SENATE.]

Report on the Polar Expedition.

[20th CONG. 2d Sess.

and twenty-two cents, (drawn from the funds appropriated by Congress for " the repairs of vessels in ordinary”) an amount which, most assuredly, could not have been necessary for the repair of a sloop of war destined for any ordinary service.

Provisions, peculiarly adapted to this service, have been ordered, (and, as the Committee understand, been purchased) at an expence of about three thousand dollars, drawn from the appropriations for " provisions" for the

navy.

A special agent has been employed to collect information for the guidance of this expedition," respecting the objects to be examined," at an expense of eleven hundred and sixteen dollars, which has been charged to the " contingent expenses" of the navy.

Seamen and others, peculiarly fitted to this particular service have been engaged, and, in short, every measure has been adopted, deemed necessary for the preparation of the expedition, and the Secretary has believed himself to be authorized to use the money necessary for these purposes. Before the explanations here received were furnished, it did not seem to the Committee to be susceptible of doubt or controversy, that, in preparing an exploring expedition of the character of that now under consideration, where no appropriation had been made for such an object, the necessary expenses could only have been discharged by "a transfer of appropriations."

It appears from the message of the President, as well as the report of the Secretary, at the opening of the session, that the expedition was considered as having already received a legal sanction, and that all preparatory measures had been adopted; and it was expressly stated by the Secretary, that a sufficient authority was conceived to be derived from this source to " justify the expenditure of the money."

is estimated at only thirty-three, while the number of such seamen usually employed in a single sloop of war is sixtytwo. There are many other items which seem to the Committee to be estimated too low, and making reasonable allowances for the extra expenses incident to all novel enterprises, the Committee should not be disposed to put down the whole cost of this expedition, supposing it to continue for three years, at less than four hundred thousand dollars. The Secretary of the Navy, however, sug. gests, that the repairs of the Peacock, as well as the expense of supporting her at sea, cannot properly be considered as chargeable to this expedition, inasmuch as she would be employed on other service, if not sent out on the exploring expedition. The Committee, however, cannot recognize the correctness of this view of the subject, because they cannot suppose that the Peacock, or any other vessel of war, would be rebuilt and put into commission, unless her services were actually required on some one of the cruising stations at which our ships are employed, for the protection of American commerce. Congress has certainly been, heretofore, induced to believe, that, in receiving estimates of the number of vessels to be kept in commission during the year, none were included which were not considered necessary to be employed on the different established stations abroad. The Peacock, therefore, if not sent on the exploring expedition, would certainly not be sent to the West Indies, or any where else, unless her services be necessary there, and if, notwithstanding such necessity, she shall be detached on a separate and distant service, her place must, of course, be supplied by some other vessel. The Peacock having been included as one of the sloops of war estimated for last year, by no means proves that she would have been repaired and employed during the present year, without any reference to the exploring expedition, inasmuch as it is understood that she was included in the es- Believing that the resolution relied on afforded no autimates of the preceding years, and yet she was not re- thority for fitting out an exploring expedition, or for applypaired or put in commission, simply, it is presumed, be- ing a cent of the public money towards any such object, cause her services were not found to be necessary. In the Committee had no hesitation in coming to the concluany view of the subject, however, it appears to the Com- sion, from the statement of the Secretary himself, that mitte that the true cost of the expedition to the United there has been, in some extent, at least, (though to what States must be the whole expense of preparing the vessels extent was unknown to them) an unauthorized application for sea, and supporting them while there, and that, to con- of the public funds, and after a careful examination of the sider the expense as consisting merely of the additional documents since submited, they are confirmed in the cost of such an expedition over an ordinary cruise, is a opinion. view of the subject altogether erroneous. By the same reasoning, it may be made to appear, that if, instead of purchasing vessels, we should build them at our own navy yards, and fit them out and support them in the usual way, the expedition would not cost the United States a single cent. The Committee will admit, however, that, so far as a vessel employed at any particular cruising station may be temporarily detached, without interfering with her ordinary duties as a cruising ship, this view of the subject may be supported, but it is wholly untenable when applied to an expedition entirely out of the course of ordinary service, and in no way connected with the protection of our commerce from the aggression of foreign Powers. The question of the true probable expense of such an expedition as that in contemplation of the Navy Department, is, however, one on which any member of the Senate can make his own calculations on the data now afforded by the documents submitted.

