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market, but he has ventured to calculate on a speculation of a million and more upon its falling to 65, which he anticipates. This stock, purchased at 65 in the 100, will yield 4 61 per cent. with a profit of 35 dollars on each share when paid off; those who purchased at 65, may now realize 20 dollars, and sell at 85; and those who hold at 85 know they will receive 100 dollars; and can we therefore believe that those who purchased at 85 will sell at 65, and thereby lose 20 per cent. of the capital? As the period of payment approaches, the stock will rise. If it could be even bought at 85, which it cannot, in any quantity, it would be giving our money for 3 53-100 per cent. Is that then the best employment of our money? He said, he thought not. We have other means of using this fund much more advantageously. We may pay seven millions for our Bank stock: this is yielding us 6 per cent., and this is better than can be done with money by purchasing in the market. We could now get 22 or 24 per cent. advance on that stock. The interest of this 7,000,000 in the Bank yields 420,000 dollars; while we pay but 390,000 dollars on the 13,000,000 of three per cents. The seven millions, therefore, while thus invested, is equal to the thirteen millions. Is it, therefore, wise to employ the seven millions to extinguish that amount of the thirteen millions, and leave us in debt six millions at interest? And can we feel any solicitude about paying the thirteen millions, while the burthen of that debt is countervailed by seven millions? If we make the appropriation of seven millions in the year 1831, we may use the remaining five millions either in purchasing other stock, if found advantageous, or it may be distributed among the States, or applied to national objects; or we may provide for the payment of so much of the debt due in 1832, on the first of January of that year, as Congress, in its wisdom, may hereafter provide. In 1832, there are eleven millions and interest payable, which will more than absorb the Sinking Fund of that year.

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As these are very small demands upon our resources, we may, in 1832, inquire into the reduction of the duties which may then be made.

Mr. J. said, the Chairman of the Committee has said, that the spirit of accommodation which the Bank of the United States had always manifested, would induce them to permit the Government to redeem their stock at a fair price, whenever we had the means; and they would prefer to give up our stock, which has but one or two years to run, to the payment of our stock in the Bank. He entirely concurred in this view, and had no doubt, in the year 1831, we could make our arrangements with them.

Mr. J. explained how the average balances in the Bank had been so large; which was owing to several large sums laying over, unemployed, which would never occur again; that portions of this sum were in transitu from place to place; that the Bank could not employ its capital, much less avail itself of the use of these balances. It is known that about sixteen millions of the revenue is received in New-York, where the capital of the Branch does not exceed two millions five hundred thousand dollars, and where the discounts do not exceed four to five millions. The gentleman proposes to make the Bank pay interest for these uncertain balances, which, at most, are only unapplied balances of appropriations.

Mr. J. said, the Bank has given us $1,500,000 for the bonus, the interest on which alone would exceed the interest due on the balances. Besides this, they receive and pay out, without compensation for the labor or the risk on the exchange, more than twenty millions a year. The Bank will tell you to use your money, if you desire to draw it, in any way or at any time; but that they cannot pay the interest, because they cannot employ it. Mr. J.

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said, that Mr. Crawford was induced, in 1821, to give the loan (among other reasons) to the Bank, because they could not employ their funds, of which we were a large stockholder. Mr. J. said, we had a large equivalent from the Bank in the safety and management of our funds for the use of the balances. We ought to deal justly with them. If they pay us the interest, which will not exceed $150,000 a year, we must pay them a reasonable compensation for their services. Mr. J. concluded by saying, the proposition now submitted was, in his judgment, premature, and the law unnecessary.

