since then to change the principle of the measure in any respect, he was content to rest the present question on the principles then so unanswerably established, and the discussion by which they had been defended at the last session.

Mr. WRIGHT said that the principles which had gov. erned his course last year did remain unchanged, and should govern it now. As to others, he presumed their votes last session had been governed mainly by the fact that a large surplus was actually in existence, and must be disposed of in some way. Such was not now the fact; and if any gentlemen should change their course, it was for them and not for Mr. W. to give the reasons for such change.

Mr. CLAY inquired whether it was the intention of the chairman of the Finance Committee and those with whom he acted, that if a surplus arose it was to be left in the hands of the deposite banks, where it drew an interest of two per cent., while in the hands of the States it would yield six. He was anxious to know what was to be the policy of the administration in regard to this

matter.

[Mr. WRIGHT interposed, to say that its policy would be to have no surplus.]

Then (replied Mr. C.) take the land bill, like an honest man, and there is a perfect remedy for the difficulty. Mr. C. then adverted to the remarks made by Mr. RIVES, in the discussion of the expunging resolution, as to the democratic character of the Senate, and appealed to the body now to show whether it would justify this character by opposing a measure coming to it from the confesesdly democratic branch of the Government. called upon all who had voted for the distribution bill of the last session to rally round their own principles, and oppose the striking out. But, by way of compromise, he proposed the adoption of the land bill, &c. He concluded by demanding the yeas and nays.

He

Mr. BUCHANAN said he was one of those who intended to vote against the amendment to the fortification bill which had been adopted in the House, directing that the surplus revenue exceeding five millions of dollars which might remain in the Treasury on the first day of January next, should be deposited with the States, under the provisions of the deposite act which had passed at the last session of Congress. As he had advocated the passage of that act, it became necessary that he should make a few observations explanatory of the course which he purposed to pursue on the present occasion.

Mr. B. stated that there was but little analogy between these two measures, unless it might be that they were both called deposite bills. This was the chief point of resemblance. The principles upon which the present proposition was now advocated were entirely different from those which had been assumed by the friends of the deposite bill of the last session. And here he must be permitted to express his regret that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] seemed to have abandoned his bill to distribute the proceeds of the public lands among the States. For his own part, he infinitely preferred that measure to the one now before the Senate.

What were the principles (said Mr. B.) upon which the deposite bill of the last session rested? There was then a vast sum of public money, beyond the wants of the Government, in the deposite banks, whilst an absolute certainty existed that at the end of the year this surplus would be greatly increased. At that time, these banks were not bound to pay any interest on their deposites. These accumulations of public money were loaned out by them to individuals, whilst all the profits arising from such loans went into the pockets of their stockholders. A wild spirit of speculation was thus fostered, which threatened to destroy the regular business of the country, and to convert our public domain into paper VOL. XIII.-63

[SENATE.

money. The enormous evils of this system were palpable. The banks were then inflicting deep injuries upon the country, by the manner in which they used this money; and it was every day becoming more and more uncertain whether they would be able to meet the demands of the Government, when called upon for this purpose. Under these peculiar circumstances, what was to be done? We were compelled to choose between two great evils. We must either have suffered the money to re. main in the banks, and subjected the country to the con. sequences; or it became our duty to deposite it with the States, and give them the advantage of using it until it should be required by the wants of the Government. No other practical alternative could be presented. For my own part, I felt no hesitation in making my choice.

