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den's nomination for an Associate Judge of the Supreme Court, during the present session of Congress.

2nd. That it is not expedient to fill the vacancy until after the Senate shall have acted on some proposed judiciary system.

The rule prescribed, but which has not been put on the journals, is substantially this: After the public will has been expressed against the chief executive incumbent, no vacancies shall be filled, where it is not indispensable, until that will can act in the person of his successor. This is as I understood it from the hon. Senators from Georgia and South Carolina (Messrs. BERRIEN and HAYNE), but it seemed to be modified by the honorable Senator from Virginia (Mr. TAZEWELL), so far as it regards time, magnitude, and exigency. I confess I was somewhat relieved from my surprise by these salutary modifications; and indeed, it I should happen to have misconceived this unwritten rule, I know I shall be pardoned, as they do not agree as to what it is, and especially if I should not differ from them more than they differ from themselves. The application of the rule is this: The vacancy of a Justice of the Supreme Court happened during the Presidential canvass, and it was not filled in the recess of the Senate, nor until it was known that the President had failed in the election-now it ought not to be filled but by his successor. It is somewhat singular that, if this rule, as was stated by the hon. Senator from Virginia, should govern the Senate, in all future time, the Committee have not put it on paper. If it is to govern, we know not whom, why not leave a record of something that posterity may be instructed by it? This rule is, however, to be the lez non scripta, and not only this, but the lex non scripta et non scriptura of the Senate. But let your unwritten rule be what it may-any thing which its advocates please to make it all that is intended to appear on the Journal, is, that John J. Crittenden was, on the 17th of December, nominated by the President to fill a vacancy on the bench of the Supreme Court; and on the day of February the Senate decided that it is inexpedient to act on the nomination during the present session of Congress. This is all which is to govern and instruct in future time. And what a lesson! A case without a parallel! An office of the highest trust, prescribed by the constitution and defined by law; and yet, after seven weeks' delay, and having four weeks more before us, we gravely determine that it is unnecessary to act on this nomination. I wonder not that no written rule could be invented as an apology for such a case. But it has by more than one honorable Senator been attempted to justify this delay, on the ground that the President, too, has been slow in making this nomination. The vacancy occurred in August, and no appointment was made in the recess.

Now it seems to me, too, that, as terms of the court were to have been held in that circuit after the vacancy, and before the nomination to the Senate, the appointment should have been made in the recess. But, although I do not stand here to justify or apologize for the President, I can still imagine that he might have just motives for the delay. I admit that some men might be found who would accept such a temporary appointment, though they could have no reasonable assurance that they would hold it a month; but such men would confer little honor on the supreme bench of justice. A high-minded honorable man, and one who would reflect dignity and splendor upon that court, would scarcely subject himself to such a casualty. It might be, and probably was the case, and the indications here already justify the supposition, that there was good reason to suspect that any such appointment would not be confirmed by this Senate: whoever was worthy of such a trust, would incur the hazard and mortification of a rejection, even while he was administering justice within twenty feet of the tribunal that might reject him. And, indeed, I cannot readily perceive what

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the President, if his motives were selfish, would have to gain by delay. The vacancy occurred during the canvass. If the patronage of an office comes in aid of an election, (and if it does not there would probably be no objection to Mr. Crittenden), this appointment, in the recess, would have helped Mr. Adams. Surely the nomination, after the election was determined, would neither help or harm him. In fine, if the motives may be honest or sinister, it is but charitable to assign to it honesty; especially as the President implicated is not here to explain.

But the nomination was made to the Senate as early as the 17th December; about seven weeks ago. If the President delayed unreasonably, should we? If, by his neglect, the public service has suffered, are we to delay that it may suffer more? It would be the strangest reason in the world. I should, with great deference, suppose that, if the President had been tardy or remiss, it would be a strong reason why the Senate should act with all possible promptitude. It would to me, sir, be a lame and miserable apology, that as the President had done wrong, we, by his example, may do so too. No precedent or authority, however respectable, can justify the neglect of a duty required by the constitution and the laws. But had the appointment been made in the recess, then it would probably have been usurpation that the President should fill such an office when he had every reason to expect that his power was about to expire. Had the nomination been made at the very commencement of the session, the complaint would have been that time was not given to consult the Western members; and now, as the nomination was made on the 17th December, it was too late, and not so late, notwithstanding, but that we may postpone it during a whole session, without detriment to the public interest! Sir, the measure and the reasons for it are equally unparalleled.