The

Mr. BENTON had a remark to make in reply to the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON), which was, that all these statements about the amount and use of the ba lances would come much better when they came officially, as he hoped they would, from the President of the Bank. With respect to the amount of actual balances, of which he had only exhibited the average, he presumed the Senate would soon have an opportunity of seeing them, as they had been called for by a resolution of the Senate. Their amount would then be seen to be great, astonishingly great. He differed from the gentleman as to the proper time for this debate. He did not think it premature; on the contrary, it was hardly early enough. He himself had begun, about a year ago, to call the attention of the people to the great subject of extinguishing the public debt, and abolishing ten millions of duties. subject was just beginning to take root in the public mind, and there was now hardly time for the people to think, to make up their minds, and to make known their minds, before Congress would have to act. The subject was one of vast consequence in principle, and of great extent in detail. The Committee of Finance had reported forty-five articles on which duties might be abolished without injury to domestic industry. He, Mr. B., would add fifteen articles more, of which two, namely, blankets and strouds, for the Indian trade, were of the first moment to his constituents engaged in the fur trade; and three others, namely, tin, copper and brass, in plates or sheets, fit for manafacturing here, were of great moment to the numerous manufacturers of these articles, and to the still more numerous class who used the articles after they are manufactured. The payment of the debt, and the consequent abolition of duties, will be the test of new parties. will stand up openly for the continuance of the debt; but innumerable operations will be carried on to diminish the revenue, or to squander it; the effect, if not the object of which, will be to perpetuate the debt. He, Mr. B, was against partial reductions of duty to diminish the revenue and to continue the debt, to relieve one part of the community, and leave the burthens upon another he was for abolition, when the whole list would be taken up

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Mr. B. wished to correct an error which prevailed as to the character of his resolutions. Gentlemen did not seem to understand them, though printed and laid on every table; they were treated as if compulsory on our Commissioners to purchase the public debt, and thereupon an argument was founded, that their going into the market would raise the price of stock. Not so the fact, nor the consequence. The resolutions were not compulsory, but optionary; the Commissioners were to purchase, or not to purchase, as they deemed best. It was not like merchants going into the market to buy tobacco, cotton or flour. We bought our debt, not to sell it again, but to ex tinguish it. We would buy the three per cents. to cancel that stock forever, and he still believed that stock would lose a part of its value in the eyes of its holders, especially its European holders, if his resolution should become a law, and subject that stock to extinction on any day. The holders would want to get rid of a stock that might throw their money upon them at any moment; they would want a more permanent investment; one at least that fixed a time to exist.

SENATE.]

Distribution of the Revenue.

[JAN. 13, 1829.

Mr. B. would note one other advantage, and a great 1834, and as more than four and a half millions of our one, in clothing our Commissioners with power to pur-five per cent. debt is not redeemable before the first day chase in the market when they had the money: it was in the saving of interest. At present we only pay from half year to half year; and if we have millions on hand in the first quarter, it must lie idle to the end of the second quarter, the debt all the while drawing interest.

of January, 1835, there will be a large surplus in our Treasury, between the years 1832 and 1835, not applicable to the reduction of the public debt, under the present regulation of the Sinking Fund.

It is proposed, by the bill under consideration, to apThe question was then taken separately, on referring propriate, after the 1st of January, 1830, five millions of the first, second, and third clauses of the resolution to the the Sinking Fund to the fund for distribution; still, howCommittee on Finance, and decided in the affirmative-ever, subject to the control of Congress; as no more is to the remainder of the resolution was then also referred.

TUESDAY, JAN. 13, 1829.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE REVENUE.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, took up the following bill:

"Be it enacted, &c. That the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized and required, under such regulations as he may think proper to prescribe, to divide annually among the several States of the Union, in the ratio of direct taxation, all moneys in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, on the first day of June next, and on the first day of June in every succeeding year.

"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That, of the annual sum of ten millions of dollars appropriated to the Sinking Fund by the second section of the act of the third of March, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, entitled, An act to provide for the redemption of the public debt,' five millions be appropriated to the fund to be divided among the States, as by the first section of this act, annually, after the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine; and that so much of the residue of the said annual sum of ten millions of dollars, as shall not, on the first day of June of any year, have been applied to the redemption of the public debt, shall be appropriated to the fund to be divided among the States as aforesaid.

be divided than may be found in the Treasury unappropriated, on the first day of June, in that year, and on the first day of June in each succeeding year.

By this arrangement, the public debt-except the three per cents. and Bank loan-might be extinguished on the first day of January, 1838, and forty millions of dollars distributed among the States. This would admit of a gradual reduction of the public debt; but, as fast as the public good requires that it should be reduced, it would speedily bring into operation a fund for such objects of education and internal improvement, as the States might think proper to adopt; and gradually introduce a safe system for the disposal of our surplus funds, after the extinguishment of our debt, and which, after all the reductions of revenue that can or will be adopted, will not fall short of five millions of dollars a year.

