"2. Resolved, That all artificial regulations adopted by Congress for the conduct of the business of that assembly, which have the effect to operate more favorably on one class of petitioners than on another, is impolitic and oppressive. Not only were great changes to take place in offices, but, if those who speak, as if with authority, know any thing about it, in salaries also; and, indeed, in many other particulars. The salary of the President, for instance, "3. Resolved, therefore, That all private or individual was to be reduced to a mere competency "for the support matter submitted to the several committees of this House, of a private gentleman;" we should have no more" of this shall be reported on by the said committees severally, in miserable mummery of levees," &c. Ay, and we should the same order in which each case was submitted; and see no more Indians walking the streets with their shoes when several cases shall be submitted on the same day, and boots blacked, and medals suspended from their necks. they shall be taken up and reported on by alphabetical arWe should have pamphlets without title pages; each mem-rangement. ber would furnish himself with paper, and with his own 4. Resolved, That all private or individual matter, reknife make his own pen; and if he read the news, pay for ported on by the several committees of this House, shall it, and that too, without soda water. Oh! what econo-each, in the order of the report, be entered by the Clerk my! What an age of republican simplicity! of salutary on the calendar or docket of the House; and each case so reform! And these, all these, we are told, were but a entered shall, as a matter of right, be taken up and desmall part of the dishes which would be highly seasoned, cided on, when such matter falls within the standing order and tastefully served up, "for this great national banquet of the day. of reform." When all this would come to pass, [Mr. B. said] he would not pretend to predict. He was inclined to suspect, from the disposition made a few mornings since, of a certain resolution offered by his colleague, [Mr. WICKLIFFE] and the amendments proposed upon a branch of the same subject, that the whole project might be laid upon the table for the next four years. "5. Resolved, That the third and fourth of the foregoing resolutions be added to, and become a part of, the standing rules and orders of this House." Mr. T. supported his resolutions in a speech of considerable extent, in which he dwelt, with earnestness, upon the hardship of refusing the consideration of a claim because a majority of the Committee to whom it had been referred happened to have reported against it. The result was, that such claim went to the foot of the docket, and could not come up again during the session. The effect of such a rule was, in fact, to make the decision of a Committee a final adjudication of any claim referred to this House. He recalled the House to the ancient prac→ tice, and insisted that the alteration which had recently taken place was unjust in principle, and oppressive in its operation. With a few words more, in answer to the argument as to the expediency of the proposed cession, and the oppression which would arise under the provisions of the bill, [Mr. B. said] he would close his remarks, being conscious he had already trespassed too much on the politeness of the Committee. It had been said, the Government would always be imposed on, as to the cost of such works, and that individuals could cause the necessary repair to be made at a much lower price than it would cost her. It was true, but in this case not at all applicable, unless, in- Mr. BARTLETT agreed with the gentleman from Virdeed, it were put into the hands of private Turnpike Com-ginia as to the existence of great inconveniences in the panies. Under the management of States, it would afford course of legislation in this House, but thought its cause lay the same opportunity for the practice of frauds. He did deeper than any rule of proceeding. It was to be found in not hesitate, however, to give it, as his opinion, that we the location of the members in the hall, and in the desks could not exact of the judicial officers of the State Govern- with which it was encumbered. Mr. B. inveighed against ments, as such, the discharge of duties pointed out by this the practical effect of this species of accommodation, as bill. In this particular the bill might be amended. But rendering it impossible to hear what was said, and as leadit presented, he thought, no difficulties, and would pro- ing to much unnecessary and improper reading and writing duce no oppression. If an individual committed any of- in the House, by which the time and attention of the memfence on the road, which was a proper subject of State ju- bers was diverted from the business of legislation. risdiction, it would still be cognizable in the Courts of the State. If he violated the law of Congress, as in every other case of a like kind, he would be prosecuted before Federal tribunals. We might constitute a few officers with power to try for minor offences, such as an injury to the road, a refusal to pay the toll, &c. Very few (perhaps two or three for each county) would be sufficient. In this he could perceive neither danger nor oppression. We shall be under no necessity of "dragging them to Pittsburgh for trial." Mr. B. said he would have given his opinions more at large on this last point, but the period for adjournment having arrived, he would no longer detain the Committee. [The Committee then rose.] FRIDAY, JANUARY 30, 1829. RIGHT OF PETITION. The following resolutions, offered some days since, by Mr. TALIAFERRO, of Virginia, came up this day for consideration: "1. Resolved, That, as the people of the United States are by the constitution of the United States, entitled to the full, free, and unrestrained right to petition Congress, it is equally their right to claim from Congress a prompt and VOL. V.