of insecurity and insolvency of the bank were without the slightest foundation. And time, that great arbiter of human controversies, has confirmed all that we said. The bank, from documents submitted to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury at the present session, appears to be able not only to return every dollar of the stock held in its capital by the public, but an addition of eleven per cent. beyond it.

Those who defend the executive act have to maintain not only that the President may assume upon himself the discharge of a duty specially assigned to the Secretary of the Treasury, but that he may remove that officer, arbitrarily, and without any cause, because he refused to remove the public deposites without cause.

[SENATE.

utive, and judicial—and their importance is in the order enumerated. By far the most important of the three is its legislative. In that, almost every day that it has been in session from 1789 to the present time, some legislative business has been transacted; whilst, in its judicial character, it has not sat more than three or four times in that whole period.

Why should the judicial function limit and restrain the legislative function of the Senate, more than the legislative should the judicial? If the degree of importance of the two should decide which ought to impose the restraint, in case of conflict between them, none can doubt which it should be.

But if the argument is sound, how is it possible for the Senate to perform its legislative duties? An act in vio. lation of the constitution or laws is committed by the President, or a subordinate executive officer, and it becomes necessary to correct it by the passage of a law. The very act of the President in question was under a law to which the Senate had given its concurrence. Ac

My mind conducts me to a totally different conclusion. I think, I solemnly believe, that the President "assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both," in the language of the resolution. I believed then in the truth of the resolution; and I now, in my place, and under all my responsibility, reavow my unshaken conviction|cording to the argument, the correcting law cannot of it.

originate in the Senate, because it would have to pass in judgment upon that act. Nay, more: it cannot originate in the House and be sent to the Senate, for the same reason of incompetency in the Senate to pass upon it. Suppose the bill contained a preamble reciting the unconstitutional or illegal act, to which the legislative corrective is applied: according to the argument, the Senate must not think of passing it. Pushed to its legitimate consequence, the argument requires the House of Representatives itself cautiously to abstain from the expression of any opinion upon an executive act, except when it is acting as the grand inquest of the nation, and consider

But it has been contended on this occasion, as it was in the debate which preceded the adoption of the resolution of 1834, that the Senate has no right to express the truth on any question which, by possibility, may become a subject of impeachment. It is manifest that if it may, there is no more usual or appropriate form in which it may be done than that of resolutions, joint or separate, orders, or bills. In no other mode can the collective sense of the body be expressed. But Senators maintain that no matter what may be the executive encroachment upon the joint powers of the two Houses, or the separate authority of the Senate, it is bound to standing articles of impeachment. mute, and not breathe one word of complaint or remonstrance. According to the argument, the greater the violation of the constitution or the law, the greater the incompetency of the Senate to express any opinion upon it! Further, that this incompetency is not confined to the acts of the President only, but extends to those of every officer who is liable to impeachment under the constitution. Is this possible? Can it be true? Contrary to all the laws of nature, is the Senate the only being which has no power of self-preservation-no right to complain or to remonstrate against attacks upon its very existence?

Assuming that the argument is well founded, the Senate is equally restrained from expressing any opinion which would imply the innocence or the guilt of an im peachable officer, unless it be maintained that it is lawful to express praise and approbation, but not censure or difference of opinion. Instances have occurred in our past history, (the case of the British minister, Jackson, was a memorable one,) and many others may arise in our future progress, when, in reference to foreign Powers, it may be important for Congress to approve what has been done by the Executive, to present à firm and united front, and to pledge the country to stand by The argument is, that the Senate, being the constitu- and support him. May it not do that? If the Senate tional tribunal to try all impeachments, is thereby pre dare not entertain and express any opinion upon an excluded from the exercise of the right to express any ecutive measure, how do those who support this exopinion upon any official malfeasance, except when act-punging resolution justify the acquittal of the President ing in its judicial character. which it proclaims?

If this disqualification exist, it applies to all impeachable officers, and ought to have protected the late Postmaster General against the resolution, unanimously adopted by the Senate, declaring that he had borrowed money contrary to law. And it would disable the Senate from considering that Treasury order which has formed such a prominent subject of its deliberations during the present session.