But the honorable Senator from Delaware has intimated that it has not been insisted that the public interest has suffered by our delay. Sir, was this necessary? Is not the fact within our own knowledge? Need it be farther urged? Within twenty feet from us, and almost within the hearing of my voice, the Supreme Court, who were ordered to hold their session here on the second Monday in January, have been obliged to adjourn from day to day, for want of a quorum; and we know that they have very lately determined that no case which involves a constitutional question is to be decided, as there is no prospect of more than a mere majority of the judges. And with these facts meeting us in the teeth, was it necessary to say that the public interests had suffered by our delay ? Sir, the term of that court has been prolonged, and important trials have been continued to the next year, by this delay, and we know it. Had the Senate acted upon this nomination within a reasonable time after it was made, a judge might have been appointed for that circuit; have received the notice and taken his seat here at the commencement of the session; making all allowance for casualties. Surely, then, it was unnecessary to urge what is matter of public notoriety. But this is a necessity created by law.

The constitution has provided that the judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court, and such other courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. Congress have provided by law that this court shall consist of seven judges. Here is a vacancy, and we are not allowed the "discretion" whether it ought to be filled. I am not permitted to violate the constitution and my oath to support it, by any question of political expediency. We have, to be sure, the physical power to refuse, but we have no such right. We could refuse to perform any executive or legislative duties, and thereby stop the wheels of Government entirely. But for this, our constituents would hold us to a strict and rigorous account. though by the tenure of office we may imagine that we are out of their reach for a time, still, an expression of

And al

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we

of the appointing power. The same may be said of the
consul nominated. If we need such an officer, we ap-
point; but if, in our judgment, he is unnecessary,
reject or postpone him. We have, then, disposed of
all these cases but one, the district attorney, and this,
it is admitted, is an office created by law.
But you see,
by the Journal, that he was postponed because there were
objections to the man: for he was afterwards rejected by
the Senate. No one doubts the right of the Senate to take
that time which is indispensable to decide upon the charac-
ter and qualifications of the candidate; but beyond this
they have no right to go. Now, in this long list, so tri-
umphantly cited, and so confidently relied on by the
honorable Senator from Virginia, there is not a solitary
case which in the least sustains him.

And, sir, the same may be said of the case of Amos Binney. He was nominated by Mr. Monroe for re-appointment, as navy agent at Boston, and there were objections to his official conduct. At the close of Mr. Monroe's administration, the Senate, for want of time to understand fully the merits of his case, postponed him to the 4th of March, and Mr. Adams nominated him again. His case was again discussed, and had a vote been taken directly, he would unquestionably have been rejected. But, at the request of the Senators from Massachusetts, he was postponed to the first Monday in December, equivalent to a rejection, and we expected to hear no more of Mr. Binney. But the next session the President nominated him again-his case was fully examined and discussed-the honorable Senator himself made a very able argument against him; and finally, from the facts in the case, but chiefly from those stated in Mr. Binney's own book, which he had published in his defence, he was on the 17th April rejected by a vote of thirty-five to two. The honorable Senator from Virginia had egregiously mistaken the facts in the case. The Senate never assumed the right to say that the office need not be filled, or that they had the right to transfer this appointment to a new administration; and, in another particular, it is not, as he supposes, that the technical mistake of Mr. Adams in dating the nomination on the third, when he was not President until the fourth, would have had any weight with the Senate. They would have considered the no

