SENATE.] Expunging Resolution. substance of the resolution proposed to be expunged is true, but whether such a resolution was adopted; that is the point of history. The existence on the journal of the resolution is no evidence of the truth of its allegation, but simply of its adoption; and the future historian, looking to the whole transactions of the time, would decide upon the truth or error of its allegation, without giving to it any greater weight than is due to the mere expression of an opinion. Every Senator who voted for the original resolution has a personal interest in the record. [JAN. 16, 1837. by adjudged and pronounced to be guilty of an impeachable offence, and a stigma placed upon him as a violator of his oath of office and of the laws and constitution, which he was sworn to preserve, protect, and defend, without going through the forms of an impeachment, and without allowing to him the benefits of a trial or the means of defence." Is this true in point of fact? The proceeding of which this reason professes to be descriptive was this: On the 28th day of March, 1834, the Senate, in its usual course of business, adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, That the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the revenue, bas assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the consti If it is true that to pass such a resolution was illegal and unconstitutional, and a flagrant wrong done to the President of the United States, then his friends should not desire to have it expunged, but, on the contrary, totution and laws, but in derogation of both.” preserve it as a monument of reproach to those who par ticipated in the measure. In this view of the subject, it should be preserved as a matter of satisfaction on the part of his friends, and of disgrace and shame on the part of his adversaries. And, on the other hand, if the right existed to pass the resolution, and its allegation was true in point of fact, those who sustained it by their vote have an interest in the evidence of their opinion, while those who thought otherwise have the benefit and satisfaction of being able to establish their dissent. In neither view of the case have the friends of the President any fair reason to desire that the evidence of the proceeding should be destroyed. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] may glory in the vote he gave on the occasion; the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] may do the same; neither has the right to deprive the other of the evidence of his course in relation to it. Those who voted for the resolution alone hazard any thing in preserving that evidence. If they were wrong, then it is for their shame; if they were right, it is the mere expression of an opinion from which others might rightfully and sincerely differ. If the allegations of the friends of the President are true, that the adoption of that resolution was a breach of the constitution, and a most flagrant wrong to him, would it not be more natural that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] should come here to ask us to expunge it, that he might conceal his participation in the matter? Is it not extraordinary that the Senator from Missouri, who takes great credit to himself for resisting the measure, should seek not only to conceal his own glory in opposing it, but the shame of his adversaries in supporting it? What is the purpose to be answered by expunging the resolution? The fact that such a resolution was adopted cannot now be concealed from the eye of history. The journal is only evidence of that fact, and not of the truth of the allegation con tained in it. What valuable end, then, is to be accomplished by the expunction? I fear, sir, that the future historian, looking over the whole ground of the controversy, will say, from the nature of the act, that it was a sacrifice, a peace-offering at the altar of executive pow-lation. But, sir, it is the fate of a false position to im er. In this view, we have all an interest in the record of the proceedings of this day, for good or for evil report. But sir, I come now to consider the reasons which are offered for the adoption of this expunging resolution. They are set forth in the preamble, and I presume they are the best that can be offered. They have been well weighed and considered, and no doubt the ability of the Senator from Missouri has been taxed to the uttermost to present the case in the strongest possible point of view. Ilis reasons are eight in number, and the first of them is in these words: "And whereas the said resolve was irregularly, ille gally, and unconstitutionally adopted by the Senate, in violation of the rights of defence which belong to every citizen, and in subversion of the fundamental principles of law and justice: because President Jackson was there Is this first reason, then, a true description of the sub. ject to which it refers? If the Senate had organized itself into a court of impeachment, called in the Chief Justice to preside, as required by the constitution, and then proceeded to try the President without hearing him, and to pronounce judgment upon him of removal from office, more could not have been said; no stronger language would be required to describe so wanton a viola tion of constitutional law. Is there no difference between the cases? Can a stronger case of the perversion and abuse of language be put than this, which would represent a simple resolution of a deliberative assembly, expressing merely an opinion, which has no legal effect