And how do Senators maintain this obligation of the Senate to remain silent and behold itself stript, one by one, of all its constitutional powers, without resistance, and without murmur? Is it imposed by the language of the constitution? Has any part of that instrument been pointed to which expressly enjoins it? No, no, not a syllable. But it is attempted to be deduced by another far-fetched implication. Because the Senate is the body which is to try impeachments, therefore it is inferred the Senate can express no opinion on any matter which may form the subject of impeachment. The constitu. tion does not say so. That is undeniable; but Senators

think so.

The Senate acts in three characters-legislative, exec-
VOL. XIII.-28

No Senator believed, in 1834, that, whether the President merited impeachment or not, he ever would be impeached. In point of fact he has not been, and we have every reason to suppose that he never will be, impeached. Was the majority of the Senate, in a case where it be lieved the constitution and laws to have been violated, and the liberties of the people to be endangered, to remain silent, and to refrain from proclaiming the truth, because, against all human probability, the President might be impeached by a majority of his political friends in the House of Representatives?

If an impeachment had been actually voted by the House of Representatives, there is nothing in the constitution which enjoins silence on the part of the Senate. In such a case, it would have been a matter of propriety, for the consideration of each Senator, to avoid the expression of any opinion on a matter upon which, as a sworn judge, he would be called to act.

Hitherto, I have considered the question on the supposition that the resolution of March, 1834, implied such guilt in the President that he would have been liable to conviction on a trial by impeachment before the Senate

Are you not only destitute of all authority, but positively forbidden, to do what the expunging resolution proposes? The injunction of the constitution to keep a journal of our proceedings is clear, express, and emphatic. It is free from all ambiguity: no sophistry can pervert the explicit language of the instrument, no artful device can elude the force of the obligation which it imposes. If it were possible to make more manifest the duty which it requires to be performed, that was done by the able and eloquent speeches, at the last session, of the Senators from Virginia and Louisiana, [Messrs. LEIGH and PORTER,] and at this of my colleague. I shall not repeat the argument. But, I would ask, if there were no constitutional requirement to keep a journal, what constitutional right has the Senate of this Congress to pass in judg-nal, kept in conformity with the one constitution, must ment upon the Senate of another Congress, and to expunge from its journal a deliberate act there recorded? Can an unconstitutional act of that Senate, supposing it to be so, justify you in performing another unconstitutional act?

called." Whereupon Mr. Holgate and Mr. Smith ap-
pealed from said decision; and on the question, Is the
Speaker right in his decision? the members present
voted as follows: yeas three, nays seventy-eight. Among
the latter are to be found the two Senators now repre-
senting in this body the State of Pennsylvania. On the
same day a motion was made by one of them [Mr. Bu-
CHANAN] and Mr. Kelly, and read, as follows: "Resolved,
That in the opinion of this House no part of the journals
of the House can be expunged, even by unanimous con-
sent."
The Senate observes that the question arose in a case
where the yeas and nays had not been called. Even in
such a case there were but four members out of eighty-
two that thought it was competent to the House to ex-
punge. Had the yeas and nays been called and recorded,
as they were on the resolution of March, 1834, there
would not have been a solitary vote in the House of
Representatives of Pennsylvania in support of the power
of expunging. And if you can expunge the resolution,
why may you not expunge also the recorded yeas and
nays attached to it?

But if the matter of expunction be contrary to the truth of the case, reproachful for its base subserviency, derogatory from the just and necessary powers of the Senate, and repugnant to the constitution of the United States, the manner in which it is proposed to accomplish this dark deed is also highly exceptionable. The expunging resolution, which is to blot out or enshroud the four or five lines in which the resolution of 1834 stands recorded, or rather the recitals by which it is preceded, are spun out into a thread of enormous length. It runs, whereas, and whereas, and whereas, and whereas, and whereas, &c., into a formidable array of nine several whereases. One who should have the courage to begin to read them, unaware of what was to be their termination, would think that at the end of such a tremendous display he must find the very devil. It is like a kite or a comet, except that the order of nature is inverted, and the tail, instead of being behind, is before the body to which it is appended.

