terest or safety of our institutions. But a little reflection on the subject has persuaded me of the error of these impressions, and feeling as I do the magnitude of the principles at stake on the decision of the Senate, I have thought it proper to present in the shape of an amendment to the resolution offered by the Committee, a proposition which seems to cover more fully the ground now assumed in dis cussion. The course of remarks yesterday, on either side, did not more affect the individual case upon which the Judiciary Committee have reported, than any other nomination made, or to be made, during the present session. The resolutions submitted by the committee do not declare any general principle of action, assign any motive or cause for that inexpediency which they oppose to the confirmation of this appointment, nor disclose the reasons which conduct the committee to their conclusion: nor will a perusal of our journal, when published, make known to the American people the reasons. We have learned them in the progress of the debate. We find them to involve, what some of us deem the most solemn and fearful considera ions, and we have a fair claim to have them so presented, that, when the nation shall have access to the hstory of our proceedings in this secret session, it shal be able to understand by what rules we have been governed, and whether their adoption be dangerous to its interest. These reasons have induced me to submit the amendment offered. The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee has informed us, that a majority of that committee has taken two views of this subject The first is, that the present attitude of the Executve has but one parallel in our national history: in all oher cases, the President has retired voluntarily at the expiation of eight years, and not by a transfer, invito, of the Executive power to other hands, by the people; and that thisstate of things imposes upon the Senate the necessity o. scrutinizing most narrowly the executive acts of the pesent incumbent, to avoid the undue exercise, on his part, f powers proper to be reserved to his successor." The second view is, "that, if the notion of a majority governing be any thing but a theme for holiday declamation, it is proper that this body take care the popular will be gratified and he assumes that there has been a most decisive and unparalleled expression of public will that confidence is withdrawn from the present incumbent and reposed in others. " The honorable Senator from South Carolina, also a member of the Judiciary Committee, and of another committee before whom a number of nominations are now pending, has told us he considers this "a question of delicacy, not of power; that the power is admitted; that the present Executive certainly has the power to appoint, but the Senate as clearly has the power to pause, inquire, hesitate, and delay; that the popular will is decisively expressed against the present Chief Magistrate, and ought to be obeyed; and that the rule he advocates is, that no vacancy which has occurred since this declaration of popular will, is to be filled until after the third of March, unless the regular action of the Government will be destroyed by it." Both the Senators say that " Mr. Jefferson's accession to the Government is the only case parallel to the present," and they rely on the precedent of that period. So far, Mr. President, as my researches have enabled me to judge, these gentlemen are as unsound in their doctrines as they are mistaken in their facts. Is it true, that considerations of public will, or nice questions of delicacy, are those by which we must be influenced? Can the existence of popular will, however decisively announced, divert the Senate from the performance of one of its most important and most necessary duties? No sir, far otherwise. The charter by which we must direct our course is the constitution. Whenever its voice is heard, the only popular will we can recognize is that which it announces-whatever [FEB. 2, 1829. obligation it imposes upon us we must discharge, regardless alike of the notions of delicacy to the few, or the expressed feelings of the many. According to my judgment, the constitutional injunction is clear in reference to this matter. Its language and its spirit cannot permit any one to doubt that it intended the offices created by Congress should be filled: that they should be permanently filled by the nomination of the President, and confirmation of the Senate; but, as it might often occur that a vacancy would happen in the recess, when, from the nature of the office, and the importance of its immediate operations, it would be injurious to the public interest to wait for a session of the Senate, or suspend the appointment, it gave to the President alone the power of filling such vacancy, taking care that such appointment should confer power only until the Senate could be called to act upon it. It never intended that the Executive should take from the Senate by indirect means, or by any act of commission or omission, its concurrent voice in the appointment of officers; nor did it contemplate that the Senate, by any act, should take from the Executive his concurrent voice. It is equally plain, I think, that it did not contemplate that either of these branches should add to the power of the other, or diminish aught from its own. These constitutional principles, in the abstract, will not, I presume, be controverted; and if they do not in their application govern the matter now debated, I am utterly mistaken. Let us assume the case of an officer