whatever on the rights of the individual, as the judgment of a court which acts directly and immediately upon those rights? The proceeding referred to has neither the form nor substance of a judgment. Nor is the slightest guilt imputed in the opinion as expressed by the resolution. It s'ates a fact, that the President has assumed upon himself authority and power not confer red by the constitution;" but is silent as to the motives and intention with which that fact was accompanied, the corrupt and wilful character of which alone could give to the proceeding the attribute of guilt. But sup pose, for a moment, that the Senate had, losing sight of the principles of law and justice, formed itself into a court of impeachment, and proceeded, without a hearing, to pass judgment on the individual: would that be a reason for expunging the record, for suppressing the evidence of so monstrous a proceeding? On the con trary, sir, it should stand as a monument of disgrace and dishonor to the men who participated in it. Its legal effect would be nothing; its moral influence would recoil on their own heads, and they should be held to that responsibility to public opinion, to secure which it was provided that the yeas and nays should be entered on the journal. In this view of the subject, the hollowness and fallacy of the reason assigned is manifested by the fact that those who seek to suppress the evidence are not those who advocated, but those who opposed the reso body the principles of its own destruction. If this rea son be a true description of the resolution of 28th March, 1834, and sufficient for its expunction, is it not perceived that this very expunging resolution and its preamble is open to the same objection, as pronouncing judgment on those Senators who supported the former, as guilty of an impeachable offence, and violators of their oaths of office, without the benefit of a trial? It should, then, in its turn, be expunged; and if I were called upon to draw up a preamble upon the strength of this precedent, 1 should use the same language, as being as fair and legiti mate a description of the present resolution and its preamble as this reason is descriptive of the resolution of March 28, 1834. It is absolutely suicidal. The second reason is as follows: "And whereas the said resolve, in all its shapes and forms, was unfounded and erroneous in point of fact, and, therefore, unjust and unrighteous, as well as irregular and unconstitutional; because the said President Jack son, neither in the act of dismissing Mr. Duane, nor in the appointment of Mr. Taney, as specified in the first form of the resolve; nor in taking upon himself the removing of the deposites, as specified in the second form of the same resolve; nor in any act which was then or can now be specified under the vague and ambiguous terms of the general denunciation contained in the third and last form of the resolve, did do or commit any act in violation or in derogation of the laws and constitution, or dangerous to the liberties of the people." [SENATE. It against him were duly and honorably received. Here is another instance of that conflict with other reasons, which was remarked upon in adverting to the third. implies that, if the protest had been received, then the resolve should not be expunged. But, with that confusion of ideas which seems to characterize the whole preamble, it places the protest of the President on the same footing with petitions from the people. The President demanded that his protest should be spread upon the journal, which he had no right to do. But, supposing for a moment that he had, is the refusal a reason for expunging the resolution to which the protest has reference. The The substance of this reason is, that the resolution people have an undoubted right to express their opinwas erroneous in point of fact. Is that a reason for ex- ions and wishes, in the form of petitions and memorials; punging it? It might form a very good reason for a but the President, as such, has no right to notice the counter-resolution. The subject is one on which a dif-proceedings of any other branch of the Government in ference of opinion might fairly exist, and that difference the form of a protest. It is no part of the functions or was expressed at the time, both in debate and on the privileges of executive power to review and rebuke the journal; but surely that difference of opinion is no reason proceedings of the legislative or judicial branches of the for destroying the evidence that such an opinion was ex- Government. The aspect which the whole subject aspressed. sumes, in contemplating this reason, is that of retaliation. It looks like offering an indignity to this body, by way of compensating the slight of executive power. The third reason is, that "The said resolve, as adopted, is uncertain and ambiguous containing nothing but a loose and floating charge for derogating from the laws and constitution, and assuming ungranted power and authority in the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, without specifying," &c. This reason conflicts with both the others, implying that, if the resolve were detailed and specific, it ought not to be expunged. If all these are reasons for the same act, they should not be antagonist to each other, but should harmoniously tend to the same conclusion. But want of detail can be no reason for suppressing the evidence that such a resolution was adopted. The fourth reason is merely an amplification of the third. The fifth reason is as follows: "And whereas the Senate