-38 Mr. McCOY spoke in reply, and insisted that the existing evils were not to be attributed to the desks, which he considered a great accommodation, and with which he was quite unwilling to part. He then adverted to the vast number of petitions annually presented to the House, ninetenths of which were of such a nature as required only to be examined in order to be rejected; accordingly ninetenths of them were rejected by the committees of the House. Those not rejected were still so numerous as to occupy the whole of the time which could be spared to private claims. If those manifestly unjust must take prece dence according to the order of their presentation, and must all be taken up in order, the House would, every session, reject a vast number of righteous claims, from mere want of time to arrive at them. Mr. TAYLOR adverted to the various changes which had taken place in the order of business in the House since an early period of the Government, many of which he considered as rather injurious than beneficial in their operation. He insisted on the ground taken by Mr. McCOY, and referred to the fact that, at the last session of Congress more than two thousand different subjects had been reported on, and of these two thousand reports more than three-fourths were unfavorable. It was obviously inexpedient and impossible for the House to wade through all H. OF R.] Lotteries in the City of Washington-Cumberland Road. these; and, as this could not be accomplished, it was best that what time the House could devote to private claims should be expended on those which had received the sanction of the Committee which carefully investigated them He was, therefore, opposed to the proposed amendment of the rules. Mr. STEWART now moved that the resolution lie upon the table; which motion prevailed. So the resolution was laid upon the table accordingly. LOTTERIES IN THE CITY OF WASHINGTON. The bill to continue in force the provisions of " An act to authorize the Corporation of the City of Washington to draw Lotteries," came up in order. Mr. WICKLIFFE briefly expressed himself in opposition to the principle of lottery taxation, as odious, immoral, and impolitic. He referred to some calculations which he had made from several lottery schemes published: but declined a full discussion of the subject. He concluded by demanding that the question be taken by yeas and nays. JAN. 31, FEB. 2, 1829. pursuing some branch of honest industry-minors, ap- For his own part, if a sum is wanted by the corporation of Washington, and the Government are disposed to grant it, he would rather give it to them at once, and then the whole mischief would be done; the Government would know the extent of it, whether larger or smaller. But when it sends abroad an unlimited permission to erect lottery offices, who can bound the evil? No man. On the whole, he was decidedly opposed to the bill, and was happy to hear that the yeas and nays had been called, that he might have an opportunity of recording his vote against it. Mr. SERGEANT said that he had made up his mind, long since, that the existence of lotteries was a great evil; and he had since had ample means of confirming that conclusion from facts and experience: so much so, that he could not consent to sanction any law for the establishment or the continuance of any lottery whatever. He did not affect to be more swayed by considerations of a moral kind than other gentlemen; although he did consider the question, even in that point of view, as well deserving of consideration. He thought the House might as well erect an establishment for public gambling in any other form: nay better, for this was gambling of the very worst and most injurious kind. By a new contrivance in the drawing of lotteries, that operation is now performed with almost as much celerity as the dice are thrown, or a coin tossed up in the air. Lotteries thus drawn exhibit the most rapid and powerful kind of gambling now existing; and they present a temptation of fearful force and magnitude to the indulgence of what all will own to be an evil propensity- Mr. INGERSOLL said he should rejoice entirely to exa propensity which no gentleman of this House would wish clude from the District of Columbia this species of gamto encourage in any one that is dear to him; no gentle-bling; and if such was the object of the gentlemen who man who heard him would wish to see a child of his, or a opposed this bill he would go with them heart and hand. servant or apprentice in whom he felt any interest, occupy- But he had given his assent to the present bill merely on ing his time in running after lotteries, and suffering that the ground that the