disapprobation, by their constitutional organs, would make us not a little uneasy.. But here was a special palpable necessity, which no one can mistake. The public service has suffered, and is still suffering by our delay. A co-ordinate department of the Government is deficient in its organization, and we refuse to organize it; not that we need time for deliberation, but that we will not deliberate at all-deliberating whether we shall deliberateclaiming a discretion which we utterly refuse to exercise; passing by the merits and qualifications of the candidate nominated, and referring the whole affair to a future administration. We have had seven weeks to deliberate and to act-we have done neither; and having four more before us, we would now determine that we will do nothing during the remaining time. Sir, let the advocates of this resolution say what they will, and enforce their determination by what arguments they can, and the public will and must believe that this Mr. Crittenden is postponed and virtually rejected for no other earthly reason than that he was not in favor of General Jackson for President. I consequently deny the doctrine advanced, that we may deliberate as long as we please. The constitution forbids us the abuse of a discretion given us only to be used. This discretion has not been used in this case: we have not inquired at all into the merits and qualifications of the candidate nominated; the Committee have passed him by; we are to do so too; and then the case will stand a naked case, beyond all precedent-a rejection of a man whose qualifications are not disputed, because, forsooth, he was against the successful candidate. I say beyond all precedent, for I hazard the presumption to repeat, that there has been no instance, since the first organization of the Government, that a nomination to an important office, created by law, has been postponed but from ABSOLUTE NECESSITY. Appointments should be made with all convenient speed. Of the expediency, we have no discretion; that has been determined by the law creating the office, and that must be obeyed. We have no right, no constitutional power, to resist its execution. Sir, I challenge a single case that can sustain this resolution. The Hon. Senator from Virginia appeared to rely with considerable stress on the precedents which he cited from the Journal of 1817. I have examined the Journal of that period and find them all, and more like them. The Pre-mination as made when it was sent, without regard to its sident, on the 24th of February, sent a message to the Senate, nominating Claude Crozet as professor of engineering at West Point Academy, and some others for civil offices, By another message of the same day he nominated a long list for promotions in the navy. And, by another message of the 27th of February, he nominated a consul to some place which I do not now recollect, and a districtment, and was nominated by Mr. Monroe as navy agent attorney for North Carolina. The first message was acted upon with the exception of Crozet; and his case, with all in the other messages, was postponed from the 3d to the 4th of March. If these cases were precedents at all, it is presumed the honorable Senator would not take them in their whole extent. Mr. Madison's term expired on the 3d, and Mr. Monroe's commenced on the 4th of March; yet these nominations, made by Mr. Madison, were, in Mr. Monroe's term, taken up by the Senate, and, without re-nomination, were, with one exception, confirmed. If these cases were at all in point, it would be enough to say that the whole proceeding was unconstitutional. We would scarcely admit that the nomination under discussion might be taken up and acted on after the 4th of March. But not one of the whole list of cases has any bearing on this, or has the remotest analogy? The office of professor of engineering is not established by law, and we have an unlimited discretion whether we will create it or not. In the whole list of promotions in the navy we have the same discretion. No law defines, or indeed can define, the number or time of such promotions; and it is, consequently, at the entire discretion

date; and if not, the error could have been corrected in half an hour. No, sir, the first determination in that case was for want of time to decide correctly, and the two others were rejections, and intended as such.

The case of Vandeventer, cited by the same hon. Senator. He was the chief clerk in the War Depart

at New-York. He was opposed on the ground that, while in that Department, he negotiated a contract with one Mix for stone, to be delivered at the Rip Raps, in which he himself was a co-partner, and this fraud appearing against him he was rejected. This produced a wonderful excitement-the doors of the Senate were literally blockaded by his friends from the War Department, and there was an immense pressure to have him restored. But his friends, finding that there was no hope of sustaining him, their only resource was to let him down easy; they prevailed on a majority of the Senate to postpone him indefinitely, instead of directly rejecting him.

Honorable Senators have, if possible, been less fortunate in finding an analogy in the cases of ambassadors and other public ministers. It has been matter of grave discussion in this Senate, at what time or by what event those offices become "vacant," when the office is created, and what creates it. I am very sure that the hon. Senators from Virginia and Delaware cannot sustain the position, that an appropriation for a salary and outfit is by law establishing the office, and that, after this is done, to fill it is as imperative as in the case under considera

