trary, his views were limited to the gradual suppression and disuse "of all bank bills below twenty dollars," as the only true practical reform “ultimately" to be accom. plished. And how did the President propose accomplishing this reform? Why, by such regulations, by Congress, in the management of the revenue and custody of the deposites, as would prove auxiliary to State legislation in effecting this object. Now, is not the bill of the committee precisely in accordance with these views of the President? Does not this bill propose such regulations being made in the management of the revenue as will, if aided by State legislation, suppress the circulation of all notes below twenty dollars? And the bill of the Senator from Missouri is in direct opposition to this message; for, by the use only of gold and silver in revenue payments, he abandons all hope of so managing the revenue as to make it available in suppressing the small-note currency. The object of the President is the disuse of notes under twenty dollars, that of the Senator from Missouri the disuse of every thing but gold and silver.

Nor does the Treasury order in any manner contravene those principles, imbodied in former messages. That this order was perfectly legal and constitutional, that it was in accordance with the discretionary powers vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by the joint res olution of 1816, Mr. W. said he never doubted; that the motives of the President in issuing this order were pure and patriotic was beyond dispute. The measure was evidently temporary, designed to repress inordinate speculations in the public lands; and it is expressly de clared in the President's message to be of little importance, "if the lands were sold for immediate settlement and cultivation." That it never was designed to establish the principle of excluding bank notes from revenue payments is evident from the fact that payments of cus. toms are received, as formerly, in bank paper. There yet remains one other evidence on this subject, which is conclusive. The fifth section of the act of Congress of June last, regulating the deposites of the public moneys, is in these words:

"That no bank shall be selected or continued as a place of deposite of the public money, which shall not redeem its notes and bills, on demand, in specie; nor shall any bank be selected or continued, as aforesaid, which shall, after the 4th of July, 1856, issue or pay out any note or bill of a less denomination than five dol. lars; nor shall the notes or bills of any bank be received in payment of any debt due to the United States which shall, after the said fourth day of July, 1836, issue any note or bill of a less denomination than five dollars."

Now, this act passed both Houses with unprecedented unanimity. In the Senate it was passed with but six dissenting votes, namely: Benton, Black, Cuthbert, Grundy, Walker, and Wright; not one of whom opposed it on account of the fifth section, but, as clearly stated at the time, because of the distribution principle contained in the thirteenth section. So far as the fifth section is concerned, the vote of Congress may well be considered as unanimous in its favor. The President, also, in his last message, in stating the reluctance with which he signed this bill, gives as the reason the distribution principle of the thirteenth section; but he thus distinctly eulogizes the provisions of this 5th section, as follows: "In the acts of several of the States prohibiting the cir. culation of small notes, and the auxiliary enactments of Congress at the last session, forbidding their reception in payment on public account, the true policy of the country has been advanced, and a larger proportion of the precious metals infused into our circulation." Now, the only act of the last session forbidding the reception of small notes on public account is this fifth section of this act, thus eulogized by the President and approved by bim on the 23d of June last. Yet this very section is a

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repeal of the constitution, if the bill of the committee be thus truly designated by the Senator from Missouri; for both are laws, not resolutions, and both forbid the reception of small notes only.

Let us compare their provisions in this respect: The bill of the committee declares: "From and after the passage of this act, the notes of no bank which shall issue or circulate bills or notes of a less denomination than five dollars shall be received on account of the public dues;" extending the prohibition, in December, 1841, to the notes of all banks issuing bills or notes under twenty dollars.

The fifth section of the deposite act declares: "Nor shall the notes or bills of any bank be received in payment of any debt due to the United States, which shall, after the said fourth day of July, 1836, issue any note or bill of a less denomination than five dollars."