At that time it seemed to have been admitted by every Senator, that, as a general system, it would be extremely dangerous to the country annually to distribute the surplus in the Treasury among the States. No voice was raised in favor of such a principle. It was universally condemned. As a plan of general policy, a worse one can never be devised. If pursued, it must, in a very few years, destroy the character of this Government. Let it once be established, and all men can see the inevitable consequences. Every Senator and every Representative will then come to Congress with strong feelings directly hostile to the best interests of the Federal Government. Instead of having our eyes exclusively fixed upon those great national objects intrusted to our care by the constitution, we would be more or less than men if we could banish from our minds the consideration that the full amount of every appropriation for such purposes would be so much deducted from the surplus to which our respective States would be entitled at the close of the year. The question will then be not merely what appropriations are necessary to promote the general interest of the country, but blended with this question will be another--how much can be withheld from those purposes, and to what extent can the dividend of our own States be thus increased? For example: a proposed fortification will cost half a million; in voting for or against it, the consideration will necessarily obtrude itself, would it not be better, would it not be productive of more good, to distribute this sum among our own States? In peace, it is our duty to pre pare for war. With this view, a proposition is made to increase our navy. This may be necessary to protect our commerce, and to present such an array of our power to foreign nations, that they will not dare to injure our citizens, or to insult our flag upon the ocean. In voting upon such a proposition, how easily may we delude ourselves with the idea that there is no danger, and that the country will derive more real benefit from expending the necessary amount upon railroads and canals in the respective States. Every dollar which can be withdrawn from the General Government is a dollar given to the States. Establish this policy, and you set up a principle, to use a Senatorial word, antagonistical to the constitutional and efficient exercise of the powers of the Federal Government. You will thus paralyze the energies of this Government, and reduce it to almost the same feeble condition in which it was placed under the old articles of confederation. Can the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] deny, has he denied, that this would be the effect of such a system? Under its operation, will it not always be a question how much will this or will that appropriation for national purposes deduct from State dividends? You thus present to the very agents selected to administer the Federal Government the strongest temptations to violate their duty.

The deposite bill of the last session was advocated up. on the principle that it was to be a single operation, and

to be justified alone upon the extreme necessity which then existed. What is now the state of the case? This amendment has been ingrafted by the House upon an ordinary appropriation bill. From the very nature of such bills, they ought to be, and generally are, confined to grants of money for the execution of existing laws, and for carrying into effect the settled policy of the country. To unite this deposite section, in the same bill, with the appropriations necessary to complete our system of fortifications, is to declare to the world that it has become a part of our settled policy. Does any necessity now exist for the adoption of such a measure? Are we now placed in the same situation in which we were at the last session of Congress? Will there be any surplus in the Treasury on the 1st of January next, beyond five millions? Has this fact been ascertained? Shadows, clouds, and darkness, rest upon the question. Whether there will be or not is uncertain, contingent, dependent upon the action of Congress, and upon the speculations in the public lands. My own impression is, that, if there should be a surplus, it will be comparatively small; unless this very proposition for its deposite with the States should be the means of creating it, by defeating the passage of important bills for the defence and benefit of the country. What necessity now exists for the adoption of this measure? If there shall be a surplus when Congress meet on the 1st of December next, it will then be time enough to provide for its disposition. One great objection to this measure is, that it will make the extreme medicine of the constitution its daily bread. It has already become so familiar to us that Senators are now willing to insert it in an ordinary appropriation bill, and thus make it the settled policy of the country. It should be the exception, not the rule. Above all, it is a remedy to which we ought never to resort until we know that a surplus exists, or are absolutely certain that it will exist. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. I shall not now speak of the unhappy influence which this system of distribution would exert upon the State Governments themselves; because I have not risen to make a general speech, but merely to place my own conduct, in relation to this subject, in its true light.

And now, sir, permit me again to express my sorrow that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] had not been willing to postpone this question, and to wait until the next session. Then his land bill might be presented to Congress under brighter auspices than it has ever been heretofore. If a choice is to be made between that bill and a system of distributing surpluses, it will not be difficult for me to decide. There is, in my judgment, no comparison between the two. If you grant the proceeds of the public lands to the States as their right, this is one source of revenue which you withdraw from the control of Congress. Our system of policy would thus be rendered fixed and stable. We could then accommodate our duties on imporis to the necessary expenses of the Government, and our tariff would not be subject to those perpetual changes which must ever exist whilst we derive a portion of our revenue from such a fluctuating source as that of the public lands. The States would receive this money, not as a matter of bounty, but of right. They would, therefore, not feel dependent for it upon the General Government. Nearly all the evils attendant upon a distribution of the surpluses would thus forever be avoided; and Congress would then be compelled to raise the revenue necessary to defray the expenses of the Government from the customs and from other taxes. This would introduce a wholesome spirit of economy into our councils, without making it the interest of the Senators and Representa tives in Congress to array themselves against appropriations for objects of a national character. I should therefore have rejoiced, had the Senator from Kentucky

[FEB. 28, 1837.

adhered to his land bill and opposed this amendment, which, if it should prevail, must destroy that measure. For my own part, I shall vote to strike this amendment from the bill, without the slightest apprehension of sub. jecting myself to the charge of inconsistency.