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tion. As all our foreign relations reside primarily, if not exclusively, with the President and Senate, it is impossible that an appropriation can either compel or control negotiations or the appointments, nor is it believed that such appropriations are ever so intended. Events might occur, immediately after such appropriation, which would require a mission much beyond the means provided, or which might render it inexpedient to be represented at all. The necessity of these appropriations is generally indicated by the estimate which emanates from the President; and, when otherwise, Congress only intended to say to the treaty-making power," if you choose to establish the office, we anticipate you by providing the means." It has been a subject of considerable discussion in the Senate, when, how, and at what time, the office of foreign minister is created, and when it could be properly said to become vacant. Mr. Adams had, in his message, recommending a mission to the Congress at Panama, indicated an opinion that he could have made the appointment in the recess, although he preferred to submit the subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The hon. Senator from North Carolina, (Mr. BRANCH) submitted a resolution denying the power of the President, in such a case, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, without the consent of the Senate, he being authorized by the constitution to fill vacancies only which happen in the recess; and this controversy involved of course the character and origin of such an office. And I submit to the Senators who supported that resolution, if the analogy of a minister to the case before us, upon which they now insist, does not conflict with the doctrines then advanced. Mr. Adams had in this case the power to fill the office in the recess; and the complaint is, that he did not. If the case of a minister is analogous, and the precedents there cited were not unconstitutional acts, you not only yield to him that point, but you give to every President the right to establish, in the recess, diplomatic relations, whenever, in his discretion, he may deem it expedient. I say the precedents there cited. President Washington had sent Mr. Jones as a minister to Algiers, Mr. Jefferson had sent Mr. Short to Russia, and Mr. Madison had appointed Messrs. Adams and other envoys extraordinary to negotiate a treaty of peace with England, under the mediation of the Emperor of Russia. All these appointments were made in the recess-they were all "original appointments”—we never having had such missions to either of those Powers before; and it was readily perceived that, if a Congress of nations was a diplomatic body, recognized by the laws of nations, Mr. Adams was right, or Messrs. Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, were wrong. It appeared, to be sure, in the case of Algiers, that the Senate had recommended to the President to institute such a mission, but no person was nominated to them, and surely the Senate could not give the President a carte blanche, or confirm a nomination in advance. The last case was attempted to be justified on the ground that the President, in war, he being commander-in-chief, had appointing powers which he did not possess in peace. Against this claim of power I protested, and it was the reason why I voted to lay that resolution on the table: for if the President does, by war, acquire a right to fill vacancies to offices which do not " happen" in the recess, I would not give the snap of my finger for your liberties. If, then, the President, in the recess, or the President and Senate, in session, can, at discretion, constitute these offices and fill them as vacancies, (and there is no other way in which we can reconcile these precedents with the provisions of the constitution) what analogy can there be between these casual offices, which are filled the instant they spring into existence, and this permanent office, established by the constitution, and defined by a law which requires peremptorily that it shall always consist of seven judges? In all nations foreign agencies are, VOL. V.-12

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and, from the nature of them, must be, casual; and it would be preposterous to suppose that the office of ambassador to Turkey, or any where else, had been vacant from the organization of this Government. Diplomatic missions must depend on the exigency, and be at the exclusive discretion of the appointing, which is also the treaty-making power. The same applies with equal force to consuls and all foreign agencies. The case cited this morning by the honorable Senator from Delaware seems to me to have no bearing whatever on the question. President Washington, at the close of his first term, nominated Mr. Patterson a Justice of the Supreme Court; but recollecting that this gentleman was a member of that Congress which had created the office, and that, therefore, his appointment would be unconstitutional, he withdrew him, and, immediately on the commencement of the second term of his administration, he nominated him again, and the officer was appointed. The delay was four daysthe necessity was a constitutional disqualification; and, so soon as this objection was removed, the President and Senate proceeded to the appointment. Is this the case here? Nothing like it. No mortal can perceive the analogy.

But it is insisted that an expiring administration should leave open important offices, from courtesy to its successor, and respect to the majority who have elected him. And the honorable Senator from Virginia has cited the example of Mr. Jefferson, in 1809. And what offices does he tell us were left open by him, to be filled by Mr. Madison? Why, to be sure, Mr. Madison nominated Robert Smith, Secretary of State, and William Eustis, Secretary of War, and John Quincy Adams, Minister to Russia, and, I think he mentioned some other cases, The first office was made vacant by Mr. Madison's elevation to the Presidency. Every new President has the right to select his own cabinet; and as to the minister to Russia, Mr. Jefferson surely did not leave that office vacant: for, just before, he had attempted to fill it by Mr. Short, whom the Senate had rejected, because it was inexpedient to send any minister, and the succeeding Senate, for the same reason, rejected Mr. Madison's nomination of Mr. Adams. A President of the United States is elected for four years, and, during the whole of the time, it is his right and his duty to act. He has no right to delay from motives of courtesy or delicacy, and no President has ever so practised. On the 17th of February, 1797, Washington nominated a judge, attorney, and marshal, for Tennessee, naval officer for New-York, and consuls at Gottenburg, Genoa, and Brest; and on the 20th they were confirmed. On the 27th, four days only before his time expired, he sent to the Senate William Van Murray, for minister to the Netherlands, and on the 2d of March, he was confirmed. On the same day, Joel Barlow was nominated as consul-general to Algiers. Three other consuls, and an attorney for Georgia, were contained in the same message, and on the third they were all confirmed-not a single instance of postponement, from courtesy or any other motive.