established by law, say a collector for the port of Baltimore. A vacancy occurs in the recess, for instance in July, and the President commissions A. B. Now clearly, the constitution never intended that the President should, by his sole act, and without the participation of the Senate, continue A. B's official existence beyond some period in the next sersion, not later than the last day of the session. If the President, by omitting to nominate A. B. at the next session, can suffer him to remain in office to the close of the last day of the session, under his Executive appointment, then he can rightfully, on the day following, when his time shall have expired, renew his Executive appointment, and the same process may be annually carried on, and the office be kept in the hands of an individual for the term of the President who first appointed him, and his successor may then go through the same process, and so from one to another, until the agency of the Senate in the creation of the officer is a mere mockery. Sir, the constitution neither expects nor justifies such a proceeding. It has provided and demands a different one. The Senator from South Carolina says he admits the power of the President to nominate. It is not the power I contend for-it is the duty. The President has no discretion to exercise; the authority was not vested in him to be exercised or not, as he pleased; but it was given him because it must be exercised, when the exigency occurs, and so exercised as to allow to a co-ordinate branch of the Government its regular action upon the officer. A failure to nominate would be a violation of the duty and obligation of the President, who, by the constitution, is directed to submit the appointment to the Senate, for their advice and consent. Let us for a moment inquire whether the same reasons do not demonstrate an equal obligation upon the Senate. The proposition does appear to my mind singularly strange, that the constitution should require an act to be done which could only be done by the advice of the Senate, on application by the President; that it should imperatively enjoin upon the President the duty to ask that advice, and yet the Senate be at large to withhold its advice. The only clause in the constitution conveying to the Senate this power of confirmation, is found in the article defining the Executive power, and directing that the President shall nominate, "and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint." No other language is any where introduced, to denote more clearly the obligation of the Senate to act upon nominations. The President being bound to have the laws executed, officers being necessary to the execution of the laws and it not being in his power to create officers, without the agency of the Senate, it results, of necessity, that the Senate must contribute such agency. Our duties are correlative. The necessity imposed to demand our advice, denotes the corresponding duty to gratify the demand; and, by the very same argument, the necessity imposed upon the President now to demand, denotes as distinctly the corresponding duty now to gratify it. I have attempted to show, that, by failing to make the nomination at the proper period, the Executive can accumulate a power not conferred upon him, and deprive the Senate of their just participation in the creation of officers. It is no difficult matter to perceive that, by a failure on the part of the Senate to act when the nomination is presented, the very same results are produced. Should the Senate refuse to act upon the nomination of an officer, created in the recess, so soon as the session terminates, the President must recommission an officer. The Senate, at one session, has no higher or other authority, in this respect, than at another; and if the omission to act on a nomination, at one session, can be justified, the same omission can be justified at another, and for an indefinite period; and thus the Senate will be able to defeat the whole scheme and policy of the constitution in relation to this branch of its duties, to invest the Executive with a power in terms denied to him in the constitution, and which all the branches of the legislative department cannot confer; and, at the same time, take away and destroy one of the most important and necessary items in the constitutional character of its own body for, sir, if the Senate can be stripped by any means, whether by its own suicidal hand, or by any other power, of its claim to exercise its constitutional functions, the same, or similar reasons, will equally justify the next and every other Senate, seeing that the next Senate will have precisely the same authority we have, and certainly no more, nor no less. The constitution has not contemplated one Senate or one Congress as having more or less authority than another; nor, permit me to say, does it contemplate giving to one President more power or authority than to auother. To him who comes into office by the lowest electoral vote which the House of Representatives can adopt, and to him who comes in by the united acclamation of all the various interests which distinguish the Union, it speaks the same language, confers the same powers, presents the same restraints, and demands the performance of the same duties. It looks not to the individual man, nor trusts to his dispositions, nor reposes in his personal inclinations for his fidelity. It looks to his official character, and presents its own will as the rule of his conduct. It contemplates no change of personal character. Like a corporate being, he has a