judgment of his peers, or the law of the land; and should the public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation, to take any persons' property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same."

In regard to the first objection of the Governor, the committee remark that from the best information which they can obtain, they have no doubt he is mistaken as to the fact he has stated, relative to the location of the United States' road. The committee believe, upon evidence which is entirely satisfactory to them, that no United States' road has been laid out through Janesville, and that should the one be completed from Racine to Sinapee, by way of that place, for which an appropriation has been made by Congress, it is uncertain through what part of the town it will pass, or at what point it will cross Rock river. The committee for these reasons cannot consider that this objection is entitled to sufficient weight to prevent the passage of the bill. The second objection of the Governor, viz: That the public will be deprived of the privilege of a free bridge, during the continuance of the franchize, unless they pay for the one which the company may erect, the committee consider to be in part answered by the fact that no United States' road crosses the river at the point where the bridge is to be built, and they cannot think the inhabitants of the county of Rock, if they should wish to have a free bridge at that place would object to paying the company the cost of theirs, and the lawful interest on that sum, as provided for in the act of incorporation.

The third objection of the Governor, the committee think entirely answered by what has above been stated-they do not intend to discuss the question whether all our laws should be submitted to Congress before they take effect, as the only reason given by the Governor, why the act under consideration should be, is as the committee believe, they have shown, founded in a mistake as to facts. The fourth and last objection of the Governor, is deserving of more consideration.

The first clause of the quotation made by the Governor, from the ordidance of 1787, is as follows: "No man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land?" The committee are of the opinion that there is nothing in the

act under consideration inconsistent with this provision. For if the act under consideration becomes a law and takes effect, it becomes of course, "the law of the land" and if it deprives any man of his property, this property will be taken by virtue of "the law of the land"—the remainder of the paragraph quoted by the Governor is as follows: "and should the public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation to take any person's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same."

It is apparent that if the words just quoted are to be taken in their absolute sense, and without reference to what precedes them, no man's property could be taken for the most necessary purpose, unless the "public exigencies" demanded it "for the common preservation." As a necessary consequence, no roads or highways could be laid over the land of a citizen without his consent, for the reason that they are designed for the public accommodation and convenience merely. The committee cannot believe this to be the correct interpretation of the language of the ordinance; they think that by a more reasonable construction the property of the citizen may be taken for the use of the public, if "full compensation is made for the same."

use.

It then only remains to be shown that whatever property will be taken by virtue of the act in question will be taken for the public This the committee think, is apparent from an' inspection of the act itself. It is true, that the act allows the corporation to take tolls for crossing their bridge, but the amount is fixed by the Legislatnre, and the intention of the act is not to benefit the corporation but the public; and it is apparent that the effect will be greatly to promote the public accomodation and convenience. The tolls allowed by the Legislature are supposed to be a fair remuneration to the corporation for the cost of the bridge and no more. The committee can see no difference in principle between taxing the public for the cost of the bridge in the way proposed in the bill, and in taxing them for the gross amount at once, and collecting the tax in the usual mode.

That the intention of the act is to benefit the public, and that consequently the private property which will be taken by virtue of its provisions will be taken for the use of the public, is further apparent by the 10th section which authorizes the county of Rock to purchase the bridge at its cost, and the lawful interest thereon.

For the reasons above stated, the committee are of opinion that the bill ought to pass, and regret extremely that the Governor should have had any objections to it.

But there is another subject presented to the committee in relation to the bill to which they have given their most deliberate attention, and this is the inquiry whether it is not now a law, notwithstanding the veto of the Governor. The power of the Governor, in relation to the veto, is contained in the act of Congress, approved March 3d, 1839, and is as follows:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled:

"That every bill which shall have passed the Council and House of Representatives of the Territories of Iowa and Wisconsin, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor of the Territory; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who. shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But, in all such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill, shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within three days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Assembly by adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law."

It will be perceived by the act quoted, that if the Governor does not return a bill within three days, (Sundays excepted,) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the assembly by adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. The certificate of the Secretary of the Council, hereunto annexed, shows that the bill in question was presented to the Governor on Friday, the 21st of Janu

ary, and an inspection of the journal of the Council by the committee shows the same fact; the journal of the House of Representatives shows that the Governor returned the bill to that body without his signature, and with his objections, on Wednesday, the 26th of January; between these two days one Sunday intervened, so that (if the legal maxim holds good in this case, that "there is no division of a day," of which the committee have no doubt,) four entire days intervened (besides Sunday) between the presentation of the bill to the Governor and the return of it to the House in which it originated. It is hence clear that the bill has become a law, unless the Assembly, by adjournment, has prevented its return; and an inspection of the journals of the two Houses shows that the Assembly has not yet adjourned; it is therefore clear, that the adjournment of the Assembly has not prevented the return of the bill to the House in which it originated within the time limited by law.

The committee, cannot, for these reasons, resist the conclusion that the bill has become the law of the land. It may be urged, against the conclusion to which the committee have arrived, that if correct, it would render the power of the Governor to disapprove of the acts passed by the Legislative Assembly, entirely nugatory, as, after a bill had passed both Houses, the House in which it originated might adjourn for three days, and thus prevent its return-although the Assembly had not adjourned at all; this objection the committee think invalid, the act of Congress is too plain, and its import and meaning too apparent, to be affected by any supposed effect it may have upon the veto power of the Governor. The act of Congress appears to have been copied from the seventh section of the first article of the constitution of the United States, as the provisions of the law are identical with those contained in this article of the constitution, except that the word "Council" has been substituted for "Senate," "Governor " for "President of the United States," "Assembly " for "Congress "—the addition of the words "of the territories of Iowa and Wisconsin," so as to give it effect in those territories, and a reduction of the time within which a bill must be returned, from ten to three days; this seems to have been done without sufficiently reflecting that at the time the Houses of the Legislative Assembly of the

Territory had no such restraint imposed upon them by law, as to the time one House might adjourn without the consent of the other, as is imposed on the two Houses of Congress in the fifth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States. The law of Congress, in the absence of any limitation, on the power of one House to adjourn without the consent of the other, is manifestly not adapted to our condition, (unless indeed it be wise to do away with the veto of the Governor altogether,) but must nevertheless, while it is in force, be regarded, and receive the same construction as would the provision in the Constitution of the United States above alluded to.

The committee have taken no notice of a communication of the Governor, in which he states that he returned the bill to the House on the 25th of January, after it had adjourned; as, if the views they have taken of the subject are correct, it needs no consideration; for, as before stated, even if he was prevented by the adjournment of the House of Representatives from sending it to that body, the Assembly had not adjourned, but is still in session.

They will remark, however, that even if the law of Congress was different if that law, instead of providing that the bill should not be a law if the Governor was prevented from returning the bill by the adjournment of the Assembly, had provided that it should not be a law in case he was prevented from returning it by the adjournment of the House in which it originated—the bill in question would still have become a law, for the reason that the House of Representatives (the House in which the bill originated) held regular sessions every day from Friday, the 21st of January, to Wednesday, the 26th of the same month, except the Sunday which intervened, and that he would not have been prevented by the adjournment of the House from returning the bill within the time required by law. The committee are of opinion that the term "day," as used in the law of Congress, means the time which is occupied in the transaction of business on each day; any other construction would compel the House in which a bill has originated, to hold its session, on the third day after the presentation of the bill to the Governor, till 12 o'clock at night, or else, by its adjournment, prevent the return of the bill within three days.