Mr. RIVES explained, in reply to Mr. CLAY, that his remarks, as to the aristocratic character of the Senate, had no reference to the individual character of its members, but to the constitution of the entire body, in its collective capacity, as farthest removed from an expres sion of the popular will.

As to the appeal of the Senator to the majority of the Senate to exhibit a deference to the will of the people, as expressed by a vote of the other House, it would have had more weight had it been seconded by the ex ample of the Senator himself. Mr. R. then alluded to the stern rejection of the three million appropriation for fortifications, which had been proposed by the House of Representatives on a former memorable occasion. The Senate was now committed before the world to a sys tem of policy which was opposed to the accumulation of surplus revenue; and there was not the slightest incon sistency if, in adherence to that policy, it rejected a measure which was founded on a policy directly the reverse of this. Mr. R. adverted, as Mr. BUCHANAN had done, to the different circumstances in which the Senate had been placed at the last session, as a sufficient reason why he had advocated a similar measure, at that time, to that which he should now oppose.

Mr. PRESTON was understood to say that the Sen. ate had been regarded and represented as an aristocratic body while it was opposed to the administration, but ceased to be so when it changed to the opposite side in politics. He regretted that it was so officially termed at the time, and hoped hereafter that it would not be so referred to at all.

The observations (he said) of the Senator from Vir ginia [Mr. RIVES] were sound and judicious, so far as they related to facts; but Mr. P. had come to a different conclusion from that which Mr. R. had drawn from the premises. In the case of very large appropriations, from an abundance of money, the question readily occurred whether it might not be saved for their constit uents; thus avoiding a wasteful and inexpedient expend iture. Could not the money be saved now for their constituents or for the States. The tendency of a sur. plus was to make members of Congress negligent and prodigal, which could only be corrected by their being stimulated to the very inquiry which the gentleman from Virginia had suggested. Could it be expected that such an inquiry would make them niggardly and parsimoni ous? The annual expenditure was now $30,000,000 or $40,000,000. Could there be any danger, in this state of things, of too great economy? We were about to be over. whelmed by a surplus, which we might get clear of either by distributing among the States, or by swelling the es penditure so as to absorb it. If one or the other of these measures must be perpetual, Mr. P. would prefer habitual distribution to habitual exorbitant expenditure. The former, though an evil, had attached to it a degree of justice. The latter, a continued wasteful and prodigal expenditure, was the worst possible condition of the body politic. But Mr. P. was opposed in both forms to this eternal sweat, and would much rather reduce it at once by the lancet.

Mr. P. said be regarded the measure of distribution as baving a strong tendency to produce the very event of inquiry to which he had alluded. Pass now the meas ure of distribution, and it would arouse the States lo lock, not into the tariff, but into the annual Govern ment expenditure of $30,000,000; and they would ask, why is all this squandered? Why is not the amount re duced within reasonable Imits, and the residue given

to

FEB. 28, 1837.}

[SENATE.

Was this Government (Mr. C. asked) established to levy taxes; to collect, as trustees, the money that was to be expended by the States? Certainly not. When it collects taxes, is it to do it for the use of the States? Is

Gentlemen differed (said Mr. P.) in regard to the question whether there would or would not be a surplus. But if there should be a surplus, did they intend that it should remain in the banks? If there should be a surplus, all concurred in the expression of the opinion that it ought to be distributed. But suppose there should be none, a law of distribution would not take effect, and could, therefore, be the cause of no evil. It was best (he said) to guard on the side of danger, on the supposition that there might be a surplus. Gentlemen up to the close of the last session insisted that there would not then be a cent of surplus, and they came upon us with the full cry of wait, wait till there is a surplus. Was it proper to wait till the danger was upon us, or to provide beforehand even for its possible occurrence? If there should be no surplus, there would, in any case, be no danger. They ought to provide for the danger, which could possibly result in no harm if there should be no surplus, notwithstanding gentlemen argued that the law would have a deleterious effect on the minds of the people. If there should be no surplus, there was no possibility of its debauching the people. The only safe mode was to provide for a distribution.

But the probability was, that there would be a surplus; and, small or great, it was better to distribute it among the States than leave it in the banks. If there, the bubble of paper circulation, promoted by it, would burst, and it would be in danger; though the loss to the Treasury would be slight, in comparison of the general calamity. Let it be generally understood that when there should be a surplus, the banks were not to have it, but it would go back to the Slates. Some of them had turned the back of the hand for a moment when it was presented; but where was the State that had actually refused to receive it? Some of them were coy in their words; but when a great evil was to be avoided, they thought it better to get clear of it by submitting to the loss. Some States had said they would not touch it. But every one had received it. Congress ought to adopt the measure of distribution till the people should be aroused, and the expenditures and the revenue should be brought down to the economical wants of the Gov

ernment.