Where is the distinction, in principle, as regards the reception of bank paper on public account, between the two provisions? And the Senator from Missouri, in thus denouncing the bill of the committee as a repeal of the constitution, denounces directly the President of the United States. Congress, no more than a State Legislature, can make any thing but gold or silver a tender in payment of debts by one citizen to another; but that Congress, or a State Legislature, or an individual, may waive their constitutional rights, and receive bank paper or drafts, in payment of any debt, is a principle of universal adoption in theory and practice, and never doubted by any one until at the present session by the Senator from Missouri. The distinction of the Senator in this respect was as incomprehensible to him (Mr. W.) as he believed it was to every Senator, and, indeed, was discernible only by the magnifying powers of a solar microscope. It was a point-no-point, which, like the logarithmic spiral, or asymptote of the hyperbolic curve, might be forever approached without reaching; an infinitesmal, the ghost of an idea, not only without length, breadth, thickness, shape, weight, or dimensions, but without position-—a mere imaginary nothing, which flitted before the bewildered vision of the honorable Senator, when traversing, in his fitful somnambulism, that tesselated pavement of gold, silver, and billon, which that Senator delighted to occupy. Sir, the Senator from Missouri might have heaped mountain high his piles of metal; he might have swept, in his Quixotic flight, over the banks of the States, putting to the sword their offi cers, stockholders, directory, and legislative bodies by which they were chartered; he might, in his reveries, have demolished their charters, and consumed their paper by the fire of his eloquence; he might have transacted, in fancy, with a metallic currency of twenty-eight millions in circulation, an actual annual businees of fifteen hundred millions, and Mr. W. would not have disturbed his beatific visions, nor would any other Senatorfor they were visions only, that could never be realizedbut when, descending from his ethereal flights, he seized upon the Committee on Public Lands as criminals, arraigned them as violators of the constitution, and prayed Heaven for deliverance from them, Mr. W. could be silent no longer. Yes, even then he would have passed lightly over the ashes of the theories of the honorable Senator, for, if he desired to make assaults upon any, it would be upon the living, and not the dead; but that Senator, in the opening of hts (Mr. W's) address, had rejected the olive branch which, upon the urgent solicitation of mutual friends, against his own judgment, he had extended to the honorable Senator. The Senator from Missouri had thus, in substance, declared his "voice was still for war." Be it so; but he hoped the Senate would all recollect that be (Mr. W.) was not the aggressor; and that, whilst he trusted he never would wantonly assail the feelings or reputation of any Senator,

mers of the constitution, that they provided in express terms for such standard, by declaring that Congress should have power to coin money, and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin; and, in the very next sentence, they provided for the exercise of power by Congress to punish for counterfeiting the current coin of the United States. Money, as the word is used in the constitution of the United States, must be understood as a definite and technical expression; it means gold and silver only, as formed and fashioned into shape and size by the order of that part of our system of Government possessing the full attributes of sovereignty, and having bestowed upon it arbitrary or positive value. Congress is authorized to borrow money on the credit of the United States. Without this special grant, Congress could not exercise the borrowing power at all. Can Congress, then, borrow any thing but money? I presume not. Under this grant to borrow money, Congress cannot borrow goods and chattels, cannot borrow horses, cattle, or any other merchandise; nor can Congress, as I contend and believe, under this grant to borrow, obtain bank notes of any description; for if Congress cannot borrow goods and chattels, which contain within them. selves an intrinsic value, and money being made the standard of that value, surely they cannot borrow bank notes, which in themselves contain no intrinsic value, but are mere credit, and the representative of money, in place of money being the standard of their value. If Congress, then, have not the power given them by the constitution to borrow bank notes, I contend they cannot exercise it; for the expressive grant to borrow money excludes the exercise of all power to borrow any thing but money; and if Congress cannot borrow bank notes, I contend that their reception in any other manner, as a part or whole of the revenue necessary for the support of this Government, is equally forbidden. I believe that to allow bank notes to be received in the collection of the customs, or in payment for the public lands, is in fact, to all practical purposes, to require your officers so to receive them; and that each is equally prohibited by the constitution.

No one, I presume, will contend that Congress can borrow money for any other purpose than that for which they can collect money from imports; when in the Treas ury of the nation, it is all a part or parcel of the revenue of the country. It follows, then, most clearly and conclusively to my mind, that what Congress cannot borrow they cannot collect as taxes, dutics, imports, or excises, because, under these heads, is the whole power of Congress to raise means for the support of this Government circumscribed; the receiving money for the public lands, or any other property belonging to the United States, I consider as falling under that class of collections embraced in the word "duties." I therefore consider this bill, which allows bank notes of any description, or under any circumstances, to be received in payment of any debt or demand on this Government, to be entirely incompatible with the constitution itself.

There is another view of this bill which, to my mind, makes it equally objectionable on constitutional grounds: it is its dangerous interference with the power and rights of the States. State banks, like all other State institutions, belong exclusively to the States, and cannot rightfully be made subject to any other than State legis. lation; Congress, therefore, cannot exercise its moneyed power, a power which is derived from the people of the States, to induce any portion of that people, or a corporation created by themselves, to exercise their powers differently from that which the laws of the State permit or require, and thus supersede State laws by the acts of Congress in measures which are purely local State con

cerns.