continuing existence, not terminated by the change of the individual incumbent, but is the same yesterday, to-day, and so long as the constitution itself shall survive. As of the Senate, so may it be said of him, that his constitutional powers and duties are the same on the third day of March in one year, as they are on the same or any other day in any other year. It is not in the power of all the branches of the Government, and certainly not of the Senate alone, to restrict the exercise of those powers which the constitution confers, either as to the manner or the time in which he shall perform them, or to say that, in a contingency, whether that of a declaration of public will, or the expectation of a more popular successor, or any other, his constitutional functions shall be suspended, either directly, by arresting his agency, or indirectly, by withholding ours. For the period. and the full period for which he was elected, he is in the possession of all the authority which will belong to the most popular incumbent, [SENATE. at the first, or any subsequent moment of his term. Nor is this assertion in the smallest degree impeached by the suggestion of the honourable Senator from Virginia, that 66 time is an ingredient in every political proposition;" with which remark he thinks the position should be qualified. Sir, the distinction attempted by that honorable Senator appears to me to have no proper place here. He admits that every President has potentially the same power, but not practically, and he proves this by showing that the first President, having filled all the offices of the then newly organized Government, had the appointment of a greater number of officers than any other, and, therefore, practically, had more power. To this I remark, in the first place, that, let the term be what it may, by which you designate the power, it is not constitutionally the privilege of this body, by a neglect of its duty, to extend or limit either the practical or the potential powers of the President. Neither the Senate or any other branch of the Government, gave to the first, or any other President, a power, potential or practical, greater than the Executive has since possessed. That a greater number of officers were then nominated may be the fact, but it has no relation to the question now before us. We wish to adjust the question of the quantum of power. its extent and duration. Power may exist when no occasion justifies its exercise. As much constitutional power is evinced by the nomination and appointment of one officer of a given grade, as by the nomination and appointment of a score of them, in the same way that the same extent of physical power is evinced by a given exertion of it in one or two instances, as well as a dozen. The Celebrated Francisco did not cease to possess gigantic physical power in all the interval, because, from the period of the Revolution, his peaceful character kept him from scenes which required its exertion, until a troublesome assailant compelled him to throw, first the rider, and then the horse, over a fence. If, however, it be insisted that time is a necessary ingredient in every political proposition, we gratify this necessity when we contend that the Executive has now, in the last year, and last month of his term, the same constitutional power which he had in the first year, and first month, and the same duties, and that each are to be exercised now as then, when the occasion occurs which the constitution has declared shall require their exercise, and that, in relation to the powers and duties of the Senate, the same doctrine applies. The remark of my friend from Louisiana applies here with infinite force, when he asks how can Senators who have been superseded by others actually appointed; claim to exercise equal authority and power with those who have again received a manifestation of continuing confidence, and, at the same moment, deny to a President the full powers of his station, solely because he is superseded by the election of another? It is not to Senators only this remark applies; most of the offices, which are held for a period of years, subject the persons holding them to the same predicament. The honorable Senator from Virginia has frequently repeated the epithet "repudiated," as applied to the President, with a decided commendation of its peculiar fitness. Is the appellation less descriptive of a Senator, or member of the other House, who, by a change of public opinion, has been pretermitted and superseded by the appointment of another? Is it not still more descriptive of another, whose abandonment of all the peculiar political tenets which caused his election, has withdrawn from him the confidence of the very persons and party who elected him? And yet, because to such, you might appropriately apply the term of “ repudiated Senators," or "repudiated members of the House of Representatives," would you, therefore, restrain them from the exercise of any power or duty which belongs to their official station, or, when exercised, would you fail to give to their acts all the effect which could be claimed for them under different circumstances? Is a law less obligatory, because such members assisted in its enactment, or will its violation be less criminal? Such a doctrine, pushed to its fair and necessary results, would prove destructive to the Government. FEB. 2, 1829. next the other; and yet, when called to their eternal I have thus far, sir, argued this question on constitutional grounds, with the concession of the fact assumed by the Senators, who have asserted that the