Corporation of Washington had forhigh and morbid excitement which always accompanies merly had a similar grant made them, and in consequence such a pursuit. So great was this temptation in its actual of the defalcation of an individual had been losers to a results on society, that in a thousand cases it has urged men large amount. Mr. I. dwelt on the venerable character to the commission of acts which brought them to a gaol, if of preceding legislators who had sanctioned this grant, not to the gallows. Here Mr. S. adverted to one very af- and then stated the careful manner in which the present fecting instance in illustration of his position. It was the bill had been guarded. But still insisting on his disapcase of an aged and highly respectable man of character, proval of the principle of lotteries, he said he would, for till then unblemished, and of such standing as to bring him the present, move to lay the bill on the table, in order into an office of great trust in a moneyed institution. In that, if gentlemen chose to introduce a resolution on the consequence of a defalcation in the funds, the grey hairs subject of putting an end to all lottery selling within of this unhappy man were brought down to the lowest the District, they might have an opportunity to do so. He state of ignominy by his being tried and convicted for pur- then moved to lay the bill upon the table; but withdrew loining the money of the institution. It was found, on ex- the motion at the request of amining into the case, that all this amount of funds had gone to a lottery office. The man had been dealing in lottery tickets for a long time before; (in tickets authorized by law) but, being unfortunate, he yielded in his despair to the force of a propensity which sometimes gets the mastery of the strongest minds, and which is sure to make an easy conquest over weak ones. Lotteries, he said, were springing up like mushrooms, or rather like the poisonous resemblance of mushrooms, which having the same appearance, are nevertheless deadly to every one who eats of them. If any gentleman will go to the apartment where a lottery was drawing, he would see collected there a crowd of a description which would make his heart ache-a crowd consisting of persons, no one of whom ought to be there; persons who ought to be at home, Mr. LITTLE, who moved to re-commit the bill with instructions to introduce a bill to prohibit the sale of lottery tickets within the District of Columbia; which was carried nem. con. SATURDAY, JAN. 31, 1829. This day was principally occupied in the discussion of bills of a private nature. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1829. The House again went into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and resumed the consideration of the bill for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road. Mr. STEVENSON, of Virginia, [the Speaker] said that he owed to the Committee the expression of his thanks for the opportunity which they had kindly afforded him of presenting his views upon the subject under consideration, and the reasons which would govern his vote. He should not, probably, have felt himself justified in entering, at this time, into the general discussion of the powers of the General Government to execute a system of internal improvement, if he did not consider the bill, in its present shape, as affirming that power, and, consequently, one among the most important which could he debated in that House. He concurred fully in the opinion expressed some days ago, by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. BUCHANAN] who opened so ably the debate-that this question was one, which, in its consequences, involved not only the existence of the Federal constitution, in its native purity, but the peace and security of the Union. We were now called upon [Mr. S. said] to decide whether the great powers of sovereignty, affecting life, liberty, and property, were to be transferred from the States and brought within the control and action of the Federal Government; or whether we were at once to arrest this claim of power, by a vigorous and effectual resistance, before it reached the gates of the sanctuary and shook the pillars of our Union. It was in this view of the subject that he felt himself justified, not only in mingling in the debate, but called upon to oppose, by every effort in his power, the passage of the bill; or to renounce for ever principles which he had long cherished, and which had been the guide of his public life. The remarks which he should offer to the consideration of the Committee were intended to show that Congress had no constitutional power to pass this bill; and if they had the power, that it would be inexpedient and dangerous to exercise it. This bill [he said] asserted the power in the General Government to construct roads and cut canals; to erect gates; impose and collect tolls; prescribe rules and penalties, and punish for a violation of them; to give jurisdiction to State courts and officers to enforce the penal laws of the United States; and to legislate for the protection and preservation of these roads and canals when made. Such powers [Mr. S. said] included, 1st. A right in this Government to the territory or land over which the roads and canals were to be made; and, 2d. The right of jurisdiction