2. The measures which have been adopted for carrying the expedition into effect.

From the documents which accompany the late message of the President, on this subject, it appears that the Secretary of the Navy has considered the exploring expedition as sanctioned by the authority of the House of Representatives, and has therefore conceived himself authorized to apply the appropriations made for the navy to this object. The Peacock has, accordingly, been repaired, at an expen diture of eighty-one thousand seven hundred ninety dollars

They believe it to be susceptible of the clearest proof, and, consequently, that the President, as well as the Secretary, are mistaken, when they say, that "no transfer, from the different heads of appropriation for the support of the navy, to this object, have been made." If, by the "transfer of appropriations," it is to be understood that money has been drawn from one head of appropriation and applied to another, (as, for instance, that moneys apppopriated for "repairs" have been applied to "provisions") then, indeed, it may be contended that no such transfers have been made in the case; but, if the application of money, appropriated for one purpose, to another and a different purpose; if the application of money appropriated for the "repairs," "provisions," &c. of the navy, towards an exploring expedition not sanctioned by law; if the use of money appropriated for the

contingent expenses of the navy," towards the payment of a special agent, employed in collecting information for an exploring expedition, are to be considered as "transfers of appropriations," then such transfers have certainly been made. But the Committee do not desire to engage in verbal criticisms, nor to take a merely technical view of this matter. The substantial objection to the proceeding arises out of the fact that, without any lawful sanction having been given by Congress to an exploring expedition, of any description, and without the appropriation of a single dollar to any such object, such an expedition has been organized, and an unlimited discretion has been

20th CONG. 2d SESS.]

Documents relative to the Panama Mission.

used in applying the public money towards it, just as if the bill which failed last year, and is now again before Congress, had actually passed both Houses, been approved by the President, and become a law. Neither the amount applied to this object, nor the motives which may have induced the application, form any part of the considerations which have caused the Committee to express their decided disapprobation of a proceeding which they believe to be of dangerous tendency, and at variance with the principles which ought to control the appropriation and expenditure of the public money. Nor does it make any difference, in principle, that a large portion of these expenditures have been made on objects which may hereafter be converted to the use of the navy, should the expedition not receive the sanction of Congress. But it is not denied that a portion of these expenditures has been applied to objects not necessary for the ordinary service of the navy, and wholly inapplicable to that service. The Peacock has been fitted out in a manner different from, and at a cost greatly beyond, what would have been necessary in preparing her for an ordinary cruise. We are expressly informed that, among other things, a "temporary spar deck" has been provided, at an expense of nineteen hundred and forty-three dollars and twenty-one cents, which will have to be removed before she can again be used as a cruising ship. The compensation of the agent, and many other expenses, (some of which are given by the Secretary in paper D, amounting to five thousand and fifty-nine dollars and twenty-one cents) are clearly of this character; and it appears to the Committee that, whether the amount expended without authority be great or small, the proceeding is equally objectionable in principle, and equally sustains the view they have heretofore taken of this subject. The Committee forbear to press this branch of the subject further.

[Sen. and H. of R.

own proceeding, do not require the sanction of the other. But when, as in the case before us, the question was one involving delicate and interesting considerations of national policy, requiring large expenditures of money, it is too obvious to admit of argument, or to need illustration, that such a resolution could have no binding force or efficacy whatever. The Committee will not enlarge on the importance of preserving to each branch of the National Legislature, as well as to the Executive, all the powers conferred by the constitution, in order to enable them to serve as checks upon each other. They know of no practice which would be more mischievous in its effects than that either branch of Congress should be induced to avoid the delay and difficulty of passing laws on important subjects, by substituting the resolutions of one House; a practice that would become extremely dangerous, if such resolutions should ever come to be considered as affording a warrant to Executive officers to apply the public money to the purposes designated by such resolutions.