public will has been decisively and emphatically expressed in relation to the subject before us. But I now call upon these Senators for the proof of this declaration. That the people of this nation have, by an immense majority, expressed their will to have another Executive officer for the next four years, is as certainly true as to me it is strange. This has clearly demonstrated their preference for the individual elected over the rival candidate. But it does appear to be a most unwise and mischievous, as it is certainly a most uncharitable interference, that therefore all confidence is lost in the present incumbent. This would be to assert, that one candidate cannot be successful in a political contest, without subjecting his rival not only to the loss of the office contended for, but to the infinitely aggravated loss of character and public The question of public confidence in this particular confidence. In the selection of an individual for the has not been tested. When another individual was seExecutive office, the freemen of the nation exercise lected to succeed the present Chief Magistrate, it was their prejudices and partialities, influenced by whatever known he would continue to act until the 4th of March, considerations they choose to obey, and irresponsible and complaint has no where been uttered against it; but to their conscience and their God, precisely as they much less has public opinion been decisively expressdo in the election of other political officers. With some ed. The people are satisfied with the appointments, so a candidate is obnoxious for the very opinions or princi- far as any indication can justify an opinion; and I do not ples which make others his enthusiastic friends; and believe that any Executive has ever existed, which has with a thousand men, you may find a thousand motives, given more general satisfaction, by the distribution of each unlike the other, but bringing all to unite in ele-offices created by law. They have not been confined vating the same favorite. But this does not prove that each of them has lost confidence in the individual against whom his interest is exerted, much less does it prove, that they all wish to arrest the further execution of the appropriate powers and duties of the adversary candidate, being then in office, before the legal expiration of his term of office. Let us inquire what are the lessons of experience; whether the facts in relation to former persons and times have justified the theory which we are now asked to adopt. Who was the first unsuccessful candidate for this high and distinguished office? Was his defeat the result of a total want of confidence in his ability, his fidelity and his integrity? Epithets more gross, crimes more numerous, or of more turpitude, personal slanders more vile, never were uttered against any man than were spoken, written, and published against that great and good man during his canvass; and yet, Mr. Jefferson, at the expiration of four years, was again a candidate, and was successful by a decided majority, and lived to see not only the fears and apprehensions of his adversaries relieved, but to witness the vast influence of his political virtues, in making proselytes of his deadliest foes. His memory and reputation are now cherished by all, and his example commended as a model for imitation, by those who certainly did not at the moment very much admire the original. The elder Mr. Adams was ejected by a decided expression of public will, and left the Government loaded, not with his own political errors only, but with a heavier weight of political sins, which belonged properly to some, who, in the character of political friends and associates, were the most violent enemies to his reputation. But the nation did not fail in the justice which was due to him. He lived to see himself respected and esteemed for his many and excellent virtues, and a seemingly special Providence caused the period and circumstances of his death to indicate the direct agency of omnipotence, in having his name for ever connected with the existence and prosperity of this Government. At one moment one was a "repudiated" President, and, at the to any party, and have been the reward of useful merit, not of partisan service. It has been said, however, by the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. EATON), by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee (Mr. BERRIEN), and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HAYNE), that the history of 1801 is the parallel period to the present, and furnishes ample precedent for the principles now asserted. It did not at all surprise me. that the Senator from Virginia differed with these gentlemen: for, of all the authority extant, the most conclusive against them was that referred At the close of the administration of Mr. Adams, the Senate was of the same political party with himself; a vast number of offices had been created, for all of which nominations had been sent to the Senate, and the Senate confirmed every one of them. to. When Mr. Jefferson was about to be installed, his friends did not ask to leave him unembarrassed by such a process as is now suggested; his power and patronage were not erected upon the restraints to be imposed on his predecessor, or on the Senate. He came in as the representative of a great and dominant political party, to none of whom had offices been given, and he found the individuals of the party in the minority in the possession of all the offices. So far from using the remedy now suggested-the withholding the exercise of the