Amendment of the Constitution.

I do not say, sir, this was an attempt by a member to corrupt his fellows on this floor, but I say this calculation of chances is calculated corruptly, as it operates on the love of distinction in men, to influence the votes of members.

I remember to have read a proclamation from a distinguished individual on the Niagara frontier, during the year 1812, which the reading of these letters has forcibly recalled to mind. Permit me to call the attention of the House to some passages in it.

Mr. SMYTH called the gentleman to order. He asked, is it in order?

The SPEAKER. Is what in order?

[FEB. 19, 1829.

nothing to fear, but you must submit to my control and my discipline. Stand back till I am served, then your chance shall come. I will look down all opposition. No danger shall deter us. I will never basely sound the retreat.

Sir, there appears to me great analogy between the proclamation quoted and the anonymous letters, and the one goes far to explain the meaning of the other. It is not for me to say these letters, these attempts to operate upon individual hopes, and love of power, to unite men in a crusade to curtail the power of the people, are praiseworthy or censurable. The people have been told, and made to believe, not that there is danger in their re-elect

Mr. SMYTH Is it in order to read a proclamation of ing a President if they choose, but that there is danger a commanding General, during the late war?

The SPEAKER. The Chair cannot tell until it knows what it is.

Mr. SMYTH. Is it in order to apply such a proclamation to a proposition to amend the constitution?

The SPEAKER. It is impossible for the Chair to tell what application the gentleman from Ohio intends to make of it. The gentleman from Ohio is not perceived to be out of order, and he will proceed.

here. Does not this effort prove such to be the fact? Why are these extraordinary efforts made? To secure the people in the possession of their rights against a corrupt Congress; to enable them to elect whom they please, as long as they please? O, no. To enable honest, pure members of Congress to secure the votes of the people to elevate them to power, or to multiply the chances of gratifying an inordinate ambition. To curtail the people in their power, to increase the chances of demagogues, who mouth the people from the teeth outward, as a cover to their efforts to take away the power reserved to them? I would not restrain the judgment of the people. Leave them to its fair exercise, and if found too limited, extend their rights. Take no power away from them. Well informed, they are the best judges. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SMYTH] told you Virginia had already had the President thirty-two years. That, he thought, was too much; yet, no sooner has the power passed into other, States, and other hands, than he is ready to combine his forces to multiply the chances of the restoration to himself or the Virginia dynasty. Let the people have a chance of securing to themselves the lights of experience and practice; but, sir, if the constitution is to be amended in that particular, then my proposition is preferable to that of the gentleman. Mine secures the service of the President for six years, instead of four, and only excludes from re-election those elected who shall have served, leaving eligible persons who shall have been elected, who shall, from any cause, have been prevented from serving in the office, and those elected to other offices, who, from failure in the Presidency, shall have been called to discharge the duties of that office. The gentleman from Virginia is not entitled to the credit of originating this proposition. I find, in a book before me, a distinguished precedent, which will give the gentleman occasion to felicitate himself that he is supported by the weight of great example, and perhaps afford conclusive reason for some gentleman to concur with him. I allude to the proceedings of a number of distinguished individuals assembled at Hartford, in the State of Connecticut, in 1814, to consult upon the evils endured by the people, and to propose a remedy, among which evils complained of was, the small chance a certain portion of the people had to be elected to the Presidency, and to participate in the enjoyment of other offices. The seventh proposition to amend the constitution proposed by the Hartford Convention, is the one proposed by the gentleman from Virginia. I will read it. The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time." [See 7th vol. Niles's Register, 313.] Is it not astonishing that the gentleman from Virginia should be found at this day in the wake of the Hartford Convention? It is true that times change, and men change. But this is indeed extraordinary. The Hartford Convention added another clause to their proposition, which the gentleman has omitted. "Nor shall the President be elected from the same State two terms in succession." Why has the gentleman rejected this clause? I hope he will restore it, and multiply the chances among the States as well as among individuals. Was it omitted lest it should interpose an obstacle to his own elevation, or