The Committee deem it unnecessary, on the present occasion, to do more than merely to bring this subject to the notice of the Senate. They have no reason to doubt that, in adopting the resolution of the House of Representatives, in relation to an exploring expedition, as an authority for his acts, the Secretary of the Navy believed himself to be fully justified by the resolution itself, and that he was actuated by an ardent desire to promote an enterprise which he supposed would be conducive to the welfare and honor of the country. And the Committee are well satisfied that this expression of a different opinion, on their part, calling the attention of Congress and of the Departments to this subject, will be sufficient to prevent the recurrence of any similar transaction.

Documents in relation to the Panama Mission. To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

[The statements appended to this report, like those apThe only remaining part to which they would call the pended to the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, on the attention of the Senate is, the authority under which the same subject, are omitted, because their substance is supNavy Department has proceeded in preparing and organ-posed to be sufficiently embodied in the report itself.] izing the expedition. The Secretary of the Navy refers to a resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 21st of May, 1828, and relies upon it as the command to be obeyed," and "the authority to justify the expenditure of the money," &c. Before this resolution was adopted, viz: on the 25th of March, 1828, a bill had been reported by the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives, authorizing the President to prepare and send out an exploring expedition, and appropriating fifty thousand dollars for that object. This bill, for some cause unknown to your Committee, not having been acted on by the House, the resolution above mentioned was proposed, and adopted, a day or two only before the close of the session, but it was not sent to the Senate, nor presented to the President for his approbation.

I transmit herewith to Congress a copy of the instructions prepared by the Secretary of State, and furnished to the minister of the United States appointed to attend to the assembly of American plenipotentiaries, first held at Panama, and thence transferred to Tacubaya. The occasion for which they were given has passed away, and there is no present probability of the renewal of those negotiations; but the purpose for which they were intended are still of the deepest interest to our country and to the of the Government of the United States. The motive for world, and may hereafter call again for the active energies The failure of the bill which had been introduced for withholding them from general publication having ceased, the express purpose of giving the sanction of the Legisla-justice to the Government from which they emanated, and to the people for whose benefit it was instituted, require ture to an expedition (justly considered to involve high that they should be made known. With this view, and considerations of public policy) obviously put an end, for from the consideration that the subjects embraced by that session, at least, to the whole scheme, nor will any those instructions must probably engage hereafter the one pretend that a simple resolution adopted by one consideration of our successors, I deem it proper to make branch of the Legislature could give a lawful sanction to this communication to both Houses of Congress. One any object depending on the legislative will, much less that it could justify the use of the public money for carry- the Senate, requesting that it may be transmitted also to copy only of the instructions being prepared, I send it to ing it into effect. The seventh section of the first article the House of Representatives. of the constitution is perfectly explicit on this subject, and requires the same sanctions to every "order, resolution, or vote," of the two Houses, which are requisite to give validity to the most important laws In both cases, they must be agreed to by the Senate and House of Representatives, be presented to the President of the United States, and be approved of by him, before they can take effect. The only known exception to this rule is in favor of orders or resolutions which concern the separate action of each House, and which, like the rule of its

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

WASHINGTON, 3d March, 1829.

INSTRUCTIONS-GENERAL.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, 8th May, 1826. GENTLEMEN: The relations in which the United States stand to the other American Powers, and the duties, interests, and sympathies, which belong to those relations,

Sen. and H. of K.]

Documents relative to the Panama Mission.