being the constitutional tribunal for the trial of the President, when charged by the House of Representatives with offences against the laws and constitution, the adoption of the said resolve before any impeachment preferred by the House was a breach of the privileges of the House; a violation of the constitution; a subversion of justice; a prejudication of a question which might legally come before the Senate, and a disqualification of that body to perform its constitutional duty with fairness and impartiality, if the President should thereafter be regularly impeached by the House of Representatives for the same offence." The same answer may be given to this reason as is given to the first, that it is not a fair and true description of the case. It treats the resolution of 1834 as if it were a judgment of the Senate in its judicial capacity as But, sir, we come now to the sixth reason, which is perhaps the true motive, though not a justification for this extraordinary proceeding, and a gleam of light is thrown upon the subject, which gives it color and complexion. The substance of this reason is, that the President's protest was rejected, and not permitted to be entered upon the journal, while memorials and petitions VOL. XIII.-30 The seventh and eighth reasons may be classed together, and resolve themselves into the general allegation that the said resolve was inopportune, of evil example, and dangerous precedent; all of which, being a mere mat. ter of opinion, about which a fair difference might arise, could furnish no reason for expunging the resolve, however it might be urged as a reason for passing a counterresolution. We have thus, sir, gone through them all, and do not find one which justifies the conclusion that the resolution should be expunged. And if they do not singly support that conclusion, they cannot do it collect. ively. A thousand bad reasons have no more force than one. We may say, then, of this preamble, what was said of Gratiano's reasoning: "Gratiano speaks an infinite deal of nothing; more than any man in all Venice; his reasons are as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff; you shall seek all day ere you find them, and when you have them they are not worth the search." But it is said the Senate had no right to pass such a resolution; that it cannot be justified as the fair exercise of any one of its powers. Still, it may be answered, it is a fact that such a resolution was adopted, and the objection involves a mere difference of opinion, which cannot be a reason for destroying the evidence of the fact. But as to the right itself, I think there can be no doubt of its existence, when the subject is fully understood. The Senate, under the constitution, has various powers-legislative, judicial, and executive. The error lies in attempting to discover and explain the right to pass such a resolution in the exercise of any of these powers. The object of all these powers is the modification of some social or political right. But the Senate is a deliberative body, and, as such, must have opinions, and express them. It is the inherent right and property of every deliberative assembly to have and express opinions, which only can be done by resolution. A resolution of thanks cannot be traced to any one of these powers; neither can a resolution of condolence; and yet no one ever doubted the right to pass either the one or the other. If it were necessary to resort to the constitution for any express or implied authority, it might be found in the seventh section of the fourth article, which, in its last paragraph, supposes that there are other resolutions than legislative acts, or such as require the concurrence of both Houses. But the very institution of a deliberative assembly, in the nature of things, supposes and involves the existence of opinions and the right of expressing them. The powers of such an assembly, or, in other words, the control which it may exercise over the social or political rights of others, is a very different mat ter, and depends on the provisions of the constitution which gives it existence. But is it not somewhat remarkable that those who make the objection do not perceive that this very expunging resolution which they advocate presupposes the right? If the Senate has no right to pass any resolution but such as can be traced to one of those powers, what right has it to pass this expunging resolution? Into such absurdities, sir, will men fall when they seek to sustain, by reasoning, a false po sition. The right, then, to pass such a resolution I take to be unquestionable, and the exercise of it may be, at times, highly expedient, as a check or caution to the wantonness or heedlessness of executive power, and as a measure short of impeachment. But, sir, what is impeachment? A farce, a nullity! It is, like the case of the electoral colleges, an abortion. There is little danger to be apprehended but from a popular President; and the very fact of his being such, under the party or ganization of this country, supposes the fact that he is sustained and supported by a majority of the body in whom the impeaching power resides. I might here, sir, conclude what I wished to say in relation to the matter now depending before the Senate, having, as I think, established two propositions, which cover the whole ground: first, that the Senate, as a deliberative assembly, had the right to pass the resolution of March 28, 1834; and, secondly, that, whether true or not in point of fact, we have no right to expunge it, because the journal is, by