over these roads and canals, when completed. The power, if it existed at all, amounted to an absolute right of exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty in the General Government over the soil and territory of the States, for the purposes of Internal Improvement. The advocates of the bill, it was true, had denied the exclusiveness of the power; but the error into which they had fallen arose from their taking for granted what they had not attempted to prove; and that was, that the power was concurrent, and capable of execution by both Governments. This Mr. S. denied; and although it was difficult, he knew, to draw the exact line between exclusive and concurrent powers in all cases which might arise, under the constitution, between the two Governments, yet he could show, he thought very clearly, that the power now claimed over the domain and territory of the States, for the purposes of Internal Improvement, if it existed at all, must necessarily be exclusive. In the first place, [he said] exclusive jurisdiction was not only inherent in the very nature of the power, but it was essential and indispensable to the execution of the power itself. It belonged, therefore, either to the General Government, or to the State Governments. It was not, and could not be, concurrent. A concurrent authority in two independent Governments to perform the same functions with respect to the [H. OF R. same thing, and at the same time, was, from its nature, inadinissible, both in theory and practice. If, as the advocates of the bill supposed, this power could be exercised concurrently, and the General and State Governments both have the right to make roads and canals over the same territory and between the same points, and then to legislate and take jurisdiction over them, what [he asked] would be the inevitable result? Was it not apparent to every unprejudiced mind, that there would be a total failure of the power itself, on the part of either Government? Was it to be supposed that the two Governments, acting separately, would not judge differently? Would there not be continual collisions, discord, and disorders, arising from the action of two Governments with concurrent and plenary powers, in relation to the same subject matter? Did not a concurrent jurisdiction in each Government pre-suppose each independent; and if the same power to act be in both Governments, and neither supreme, would not the inevitable consequence be, not only collision and warfare, but fatal repugnancy? Was it possible to imagine that they could operate with harmony, and the clashing of jurisdiction be prevented? Could these rival powers operate together, and not re-act and over-power each other? Might not the acts of the General Government to-day be subverted and defeated by the State Governments to-morrow? Might not the laws and regulations of the one Government be changed or abrogated by the other? Might not acts, made punishable by the one, be declared dispunishable by the other? Besides, what would be the effect of a concurrent power and authority in two governments, as it regarded those upon whom the system would immediately operate? Could it be supposed, for a moment, that the people of this country would sit down quietly under the operation of highly penal laws, emanating from distinct Governments, dictated by distinct wills, and inflicting different punishments for the same acts? Could it be believed that such a system of oppression would be tolerated by freemen, in a free country? He presumed not. He called, then, upon the friends of the bill to show how this power could be concurrent, and yet available. As yet, he had heard nothing advanced in support of it, and he could imagine, he confessed, no reasoning capable of sustaining it. When gentlemen, however, could satisfy him how two distinct powers could be supreme over each other; when they proved to him, how two objects could occupy the same space; or how two distinct wills could be executed at the same time, in relation to the same thing-be effectual and yet compatible-he might, indeed, comprehend how the power, claimed by the friends of Internal Improvement, could be concurrent between the General and State Governments. Until this was done, he could not yield his assent. But, apart from the nature of the power, the rules of construction, established for ascertaining the character of the powers between the two Governments, settled, conclusively, the one now under consideration. The rule [Mr. S. said] was this: wherever a power was granted, by the constitution, to the General Government, the power was exclusive if the existence of the same power in the State would be absolutely and totally repugnant. In other words, where an authority was given to the Union, with which a similar authority in the State Governments would be utterly conflicting and irreconcileable, there the authority was exclusive. This rule of construction was established by the framers of the constitution at the time of its adoption; had been affirmed by all the State Governments; and adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, as the just rule of interpretation. Apply this rule to the power now claimed, and who can doubt that it must be an exclusive, and not a concurrent power? Does not every one see, that, if this power of