Of this feature of the bill, however, I am not particularly tenacious. Should the whole of the Sinking Fund be applied to the reduction of the debt, till the first of January, 1831, or 1832, the States would wait the longer for the funds, which are extremely necessary to their purposes, and which they could apply to the greatest possible advantage to the country, but the debt would be the sooner extinguished. Even if this part of the bill should be altogether omitted, still its most important objects would be answered, and many objections to it obviated. If the bill should simply provide, that, after the first day of June, of the next and every succeeding year, the unappropriated moneys in the Treasury should be divided among the States, in the ratio of direct taxation, and that such parts of the Sinking Fund, as, in any year, should not be applied to the reduction of the public debt, should be considered as unappropriated money, the most important objects in view would be attained. The States would ultimately, and in a short time, have the benefit of their funds; and the inconvenience and extreme danger of a large surplus in the United States' Treasury, to be legislated away by Congress, would be avoided.

Mr. DICKERSON (who introduced the bill) arose and said, that, two years ago, when this subject was under discussion, he endeavored to show the necessity of providing, in time, for the proper direction of our funds when our public debt shall be paid; when the great works for national defence shall be completed; and when the demands upon our Treasury, growing out of the consequences of the revolutionary and late wars, shall be reduced to a small amount. He then endeavored to show, that, whatever system should be adopted for this purpose, it ought to commence before the entire extinguishment of the public debt: and he further attempted to show the ex-ly treme danger of a large surplus in our Treasury, unless subject to some well digested and previously settled regulation for its disposal.

I thought then, as I do now, [said Mr D.] that with a proper retrenchment of our expenditures, we might divert a large sum, annually, in addition to the ten millions appropriated to the Sinking Fund, towards the reduction of the public debt; by which, the moment of its final redemption might be greatly hastened. Believing, however, that no proposition to divert from the present objects of expenditure, any considerable portion of our revenue, would be well received, I shall consider the subject as if no more than ten millions of dollars a year were to be applied to the reduction of the public debt.

At this rate, however, it is rapidly drawing to a close. By a calculation which I had the honor to submit to the Senate, it appears that, by the annual application of the ten millions of dollars, our debt, except that bearing an interest of three per cent., and the United States' Bank loan, may be extinguished on the 1st day of July, 1833; and leaving, on that day, a surplus of $342,069 28. But, as more than two millions of the four and a half per cent. stock is not redeemable before the the first day of January,

There is great impatience to see the public debt entireextinguished. It is now reduced to a small amount; and it would certainly be a gratifying circumstance, that we might proclaim to the world that we were out of debt. But for that gratification I would not pay too dearly: I would not buy up the stock of the United States, even at its present prices; and the prices would rise the moment we determine to purchase it. We should thus give an immense advantage to the holders of the stock, now chiefly in the hands of the Bank of the United States, and other moneyed institutions in this country, and in the hands of rich stockjobbers in Europe. A proposition to authorize the purchase of this stock is now referred to the Committee of Finance; but that committee will hardly recommend any measure for that purpose, that shall lead to a serious loss of money on the part of the United States. The chairman of that committee (Mr. SMITH, of Maryland,) thinks that, as a large portion of the stock not redeemable before the 1st of January. 1834, and 1835, is held by the Bank of the United States, they will, from a disposition to accommodate the General Government, surrender that stock before it is redeemable, upon our paying them its nominal value; and that we might improve this good disposition very much, by threatening the Bank to pay off the seven millions loan. I have no doubt that something might be done

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Leaving a clear loss of

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8,742,562 14

$2,659,250 89 to the country, and gain to the stockholders, should we purchase at the present price. But should we determine to purchase it at any price, or to redeem it immediately, or within a short period, it would rise to its nominal value; which would be more than its par value, by $4,653,677 31. It is, however, not to be presumed, that Congress will warrant the purchase of this debt, upon any principle by which the United States are to lose the one half, or even the one quarter of a million of dollars. It is, therefore, probable, that this debt will remain many years unredeemed. But, should we determine to purchase it, or redeem it even at its nominal value, and to a loss of more than four and a half millions of dollars, it may be quickly done, as it would only require the application of the Sinking Fund for about one year and a half. But we may relieve ourselves of this debt at a much cheaper rate than paying for thirteen millions of dollars, its nominal value; or eleven millions, its present value in the market.