[20th CONG. 2d SESS.

a minority to agreements and acts contrary to its will, by the mere circumstance of the concurrence of a majority of the States in those agreements and acts. Each State will, consequently, be governed and left free, according to its own sense of its particular interests. All notion is rejected of an Amphictyonic council, invested with power finally to decide controversies between the American States, or to regulate, in any respect, their conduct. Such a council might have been well enough adapted to a number of small, contracted States, whose united territory would fall short of the extent of that of the smallest of the American Powers The complicated and various interests which appertain to the nations of this vast continent, cannot be safely confided to the superintendence of one legislative authority. We should almost as soon expect to see an Amphictyonic council to regulate the affairs of the whole globe. But even if it were desirable to establish such a tribunal, it is beyond the competency of the Government of the United States voluntarily to assent to it, without a previous change of their actual constitution

have determined the President to accept an invitation which has been given by the republics of Colombia, Mexico, and Central America, to the United States, to send representatives to the Congress at Panama. He could not, indeed, have declined an invitation proceeding from sources so highly respectable, and communicated in the most delicate and respectful manner, without subjecting the United States to the reproach of insensibility to the deepest concerns of the American hemisphere, and, perhaps, to a want of sincerity in most important declarations, solemnly made by his predecessor, in the face of the old and the new world. In yielding, therefore, to the friendly wishes of those three republics, communicated in the notes of their respective ministers at Washington, of which copies are herewith, the United States act in perfect consistency with all their previous conduct and professions, in respect to the new American States. The assembling of a Congress at Panama, composed of diplomatic representatives from independent American nations, will form a new epoch in human affairs The fact itself, whatever may be the issue of the conferences of such a Congress, cannot fail to challenge the attention of the present generation of the civilized world, and to command that of posterity. But the hope is confidently indulged, that it will have other and stronger claims upon the regard of mankind, than any which arise out of the mere circumstance of its novelty; and that it will entitle itself to the affection and lasting gratitude of all America, by the wisdom and liberality of its principles, and by the new gua-With this necessary and indispensable restriction upon rantees it may create for the great interests which will engage its deliberations. On an occasion so highly important and responsible, the President has been desirous that the representation from the United States should be composed of distinguished citizens. Confiding in your zeal, ability, and patriotism, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, he has selected you for this interesting service. And it is his wish that you should proceed, with all practicable despatch, to Panama. (For the purpose of carrying out Mr. Sergeant, the United States' ship Lexington has been prepared, and is now ready to sail from the port of New York, to Porto Bello. Mr. Anderson, having been notified of his appointment, has been directed to leave the affairs of the United States at Bogota in the charge of such person as he may, for that purpose, designate, and to join Mr. Sergeant at Porto Bello, from whence it is supposed that it will be most convenient to proceed, by land, across the isthmus to Panama. Ministers from several of the Powers have, probably, by this time, reached that place, and they may even have proceeded to a comparison of their respective credentials, and to conferences on some of the objects of the congress, but it is probable they will have deferred, until your arrival, a consideration of those deliberations on which it was expected that we should take part.

Although the speculation of such a council has been sometimes made, and associated in the public papers with the contemplated Congress, we can hardly anticipate that it will be seriously pressed by any of the Powers. The congresses which have been so common in Europe, especially within these later times, have been altogether diplomatic, and, consequently, the States whose ministers composed them, were only bound by their signatures. the action of the Congress, great advantages may, nevertheless, be derived from an assembly, at the same time and place, of ministers from all the American nations. Such an assembly will afford great facilities for free and friendly conferences, for mutual and necessary explanations, and for discussing and establishing some general principles, applicable to peace and war, to commerce and navigation, with the sanction of all America. Treaties may be concluded, in the course of a few months, at such a congress, laying the foundations of lasting amity and good neighborhood, which it would require many years to consummate, if, indeed, they would be at all practicable, by separate and successive negotiations, conducted between the several Powers, at different times and places. Keeping constantly in view the essential character and object of the Congress, which have been described, it is very important in what manner its conferences and discussions may be regulated.