internal improvement be in the General Government, the existence and exercise of the like power in the State Governments would be H. OF R.] Cumberland Road. [FEB. 2, 1829. directly a conflicting and repugnant power? What would State, any power over soil and territory, as resulting from become of the efficacy and energy of the power necessa- the general rights of sovereignty. There was no right ry for its execution, in the one Government, if there was regarded more sacred by the States and the people; and a like concurrent and antagonizing power in another and we know, from the history of those days, that those parts distinct Government? It was impossible, he thought, that of the constitution which gave exclusive jurisdiction to there could be two opinions upon the exclusiveness of this the Federal Government in the expressly enumerated power. He thought it too clear to admit of a rational cases, and the concurrent power of taxation, were subjects doubt. He felt authorized, therefore, in saying (both of great and just jealousy, and were seized upon and from the nature of the power, and the rules of construc- wielded with powerful and alarming effect by the opponents tion) that, if there was a power in the General Govern- of the constitution; and no where more so, than in Virgiment (which, though, he utterly denied) to execute a sys- nia, New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island; and it tem of internal improvement, by roads and canals, they was this power over soil and territory which mainly inducmust have complete and perfect jurisdiction over the do-ed the latter State to hold off from the Union, for one or main and territory of the States for that purpose, and that jurisdiction must be absolute, and exclusive of all State power and authority. He would next proceed to examine and show what was the extent of federal jurisdiction over soil and territory, as limited by the words and spirit of the constitution itself Before he did this, however, he begged permission to of fer to the Committee one or two general remarks upon the situation of the United States at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and the leading objects for which it was formed. It could not [Mr. S. said] be too often repeated in that hall, nor too widely circulated, that the constitutional compact was not the act of the American people, as constituting one homogeneous mass. They united in establishing the Federal Government as distinct societies of freemen, possessing separate territorial rights, and distinct and separate sovereignties. Differing essentially from each other, (not only as it regarded territorial limits, but in their manners, habits, and interests,) it was found not a very easy matter to form a confederated Government, to answer the purpose of protecting all, and yet leaving all in the full possession of the rights and sovereignties which each possessed. The task of forming such a confederation, and maintaining a division of powers between distinct and independent Governments, was much greater than between departments of the same Government; but, difficult as it was, it was not to be abandoned; and the States finally settled down, and united upon certain great principles of mutual concession and compromise. This fact was distinctly announced in the letter of General Washington to the President of the old Congress, an extract from which he would read: "It is (says he] at all times difficult to draw, with precision, the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and, on the present occasion, this difficulty was increased, by a difference among the several States as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests". Whilst the States, therefore, surrendered a portion of their rights and sovereignty, for the purposes of union and defence; for protection against foreign aggression and domestic evils; the great and prominent feature, the inviolable and protecting painciple in the compact of union, was the division and limitation of powers between the two Governments, and the preservation of the rights and sovereignty not surrendered by it. The General Government was, therefore, a Government of limited and granted powers, and not a limitation of powers possessed. The constitution gave it being: it was the commission under which it was to act, and from which it derived all its powers. It was a Government purely of compact, and had no inherent rights or resulting sovereignty. Created for specific purposes, and invested with specific powers, it was to this charter that the Government had to look for its authority to act. Now, among the mass of rights intended by the States to be reserved, and not to be granted, was the right of jurisdiction over their domain and territory. These were the essential and vital atrributes of sovereignty, which they meant to retain and most clearly to guard. It was never intended to give to the General Government the right to exercise, within the limits of a two years after the constitution was adopted. 