the constitution, a permanent record. I will further incidentally remark that, if the right of expunction exists, and is to be established by this precedent, then a subseqent Senate may expunge this expunging resolution; and so, in all time to come, these successive expunctions may serve to indicate the triumph or defeat of the respective political parties of the country. But an attempt has been made to sustain this measure by a resort to precedents. Sir, precedents are of no authority when opposed to a clear, ascertained, settled principle. They are resorted to in doubtful cases, and often to avoid the force of principle. It is easier, at all times, to follow precedents than to reason. But, sir, above all things precedents drawn from a period of revolution, such as that referred to by the Senator from Virginia, [Mr. RIVES,] are of no weight in a time of profound tranquillity, when security and leisure give opportunity for reflection. may be very expedient, in a moment of unsettled government and of violence, to suppress the evidence of a particular proceeding; but one could scarcely rely upon such authority for a warrant to corrupt a constitutional record in moments of security and regular government. And yet such is the character of the Senator's domestic precedent. As to his English precedents, they are of no value on a question like this, which does not depend on general parliamentary practice, but on the express provisions of a written constitution, which has directed the keeping of a journal, and contemplates that journal as a permanent record. It I am warned by the lateness of the hour that it is time to take leave of the subject; but, sir, before I take my seat, I cannot forbear to offer a few remarks on some of the opinions and sentiments expressed by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. RIVES] and others. We have been told by that Senator that the Senate is an aristocratical feature of the Government; that it is the citadel of that aristocratic spirit which seeks to ride on the necks of the people. What purpose, sir, is this sentiment to answer? Is it to break down the Senate? To bring it into contempt and odium with the people' But, first, sir, let us inquire into the fact. Aristocracy in America! Where are its elements, where its means and appliances? Here, sir, where the wheel of fortune is perpetually revolving; where the poor man of to-day becomes the rich man of tomorrow; and no one can tell, whatever his present actual [JAN. 16, 1837. property, that his grandson may not be compelled to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow; where political rights are equal, and the avenues to wealth and honor open to every man, where the laws and customs of the country guard no man's inheritance in a settled course of descent, but break up and distribute in various rivu lets that wealth which may have been dammed up in the course of temporary accumulation; I say, sir, here, and under such circumstances, to talk of aristocracy is an insult to the common sense of the community. I see, sir, a practical refutation of this sentiment in the persons of the distinguished men by whom I am surrounded. To what patronage were they indebted for the honorable distinction which they have attained? To what do they owe their elevation and the high consideration in which they are held by the whole country, but to the unaided efforts of their own abilities? Why, sir, you find in the person of your Chief Magistrate another striking proof of its error. A poor boy, for so I believe the story runs, cuffed during the revolutionary war by a British officer for not performing some menial office, wins his way to the highest honors of the republic, and comes to preside over the destinies of a great people; "bids the Romans mark him, and write his speeches in their books." Sir, the term is a mere catchword, or, to use the metaphor of the Senator from South Carolina, "a mere tinkling bell, to bring together a rabble of ideas which overwhelm all reasoning." One of the strongest objections I have had to the course of the present administration has been, its constant effort to array the different portions of society against each other, and its habit of appealing for support to the worst passions and prejudices of our nature. When I heard the distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. RIVES] a few days since, in the debate on the Treasury circular, declare that he did not belong to that class of politicians who divided society horizontally, but rather perpendicularly, into classes who mutually sustained and supported each other, I thought I perceived the dawn of a better state of things, and I felt grateful to him, sir, for the sentiment; but alas! sir, I fear that it was but a temporary impulse of sound feeling, that must subside before the policy of the party. To test the soundness of this opinion, let us for a moment consider the nature of this Government. It is emphatically a Government, as contradistinguished from a confederacy, limited in its powers, though supreme within its sphere; the legislative powers being vested in a Congress, composed of the Senate and House of Representatives. The people, being the source of all power, elect, either immediately or mediately, their representatives; immediately in the instance of the House of Representatives, mediately in the instance of the Senate. We are all, sir, the representatives of the people, though chosen after a different manner. I claim, sir, to be not the immediate but the general representative of the