What does this bill provide? That the paper of certain State banks shall be, or, if you please, per

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That

mitted to be, taken in the payment of the revenue of this Government, on condition that such banks will adopt certain regulations which Congress shall prescribe. It is true that we do not attempt any coercive power over the banks, but we make use of moneyed power, a power often far more dangerous and destructive to the rights of the country than force itself. money is power, is an established maxim. We, then, offer the State banks the keeping of our money, and of course its use for the time being, provided they will conform to certain regulations which we prescribe. Is not this a palpable interference with State sovereignty, and of course a violation of the constitution of the United States? It seems to me there can be but one answer to this question. It is no removal of the objection, at least to my mind, to say that the banks will make the regula tions required by this bill by contract; this view of the subject rather increases the objections. Corporations derive all their power of action from their charters alone. If I may use a figurative expression, they can only live and move therein; they cannot contract away any of their powers, nor can they acquire new power by contract-I mean the power of action as corporations; yet, if Congress can contract with State banks, who, by the grants in their charters, have power to issue one, two, or three dollar notes, to forego that power, and issue no notes of a less denomination than five dollars, I cannot see why Congress cannot extend the contract to the issuing of notes of any amount whatever, or even to the buying up the charter itself, and thus defeat the very end and object of the institution; and this right of Congress can be extended so as to put an end to all power of State legislation over an institution created by the State for wise and valuable purposes. But, sir, I object to this whole policy of bargaining with State institutions, or with citizens of a State, for any part or portion of the State sovereignty. If you can do it in one instance, you can do it in all instances; and the State Governments will be less than the corporations which they have created, when you take those corporations into your keeping for any purpose whatever. Sir, I regret, I deplore, the constant tendency which I witness here to extend the action of this Government into the orbit of State power; you prescribe oaths and forms for the settlement of disputed claims, and the rights of property, between citizens of the same State; you authorize your courts to take cognizance of and punish offences which are properly cognizable in State courts, and punishable by State laws; and you invite the citizens of the States to come to you in their primary assemblies against their own Government; thus unceasingly, as time is bringing all things to an end, are you putting an end to the sovereignty of the States. How soon we shall find a grand central Government in the ten miles square is not for me to conjecture; but against this whole process I do, as a Senator in the Congress of the United States, enter my most solemn protest.

Mr. President, I trust I shall not be considered as departing from the plan which I had marked out for myself on this occasion, by a brief notice of some of the arguments I have heard on this question. It will be rcmembered that they commenced with the introduction of the resolution offered by my colleague to rescind the Treasury order of July last, requiring money payment for public land. The argument in the early stages of the debate was directed against the power of the President to issue that order; as I have no doubt that the power was constitutionally exercised, and as that part of the argument seems to have been abandoned, I shall not now notice it. There is one feature, however, of that argument deserving a passing remark. It has been said by gentlemen that they could not support the resolution of my colleague, as they consider, in doing so, they cast

censure on the President; but the bill now before the Senate is to accomplish the same object--a repeal of the order--though by different words; yet it seems to have their undivided support. For my single self, I am unable to reconcile this apparent incongruity; but if the implication of censure can in any case be a reason for our course here, it ought to operate most strongly when it is calculated to censure the constitution of the country and the policy of the States. The President, I am sure, cannot thank his friends for their reasons; if any part or parcel of his official conduct cannot be supported on principle, he will never ask that it shall be excused in pity; he well knows that we take our seats under the solemn injunction of an oath to support the constitution, but not the administration; that is matter of choice, not of obligation; and he has too high a regard for the constitution to tolerate for a moment a friend who would sacrifice it for his personal or official favor. But, sir, I return from this digression. It was so thrown in my way that I could not well get round it, but was compelled to take up and remove it. The arguments on the bill before us are what I have now to do with. I shall consider them as they occur to my recollection, not having taken notes at the time, as I did not then intend or expect to speak on this question. In support of the doctrine of the bill, it has been contended that Congress have the power to take, in payments for any dues of the Government, articles in kind such as to them may seem proper. To this doctrine I can never assent, except gentlemen can prove that Congress have the power to make money of wool, or leather, or any other chattel. I mean, to consider and receive these articles as money; for I hold that, by the constitution, Congress can collect the revenue of the Government in nothing but money. If they, then, can, by the magic of their power, transnute a yard of broadcloth into money for the time being, and receive it for the duty payable upon the whole piece, the argument is good, but not otherwise. I think this an important branch of the subject, and ought to be well considered; and although I may not be able to add a new idea, or advance a single additional thought, yet I consider it a duty not to conceal my opinion. I hold that the Government of the United States has not the power to possess itself of any property whatever by contract, or purchase from individuals or corporate bodies, but such only as is necessary and proper to car1y on the functions of the Government. Congress cannot barter with individuals even for that: they may sell their own property, constitutionally acquired, and with the proceeds, money of course, purchase what they

may need.