The annual interest on this debt amounts to $398,887 48. A capital of $6,648,124 67, at six per cent., will yield that amount of interest. If, therefore, we set apart and pledge so much of our seven millions of stock in the United States Bank, yielding us six per cent. interest, to the holders of the three per cent. stock, it will pay their interest so long as our Bank stock gives us the present dividends. And possibly the Bank might be induced, by further application of the screws, to relieve us of our three per cent. debt for a little more than six and a half millions of our stock in that institution. But whether they relieve us from this debt, or whether we receive our dividends upon the whole of our stock in Bank, and pay the interest on our three per cent. debt, is of but little importance to the country, as in either case there would be no loss while there would be a very great one by any mode yet suggested, of purchasing or redeeming the debt. To those who think that it would be better to reduce our revenue, so that, at the time of the extinguishment of our debt, our receipts into the Treasury may be diminished by ten millions of dollars, I would answer, that such a reduction will not take place: no one, who examines the state of our country, can, for a moment, believe it. Without any increase of duties, it is evident that our revenues must rapidly increase with our increasing population, and consequent consumption. A reduction of duties upon particular articles of consumption, as teas, coffee, wines, and silks, would not lead to a correspondent reduction of the revenue derived from those articles; as diminishing the duties upon them would increase their importation and consumption. In a report made by the chairman of the Committee on Finance, of the 21st of April last, there is a list of articles, upon which it is stated, the duties might be repealed after the payment of our debt; and another, upon which it is stated, that there might be a reduction of fifty per cent. upon the duties. The first embraces wines of all kinds, teas of all kinds, silks of all kinds, coffee, salt, raisins, indigo, pepper, and a variety of other articles

[SENATE.

of less importance; giving, altogether, a revenue in the year 1827, of $6,119,466. The second list consists of linens, worsted stuff goods, nankeens, black bottles, demijohns, thread and silk lace, and other articles; giving a revenue, in all, of $1,181,575; fifty per cent. on which would amount to $590,787, which added to the revenue on the first list, amounts to $7,301,041; by which amount, according to this statement, our revenue may be diminished.

But suppose this reduction to take place; still, by the time that our debt shall be paid, the great works for national defence completed, or nearly so, our public buildings finished, and the expenditures growing out of the late and revolutionary wars, particularly the payment of pensions, be brought to a close, there will still be in the Treasury a surplus of more than five millions of dollars a year.

As, in case of war, or danger of war, we must resort to the most important articles of taxation in the first list, as wines, teas, coffee, &c.; it would not be prudent to discontinue the duties upon them entirely at any time. The merchants have asked a reduction of duties upon teas, but not a repeal of those duties. There ought undoubtedly to be a great reduction of duties upon many of the articles in that list; but certainly not a repeal of the duties upon the most important of them. There are some articles in this list, upon which it cannot be presumed that Congress will abolish the duties: for instance, it is proposed to abolish the duties on wines of all kinds, amounting to $667,369; and upon silks of all kinds, amounting to $1,281,094: the duties upon these two articles amount to nearly a third of those upon the whole list.

At the last session, we reduced the rates of duties upon some of these articles, the policy of which measure may be fairly doubted. I thought the measure an ill-judged one then, and I think it so now. I am confident the country will not sustain us, in abolishing the duties upon these articles of luxury, when there is a spirit prevailing through the nation to produce them for our own consumption. The production of wines and silks may, and will be of the highest importance to our agriculture and manufactures, as they will give employment to a large portion of the capital and labor of all the States, but more particularly to those of the South, where they show but little disposition to embark in other manufactures. Upon the articles of wines and silks, I do not believe there will be any reduction of revenue. There are other articles in this list on which there will not be an entire reduction of duties, as salt and indigo. Upon the whole, the greatest reduction of revenue that will take place upon the articles in this list, will not exceed three millions of dollars.