I shall not trespass on the Senate by inquiring into the truth of all the assertions of fact and of principle contained in these recitals. It would not be difficult to expose them all, and to show that not one of them has more than a colorable foundation. It is asserted by one of them that the President was put upon his trial, and condemned, unheard, by the Senate, in 1834. Was that true? Was it a trial? Can the majority now assert, upon their oaths, and in their consciences, that there was any trial or condemnation? During the warmth of debate, Senators might endeavor to persuade themselves and the public that the proceeding of 1834 was, in its effects and consequences, a trial, and would be a condemnation of the President; but now, after the lapse of near three years, when the excitement arising from an animated discussion has passed away, it is marvellous that any one should be prepared to assert that an expression of the opinion of the Senate upon the character of an executive act was an arraignment, trial, and conviction, of the President of the United States!

Another fact, asserted in one of these recitals, is, that the resolution of 1834, in either of the forms in which it was originally presented or subsequently modified, prior to the final shape which it assumed when adopted, would have been rejected by a majority of the Senate. What evidence is there in support of this assertion? None. It is, 1 verily believe, directly contrary to the fact. In either of the modifications of the resolution, I have not a doubt that it would have passed! They were all made in that spirit of accommodation by which the mover of the resolution has ever regulated his conduct as a member of a deliberative body. In not one single instance

[SENATE.

did he understand from any Senator at whose request he made the modification, that, without it, he would vote against the resolution. How, then, can even the Sena. tors who were of the minority of 1834 undertake to make the assertion in question? How can the new Senators, who have come here since, pledge themselves to the fact asserted in the recital of which they could not have had any conusance? But all the members of the majority-the veterans and the raw recruits-the six years men and the six weeks men-are required to con cur in this most unfounded assertion, as I believe it to be. I submit it to one of the latter (looking towards Mr. DANA, from Maine, here by a temporary appointment from the Executive) whether, instead of inundating the Senate with a torrent of fulsome and revolting adulation poured on the President, it would not be wiser and more patriotic to illustrate the brief period of his senatorial existence by some great measure fraught with general benefit to the whole Union? Or, if he will not or cannot elevate himself to a view of the interests of the entire country, whether he had not better dedicate his time to an investigation into the causes of an alien jurisdiction being still exercised over a large part of the territory of the State which he represents? And why the American carrying trade to the British colonies, in which his State was so deeply interested, has been lost by a most im provident and bungling arrangement?

Mr. President, what patriotic purpose is to be accomplished by this expunging resolution? What new honor or fresh laurels will it win for our common country? Is the power of the Senate so vast that it ought to be circumscribed, and that of the President so restricted that it ought to be extended? What power has the Senate? None, separately. It can only act jointly with the other House, or jointly with the Executive. And although the theory of the constitution supposes, when consulted by him, it may freely give an affirmative or negative response, according to the practice, as it now exists, it has lost the faculty of pronouncing the negative monosyllable. When the Senate expresses its deliberate judgment, in the form of resolution, that resolution has no compulsory force, but appeals only to the dispassionate intelligence, the calm reason, and the sober judgment, of the community. The Senate has no army, no navy, no patronage, no lucrative offices, nor glitterhonors, to bestow. Around us there is no swarm of greedy expectants, rendering us homage, anticipating our wishes, and ready to execute our commands.

How is it with the President? Is he powerless? He
is felt from one extremity to the other of this vast re-
public. By means of principles which he has introduced
and innovations which he has made in our institutions,
alas! but too much countenanced by Congress and a
confiding people, he exercises uncontrolled the power
of the State. In one hand he holds the purse, and in the
other brandishes the sword of the country. Myriads of
dependants and partisans, scattered over the land, are
ever ready to sing hosannas to him, and to laud to the skies
whatever he does. He has swept over the Government,
during the last eight years, like a tropical tornado.
Every department exhibits traces of the ravages of the
Take as one example the Bank of the United
States. No institution could have been more popular
with the people, with Congress, and with State Legisla
tures. None ever better fulfilled the great purposes of
its establishment. But it unfortunately incurred the dis-
pleasure of the President; he spoke, and the bank lies
prostrate. And those who were loudest in its praise are
now loudest in its condemnation. What object of his
ambition is unsatisfied? When disabled from age any
longer to hold the sceptre of power, he designates his
successor, and transmits it to his favorite!
does he want? Must we blot, deface, and mutilate, the

storm.