Experience has, perhaps, sufficiently established, that, for precision, for safety to the negotiators themselves, and for an early practical result, it is wisest to proceed by protocol, in which the mutual propositions of the parties, together with such concise observations as any of them desire to have preserved, are carefully recorded. But you are left free to agree to that mode of proceeding, with the indispensable limitation before stated, which, under all circumstances, shall appear to you most advisable. Your power conveys an authority to treat with all or any of the nations represented at the Congress, of any of the subjects comprised in your instructions. And on those, especially, of commerce and navigation, maritime law, and neutral and belligerent rights, it is the President's wish that, if those interests cannot be adjusted satisfactorily to all the attending Powers, you should form, nevertheless, treaties with such as may be disposed to conclude them with you. But, in the conduct of any such separate negotiations, you will carefully avoid giving any occasion of offence to those Powers who may decline treat

Your power, accompanying this letter, is joint and several, authorizing you to confer and treat with ministers, 'also duly authorized, from all or any of the American Powers, of peace, friendship, commerce, navigation, maritime law, neutral and belligerent rights, and other matters interesting to the continent of America. After the mutual exchange of powers, it will be necessary to determine the forms of deliberation, and the modes of proceeding, of the Congress. It is distinctly understood by the President, that it is to be regarded, in all respects, as diplomatic, in contradistinction to a body clothed with powers of ordinary legislation; that is to say, no one of the States represented is to be considered bound by any treaty, convention, pact, or act, to which it does not sub-ing; and, if you should have strong reason to believe that scribe, and expressly assent by its acting representative; and that, in the instance of treaties, conventions, and pacts, they are to be returned, for final ratification, to each contracting State, according to the provisions of its particular constitution. All idea is, therefore, excluded, of binding

the fact itself, of opening such separate negotiations, would have the tendency of creating unfriendly feelings and relations with other American Powers, you will decline entering on them altogether. You are also authorized to agree upon a transfer of the conferences from Pa

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Documents relative to the Panama Mission.

[Sen. and H. of R.

at a distance from their borders: for it cannot be doubted that the presumptuous spirit which would have impelled Europe upon the other American republics, in aid of Spain, or on account of the forms of their political institutions, would not have been appeased, if her arms, in such an unrighteous contest, should have been successful, until they were extended here, and every vestige of human freedom had been obliterated within these States.

There was a time when such designs were seriously ap

nama to any other place on the American continent that may be considered more eligible for conducting them. In now proceeding to direct your attention particularly to the instructions of the President, by which, after having settled the preliminary point to which I have just adverted, you will govern yourselves, the first observation to be made is, that, in acceding to the invitation which has been accepted, no intention has been entertained to change the present pacific and neutral policy of the United States. On the contrary, it has been distinct-prehended; and it is believed that the declaration of the ly understood by the three republics who gave the invitation, and has been enforced on our part, in all our communications with them in regard to it, that the United States would strictly adhere to that policy, and mean faithfully to perform all their neutral obligations. Whilst the existing war is limited to the present parties, it is as unnecessary as it would be unwise, in the United States, to become a belligerent. A state of things can hardly be imagined, in which they would voluntarily take part on the side of Spain; and on that of the republics it would be entirely useless, since they have been all along able, unaided, triumphantly to maintain their cause, and to conquer the arms, if they have not overcome the obstinacy, of Spain. By maintaining the neutral position which the United States have assumed, they have been enabled to hold strong language to Europe, and successfully to check any disposition which existed there to assist Spain in the re-conquest of the colonies. If they had departed from their neutrality, and precipitated themselves into the war, there was much reason to apprehend that their exertions might have been neutralized, if not overbalanced, by those of other Powers, who would have been drawn, by that rash example, into the war, in behalf of Spain. Keeping, therefore, constantly in view the settled pacific policy of the United States, and the duties which flow from their neutrality, the subjects will now be particularized, which, it is anticipated, will engage the consideration of the Congress at Panama.