46 Now, sir, bearing in mind these principles, let us see what are the provisions as to jurisdiction over domain and territory, granted by the constitution to the Federal Government. And here [said Mr. S.] I affirm the proposition, that the eighth section of the first article of the constitution points out the mode, and the only one, in which the General Government can acquire land, as a sovereign, within the territorial limits of any State in the Union. It is to this part of the constitution we are to look for the power over soil and territory, and exclusive jurisdiction. The words of that article are, Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings." By this clause, Congress have power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this District, and all other places purchased by the consent of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings. Can human language be more clear and explicit? Does not this enumeration exclude, necessarily, all like authority in all other places than those named? The Committee will remark that the power of exclusive legislation, (which means jurisdiction) is to be united with a cession of territory, and that is to be the free act of the State Government. The very essence of the provision was, that the States should exercise their sovereign will and pleasure in ceding the jurisdiction for one of the enumerated objects in the constitution, or might withhold their assent, or annex to it such conditions and stipulations as they pleased. [Here Mr. S cited several cases in which cessions had been made sub modo; some reserving one privilege and jurisdiction, and others those of a different kind.] He maintained, then, that the objects of this enumeration were intended, by the wise men who framed the constitution, to express, and not leave to implication, powers, on the part of the General Government, which touched the territorial jurisdiction of the States. They knew that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction, in certain enumerated cases, would exclude the like jurisdiction in all other places not named; because, of what avail would such an express enumeration be, if the constitution intended to leave greater powers of like kind to be exercised by implication and construction? No; these enumerated grants were designed, and wisely intended, to quiet the fears and protect the rights of the States and the people, over their soil and territory. They were deemed sacred, and not to be touched, except for these purposes, and in the manner declared in the constitution. The General Government, therefore, could exercise no property in the soil, in a national point of view, except in the enumerated cases, and under the power of taxation. There the power was, from the necessity of the case, plenary, (though concurrent) as he should presently show. FEB. 2, 1829. Cumberland Road. [H. OF R. ed patronage on the part of the General Government itself. If a State could grant to Congress, or Congress to the States, powers and privileges allotted to each y the constitution, why might not Congress have the same power to grant to a State the right of declaring war? or the State to grant to Congress any privilege reserved by the constitution and the people to the States? The limitations, and checks, and prohibitions, in the consitution, were intended to prevent one party from acquiring the rights and powers aliotted by the people to each other. and for preserving, unimpaired, a division of power indispensably necessary for the preservation of the whole. It had been argued, by some of the gentlemen who had preceded him in this debate, that this Government might constitutionally hold land within the territorial limits of a State. Mr. S. said that he would not now stop to discuss this proposition; but this he would say, that, if the Federal Government can so hold, they must do it (as an individual would) subject to the territorial and municipal jurisdiction of the State in which the land lies. Owning the fee simple of the land, was not an attribute inseparable from sovereignty for the ownership of the soil, and jurisdiction over it, was, and in fact does, often exist, separately from each other. It was not inconsistent with sovereignty for one sovereign to hold land within the territorial limits of another sovereign, subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. This principle was laid down and recognized by writers on the law of nations, and especially by Vattel and Marten. The lex loci rei sita was universal as to reality. Such had been the practice of this Government from its earliest operation. Mr S. here referred to a case decided in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which sustained fully the principle he had laid down. In that case the United States held a lot of ground in the city of Pittsburg, by title from the former proprietary of Pennsylvania, which the Government occupied many years as a fort and place of defence. Having ceased so to use, and wishing to sell it, Congress passed a law authorizing the President of the United States to sell and convey it. By the State law of Pennsylvania, no person, except a licensed auctioneer, was permitted to sell real estate in the city of Pittsburg The agent of the President, how-relation to the State Governments. It was not only then ever proceeded to sell, in violation of the State laws; a prosecution was instituted on the part of the State, and he was fined one hundred dollars by the inferior court; the case was carried up, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; the fine paid by the United States, and the decision acquiesced in.