confirming power of the Senate-Mr. Jefferson did what every President ought to do. He assumed, in the face of the American people, the responsibility of doing, openly and boldly, what, according to his opinions of the constitution and the law, he had a right to do. Where commissions were made out and delivered, he removed the incumbent and appointed another; where the commissions were not made out, he refused to issue them; and in some cases in which commissions were made out, but not delivered, he refused to deliver them. According to the decision of the Supreme Court, in Marbury and Madison, reported in 1 Cranch, the commissions which were refused to the Justices of the Peace, there mentioned, were not necessary to constitute these individuals judicial officers; they were made so by their appointment and confirmation, and they were beyond the control of the President, holding their offices for five years, during which time he had no authority to remove them. He, no doubt, supposed he did possess the authority which he exercised. Sir, my first political opinions were received at that period-received from the political friends of Mr. Jefferson, who were devoted to him. I was nurtured in that school, and amongst that class of political men, and have ever been in full membership, or, at least, have not, with my knowledge, abandoned it; although, of late, I find politicians, who were not formerly enrolled under that banner, nor supposed to be very ardent friends of Mr. Jefferson, or his administration, taking a very decided lead in sounding his praises and extolling his administration, and presenting especially the most violent of his measures as the only fit pattern for imitation. Mr. Jefferson's conduct was open, and exposed to the nation. When arraigned for it, as he was, by a memorial from New Haven, he avowed the motives which influenced him. He declared that it was unequal and unjust that the minority should retain all the offices under the Government; that there ought to be a distribution in the fair proportion of parties; that it was his object to effect such a distribution; and when that was done, then the only inquiries ought to be, "is he honest?" "is he capable?" "is he faithful ?" Beyond this, Mr Jefferson did not go. It cannot be asserted that, in reference to any division of parties, the offices under the Government are now held by any one political party; and, therefore, if precedent would make law, this precedent would not avail. But, as the honorable Senator from Virginia (Mr. TAZEWELL) has said the precedent of 1801 is the strongest precedent to sustain the doctrine maintained by us. All other periods of the Government furnish testimony of the same characGeneral Washington made nominations to the Senate, to the last day of his official existence, and the Senate confirmed them. Mr. Adams, who succeeded him, as has been proved, did the same thing, and the Senate confirmed his nominations. Mr. Jefferson, in like manner, made nominations to the full end of his term, and the Senate acted upon them. So with Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe, and the Senate of those times, respectively. ter. [SENATE. The Senator from Virginia, after protesting that no want of delicacy towards me is to be inferred from his remark, impeaches the correctness of the assertion contained in the amendment, that such is the settled practice," on the authority of several instances which he refers to. All the cases alluded to by that Senator are appointments made in virtue of the power derived under the constitution, and not offices created by "act of Congress," to which the resolution is confined. The Senator from Virginia does not perceive the distinction which is made; yet it appears perfectly obvious. The constitution has said the President and Senate may constitute ambassadors and other public ministers, but has it any where directed that the particular offices to whom the Senator has alluded shall be appointed? Certainly not. It has given a discretion to the President and Senate as to the time when, and the foreign Power to whom, they are to be appointed. The Senate, in such cases, has constitutionally a controlling power over the President, and have always exercised it, and he has a power, without which they cannot act. Both must agree, or the public minister will not only not. be appointed to-day, or to-morrow, but not at all. It is, therefore, entirely proper that the Senate, in the exercise of their constitutional duty, shall postpone, from day to day, from session to session, or from year to year, appointments like these; and the technical phraseology of the Senate, when opposed to the creation of a particular mission proposed by the President, is, that they "deem it inexpedient to appoint a minister to the nation or court proposed." Such was the case when Mr. Madison proposed the present Chief Magistrate as minister to Russia. The Senate, not from an objection to the person proposed, as the Senator would seem to suggest, but because they did not agree to the propriety of having a minister to represent this Government at that court, resolved, as the Senator has informed us from the journal, that it was "inexpedient." And if the gentleman would have investigated the subject, he would have found, in a few pages more, that the same President Madison re-nominated the same individual when satisfactory reasons were adduced to justify the mission, and that the Senate, of nearly the same individuals, approved the nomination unanimously, with the exception of Mr. Alexander Contee Hanson, of Baltimore, who