We recur next to the close of Mr. Adams's administration in 1801; and, although the honorable Senator from South Carolina seemed willing to rest his case on the precedents of that period, we find nothing to justify the adoption of this resolution, and consequently we have a right to expect that the honorable Senator will himself abandon it. Mr. Bayard's nomination as minister to France was dated on the 13th of February, sent on the 18th, and confirmed on the 19th. Mr. Bayard declined the appointment, for reasons which, it appears by the President's message, equally apply to any other person, and he declined making another nomination. What Mr. Bayard's reasons were, does not appear from the Journal, and why his case has been referred to at all is not readily perceived. Was it to prove the practice,

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of an expiring administration to postpone? It proves the very reverse. The honorable Senator from Virginia gives us a supplementary narrative to the affair, which does not appear on the Journal: that Mr. Bayard would not accept the mission from Mr. Adams without an assurance that he should be retained by his successor; that, in a conversation with Mr. Jefferson, he learnt that he would not be retained, and thereupon so informed the Senators, indicating a wish to be confirmed, stating that he should decline, and the reasons; he was appointed, and did decline. As this narrative is, to say the least, a singular one, and not much to the honor of Mr. Bayard-as nothing appears on the Journal from which it can be inferred--as it is a transaction near thirty years old, cited from memory--as the honorable Senator has so much mistaken the facts in the very recent case of Amos Binney-he will pardon me if I do not entirely rely on his recollection. My conjecture would ascribe to Mr. Bayard a much higher motive. He needed not the confirmation of the Senate to save his character or his feelings. But he had performed a part in the then recent election of President which rendered his situation extremely critical. A distinguished member of the Federal party, he had voted with his friends in more than thirty succesive ballotings; but he held the vote of Delaware in his hands-he saw that Mr. Burr could not be made President, and he was determined that a President should be elected. Mr. Jefferson, we know, was elected President by Mr. Bayard's influence. However pure his motives, he well knew, that, to hold an office under a President whose election he had contributed so essentially to effect, would subject him to suspicions which a highminded, honorable man, like him, could not endure. He therefore declined the office, and has thereby established the character of a patriot, who, in an important crisis, abandoned his party to save his country.* But be this as it may, how the appointment and declining of Mr. Bayard can be cited as a precedent to postpone from one administration to another, is to me utterly inexplicable. All Mr. Adam's nominations (midnight, as some of them were called) were confirmed, with scarcely an exception.

At the close of Mr. Jefferson's administration, to which I have already referred in reply to the honorable Senator from Virginia, I have not been able to find a single case of postponement to throw the appointment into the hands of his successor. The postponements at the close of Mr. Madison's term are accounted for on the ground of the hurry and pressure at the close of the war, and that they were for appointments to offices which might be filled or not, at the discretion of the appointing power. And at the close of Mr. Monroe's term, nominations to important offices were made and acted on, even down to its last hour, and not one postponed but for objections which went to the character and qualifications. Give us a case of a vacancy in a permanent office established by law, and a nomination in December to fill it, postponed on the 4th of February to the 4th of March, passing by entirely the merits of the candidate, for the purpose of giving the appointment to the succeeding administration, and you furnish a precedent-you establish an analogy. But all your attempts have miserably, fatally failed.

Now, if it is expedient to take from this administration and give to the next, why not meet the question at once, and reject? Why not say that John J. Crittenden ought not to be a Justice of the Supreme Court, because he was opposed to the election of General Jackson? If that is the reason, avow it, and the people will judge whether it is a sound one. And if you will give me probable grounds

Note by Mr. H-After these remarks in reply to Mr. Tazewell, Mr. McLane, of Delaware, confirmed the fact that the motive which Mr. Holmes had ascribed to Mr Bayard was the true one, and stated that he had seen his letter to that effect.

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to believe that he is a political partisan, who would carry his feelings with him, and indulge them upon the bench; that he would, in the disguise of charges to grand juries, or in any other way, pervert the office of judge into that of political apostle, no matter for whom or what, I will cheerfully give him my decided and emphatic no. Yes, sir, I have witnessed too often the pure ermine of justice soiled and polluted by the political partisan.