* Nor would the consent of the State [said Mr. S.] alter the case, and confer jurisdiction, as had been supposed by some of the friends of the bill. Congress have no power to receive, nor the States to grant, jurisdiction over soil and territory, in any but the cases enumerated in the constitution. No State has a right [he said] to make a cession to Congress of one foot of territory beyond the constitutional provisions. Could Maryland and Virginia, for instance, have ceded to the General Government twenty miles square, under an impression that it was needful for national purposes? Certainly not. And why? Because the constitution limits the grant to ten miles only. If, then, a State Legislature cannot cede the whole of her territory to the United States, she cannot cede one inch beyond the constitutional limitation, because the powers and jurisdiction granted to the General Government cannot be enlarged and extended by the consent of one or two States of the Union. It would soon cease to be a Government of defined and limited powere, if one State could, by her consent, enlarge the sphere of action, and infuse into it powers not embraced by the constitution. If this could be done, agreements between Congress and single States, successively, might not only weaken but destroy the radical principles of the constitution, without any reference to the constitutional mode of amendment, which requires three-fourths of the States. It was wisely intended by the parties to the compact, that the uniformity of the powers of the General Government, in relation to the States, should not be destroyed by bargains between other parties, unsettling the divisions and dividends of power between the State Governments collectively, and the General Government, and producing all those evils which would inevitably arise from exclusive benefits on the part of some States; the local incapacities of others, and the influence of a dangerous and unbound If there be any principle, then, which ought not to be questioned, it was, that the States are sovereign as to territorial jurisdiction, except the cases enumerated in the constitution. The constitution was not ambiguous. It was intelligible to every capacity. Ambiguity in such an instrument would have been a deadly poison, against which its wise framers seemed most anxious to guard. It has always been justly regarded as the work of philosophy and wisdom. No ingenuity, no sophistry, can or ought to defeat the plain meaning of its provisions. The clause in relation to the power of exclusive jurisdiction was plain, explicit and guarded. It was to this that the States looked as the constitutional security over soil and territory, and the barrier against encroachments on the part of the Federal Government, in that quarter. We all know how ably and vigorously the constitution was resisted at the time of its adoption, and the alarm which was spread in feared, but openly declared by many of the ablest opposers of the constitution, that the powers granted by the General Government would be abused; that the Government would be badly administered; that offices would be improperly bestowed; that the commerce of the country would be mismanaged; that the public credit would be impaired, and the public treasures dissipated; but no man then dreamed, that the constitution intended to impair the rights and sovereignty of the States over their soil and territory, or transfer to this Government such powers as those now claimed. He felt justified, therefore, in assuming it as incontrovertible, that the only cases of exclusive jurisdiction, in the General Government, over soil and territory, were those enumerated in the constitution; that the power of internal improvement, by roads and canals, required this exclusive jurisdiction over the soil and territory of the Union; that such a power was not one of those so enumerated in the constitution; and that, therefore, the power did not exist, and could not rightfully be exercised. Here [Mr. S. said] he might safely rest the question of constitutional power; but he would admit, for the purpose of the argument, that the exclusive jurisdiction which he had shown, he thought, to be indispensible to a fair execution of the power, was not necessary; he should yet deny that there was a power of any kind in this Government to construct roads and canals, and make internal improvements. It was not pretended that the power was the subject of express grant; it must, therefore, be derived as incidental or accessorial to some other of the specific grants of power in the constitution. Now, [said Mr. S.] I deny that a general power of internal improvement has any connexion, affiliation, or subserviency, to any one of the specific grants of power in the constitution. It does not, and cannot, in the remotest degree, partake of a derivative or incidental character; but, on the contrary, is a high, sovereign, substantive, and paramount power, rising without limit, and running without control. Moreover, such a power, if it exists, must be executed by the legislative department of the Government, and, from its very nature, could not be limited or restricted by any co-ordinate department, as he should presently show. The constitution was a system of limitations and checks, and there |