coupled with the obligation to bear the financial burden of those wages and the receipt of the benefits of the hours worked, as from the absolute power to hire and fire or the power to control all the activities of the worker. In other words, where the conditions of the relation are such that the process of collective bargaining may appropriately be utilized as contemplated by the Act, the necessary relationship may be found to be present. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, supra, 129.

The Board's determination that there was a relationship in this case deserving of statutory protection does not reflect an isolated or careless reconciliation of the rights guaranteed by the Act with the important wartime duties of plant protection employees. In the course of its administration of the Act during the war, the Board was faced with this problem many times.20 It was well acquainted with the important and complex considerations inherent in the situation. The responsibility of representing the public interest in such matters and of reaching a judgment after giving due weight to all the relevant factors lay primarily with the Board. See Southern Steamship Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31, 47. In the absence of some compelling evidence that the Board has failed to measure up to its responsibility, courts should be reluctant to overturn the considered judgment of the Board and to substitute their own ideas of the public interest. We find no such evidence in this case.

Here we have the Board's considered and consistent judgment that militarized plant guards may safely be permitted to join unions and bargain collectively and that their military duties and obligations do not suffer thereby.

20 See, e. g., Chrysler Corporation, 44 N. L. R. B. 881; Budd Wheel Co., 52 N. L. R. B. 666; Dravo Corporation, 52 N. L. R. B. 322. See also National Labor Relations Board, Seventh Annual Report (1943), p. 63; Eighth Annual Report (1944), p. 57.

398

Opinion of the Court.

In agreement with that viewpoint has been the War Department, the agency most directly concerned with the military aspects of the problem. Its regulations and directives have clearly acknowledged the feasibility of recognizing collective bargaining rights of these guards during wartime, provided only that no encroachment is made upon military necessities. This policy of the Board, moreover, has been confirmed by experience. The Board states that it has certified bargaining representatives for units of militarized guards in more than 105 cases, in none of which has any danger to the public interest or to the war effort resulted.

Under such circumstances, it would be folly on our part to disregard or to upset the policy the Board has applied in this case.21 Since the Board's order is in accord with the law and has substantial roots in the evidence, it should have been enforced by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Respondent's objections to the language and scope of the order are either without merit or have been removed by the demilitarization of the guards. And any issues concerning the subsequent deputization of the guards as policemen are answered by our decision in Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., post, p. 416. The judgment below is accordingly

Reversed.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON dissent substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the court below, 155 F.2d 567.

21 In adopting the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163, Congress provided in §7 (a) (2) that all actions of the National War Labor Board must conform to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act-an indication that Congress deemed the preservation of the right to collective bargaining to be essential in war industries.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORP.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

No. 418. Argued March 7, 1947-Decided May 19, 1947.

1. In the circumstances of this case, the militarization of certain guards employed by a private plant engaged in war production did not preclude the National Labor Relations Board from grouping them in a separate unit for collective bargaining and permitting them to choose as their bargaining representative a union which also represented production and maintenance employees. Pp.

422-427.

2. The determination of the National Labor Relations Board that, in the circumstances of this case, certain guards at a private plant of the respondent engaged in war production, though employed in accordance with a requirement of the War Department and enrolled as civilian auxiliaries to the military police of the United States Army subject to Army Regulations, were "employees" of respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act was justified by the evidence and the law. Labor Board v. Atkins & Co., ante, p. 398. P. 422.

3. A proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act to enforce a Board order requiring an employer to bargain with the representative of militarized plant guards, held not rendered moot by their subsequent demilitarization, in and of itself. Labor Board v. Atkins & Co., ante, p. 398. Pp. 421–422.

4. The provision of § 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act that "No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances," refers to objections which might have been but were not raised in the original proceeding before the Board. P. 427.

5. The reviewing court has power to consider an issue which has come into existence since the proceeding was before the Board. Pp. 427-428.

6. When circumstances arise after the Board's order has been issued which may affect the propriety of enforcement of the order, the reviewing court has discretion to decide the matter itself or to remand it to the Board for further consideration. P. 428.

7. In the circumstances of this case, it is unnecessary to remand the case to the National Labor Relations Board for consideration of the issue as to the status of plant guards who were deputized as municipal policemen subsequently to the issuance of the Board's order, there being nothing in the instant case which would make inapplicable the Board's known policy with respect to deputized guards. P. 428.

8. The facts and law of this case would justify a determination by the Board that the guards at the private plant in question were "employees" within the meaning of § 2 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, notwithstanding their deputization as municipal policemen; and that they were entitled to select as their bargaining agent a union which also represented production and maintenance workers. Pp. 429-431.

154 F.2d 932, reversed.

An order of the National Labor Relations Board, 53 N. L. R. B. 1046, issued under the National Labor Relations Act, was denied enforcement by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 154 F. 2d 932. (A previous judgment, 146 F.2d 718, had been vacated and the case remanded by this Court, 325 U. S. 838.) This Court granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 710. Reversed, p. 431.

Ruth Weyand argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Gerhard P..Van Arkel, Morris P. Glushien and Mozart G. Ratner.

John C. Bane, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were H. Parker Sharp and Paul J. Winschel.

Arnold F. Bunge filed a brief for the Packard Motor Car Company, as amicus curiae, in support of respondent.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Like Labor Board v. Atkins & Co., ante, p. 398, this case involves the rights of militarized plant guards under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. But certain problems are raised here which are not present in the Atkins case.

Respondent owns and operates several large steel manufacturing works and was engaged in the production of war materials during the recent war. At respondent's Otis Works at Cleveland, Ohio, about 4,700 individuals are employed. Production and maintenance employees constitute the great bulk of these workers. But there is also included in the total a group of guards and watchmen, numbering about sixty men normally.

A union affiliated with the United Steelworkers of America, C. I. O., has been the exclusive bargaining agent for the production and maintenance employees. Under a contract made with respondent late in 1942, this union disclaimed any representation of "Foremen or Assistant Foremen in charge of any classes of labor, watchmen, salaried employees and nurses." On March 15, 1943, this union filed a petition for investigation and certification of representatives pursuant to § 9 (c) of the Act, in which it sought to be certified as the collective bargaining representative of the guard force. A hearing was then held. Respondent claimed that a unit composed of these guards was inappropriate because they "perform certain assigned work that is strictly representative of management." Respondent also claimed that any allegation by the union that a unit including watchmen is appropriate was "a direct contravention" of the 1942 contract. And it was further alleged that any unionization of watchmen or guards was particularly inappropriate during a time of war, that their duties "do not differ greatly from the duties