What more

1

records of the country, to punish the presumptuousness
of expressing an opinion contrary to his own?

What patriotic purpose is to be accomplished by this
expunging resolution? Can you make that not to be
which has been? Can you eradicate from memory and
from history the fact that in March, 1834, a majority of
the Senate of the United States passed the resolution
which excites your enmity? Is it your vain and wicked
object to arrogate to yourselves that power of annihilating
the past which has been denied to Omnipotence itself?
Do you intend to thrust your hands into our hearts, and
to pluck out the deeply rooted convictions which are
there! Or is it your design merely to stigmatize us?
You cannot stigmatize us.

Ne'er yet did base dishonor blur our name.
Standing securely upon our conscious rectitude, and
bearing aloft the shield of the constitution of our coun-
try, your puny efforts are impotent; and we defy all your
power. Put the majority of 1834 in one scale, and that
by which this expunging resolution is to be carried in the
other, and let truth and justice, in heaven above and
on earth below, and liberty and patriotism, decide the
preponderance.

What patriotic purpose is to be accomplished by this
expunging resolution? Is it to appease the wrath and
to heal the wounded pride of the Chief Magistrate? If
he be really the hero that his friends represent him, he
must despise all mean condescension, all grovelling
sycophancy, all self-degradation and self-abasement. He
would reject, with scorn and contempt, as unworthy of
his fame, your black scratches and your baby lines in
the fair records of his country. Black lines! Black
lines! Sir, I hope the Secretary of the Senate will pre- |
serve the pen with which he may inscribe them, and
present it to that Senator of the majority whom he may
select, as a proud trophy, to be transmitted to his de-
scendants. And hereafter, when we shall lose the forms
of our free institutions, all that now remain to us, some
future American monarch, in gratitude to those by whose
means he has been enabled, upon the ruins of civil lib.
erty, to erect a throne, and to commemorate especially
this expunging resolution, may institute a new order of
knighthood, and confer on it the appropriate name of
the Knight of the Black Lines.

[JAN. 16, 1837.

trine of passive obedience and non-resistance. And, if the people do not pour out their indignation and impre cations, I have yet to learn the character of American freemen.

When Mr. CLAY had concluded,

Mr. BUCHANAN rose and spoke as follows:

Mr. President: after the able and eloquent display of the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] who has just resumed his seat, after having so long enchained the atten tion of his audience, it might be the dictate of prudence for me to remain silent. But I feel too deeply my responsibility as an American Senator, not to make the attempt to place before the Senate and the country the reasons which, in my opinion, will justify the vote which I intend to give this day.

A more grave and solemn question has rarely, if ever, been submitted to the Senate of the United States, than the one now under discussion. This Senate is now call. ed upon to review its own decision, to rejudge its own justice, and to annihilate its own sentence, deliberately pronounced against the co-ordinate executive branch of this Government. On the 28th of March, 1834, the American Senate, in the face of the American people, in the face of the whole world, by a solemn resolution, pronounced the President of the United States to be a violator of the constitution of his country-of that consti tution which he had solemnly sworn "to preserve, protect, and defend." Whether we consider the exalted character of the tribunal which pronounced this condemnation, or the illustrious object against which it was directed, we ought to feel deeply impressed with the high and lasting importance of the present proceeding. It is in fact, if not in form, the trial of the Senate for having unjustly and unconstitutionally tried and condemned the President; and their accusers are the American people. In this cause I am one of the judges. In some respects, it is a painful position for me to occupy. It is vain, however, to express unavailing regrets. I must, and shall, firmly and sternly, do my duty, although in the performance of it I may wound the feelings of gentlemen whom I respect and esteem. I shall proceed no further than the occa. sion demands, and will, therefore, justify.