But we are approaching a political millenium, and we must anticipate it, in order to give it its effect, and to enjoy it in full fruition. Now, what is this grand political and moral revolution, of which there is so much boast? What is this great change of principle, which promises such an effectual regeneration? If it is only that the same thing is to be done with other hands, then the exclusive benefit is for the hands that are to be employed, and the people have" their labor for their pains." If it is nothing but a scramble for office, a contest between the seekers and the incumbents-the outs and the ins-in a national view, it is, after all, no great affair. We have not yet been told, and we ask, what is it?

Are the names of Federalist and Republican to be revived, and the lines distinctly marked, as they were before, during, and at the close of the war? It is believed that many, even of those who now hear me, would scarcely subscribe to such a policy. And, besides, on this point, General Jackson is pledged. In his letter to Mr. Monroe, at the commencement of his administration, and at the close of the war, when these lines were deep and distinct, he says:

Upon every selection, party and party feelings should be avoided. Now is the time to exterminate that monster party spirit. By selecting characters most conspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity, and firmness, without regard to party, you will go far to eradicate those feelings which, on former occasions, threw so many obstacles in the way of Government, and perhaps have the pleasure and honor of uniting a people heretofore politically divided. The Chief Magistrate of a great and powerful nation should never indulge in party feelings. His conduct should be liberal and disinterested, always bearing in mind that he acts for the whole, and not a part, of the community. By this course, you will exalt the national character, and acquire for yourself a name as imperishable as monumental marble. Consult no party in your choice-pursue the dictates of that unerring judgment which has so long and so often benefited our country and rendered illustrious its rulers."

With all my doubts whether General Jackson was competent for President of the United States, and believing, as I still do, that his predecessor ought to have been preferred, yet I believe him an honorable man-a man of his word; and, having once said that these names were mere bubbles,' he is too much of a practical man to be playing with bubbles. Is it to be restrictive or latitudinarian, in the construction of the constitution? Or, in plain language, is it to be for or against internal improvements, roads and canals? If for them, then, I suppose, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, will cordially support it. If against them, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky, will support it with equal cordiality. Is it to be tariff or anti-tariff? If the former, the first mentioned States, we may suppose, will still adhere; and if the latter, then New York, Pennsylvania, and the whole West, will defend it with all their might. Is it to be the patron of commerce, so long neglected, passed by, embarrassed, and encumbered, to build up other interests? Sir, I should rejoice at this, but I fear. Your President's habits, predilections, and experience, would scarcely lead him that way. Is it to be military? Very little change would be necessary for this. Ever since the war, the military spirit has predominated. We have been even magnanimous ; have built fortifications in foreign countries, have erected and

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aside, and the soul explores the gulf she has to pass and is shaking her wings to be gone; is it then the time to upbraid and reproach him-to tell him he is about to rush "unannointed and unannealed" into the presence of an angry God, consigned to the regions of everlasting despair, "cast upon the burning lake, wrapt in chains, to converse with everlasting groans, unpitied, unrespited, unreprieved, for ages of hopeless end?" No, sir, humanity. Christian charity, would forbid it. Pursuing the hongentleman's usual magnanimity to upbraid and reproach the President, whose political life is so soon to expire? Mr. Adams, it may be said, dies a premature death "in his full strength, his breasts full of milk, and his bones moistened with marrow;" but he dies not the "death of the wicked." He goes out of office an honest man-uncorrupted and incorruptible.

armed forts which we can never man, to no other effect but to accomodate an enemy. In no event can it be expected that any administration can do more in these respects than has been done. Is it to be economical? Any thing that would correct the extravagancies and prodigality which infest all governments, and which, with all your vigilance, are making rapid strides in this, would be a relief to the people. Let this be the case and "the radicals," of 1824 would lift their heads, and I should rejoice with joy unspeakable at the re-election of the honorable Sena-orable Senator's parallel, does it then comport with that tor from New Jersey. We would then pounce like an eagle at Dauphin Island speculations. and rip up the "Rip Raps" by the roots. But, Sir, if the changes are to be made which this resolution indicates, your new officers will strike against reform, inasmuch as the public patronage, as it is, will fall far short of satisfying expectation. We shall talk about reform, and spend much time and money in the discussion and-do nothing. It will at last come to this, and nothing more: Other men will fill the same offices, with the same emoluments, be as importunate, and commit the same peculations; and this will be the sum and substance of your great "moral and political revolution."