alone voted against him. The cases brought by the Senator from Virginia, then, have no influence upon the fact. They are none of them such cases as the amendment speaks of. But the gentleman asks if a Judge of the Supreme Court is not an officer created by the Constitution? I answer yes, to some extent he is; but he is, nevertheless, within the language of the amendment, because his appointment is especially directed by act of Congress. The constitution provides that there shall be a Supreme Court." but 66 I cannot exhaust myself, or fatigue the Senate, by reading from the Journal. The long list sent in by Mr. Jefferson, in his message in March, 1801, in which these words were used, "nominated, but not appointed," and which has entirely misled the gentleman, has been examined, and not one solitary case is found not acted upon by the previous Senate; and it is perfectly certain that the language was used as descriptive of persons either not commissioned, or to whom commissions, although made out, were not delivered. All that could be demanded has been done cases referred to as exceptions have been examined, and they are found not to exist, or to be capable of ready explanation. It is not intended to say that no one case has occurred in which the Senate delayed their action upon the subject beyond the session. In the very nature of things this must occur, and without censure. Where information was required to enable either the President or the Senate to act, and could not possibly be had in due time to act before the end of the session, it would justify delay. Whatever the constitution might enjoin, it did not mean to exact impossibilities; and if, therefore, it re- Again, the Senator from Virginia has taken exception quired an act to be done, and, from a necessary cause, a to what he terms a misquotation of the constitution, which preliminary fact was to be ascertained, which could not be he finds in the amendment, that, in enumerating the Exeascertained within the time prescribed, it afforded justifica-cutive power of appointment, it omits to pursue the contion for leaving it undone. If delay is asked for necessary information, no one is less disposed than I am to oppose it; but that is a consideration altogether different from delay asked for the avowed purpose of defeating a co-ordinate branch of the Government in the exercise of its power and its duties. it does not designate the number of Judges The act of Congress was necessary to the organization of the court, and to ascertain the number of Judges; after which, the President and Senate have no discretion as to their appointment or non-appointment. The Senate cannot, when the President nominates, say, in this case it is inexpedient to have a seventh judge on the supreme bench. The case is altogether unlike that of public ministers, and differs in nothing, as to the present question, from other officers appointed by other acts of Congress. stitution, in naming "ambassadors and other public ministers," as well as "all other officers." There is no attempt or profession of attempt on the face of the amendment, to pursue the words of the constitution. It states the truth, that the President is vested, thereby, with the power and the duty to nominate to all offices created by act of Congress, for which other provision is not made; but it does not affirm or deny any other power or duty in reference to other persons or things, except as to the subject matter of the amendment; and I do not perceive that it is just cause of complaint that the amendment has not made reference to parts of the constitution not having relation to the subjects of which it treats. I am as little sensible of the proper application of another remark of the Senator from Virginia, which imputes to the advocates of this amendment the doctrine which he is pleased to say was once urged on this floor, on the memorable occasion of Mr. Jefferson's recommendation of an embargo-that it is constituting the Senate the "recording officers of Presidential edicts." If he supposes this amendment looks to such a doctrine for aid, he has greatly misconceived its character. The argument is, that the Senate are bound to act-reject or confirm the nomination; so is the assertion of the amendment. Does this deprive the Senate of their free exercise of judgment? Assuredly not. Let gentlemen record their names on the Journal in opposition to the individual named, and they have no account to render for so doing, but to their consciences and their constituents. It will then be the duty of the Executive to present another and another, until one is found who, in the opinion of the majority, is qualified. [FEB. 2, 1829. ment of the competent tribunal, and give loose to its discretion! Sir, what is the value of your boasted Government, if it be not that it secures your people against the tyranny of discretion in rulers? If it is not in having written law, known and obligatory, as well upon your every department-upon this Senate amongst the rest-as upon the meanest man in society? Once let discretion be adopted as the rule of conduct for those in power, and no man can prescribe limits to the mischief which must ensue. I implore gentlemen seriously to reflect upon the consequences of our conduct. We have successfully passed through many and great political convulsions. Our predecessors have adhered to the plain terms of their charter by which we hold our seats The storm has raged without; party animosities have been indulged elsewhere, but within this hall a steady, even-handed course has been pursued, regardless