State of Virginia, as I hold that Senator to be the general representative of Delaware; and I, for one, thank Virginia for having sent so able and distinguished a representative of our common interests. The more permanent charac ter of the representation in this body is a check imposed by the people themselves on their own action. The whole system is one of checks and balances. The two Houses of Congress are mutual checks on each other. The Sen. ate may fairly be presumed to be the more grave and sedate body, from the general fact of possessing less of youth and its attributes; although, sir, to be sure, there are some veterans in the other House, as well as some youthful aspirants in this. The ancient Germans, sir, who car ried among the nations whom they conquered their notions of civil polity, were in the habit of arguing every question twice, once at their carousals, probably drunk, and once sober, that there might be in their councils a 1 due degree of vivacity and deliberation. The same idea may be supposed to be carried out in our institutions, though the requisite attributes may not be insured by the same means. In claiming, sir, for this body the attribute of deliberation, I do not mean to say that we are by contradistinction the sober body. [SENATE. ent feeling which should characterize a nation of free men. In opening the subject of this expunging resolution, the Senator from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] has seen fit to entertain us with a magnificent eulogy on the merits of the President. This, no doubt, was a very fit introduction to the measure which is proposed, and may perhaps serve to indicate its ultimate aim and purpose. He has been described at one time as teaching the saucy Britons a lesson of humility from behind the cotton bags of New Orleans, and at another rebuking with the thunder of American cannon the savages of the Pacific ocean, "bestriding the narrow world like a Colossus." Not content with this plenitude of military fame, he has been endued with all civic virtues and superhuman sagacity. While listening to this strain of adulation, every soberminded individual must have involuntarily exclaimed, with Cassius, "Now, in the names of all the gods at once, upon what meat doth this our Cæsar feed, that he is grown so great? Sir, I am not disposed to deny his real merits, or to withhold my gratitude for his real services. He has, sir, rendered good service to his country, and well has that country repaid him for it. But that service was in a military, not in a civil capacity. The constitution which has established this system of government was the peaceable and deliberate work of the people. It was not, sir, the result of accident, or of a struggle for political power between different orders of society. To find fault, then, with the Senate is to impeach the wisdom and intelligence of the people themselves. It is they who, in adopting the federal constitution, have said that the Senate shall be organized as we find it, have prescribed the mode of its election, and given to it the character of greater permanency. But sir, I ask again, what is the meaning of this sentiment? Are we to be prepared for reducing the Government to a unit, as we have been told that the cabinet should be one? Is it intended to blot out the component parts of this system, and reduce the Government to the simple relation of the President and the people? In the message of 1832 the Supreme Court was assailed, and its authority, as the interpreter of the constitution, denied; and now, sir, we are told by the Senator from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] that the President has corrected and repealed the decision of that court in relation to the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States; and that, in his opinion, all that remains to be done is to issue an audita querella to ascertain the fact, have it entered on the record, and the judgment reversed. Here is at once a new attribute of power, and a most extraordinary mode of proceeding. On the other hand, we are told by the Senator from Virginia that the Senate is the citadel of that aristocratic spirit which seeks to ride on the necks of the people. If the Senator merely means that this language is descriptive of himself and bis friends, be it so. I cannot quarrel with what he may deem just and proper as to them, though I should have been backward myself in so characterizing them; but, sir, I utterly deny its justice and propriety as applicable to myself, or those with whom I have the honor and the happiness to act. In relation to this Government, I and my immediate constit uents, and I believe a great majority of the American people, are conservatives. We go for the Government as it is. We wish to preserve the system of Federal and State Governments as it was established by the wisdom "We ask no change, and, least of all, such changes as they would bring us." In this system we live, and move, and have our being; and as we were the first to adopt the constitution, we shall be the last to abandon it. We have heard much about the policy of the Executive, and have even been advised to look to that source for the initiative of certain measures. To my mind, all this is of a piece with that exaggerated and false conception of executive power and consequence which has characterized the present Chief Magistrate and his advisers, The executive power which represents the common force of society is, in every just theory, and in the nature of things, inferior to the legisla-it tive