As to the second list, upon which there is to be a reduction of fifty per cent. upon the duties, there will in fact be but a small reduction of revenue. Reducing the duties fifty per cent. would probably increase the consumption twenty-five per cent., in which case there would be a reduction of revenue of no more than twenty-five per cent., or $295,393. This, however, is greater than any reduction that will actually take place. Can any one believe that there will be any considerable reduction of duties upon linens or nankeens, which would exclude our cotton fabrics; upon worsted stuff goods, which would exclude our woollens; or upon thread or silk lace, the duties upon which several articles amount to more than a million of dollars; or upon black bottles, or demijohns? The reduction of duties upon this second list will not exceed $150,000. We must presume that we shall have a large surplus of revenue, if not permanently, certainly for many years, as the great reductions of duties contemplated cannot take place suddenly without manifest injury to the country. If, for instance, we should repeal the duties upon teas, it would carry ruin to those merchants who have large quantities on hand; so as to wine, coffee, and

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other articles. There must be time to dispose of the present stock, before the alteration of the duties could have the least effect in reducing the prices, or we ought to restore to the importers the duties they shall have paid. If there is even a probability that we shall have surplus funds to a large amount, we should legislate to meet such probable event. It may be thought, and I have frequently heard it said, that however important it may be that the States should have the funds proposed to be divided among them, it is an unnecessary operation to collect the money from them for the purpose of returning it to them. That it would be better to suffer the State Governments to collect the money for themselves. To this it would be a sufficient answer to say, that moneys collected by the General Government do not cost a quarter as much in the collection, as an equal amount collected by the States; and, whether we raise a few millions, more or less, from imposts, we have the same number of officers engaged in collecting the revenue. It is, however, not in contemplation to collect money merely for the purpose of distribution-but to distribute the money that may and will be accumulated in our Treasury, from time to time, by the operation of our financial system; which, to provide for the exigencies of our Government at all times, and to be prepared for contingencies against which it is our duty to make ample provision, will occasionally afford surplusses not wanted for the purposes of the General Government, and which may be estimated at five millions of dollars a year at least. It is a subject worthy of inquiry, however, if not now, at some future period, how far the States may avail themselves of the agency of the General Government, to reach, for their several benefit, the objects of taxation which have been surrendered to the Union for the general good. All revenues arising from foreign commerce are vested in the General Governinent; and all revenues arising from excises, with very few exceptions, are of necessity vested in the same Government; for no State can lay an excise upon her manufactures, without driving the capital invested in such manufactures, in a greater or less degree, into the neighboring States; nor upon the produce of her soil, without enabling the farmers and planters of the neighboring States to supply her markets, to the exclusion of her own industry and capital. Imposts and excises are, therefore, vested in the General Government. The only objects of taxation left to the States are of the most odious character, and several of the States are compelled to resort to a land tax to support their governments. The Legislatures of such States reluctantly engage in any measures of internal improvement, or systems of education, as they must lead to taxes which the people would not willingly bear.

When our constitution was formed, the whole of the revenues to be derived from the subjects of taxation, thus surrendered, were wanted for the purposes of the General Government, and have continued to be so for forty years This, however, was not the reason of vesting these objects of taxation in the General Government to the exclusion of the States. The reason of the surrender was, that, without it, no union could have taken place; and the Union would be instantly dissolved if the States should resume the right of laying imposts. During wars these sources of revenue will continue to be necessary to the United States, and not to the several States, as at such times labor is too high to admit of works of internal improvement. In times of peace they will not be wanted, except in part, by the United States, but will be most wanted by the States, for objects of internal improvement, which only in peace can be carried on with success. It is absolutely necessary that all revenues derived from commerce should be collected by the General Government, as they cannot be collected by the State Governments without dissolving the Union; but there is no such necessity that they should be expended by the General Government. If expended by

[JAN. 13, 1829.

the States, they would cement, and not dissolve the Union. They were yielded up for the benefit of the whole but would not this primary object be defeated by locking them up from the States when most wanted for their purposes, and not wanted for the purposes of the General Government? Such a time must have been anticipated by the statesmen who formed our constitution; and, if we conclude that they intended thus unnecessarily to cripple the energies of the States, do we not impeach their wisdom and their patriotism? But I will not pursue this inquiry further, or express any decided opinion upon it, as it is not necessary to my present purpose.

