government were bound to seck redress, the act of war was the measure by which redress was sought-the highest act to which a nation can resort. And whether they in fact obtain redress must depend on the fate of war. But no Government guaranties the result. Its duty is, by all reasonable means consistent with the best interest of the communi❤ ty, to seek redress. It is not, however, bound to continue a war until redress is obtained. The higher interest of the country must control; and if this requires that a peace should be made without obtaining redress, the loss must be submitted to. The Government is bound only to use its best efforts; these failing, the citizen must submit to the fate of war. If, however, a satisfaction be obtained, in part or in whole, the Government is bound to distribute it among the claimants. The claimants for the French spoliations prior to 1800 base their claims on the allegation that their rights se cured by treaty were violated; and that the Government, by treaty, have released those claims, in consideration of an equivalent. The issue is made on the equivalent; but if the principle now assumed be admitted, this issue be. comes immaterial. They will be entitled to relief, though an equivalent was not obtained, because it was not obtained, By the treaty of Holston, of 1791, an end was put to |