of every consideration out that of duty; and the storm has passed away, and left us the bright heritage we now enjoy. Let us not be less faithful to those who are to succeed us; and with a stern regard to the solemn obligations we owe to the constitution and the country, let us still recognize no other guide but the one, and no other object but the interests of the other. Mr. HOLMES remarked, that when Coriolanus, beThe honorable Senator from Virginia has said, with lieving that his countrymen were ungrateful, had determuch emphasis. that the doctrine of this amendment com- mined to abjure them, and to claim the protection of pels us to censure the conduct of the President in delay- Tullus Aufidius, his mortal enemy, he entered the city ing the appointment from the period of Judge Trimble's of Antium at midnight-all was silent and still as death. death, until the nomination. I am not quite so well pre- Ruminating on the extraordinary step he had taken, and pared to make an uncharitable deduction from the facts upon its probable results, he expresses his thoughts in of this case, as to say there is any cause of censure. What this soliloquy: "O, world! thy slippery turns: friends were his motives for delay I know not; but, in as far as now fast sworn, whose double bosoms seem to wear one they have been stated by the Senator from Louisiana, they heart; whose bed, and hours, and meal, and exercise, are have been those of delicacy towards the Senate. All I still together; who twine as 'twere in love inseparable, feel myself called upon to say on this part of the subject shall within this hour, on a dissension of a doit, break out is, that unless the President had satisfactory cause for de- to bitterest enmity. Thus fellest foes, whose passions and lay, he ought, in my opinion, to have made the appoint- whose plots have broke their rest to take the one the ment as soon as the vacancy occurred. other, from some chance, some cause, not worth an egg, shall grow dear friends, and interjoin their issues." Why this quotation has been omitted in some editions of Shakspeare I know not-suffice it to say, that it is the history, in brief, of the politicians of the civilized world. It is "the abstract and brief chronicle of the times" The reason is this: There is much less disinterested patriotism in the world than is imagined-coalitions have been, and still are, formed and broken up, according to the interests of the coalescing parties. The friends of Mr. Crawford had been circumvented and subdued, yet they could unite with the victor to subdue others. I come now to the last, and perhaps the most alarming part of the doctrine urged on the other side. Gentlemen propose a rule which is to be enforced or relaxed by what they consider the necessities or exigencies of the public interest. If the exigencies of the public shall require the officer, he shall be created; if not, his creation shall be delayed till the next President comes into power. And who, I pray you, sir, is to judge of this exigency? The Senate is a party from whom a duty is asked; it shall be performed if necessary, but the Senate do not wish to perform it if not necessary. Are we to look to some third and independent power to pass a cool and impartial judgment on the subject, by which the action of this unwilling party is to be elicited or restrained? No, sir, no such proposition is before us. The Senate itself, the unwilling party, is to be the judge of the exigency, and the judge without appeal. The three branches of the legislative department of the Government, at a moment when no influence operated but the desire to promote the public weal, have said that these officers are necessary to the public interest. Not to become necessary at certain periods or on certain contingencies, but at all times; they are to be permanent, continuing offices, for whose regular appointment, whenever a vacancy shall occur, ample provision is made. The constitution has delegated to this tribunal, and to none other, the authority to decide upon, and to provide for, such necessities, and they have pronounced an opinion, and made such provisions. To this body it has denied the power so to decide, even in its coolest moments, and when least influenced by political or any other excitement. And yet this body now, at the moment of action, and at a period of much excitement, is to disregard the judg We hear much of the public will, and all reverence it, when that will accords with their own. The popular voice is always right in the sight of a politician who happens to be in the majority; but always wrong when that majority is against him. I well remember that, at the last election of President, a distinguished citizen, whose name I would never repeat but with the profoundest respect, came into the House of Representatives the lowest of the three. He was the least popular, but he was the favorite of the honorable Senator from Delaware and myself. We took sweet counsel together," and, instead of yielding to the popular will, it was thought our duty" to nail our colors to the mast ;" and he could and he did act up to this determination, notwithstanding the "popular will." Now should this apparent attempt at proscription, or any other cause, place this majority in a minority, many others would probably become very devoted to the public will, while some of this triumphant majority would perhaps "nail their colors to the mast.' The resolutions on which we are to act, and which are the subject of the present discussions, are, 1st. That it is not necessary to act on John J. Critten |