Mr. WRIGHT. I intend to give the proclamation application, and hope to succeed. I will read, sir, what I did not say, as the gentleman supposes, was from a distinguished commanding General of the army, but what I said was from a distinguished individual on the Niagara frontier, in the year 1812. "The present is the hour of renown." Yes, sir, so thought the letter writer, the present is the hour of renown-look well to the chances. "Have you not a wish for fame?" Do you not desire distinction, political elevation? Have you not a wish to attain the Presidential chair? a desire for the fame flowing from its possession? Then look well to it, calculate, remember that while six times eight make forty-eight, six times four make only twenty-four; and unite with me to multiply your chances, even on the destruction or ruin of the constitution. "Would you not choose, in future times, to be named as one who, imitating the heroes whom Montgomery led, have, in spite of the seasons, visited the tomb of the chief, and conquered the country where he lies? Yes, you desire your share of fame." Do you not choose, in future times, to be named as one who has filled the Presidential chair, in spite of advanced seasons? Calculate the chances. Would you attain your ambitious end? then ament the constitution, even if it should lead you to visit the tomb of the chief lately elected President, and to conquer the country where he lies. You do desire fame. "Then seize the present moment. If you do not, you will reject it, and say, the valiant bled in vain; the friends of my country fell, and I was not there." Seize the present moment; amend the constitution; cut off the hopes of the chief, or we, the friends of the country, will fall. "Advance, then, to our aid." Help me to amend the constitution, and into the Presidency. "I will wait for you for a few days. I cannot give the day of my departure; but, come on." Come to my aid; I want the Presidency. I will wait for you to fall in my train only a few days. I cannot now tell when I shall start on my pilgrimage; but, come on. Be ready, or your chances will be lessened, and you will regret it. "Come in companies, half companies," or singly." Come, all ye aspirants to the Presidency, in companies or singly; follow me, and I will show you your chances. "I will organize you for a short tour." No more eight year terms; no more six times eight: you shall have short tours, only six times four. Come to me, rally under my banner, and I will organize you. "Ride to this place, if the distance is far, and send back your horses." Come, ye ambitious, ride, mount the people; if you are far off, ride into power, and send your horses back. "But remember that every man who accompanies us places himself under my command, and shall submit to the salutary restraints of discipline." Come on, you have

that of some friend, whose hopes of office had been appealed to? I beg him to remember that six times four is only twenty-four years The Hartford Convention openly avowed the object of multiplying the chances of the New England people to obtain employment and power. What is avowed in the anonymous letters? the multiplication of the chances of the outs to get in, and to put the ins out. The proceedings of the Convention have been execrated. Is it more laudable now to multiply the chances of politicians on this floor, appointed or disappointed, to get office, than in 1814? Is such an effort commendable in the South, or on this floor, and execrable in New England?

What I have said, sir, applies to the first proposition to amend. I will now proceed to my second proposition The second proposition rests on higher authority than any thing I can say. It looks to the election of President, at all hazards, by the people, and certainly places the power to choose one step nearer to them. Among the propositions presented by the gentleman from South Carolina, heretofore, which were discussed and voted on, was a resolution declaring that the people ought to vote directly for President By referring to the journals of the House of the 1st of April, 1826, you will find that was agreed to by the House, by a vote of 138 to 52,

Mr. SMYTH asked if the gentleman was speaking to his second proposition.

Mr. WRIGHT. I am speaking to my second amendment. The gentleman has no second proposition. He withdrew it. No detail of the method of securing the proposed right to the people was then adjusted, and the project failed. I have endeavored to remedy that defect, and to adjust the details to secure the object, while at the same time I avoid delay. I think, in operation or practice, it would exclude the election from this House altogether. It gives the free white males the power to vote directly for President and Vice-President, and rests the choice on a majority of the votes so given in the United States, and provides that the people shall, at the same time they vote for them, also vote for electors, equal to the number of Senators and Representatives of their State in Congress. In case no one has a majority of all the votes of the people, then the electors, so chosen, shall convene and vote for President as now practised, limiting their votes to the two highest of those voted for by the people direct; and if no choice is then made, the House of Representatives, as a dernier resort to prevent anarchy, choose as now. It is thought this will secure the choice of President where it ought to rest-with the people. On this subject I call the attention of gentlemen to a preamble and resolution of the Legislature of Ohio, submitted by me to this House in February, 1827. I will read an

extract.