Mr. CUTHBERT, having alluded rather indistinctly to the position which Georgia occupied in relation to this subject, said that his friend from South Carolina had stated very justly that some means ought to be devised to prevent extravagant expenditure. But had he been 89 zealous in providing the proper means of doing it, as in condemning the Government for raising the expenditures? Or when one administration raises their expenditures, did he propose that another should commit, as a remedy, an immediate robbery on the people, collecting their money for the purpose of distribution? His friend, be thought, had fallen into the extreme of error, propo

tions not intended by the constitution? On the other hand, is not every operation of this kind to be avoided? Mr. C. would ask the Senators from South Carolina, when first this measure was resorted to, was it not through fear and anxiety? And had it not inverted the regular administration of the Government? Could a single instance be cited in which new and extraordina ry measures of this kind had not led to evil?

And was there no danger to the Government from this new principle? Could any gentleman, however sanguine in his temper, fail to perceive that this operation would create a disturbance in the machinery of Government? What would be the necessary effect of the measure? The States would get into the Treasury by anticipation, and by imagination it would already be theirs; and not until after the Government was properly sustained would the remainder go to the States, but certain remnants would be left by them for the use of the Government. Representatives from the States would come here to procure the means of excessive internal improvements, and would leave the Government just so much as would maintain a miserable existence. But there was also another view of the subject. Such was the pride and perversion of reason in the human mind, so great was the complication of motives that might be brought to bear upon it, that it was impossible to determine, in some cases, even between two opposite results. It might, therefore, be that the States would sink to a pitiful dependence on the Federal Government. And who dared deny that this might take place? Taken either way, it was a great evil in the proper ma chinery, and eminently disturbing the principle of Gov ernment. How great would be the mischief, it was im possible to determine; but even this uncertainty, in one sense, made it the more terrific. Was this measure, then, to be cherished and encouraged? Mr. C. called upon Senators who had an influence and name with the American people to maintain those great principles on which their safety and happiness depended.

The Senators from South Carolina had acknowledged, not only by their actions but their words, that there was no reason to apprehend a surplus in the coming year. This, then, was a new dread of a surplus, which had arisen suddenly, since Saturday last at six o'clock; (al luding to the origin of the proposition for distribution in the House.) That (Mr. C. said) was the date of this new anxiety.

Mr. NILES here made some remarks on the subject, in opposition to distribution, and unfavorable to the Sen ate, when opposed to the administration.

Here a short conversation took place, by Messrs. CLAY, WRIGHT, WEBSTER, and BENTON, on the subject of suspending the action on the bill till to-mor row; which, however, was not formally proposed.

Mr. BROWN remarked that the subject of the debate, which he had no disposition to prolong, had no connex. ion whatever with the main object of the bill. This he deemed a sufficient objection to the proposition as now presented, even if there were no objection on prin. ciple. The provision for distribution came intrenched behind the fortification bill; and he deemed this a system of legislation radically wrong, in which two great questions, wholly distinct, were so connected that Senators might be compelled either to take both, or else to lose both together.

The Senator from Kentucky had said that the present proposition was identical with that of the last session. Mr. B. thought there was a most material difference between them, and, in fact, no similitude at all. At the last session, there was an actual ascertained surplus; but now there was no surplus actually in the Treasury. There was only a possibility that it might accumulate. The one was a case of absolute necessity, the surplus having accumulated during several preceding years. But now they were called on to provide for a distribution of a surplus which might never occur.

The measure, he said, would be an injury to the State Governments, by inducing them to enter upon extravagant schemes of improvement, in anticipation of a surplus. Expectations would be excited by the act, which would never be realized. This, stimulating them to extravagant schemes, would throw them into difficulty, and do an unknown amount of mischief. And why legislate at all on the subject at this juncture? The provision in the bill proposed a distribution of the surplus on the 1st of January next; but, before that time, another session of Congress would commence, and there would be time enough then to legislate on what was certain, and not uncertain or improbable.