Who was the President of the United States against whom this sentence has been pronounced? Andrew Jackson-a name which every American mother, after the party strife which agitates us for the present mo ment shall have passed away, will, during all the genera tions which this republic is destined to endure, teach her infant to lisp with that of the venerated name of Washington. The one was the founder, the other the preserver, of the liberties of bis country.

But why should I detain the Senate, or needlessly waste my breath in fruitless exertions. The decree has gone forth. It is one of urgency, too. The deed is to be done that foul deed which, like the blood-stained hands of the guilty Macbeth, all ocean's waters will never wash out. Proceed, then, to the noble work which lies before you, and, like other skilful execution ers, do it quickly. And when you have perpetrated it, If President Jackson has been guilty of violating the go home to the people, and tell them what glorious hon- constitution of the United States, let impartial justice ors you have achieved for our common country. Tell take its course. I admit that it is no justification for them that you have extinguished one of the brightest such a crime that his long life has been more distinguishand purest lights that ever burnt at the altar of civil lib-ed by acts of disinterested patriotism than that of any erty. Tell them that you have silenced one of the noblest batteries that ever thundered in defence of the constitution, and bravely spiked the cannon. Tell them that, henceforward, no matter what daring or outrageous act any President may perform, you have forever hermetically sealed the mouth of the Senate. Tell them that he may fearlessly assume what powers he pleases, snatch from its lawful custody the public purse, com- If, on the other hand, he is pure and immaculate from mand a military detachment to enter the halls of the the charge, let us be swift to do him justice, and to blot Capitol, overawe Congress, trample down the constitu- out the foul stigma which the Senate have placed upon tion, and raze every bulwark of freedom; but that the his character. If we are not, he may go down to the Senate must stand mute, in silent submission, and not grave in doubt as to what may be the final judgment of dare to raise its opposing voice. That it must wait until his country. In any event, he must soon retire to the a House of Representatives, humbled and subdued like shades of private life. Shall we, then, suffer his official itself, and a majority of it composed of the partisans of term to expire without first doing him justice? It may the President, shall prefer articles of impeachment. Tell be said of me, as it has already been said of other Senathem, finally, that you have restored the glorious doctors, that I am one of the gross adulators of the Presi

American citizen now living. It is no justification that the honesty of his heart and the purity of his intentions have become proverbial, even amongst his political enemies. It is no justification that in the hour of danger, and in the day of battle, he has been his country's shield. If he has been guilty, let his name be "damned to ever lasting fame," with those of Cæsar and of Napoleon.

dent. But, sir, I have never said thus much of him whilst he was in the meridian of his power. Now, that his political sun is nearly set, I feel myself at liberty to pour forth my grateful feelings, as an American citizen, to a man who has done so much for his country. I have never, for myself, either directly or indirectly, solicited office at his hands; and my character must greatly change, if I should ever do so from any of his successors. If I should bestow upon him the meed of my poor praise, it springs from an impulse far different from that which has been attributed to the majority on this floor. I speak as an independent freeman and American Senator: and I feel proud now to have the opportunity of raising my voice in his defence.

On the 28th day of March, 1834, the Senate of the United States resolved "that the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.” In discussing this subject, I shall undertake to prove, first, that this resolution is unjust; secondly, that it is unconstitutional; and in the last place, that it ought to be expunged from our journals, in the manner proposed by the Senator from Missouri, [Mr. BENTON.]

First, then, it is unjust. On this branch of the subject, I had intended to confine myself to a bare expression of my own decided opinion. This point has been so often and so ably discussed, that it is impossible for me to cast any new light upon it. But as it is my intention to follow the footsteps of the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CLAY,] wherever they may lead, I must again tread the ground which has been so often trodden. As the Senator, however, has confined himself to a mere passing reference to the topics which this head presents, I shall, in this particular, follow his example.