Congress cannot receive the real estate of the Government debtor, or of a defaulter, in the payments of such debts or default; because Congress cannot, without the consent of the States, purchase any land within their respective jurisdictions. The reason is obvious; for the exercise of exclusive authority over the rights of individ ual property within its jurisdiction is essential, I may say v tally so, to State sovereignty. The primary disposal of the public domain acquired by treaty with other nations, or by cessions made by States, which is, in fact, the same thing, is clearly within the power of Congress; but having once disposed of the soil, this Government can never resume those rights without the consent of the States in which the land is situate. If, then, Congress cannot receive in payment of taxes, imposts, or excises, the real estate of the person who owes such duties, and thus enter the arena with the land speculator, much less can we receive, for the dues of the Government, hats, shoes, clothes, wines, sugars, or any other duitable article, for the amount of duty due by the importer; if it were otherwise, the Government has the power to enter into competition with any of her citizens in the general

[JAN. 30, 1837.

trade of the country-a power in fact to become a dealer in slaves, so long as slaves can be considered proper. ty. I understand this power as contended for. I mean the general power to purchase or receive property for its dues, or even apply the revenue of Government for that purpose. Viewing it in that light, it is a power at which I revolt, and one to which I am sure the people of this country would not, for a moment, submit." It was this glaring absurdity (at least to my mind) that in duced me vote at the last session against the bill for the purchase of stocks with the surplus revenue of the country; and I confess I heard the other day, when the bill for advancing to claimants under the French and Neapolitan treaties their dues was under consideration, not only with surprise, but with astonishment, the principle advanced, that, as we had a surplus of money on hand, it was improper we should suffer it to lie idle in the Treasury; that if we could make three or four per cent. by making advances to these claimants, it was wise and proper to do so; that we had the power, and it was prudent so to invest this money that it would be productive; that when we came to appropriate by law, we should find its quantity increased. I do not pretend to give the exact words, as used in the argumen', but I feel sure that I remember them substantially. I endeavored at the moment to realize in my own mind the practical operation of the rule. I well remember of mentally asking myself if this doctrine be true; if we can take the whole of the surplus money in the Treasury, send our agent into the New York market, and purchase the entire stock of broadcloth or tea on hand. This would no doubt be a safe and sure investment, and one by which this Government could not only make four per cent. per annum, but probably from twenty to fifty per cent. in a few months. I did not hesitate a moment in deciding that we had not the power; and if we had, however advantageous to the Government it might be, it would be most grossly unjust. I am still unable to see any difference in principle between power to receive or purchase cloth, and the power to receive bank notes. Bank notes, being but mere evidences of debt, are, or ought to be, less the object of our care than things of more substantial value. There is another objection to the receiving of bank notes, as contemplated by this bill: it is the odious doctrine of preference which it contains; and that preference is not matter of law, but matter of discretion, given by law to the officers and agents of Government. If this bill is not obnoxious to the words of the fifth paragraph of the ninth section, first article, of the constitution, it falls clearly within the reason of that paragraph. No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another. Suppose we should read, no preference shall be given by any regulation of revenue to the banks of one State over those of another. Would not such reading appear to be founded on equally reasonable and just principles? I should think so. Does not this bill claim the power, if in fact it does not expressly authorize its exercise, to make this prefer ence? If you can make a discrimination in bank notes at all, if indeed you can designate what are specie-paying banks, as the phrase is, you can make any other designation or discrimination you please; and thus, in the regulation of the revenue, give a preference to one bank over another, or to the banks of one State over those of another. A proposition so plain, and a practice so unjust and absurd, must strike every mind, at the first view, as highly improper, if not unconstitutional.

But the principle that the Government shall undertake to discriminate between the bank notes of different banks has been, and still is, productive of much injury to the paper circulation of the country, as created by the States. It has been often said, and I admit its truth,