power, which is the representative of the common But all this, sir, is apart from the main question. We intelligence and the common will, and that, too, precisc- are called upon to expunge a resolution from our jourly in the degree in which brute force is inferior to reason. nal, to suppress the evidence of a fact, to falsify a recIt is the business of the President to execute the laws, ord! If the right to do so were a matter of doubt not to make them. The policy of the Executive! merely, it would be the part of a prudent and conscienWho charged the President with the care of the gen- tious man to pause. Let not, I pray, sir, the exciteeral welfare? What business has he with any policy disment of party spirit hurry this body to an act which is a tinct from the policy of the law? The prosperity of a clear infraction of the constitution; be satisfied with a great and civilized people depends on the laws, and counter-resolution, expressing in as strong terms as you not on the will of the Executive. Sir, I regret to hear please your approbation of the President's conduct, and such opinions expressed. I trust in God they will not your repugnance to the resolution of the 28th of March, prevail in this country; for, to my mind, they are in 1834, but do not let us inflict another wound upon the direct hostility with that tone of manly and independ-great charter of our Union. Rely upon it, sir, that if Much has, as usual, been said about the people, and the people's friends, and an impression is attempted to be given that those who support this administration are alone the friends of the people. Who are they that thus arrogantly talk about the people, as if they belonged to some superior order? The people's friends, indeed! The people, sir, stand in need of no friends; they are the sovereigns; it is they who dispense their smiles and their favors; and it would be much more becoming and seemly to speak of the people as being one's friend than of one's self as being the friend of the people. There is, to be sure, one point of view in which the supporters of this administration, I mean those in office, may be considered the friends of the people. It is the same in which the licentiate, in Gil Blas, is termed and considered himself the friend of the poor, and who proved his friendship by consuming their revenues. of our ancestors. The aid of public opinion has been invoked in relation to this measure, and we are told by the Senator from Missouri that the people have rendered their verdict, and he demands judgment and execution. When and how, sir, was the issue made up? The resolution of March, 1834, was adopted after the last presidential election; but this notion of a verdict is gathered from the fact of the continued ascendency of the party and the resolves of some State Legislatures. Can any thing be more preposterous than the assumption that a majority of the people, liking the man, in yielding to him their support, are to be understood as approving of every thing that he says and does, and disapproving of every thing that is said or done against him? As well might it be contended, on the same ground, that because General Jackson smokes a pipe, the verdict of the people has established that it is right and proper to use tobacco, and that the legitimate mode of doing so is by smoking in an earthen pipe. the frenzy of party spirit, or any other motive, shall lead you to do this deed, you will find yourselves in the condition of a homicide, who, having exhausted his malice in a deed of violence, recoils with horror and remorse from the victim of his passion. When Mr. BAYARD had concluded, It Mr. HENDRICKS rose and said that, at this late hour of the day, it would be out of place to attempt an argument or a speech to the Senate; and such was not his purpose, in the few words he had at present to say. had been his intention, some time ago, to have troubled the Senate with his views somewhat at large on the subject; but he would content himself now with saying a very few words; and this was perhaps necessary, owing to the peculiar position he occupied in relation to the proposition before the Senate. It would be recollected that he had voted against the resolution of 1834, so much complained of, the resolution which it was now proposed to expunge from the journals of the Senate. He did so for many of the reasons contained in the preamble to the resolution now on our tables. In some of the reasons, however, contained in that preamble, he did not concur, and of course could not vote for it. For some of the reasons contained in it he could most cheerfully vote. No member of the Senate more than himself (said Mr. H.) regretted the passage of that resolution. No one could have been more opposed to it. He viewed it as an apple of discord set in motion; a firebrand thrown into the community, calculated to do more harm than any other measure proposed at that eventful session; and he now believed that it had done more harm in exciting party spirit to its present dangerous height than any other measure which could have been proposed. The danger apprebended to the constitution by this act of expunging (said Mr. H.) is a natural consequence of the measure of 1834; as much so as that one act of violence should succeed another. A party in power to-day, and who shall use that power indiscreetly, will be sure to meet with retaliation, as soon as the opposite party shall triumph. Hence violent measures of this kind are as sure to succeed each other, in the mutations of party power, as ef. fect is to follow