"Frequent changes in the fundamental law of any community are unwise and injurious, and should not be attempted for slight and trivial causes; but, when we are called upon to give our assent to a proposition to change the Federal Constitution, one conceived in the most profound political wisdom; one that has secured to these United States both civil and religious liberty in their fullest enjoyment; that has given to us a succession of Presidents, equally illustrious for their talents and their patriotism. under whose guidance and protection we have become a great, powerful, and happy nation; a sense of duty to ourselves and our posterity forbids the hazard of all those blessings on an untried experiment. But, should a constitutional majority of the States composing this Union, or of Congress, deem it advisable so to amend the constitution of the United States as to prevent the election of President, in any event, from devolving on the House of Representatives, your committee recommend that it be made on the basis of political justice—the voice of the free white male citizens of the United States. Therefore, "Resolved by the General Assembly of the State of

[H OF R

Ohio, That, in that event, our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested, to use their endeavors to procure such an amendment of the constitution of the United States as will authorize all free white male citizens of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years, to vote directly for President of the United States; and, at the same time, to vote for as many electors as the State may be entitled to have Senators and Representatives in Congress; which electors shall, in case no candidate shall have a majority of all the votes given by the free white male citizens of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years, proceed, forthwith, to elect a President from the two persons having the highest number of votes." My second proposition is in perfect keeping with this proposition of Ohio. That State is opposed to any amendment to the constitution; but if it is to be amended-if the concessions on which it rests are to be broken up, and readjusted, it claims to have them adjusted on the basis of political justice. I concur with the Legislature, and avow my unwillingness to alter or touch the constitution, which has heaped upon this people so many blessings, and extorted from all parts of the world unbounded approbation; but if it must be altered for any purpose, I wish the choice of a President to rest on the whole people of the Union, giving to white citizens, in all parts of the United States, an equal voice in the choice. Ohio may be singular in the opinion expressed. You, sir, may repudiate all claim to an equal participation in political power-all measures securing the influence of the section where you live. These are not my feelings. I say, let the constitution alone; but if you will change it, then do us justice-if we are to make a new bargain, we must do the best we can for our State, under all the circumstances. I am selfish enough so to act. The present constitution resulted from a spirit of compromise. Let it alone. The people are happy under its auspices. Let them advance in prosperity and happiness. I will not go one step to satisfy the lust of power of politicians, aspirants to office, who are always fomenting discontent and distrust. I stand here the advocate of the people, and am proud to defend their rights against all the attacks of jacobins and demagogues.

[Here the time allotted to morning business expired. Mr. SMYTH asked to have the rule suspended that he might reply, or perhaps he would have no chance this session. Negatived]

FEBRUARY 16, 1829.-Mr. WRIGHT resumed. I hold it to be right, Mr. Speaker, to draw on the gentleman from Virginia to support my amendment. In his former speech on his amendments, he said," this amendment will take away power from this House, and confer it on the people." "The constitution is defective in not providing that the will of the people shall be expressed." This is what my amendment seeks to remedy. He says further, It may be objected that the amendment does not provide that the election, in the first instance, shall be made by the people, without the intervention of electors. It is my opinion the election ought to be thus made: but as a proposition to that effect would be to take from State Legislatures a power they now possess," &c., it cannot be obtained. Why, sir, is that an objection? Is it aristocratic in this House to retain power, and democratic for the State Legislatures to withhold it from the people? No, sir, that is not it. The true secret is, there is a constitution-mending mania abroad-something must be done, or it will die away. The love of power may induce State Legislatures to reject propositions, and therefore we must forbear to do what is just, what we proclaim to be right, and propose something short of it, so as to keep moving. If we are to amend the constitution, let us propose what is right, strike at aristocracy wherever we find it, here or in the State Legislatures. Let us give up our own power, and then may we not confidently ask the State Legislators to surrender theirs also to the people?

As to the third and fifth of my propositions to amend, I shall consider them together, as coming within the same general principle. The third makes members of this House, when the House chooses a President, ineligible to office during the Presidential term of the person elected. The fifth makes members of Congress ineligible to office during the time for which they are elected. Is not this right? The gentleman from Virginia nods assent. Why did he then abandon his proposition on the subject? If there be any apprehension of corruption, it is expected to find it here Let us reform here, then. The gentleman told us in his speech, that Presidents had made appointments from this House, to reward services rendered him, or to remove opponents from his way-and that one hundred and twenty members of Congress had been appointed by the President to office. This may be true; but does it evidence corruption in the President, or the members? The gentleman may believe it-I do not. Let him give an instance. The gentleman said, If a member wants an office under the United States, and is eligible, there is before him a constant lure to draw him to the support of the President." Well, sir, suppose I admit this truth. Why, then, let me ask, did the gentleman withdraw his proposition to take away this lure? Why leave it still to operate? Has he any new, unfledged hope of office, making the lure to him more agreeable?