That the time is at hand when a large portion of the revenues of the United States will be devoted to the objects of internal improvements, by roads and canals, either by the General Government, or by the State Governments, no one can doubt, who attentively considers the subject. The event is certain to those who hope, and inevitable to those who fear it. Of the two modes, the choice alone is left to us. I am among those who do not believe that the constitution has given, or that it was intended to give, by those who formed it, the power to the General Government to make roads and canals through the States, with or without their permission. That to do so, without the assent of the States, would be an invasion of their modified sovereignity-and that the assent of States interested would not warrant the measure, as the system of internal improvement which the United States can exercise, if they can exercise any, must be general and not partial-must be operative in all the States, or in none. But this part of our constitution will yield to the overwhelming, the irresistible pressure of surplus funds, if left to their undivided operation. In 1817, Congress passed a bill to set apart certain funds for internal improvements, in which they pledged those funds to the constructing of roads and canals, and improving the navigation of water-courses in the different States, with the assent of the States in the ratio of representation. The President, Mr Madison, objected to the passing of this bill; and, in his reasons for so doing, he denies the power on the part of the United States, and says: "If a general power to construct roads and canals, and to improve the navigation of water-courses, with the train of nowers incident thereto, be not possessed by Congress, the assent of the States, as provided for in the bill, cannot confer the power. The only case in which the consent and cession of particular States can extend the power of Congress, are those specified and provided for in the Constitution." Notwithstanding these objections, and notwithstanding our public debt then amounted to more than one hundred and twenty-three millions of dollars, the House of Representatives, on reconsidering the bill, gave sixty votes for its final passage, and but fifty against it; but as it required twothirds in the affirmative, the bill was lost. It was with difficulty that the provision in the bill, requiring the assent of the States, was adopted-as, when proposed as an amendment to the original bill, it was strenuously resisted in the House of Representatives. A large portion of the most experienced statesmen of the nation believed that Mr. Madison's construction of the constitution was a correct one; upon the strict observance of which, the prosperity, harmony, and even permanency of the Union, in no small degree depend.

If, when we were laboring under the greatest weight of debt that ever oppressed this country, this part of our constitution was saved only by the firmness of the President, exercising his qualified negative, what are we to expect when it shall again be assailed by those who think the power of Congress is limited only by its will, and who shall be aided in their views by the irresistible force of surplus funds? Even those most determined to support the constitution must yield, or see the States which they represent excluded from a participation in those funds,

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which have been derived, in part, from their commerce and their industry.

Independently of constitutional objections to the exercise of the right of Congress to make roads and canals in the States, with or without the permission of such States, or even the right of subscribing to, and holding, shares in the stock of turnpike roads, rail-road and canal companies, there are other considerations, altogether sufficient, to prevent our ever embarking in this system. If Congress undertake to make roads and canals, it will inevitably happen, that States which do not want roads and canals must involuntarily contribute to make roads and canals in States where they are wanted; States which have expended large sums for roads and canals for themselves, must contribute to the making roads and canals in States which have made no such improvement; and States which are deeply in debt for their improvements, must aid those who are unwilling to devote their resources, or even pledge their credit, for such purposes. The most gross injustice must take place where great influence can be brought to bear upon the members of Congress. Moneys will be appropriated to the exclusive benefit of particular sections of the country, without regard to the general good, and to the utter neglect of other sections, having equal claims, but less influence. Jealousies of the most inveterate character must arise, and distract the councils of the nation. State will be arrayed against State; the East and West against the South; the South and West against the East; the South and East against the West. The most dangerous combination will take place, for the purpose of engrossing the public funds; and these will have the most deleterious influence in the passing of every important law; will regulate the appointments to office, and control the election of every future President of the United States. The arm of the General Government will be rendered too strong to be restrained by any salutary check provided by the constitution; and the administration, with its host of engineers, will regulate the affairs of the nation at their pleasure, and prostrate the barriers established for the protection of State sovereignties and State rights. If Congress should embark in a general system of making roads and canals, the experience we have already had must convince us, that the whole year would not suffice for the necessary legislation upon the subjects which would be presented to us. Congress, instead of being a body for the superintendence of the general concerns of the Union, which of necessity belongs to them, would find themselves almost exclusively engaged in the business, never thought of by the federal convention, of making roads and canals, which properly belong to the States. The experience we have had should convince us that there must be a waste of one or two hundred per cent. upon all the moneys to be laid out by the United States for those improvements. The Cumberland road has already cost us more than fourteen thousand dollars per mile, and it is now, in many parts of it, nearly impassable. And in some of our fortifications there has been as great a waste of public money. In England, where more has been done in making roads and canals than in any other part of the world, the whole has been the work of individual enterprise; the government has never taken any part in them. Should Congress pursue the plan already begun, of subscribing to canal companies, and extend the same to railroad companies, in a few years our financial system will present an immense complication of funds and deficits, so perplexed, entangled, intricate, and involved, as to defy all powers of involution, extrication, or comprehension.

