tained to be deficient in a greater degree than could be compensated by the importation of that year, large as it was. And the still greater failure of the crops in this country in 1811 coinciding with a similar failure in other parts of Europe, gave a more decided impulse to a renewed range of high prices, which lasted more or less till the summer of 1813. Thus, the interval of depression from actual or supposed abundance was only momentary; and there was immediately afterwards a constant and quick succession of grounds for speculating on actual or contingent scarcity. But after the harvest of 1813 till that of 1816 the fall was nearly uninterrupted, because, at every step of it, the effect of actual was aggravated by that of still greater contingent abundance. In 1814 there was an importation of corn at greatly reduced charges of conveyance, and the large produce of our own crops again in 1815 was more than sufficient to counteract any chance of improvement from the monopoly granted by the corn bill in that year.

It is obvious, therefore, why, without any reference to the prospective alterations in the system of our currency as the cause, the failures of country banks were so much more numerous upon the relapse of prices between 1813 and 1816 than in 1810. But, if the recoil of prices of agricultural produce in 1810, and of many other commodities, was not of long duration, and did not proceed below the relatively high level from whence they had risen in the two preceding years; there was a large class of commodities which, having risen but little in 1808 and 1809, fell in 1810 and 1811 to a lower level than they had ever been at before, and continued depressed for a greater length of time. This remark applies to some branches of manufactures, to those more especially which depended on a demand for the supply of the United States of America, and which were, consequently, very much depressed by the war with those states; but I now allude to colonial produce, and particularly to coffee and sugar. The depression of coffee, for nearly two years, was not only below the lowest level at which it had ever before been, but

much lower than it has ever been since; and sugar was, for some kinds, at least, lower then than it is even at present. Now, if from the prices of that period (viz. 1810-11) be deducted, first, the difference betwen paper and gold, and then the difference of freight and insurance compared with the present period, some idea may be formed of the intensity of suffering which must have prevailed amongst the parties concerned in producing and importing such commodities. The reverses in 1810 and 1811, from over-trading and hazardous exports, probably exceeded in amount those which occurred from 1814 to 1816.

On a comparison of the two periods, my impression is, that the mercantile losses and the consequent destruction of mercantile paper, as well as of confidence in transactions on credit, were, if any thing, greater in the first than in the second; while, on the other hand, the fall of prices of agricultural produce was so much greater and longer continued, and the consequent loss of farmers, landlords, and of all persons connected with them so extensive, in the period between 1813 and 1816, as to sink into utter insignificance the reverses experienced by the corn trade in 1810. A comparison of the number of commissions of bankruptcy issued in the respective periods, distinguishing those against country bankers, tends to confirm this impression; for it will be observed that the commissions against country bankers in 1810, 1811, and 1812, were little more than half of those in 1814, 1815, and 1816, while the total number of bankruptcies was greater in the former than in the latter period.

On a survey of the whole of these fluctuations from 1807 to 1816, conceiving, as I do, that the commercial reverses between the summer of 1814 and that of 1816 were the inevitable consequence of the speculations and overtrading of the two preceding years, as also that the still greater reverses of 1810 and 1811 might clearly be traced to the high prices and over-trading of 1808 and 1809, I have no hesitation in declaring my firm belief that the whole of that period was productive of a preponderance of suffering and calamity to the commercial interests of this country. The state of high excitement produced by the rapid transitions of political events-the great and feverish activity of adventurers to elude prohibitory decrees, and to avail themselves of unexpected openings - the extraordinary alternation of scarcity and abundance of all kinds of commodities-the spirit of enterprise displayed in the undertakings of fireoffices, docks, canals, and bridges - the extensive employment of shipping, as transports, at however great a national expense-the high prizes held out where the blanks, however, were in disproportionate number-the splendour of the military achievements which terminated the war-all contribute to cast a glare over the retrospect resembling the sunshine of prosperity.

But, confining my observations to the state of commerce, I am satisfied that those who mingled in the scenes, and who were not blinded to all that surrounded them by too intent a pursuit of their own immediate objects, will bear witness with me to the long intervals of gloom-to the sudden changes from the reputation of fortunes rapidly acquired, to bankruptcy and ruin-to the extreme depression of our manufacturers in 1810, 1811, and 1812--to the destruction, or, at least, suspension from business, of a great majority of the old establishments connected with the ports of the continent of Europe, and of the United States of America, which were shut against us by the events of the war to the confiscations of British property in consequence of the French decrees-to the immense losses of

the underwriters in 1810, and again in 1814-to the recoil which, even previous to 1814, had begun to take place in the value of fire-office, canal, dock, and bridge shares-to the depreciation necessarily incidental on a peace to the shipping, and to the foreign establishments dependant for their value on a continuance of the war-and they cannot, I think, avoid coming to the conclusion, that the gloom of adversity really prevailed under that appearance of splendour which deluded the superficial or distant observer. A reference to the list of bankrupts for the last thirty years, and a comparison of the annual average number from 1810 to 1816, with that of the preceding and succeeding period *, will go far to bear out this assertion; and if it be considered that the number of private compositions to that of bankruptcies is in the proportion of probably not less than four to one—if further, the number of individuals involved by loss of situation or property in every failure be included in the view, some, though I suspect a very inadequate idea may be formed of the extent of suffering which attended the splendid but unsound state of commerce that prevailed during those years. What, it may be asked, do I mean to say that the country did not advance in wealth during the period in question? By no means. The country did, I am persuaded, advance in wealth and in population, in spite of the great fluctuations of prices, and of the precarious, and, in the majority of cases, disastrous state of commerce. am equally convinced, that an accumulation of capital has been going forward, still more rapidly since that time, notwithstanding, what I am ready to admit and deplore, the suffering state of the agricultural interest.

I

For the year 1823, the number was only 1070.-For the whole

series, see Appendix.

SECTION X.

Fluctuation of Prices and of the Amount of private Paper, from 1816 to the passing of Mr. Peel's Bill.

IF I have succeeded in giving a satisfactory solution of the causes of the great fluctuations of price, and of the corresponding expansion and contraction of private paper and credit which occurred in so remarkable a degree from 1807 to 1816, it may still be a question how far the same mode of reasoning, the same general rule derived from observation, will serve to account for the elevation of prices and the renewed extension of private paper which occurred between the autumn of 1816 and that of 1818, and for the subsequent continued decline of prices and contraction of private paper.

I have already pointed out how little coincidence there was in the preceding interval, between the increase or decrease in the amount of Bank of England notes, and that of private paper, and have, moreover, remarked that the most striking instances of a great rise of general prices occurred without any increase of Bank notes, while, on the other hand, the most memorable instances of a sudden fall took place contemporaneously with large additions to the Bank circulation. But the advocates for the doctrine which ascribes all or nearly all the fluctuations of price to the Bank restriction, overlook some of the real facts when they insist on instances only of coincidence which seem to suit their purpose of proving the connexion which they assume. Thus the article on currency in the Quarterly Review which I have before quoted, has the following passage explanatory, as the writer doubtless thinks, of the whole process of the rise and fall of prices: "From the year 1810 the price of