Again, the gentleman says: "As it is from corruption the people apprehend misrule, and the invasion of their rights, we should, as far as possible, remove every apprehension of it." "Let the Representative who has voted for a President contrary to the will of his constituents. meet the responsibility he has taken upon himself. Let no man be encouraged to brave the resentment of the people whom he serves. Let no power be allowed to interfere to protect him from the consequences of giving a vote against the will of the people. Let us secure the fidelity of the future Representatives of the people by rendering him ineligible to receive that which might be a temptation to a departure from duty."

Sir, this is good sound doctrine. It gives me pleasure to quote it. But what a pity it is that we have only the speech left; that the amendment on which it was made has been withdrawn. The speech containing these fine passages, I believe, was transmitted to that great and good man who presides with so much credit to the nation in a department of this Government, Chief Justice Marshall, and drew from him a complimentary letter, which has been published. Why did not the gentleman hold fast to that which called forth such high praise? Why did he withdraw his amendment? Did his lust of power get the mastery over him? Or is there any thing connected with the late election of President, or any arrangement since, which has lured him to attempt a multiplication of his chauces for office, even at the sacrifice of so much fame? I will not attempt to answer for the gentleman.

[FEB. 19, 1829.

seat in the Senate of the United States, directly in point on the question.

· With a view to sustain, more effectually, in practice, the axiom which divides the three great classes of power into independent constitutional checks, I would impose a provision, rendering any member of Congress ineligible to office, under the General Government, during the term for which he was elected, and for two years thereafter, except in cases of judicial office; and these I would except, for the reason that vacancies in this department are not frequent occurrences, and because no barrier should be interposed in selecting to the bench men of the first talents and integrity. Their trusts and duties being of the most responsible kind, the widest possible range should be permitted, that judicious and safe selections might be made. The politician may err, yet his error may be presently retrieved, and no considerable injury result: but with judges, particularly in the last resort, error is fatal, because without remedy.

The effect of such a constitutional provision is obvious. By it Congress, in a considerable degree, would be free from that connexion with the Executive Department, which, at present, gives strong ground of apprehension and jealousy on the part of the people. Members, instead of being liable to be withdrawn from legislating on the great interests of the nation, through prospects of Executive patronage, would be more liberally confided in by their constituents; while their vigilance would be less interrupted by party feelings and party excitements. Calculations from intrigue or management would fail: nor would their deliberations or their investigations of subjects consume so much time. The morals of the country would be improved; and virtue, uniting with the labors of the Representatives, and with the official ministers of the law, would tend to perpetuate the honor and glory of the Government.

But if this change in the constitution should not be obtained, and important appointments continue to devolve on Representatives in Congress, it requires no depth of thought to be convinced that corruption will become the order of the day; and that, under the garb of conscientious sacrifices to establish precedents for the public good, evils of serious importance to the freedom and prosperity of the republic may arise. It is through this channel that the people may expect to be attacked, in their constitutional sovereignty; and where tyranny may well be apprehended to spring up, in some favorable emergency. Against such inroads every guard ought to be interposed, and none better occurs than that of closing the suspected avenue with some necessary constitutional restriction, We know human nature to be prone to evil; we are early taught to pray that we may not be led into temptation; and hence the opinion, that, by constitutional provision, all avenues to temptation, on the part of political servants, should be closed."29 Niles's Register, 157.

Sir, this reasoning is strong and powerful. We are He quoted a passage from Edmund Pendleton, which I told by this distinguished and experienced individual, in a think worthy of notice. "An essential principle of a Re-solemn declaration to the Legislature of his State, that this presentative Government is, that it be influenced by the will of the people, which will can never be expressed if their Representatives are compelled or influenced by the hopes of office. If this hope may multiply offices, and extend patronage; if the President may nominate to valuable offices members of the Legislature who shall please him, and displease the people, by increasing his power and patronage."

House is the scene of action for that corruption which worketh the destruction of all things. That the very door my amendment proposes to shut, is the avenue by which corruption enters among us, and is sapping to its foundations our fair fabric of Government, and aiming to erect upon the necks of the people a tyranny horrible and odious Sir, if this was good doctrine in 1825, when uttered by General Jackson; if good doctrine when the gentleman from Virginia proposed his amendments and made his speech, why is it not good now? What changes have taken place to inspire confidence in the members of Congress? I know of none. Do gentlemen fear that the General, now he is elected President, will, in the spirit of reform, when making his appointments, practise upon the principles here solemnly proclaimed to the Le