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We speak of our discretion," while we refuse to exercise it; of our " right of deliberation," while we refuse to deliberate; and when the deliberate purpose seems to be that the patronage of the office now vacant shall be transferred to the next administration. Very well; take these offices, and all others that you can, and we shall expect of you a rigid fulfilment of your promises. If an administration which, you say was conceived in sin, and brought forth in iniquity-whose very origin was " bargain and corruption"-has preserved external and internal | tranquility, been attended with happiness, prosperity, and all the fruits of freedom, and has moreover extinguished twelve millions of the interest and principal of your national debt in a year, it will surely be expected that its successor, coming in by the pure and unadulterated" public will," shall at least do as much.

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It has been intimated that one object of the course proposed is to preserve the purity of the Judiciary. But it would seem to me that a judge appointed by an "expiring administration," whether in "agony" or not, would be quite as likely to be independent of the power that was expiring, and that which succeeded, as if he owed his elevation to a new and popular administration. If the intent is to make this appointment for the purpose of sustaining the next administration, I should deprecate it as the worst of evils. If an administration cannot sustain itself, without summoning to its aid this department, no matter how soon it sinks.

The honorable Senator from Delaware seems to have arraigned certain States for the changes they have made in this Senate, and to intimate that this is proscription. He would, I presume, except the State of New Jersey; and the others have only managed their own affairs in their own way, and taken the same liberty that the people of the Union have in refusing to re-elect their President. Whether the State to which he has referred acted from political motives, or from a belief that rotation in this office was most republican, I know not; but when it becomes a maxim here, that a State should yield to the executive or popular will, this Senate will be worse than useless: for its design was to preserve the federative power against both.

Sir, I have done. To postpone a nomination for an important office, to give the patronage to a future Administration, is without precedent; against principle and constitutional duty, and a dangerous example to our successors.

On the motion to refer the nomination of Mr. Crittenden (to be an Associate Judge of the United States) to the Committee on the Judiciary,

But this is the "repudiated" administration, and no appointment by it can be popular. Sir, I repeat, the public have expressed no such opinion. Is it true, that, when an officer of this government is succeeded by another, that his functions are to be suspended? Is the public confidence withdrawn from a Senator because another is elected to succeed him on the 4th of March next? I deny the inference. It is not warranted by the constitution, that, because General Jackson is elected your next President, public confidence is withdrawn from Mr. Adams. No, sir, think, exult as you may; but, mark me, this administration, with all its faults, presented as they now are in Mr. JOHNSTON said, this motion is a deviation from bold relief, will constitute the brightest page in your pothe usage of the Senate. It had been usual to lay the litical history. What! "repudiated," "disgraced," be- nominations for some days on the table, and when called cause not re-elected? Was it so with William H. Craw-up for consideration, the members of the State interested ford ? When pale disease and excruciating pain had stretched him on his restless couch for many a sleepless night; when his eye became dim, his limbs tottered, his tongue faltered, and the whole man was prostrate; it was then that the vilest conspiracy was formed to ruin him. Some of his friends became cool, and, like the Priest and the Levite, passed by on the one side and on the other, wagging their heads with indifference; and it was the Adams man who acted the good Samaritan; came to him; saw his condition, took care of him, and restored him; yet he failed--but he was not repudiated nor disgraced. I like the parallel of the honorable Senator from Virginia, of the natural and political death, but not so well the accompanying remarks. He speaks, exultingly, that this administration is " expiring in agony." Sir, when man, even if he has been an inveterate sinner, approaches the last verge of life; when he is about to shut his eyes on all sublunary things, and to go that way "whence no traveller returns; when the curtain of futurity is drawn

in the appointment gave the Senate the information which they might possess with regard to the character and qualifications of the person in nomination; other members sometimes gave their opinions, and upon these statements the Senate relied. If the person was unknown to the Senate, the nomination was referred, as the most convenient mode of obtaining information. If charges were preferred, it was referred that the Committee might examine. In cases of re-nomination, where persons had the disbursement of public money, it was referred, in order to ascertain how the accounts stood. In cases of ministers, referrence has been sometimes made to the Committee of Foreign Relations, to enquire into the expediency of the mission. But no reference of a judicial appointment was recollected. He thought the innovation would introduce a very inconvenient practice.

On the report of the Committee, that it was inexpedient to act on the nomination of J. J. Crittenden, Mr. JOHNSTON rose in reply to Mr. BERRIEN.

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