Although the resolution condemning the President is vague and general in its terms, yet we all know that it was founded upon his removal of the public deposites from the Bank of the United States. The Senator from Kentucky has contended that this act was a violation of law. And why? Because, says he, it is well known that the public money was secure in that institution; and by its charter the public deposites could not be removed from it, unless under a just apprehension that they were in danger. Now, sir, I admit that if the President had no right to remove these deposites, except for the sole reason that their safety was in danger, the Senator has established his position. But what is the fact? Was the Government thus restricted by the terms of the bank charter? I answer, no. Such a limitation is nowhere to be found in it. Let me read the sixteenth section, which is the only one relating to the subject. It enacts, "that the deposites of the money of the United States, in places in which the said bank and branches thereof may be established, shall be made in said bank or branches thereof, unless the Secretary of the Treas ury shall at any time otherwise order and direct; in the Secretary of the Treasury shall immedi ately lay before Congress, if in session, and if not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reasons of such order or direction."

which case,

Is not the authority thus conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury as broad and as ample as the English language will admit? Where is the limitation, where the restriction? One might have supposed, from the argument of the Senator from Kentucky, that the charter had restricted the Secretary of the Treasury from re moving the deposites, unless he believed them to be insecure in the Bank of the United States; but the language of the law itself completely refates his argument. They were to remain in the Bank of the United States, "unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct."

[SENATE.

The sole limitation upon the discretion of that officer was his immediate and direct responsibility to Congress. To us he was bound to render his reasons for removing the deposites. We, and we alone, are constituted the judges as to the sufficiency of these reasons.

It would be an easy task to prove that the authors of the bank charter acted wisely in not limiting the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury over the deposites to the single case of their apprehended insecurity. We may imagine many other reasons which would have rendered their removal both wise and expedient. But I forbear, especially as the case now before the Senate presents as striking an illustration of this proposition as I could possibly imagine. Upon what principle, then, do I justify the removal of the deposites?

The Bank of the United States had determined to apply for a recharter at the session of Congress immediately preceding the last presidential election. Preparatory to this application, and whilst it was pending, in the short space of sixteen months, it had increased its loans more than $28,000,000. They rose from forty-two millions to seventy millions between the last of December, 1830, and the 1st of May, 1832. Whilst this boasted regulator of the currency was thus expanding its discounts, all the local banks followed the example. The impulse of self-interest urged them to pursue this course. A delusive prosperity was thus spread over the land. Money, every where, became plenty. The bank was regarded as the beneficent parent, who was pouring her money out into the laps of her children. She thought herself wise and provident in thus rendering herself popular. The recharter passed both Houses of Congress by triumphant majorities. But then came "the frost, the killing frost." It was not so easy to propitiate "the Old Roman." Although he well knew the power and influence which the bank could exert against him at the then approaching presidential election, he cast such considerations to the winds. He vetoed the bill, and, in the most solemn manner, placed himself for trial upon this question before the American people.

From that moment the faith of many of his former friends began to grow cold. The bank openly took the field against his re-election. It expended large sums in subsidizing editors, and in circulating pamphlets, and papers, and speeches, throughout the Union, calculated to inflame the public mind against the President. I merely glance at these things.

Let us pause, for a single moment, to consider the consequences of such conduct. What right had the bank, as a corporation, to enter the arena of politics, for the purpose of defending itself, and attacking the President? Whilst I freely admit that each individual stockholder possessed the same rights, in this respect, as every other American citizen, I pray you to consider what a dangerous precedent the bank has thus established. Our banks now number nearly a thousand, and our other chartered institutions are almost innumerable. If all these corporations are to be justified in using their corporate funds for the purpose of influencing elections, of elevating their political friends, and crushing their political foes, our condition is truly deplorable. We shall thus introduce into the State a new, a dangerous, and an alarming power, the effects of which no man can anticipate. Watchful jealousy is the price which a free people must ever pay for their liberties; and this jealousy should be argus-eyed in watching the political

movements of corporations.

After the bank had been defeated in the presidential election, it adopted a new course of policy. What it had been unable to accomplish by making money plenty, it determined it would wrest from the sufferings of the people by making money scarce. Pressure and panic

=