Another objection to the measure was, that it would tend to fix perpetual distribution on the General Government. The distribution law of the last session Mr. B. believed to be judicious, and the lesser of the two evils, one of which was unavoidable. But he would not contribute to the establishment of a system which he considered pernicious. And legislation of this kind, in so quick succession, he thought was calculated to fix the system upon us.

The country, he thought, must feel greatly indebted to their watchful guardians, who were for dividing a surplus among them which had no existence except in imagination. Mr. B. had always supposed that, when a trust had been committed to trustees, they had discharged their duty faithfully when they distributed funds after they had actually accrued. But here gentlemen proposed to execute a trust which had not yet devolved

upon them.

But there was another aspect in which the question might be viewed, of great importance to the Union, and especially to the planting States of the South. No system which the advocates of the tariff could devise would be better calculated than this system to perpetuate the tariff. If Congress would give in to the system of annual distribution, this country would not, for years, if ever, be relieved from the tariff system. From the want of time, Mr. B. said he should forego some of the remarks which he had intended to make on this subject. Mr. CALHOUN said the question was now brought to the single point, of what discrimination there was between this bill and the other, and whether this was unwise and that a wise one. Gentlemen admitted that the situation of the banks last year and now was precisely the same. The next point of the Senator from Pennsylvania (for others had followed almost exactly in the track which he had stricken out) was, that when the law of last year was passed, there was a large surplus in the Treasury, while now there was none. But (said Mr. C.) notwithstanding the distribution on the 1st of January last, our Treasury is as full now as it was at that

[FEB. 28, 1837.

was now rising, and would probably continue to rise. The rice crop, also, was rather better, though the tobacco was not quite as much; so that the products for export in 1837 might be fairly put down to equal those of 1836. The profits of trade were never higher, and the customs would probably not be less than $25,000,000 or $30,000,000, though in his estimate he had made the customs rather less than last year.

In relation to the revenue from the public lands, Mr. C. had been guided more by the opinions of others who had more experience, and he had set it down at eight or nine millions of dollars. To this was to be added the stock in the United States Bank, which would make an aggregate, for the year, of $42,000,000.

The question now, whether there would or would not be a surplus, depended (he said) on the answer to the question whether Congress would appropriate all this money. Would politicians of the Jefferson school, who had expelled the old administration, partly on account of its prodigality in an anuual expenditure of some $12,000,000, would they go so far as to appropriate even $27,000,000? At this Mr. C. would place the expenditure, though he thought the extreme ought not to exceed fifteen or sixteen millions, and the average not more than twelve or fourteen millions. There would then be a surplus of some fifteen or seventeen millions, with the enormous expenditure which he admitted might be made.

Last year, the reiterated predictions that there would be no surplus had proved to be false. This year they would be equally so. There was a heavy surplus now, and, without extraordinary expenditures, there would be at the end of the year. There were two reasons which he thought decisive in urging at this time the measure of distribution. One was, that if they made no disposition of the surplus, the scenes of last year would be renewed; the banks would loan extravagantly, relying on the surplus as banking capital, and would extend speculation every way and to every thing. This state of things the President himself had denounced; and yet, notwithstanding past experience and these denunci ations of the President, we were now told to omit this measure for preventing such a result. The opposite course (Mr. C. said) was the true one. now, and it would check extravagance and speculation, and remedy the very disordered state of the currency, which would otherwise be still more disordered. This would meet fully and decisively the two first objects of the Senator from Pennsylvania and of every Senator.

Pass this law

The next argument was, that the passage of the bill would familiarize us to a system of distribution, which might thus be permanently ingrafted on the administra tion of the Government; whereas distribution ought to be an exception, and not the rule. To this latter prop osition Mr. C. agreed most heartily; and no man urged it more than he. He was the first to denounce such a system, and his opinion on this point had undergone no change whatever. It ought to be an exception, and not the rule. His own language was, that it was to be used as medicine, and not as food; and the provisions of this very bill were founded on the disordered condition of the republic. It was in the congestive state, and this bill was intended to remove the obstructions. But the dose must be repeated till the system should become healthy. In Mr. C's opinion, the measure ought to be repeated while the revenue should be going down, till the time of its reduction to the economical wants of the Government. It might require repetition again and again; while the scheme, as a permanent one, would be perfectly absurd. As such, there was not the smallest reason to fear that the people would ever come into it. General Jackson, in two of his messages, had strongly recommended it; but, with all his popularity and power,