cause. Much, however, as he was opposed to the resolution of 1834, he could not vote to expunge it from the journals. That was a question, in his opinion, having nothing to do with the merits or demerits of the original proposition. The question before the Senate was one of power to expunge the journal, no matter what journal it might be. He thought no such power existed in the Senate, nor any where else; and his oath to support the Constitution of the United States was imperative, and prohibited him from giving any such vote, whatever may have been his opinion of the resolution proposed to be expunged. It was, in his view of the constitution, as much a duty to keep and preserve the journals of unconstitutional proceedings, if such there be, as of any other. Our constituents have as much right to know our bad acts as our good ones; because it is for these they will call us to account; and it would be strange doctrine, that we could shield ourselves from responsibility by expunging the journals. The argument, then, of the Senator from Pennsylvania, that the resolution of 1834 was unconstitutional, and therefore ought to be expunged, did not in the least relieve his mind. He understood, too, that this was the basis of the votes of other members of the Senate in favor of expunging. Much as he disapproved of the resolution of 1834, he believed that it was constitutional, and that it was such a proposition as the Senate might entertain and adopt. He saw nothing unconstitutional about it. It might, or it might not, be considered an abstract proposition. It had, indeed, remained as a mere declaratory expression of the Senate, but it might have been the basis of legislation. Whether [JAN. 16, 1837. it be true or false is a matter of opinion. Those who voted for it unquestionably believed its affirmations to be true. They believed that the President had, in relation to the revenue, exercised authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both. He, who voted against it, believed that the authority and power exercised by the President was not in derogation of the constitution and laws; and, however much he dissented on the ground of expediency from that which had been done, he never doubted the constitutional and legal power of the President to do what he did. It had been said (continued Mr. H.) that the resolu tion of 1834 contains impeachable matter against the President, and that, on this account, it is not entitled to a place on the journals. He did not think, however, that it contained any impeachable matter. It charged no evil or corrupt intention, which was the essential ingredient of impeachable matter. He referred to the case of Peck's trial before the Senate, and stated that the absence of proof of corrupt intention was the basis of his acquittal by the Senate. This had been the reason of his own vote of acquittal; and this, he had good reason to believe, was the basis of votes of acquittal generally. In voting against expunging, he did not vote to affirm the truth of the resolution of 1834. He had already stated the reverse. He believed that the President had the power, whatever he might think of its exercise, under the circumstances of that case. But his opinion that the resolution proposed to be expunged was and is un true, had nothing to do with his duty in the present case, and could not, in any degree, influence his vote. The Senate had no power to expunge the journals. He could, without the least difficulty, vote upon the journals of the present session a resolution to rescind that of 1834, or to affirm a contrary proposition. This, while it would clearly assert the opinion of the Senate in relation to the proceedings of 1834, would not obliterate the journals of that day, and would have all the effect of the mode proposed. Mr. H. here referred to the constitution, which says that "each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their opinion require secrecy," and said that the obligations of his oath to support the constitution of the United States made, in his conscience and judgment, his duty on the present occasion clear and imperative. The constitution required the journal to be kept. He could not vote to destroy, or expunge, or ob literate it. But it is contended (said Mr. H.) that the black lines proposed to be drawn around the journal of 1834 will not expunge it in reality; that they will take nothing away from it. It will not, however, be contended that writing the words required to be written across the face of it will not deface, and, to a certain extent, obliterate it. But suppose these black lines and this writing upon the journal of 1834 takes nothing away from that journal, it will surely not be denied that a material addition will be made to it. The constitution requires the journal to be published, but how was this to be published? Could it be published as the journal of 1834? No, That had been published three years ago. There were in that publication no black lines; no writing across the face of the record. If you publish it as the journal of 1834, you falsify the former publication. You cannot publish it as the journal of 1837, because it is the journal of 1834. There, and there only, are the black lines and labellous writing to be found. No page of the journal of 1837 contains any thing like it. In what shape, or form, or manner, then, will you obey the injunction of the constitution, in publishing the journal of these proceedings? The truth is, (said Mr. H.,) the more we look at this thing, the more difficulty we must see in |