The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to subscribe one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to the Dismal Swamp Canal; to subscribe three hundred thousand dollars to the Delaware and Chesapeake Canal; to subscribe one hundred thousand dollars in the Louisville Canal; and one million of dollars in the Chesapeake and

[SENATE.

Ohio Canal; to vote for President and Directors of these companies, annually; and to receive the tolls and other emoluments accruing to the United States from these companies. And, as to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal," he shall have and enjoy, in behalf of the United States, any other right of a stockholder in said company." Suppose we had subscriptions in one hundred canal and rail-road companies-and we are in a fair way to have twice that number in a few years-the Secretary would have a rare time of it in attending election-dinners of President and Directors of these companies, in which it is to be feared he might lose sight of our part of the tolls and emoluments arising from these numerous partnerships. We should soon want at least eight or ten additional Secretaries to attend to our complicated rail-road and canal concerns. Should we proceed in this system of becoming partners in all the rail-road and canal companies that will apply for our aid, we shall, in a few years, after squandering millions of money, be obliged, from the mere mass of legislation that it would impose upon us, to relinquish the whole in utter despair.

I have no doubt of the constitutionality of the measure proposed in this bill. Others may have. The doubts of some, as to the constitutional powers of Congress, if adopted by a majority, would put an end to some of the most important and indispensable objects of legislation; while others seem to consider no provision in the constitution as an impediment to the exercise of the will of Congress. I am with those who are in favor of a rigid construction of the constitution; but not too rigid. Among the enumerated powers of Congress, is that to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; and they are to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof. It is a matter of extreme difficulty to ascertain the exact extent and limits of the powers vested in Congress by this provision of our constitution. Had the members of the Federal Convention been required to define those powers, they would probably have been as much at a loss as we are. It was undoubtedly intended, however, by this provision, to vest in Congress, a body of which there was the least jealousy, a power not otherwise granted, but absolutely necessary to the perfection of the system-a power which it was impossible accurately to define, or upon the exact limits of which the convention could not agree. It was an expedient to avoid difficulties at the moment, that might otherwise have been found insurmountable; adopted under an impression that, being subordinate to the other provisions of the constitution, it might be safely trusted to the immediate representatives of the people and of the States. The power, however, has limits, and narrow limits. It must be exercised in strict accordance with, and in subordination to, the other provisions and principles of the constitution; its range must be confined by the words necessary and proper; and must, in no case, infringe the rights of States or individuals.

There must be a power to dispose of our national funds, when not wanted for the usual exigencies of the Government, or the common defence of the country, to some objects of the general welfare of the United States. And there must be a corresponding duty, on the part of Congress, to provide for the case. "Congress have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other property, belonging to the United States. There is no property, of any character whatever, belonging to the United States, that is not embraced by this provision. The right of raising revenue is not property; but revenue in the Treasury is so; and that hereafter to be there, may be the subject of present legislation. And, if we provide that any unappropriated balance in the Treasury, at any particular time, not want

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