These subjects may be arranged under two general heads: 1st. Such as relate to the future prosecution of the present war with Spain, by the combined or separate operation of the American belligerents. And, 2d. Those in which all the nations of America, whether neutral or belligerent, may have an interest.

late President to the Congress of the United States, which has been already referred to, had a powerful effect in disconcerting and arresting their progress. About the same period, Great Britain manifested a determination to pursue the same policy, in regard to the new republics, which the United States had previously marked out for themselves. After these two great maritime Powers, Great Britain and the United States, had let continental Europe know that they would not see with indifference any forcible interposition in behalf of Old Spain, it was evident that no such interposition would, or, with any prospect of success, could, be afforded. Accordingly, since that period, there have been no intimations of any designs on the part of the European alliance against the new American republics. If that alliance has seen, with any dissatisfaction, (as may be well imagined) the successful progress of those republics, both in the war and in the establishment of their free political systems, they have confined themselves to silent and unavailing regrets.

The auspicious course of events has not only occasioned the abandonment of any hostile intentions which were entertained, if such were ever entertained by the European alliance, but there is strong reason to hope that it has led to the creation of pacific, if not friendly, views towards our sister republics. Upon the entry of the President of the United States on the duties of his present office, his attention was anxiously directed to, and has been since unre/mittingly employed on, the object of establishing peace between Spain and those republics. In considering the means for its accomplishment, no very sanguine hope was indulged from an approach to Spain directly, and it was thought best to endeavor to operate on her through that alliance on whose countenance and support she mainly relied for the recovery of the colonies. Russia was known to be the soul of that alliance, and to the Emperor, of whose wisdom and friendship the United States had so many proofs, the appeal was at once made. A copy of the note from this Department to the American minister at St. Petersburg, on that subject, accompanies these instructions Copies of it were transmitted, cotemporaneously, to the courts of London and Paris, whose co-operation in the work of peace was also invited. Our minister at Madrid was instructed to lose no fit occasion there for creating or strengthening a disposition towards peace. The hope was cherished that, by a general and concerted movement of the United States and the great Powers of Europe, at the same time, the councils of Spain might be prevailed upon to accede to a peace, which had become more necessary, if possible, to her, than to the new republics. An answer has been lately received here from St. Petersburg, through Mr. Middleton, a copy of which, together with copies of his accompanying notes, is placed in your hands. From a perusal of these documents, the contents of which have been confirmed by the Russian minister, in official interviews which I have had with him, you will perceive that the appeal to Russia has not been without effect; and that the late Emperor, sensible of the necessity of peace, prior to his death, probably employed his good offices to bring it about. His successor has formally announced his intention to tread in the path of his illustrious predecessor; and it is, therefore, most likely that he will also direct the influence of that Government to the conclusion of a peace satisfactory to both parties. It is possible that these efforts

In respect to the first, for reasons already stated, we can take no part. Discussions of them must be confined to the parties to the war. You will refrain from engaging in them. You will not be expected or desired to do so. But, whilst it has been perfectly understood that the United States could not, at the Congress, jeopard their neutrality, they may be urged to contract an alliance, offensive and defensive, on the contingency of an attempt by the Powers of Europe, commonly called the Holy Alliance, either to aid Spain to reduce the new American republics to their ancient colonial state, or to compel them to adopt political systems more conformable to the policy and views of that alliance. Upon the supposition of such an attempt being actually made, there can be no doubt what it would be the interest and bounden duty of the United States to do. Their late Chief Magistrate solemnly declared what, in that event, he considered they ought to do. The people of the United States acquiesced in the declaration, and their present Chief Magistrate entirely concurs in it. If, indeed, the Powers of continental Europe could have allowed themselves to engage in the war, for either of the purposes just indicated, the United States, in opposing them with their whole force, would have been hardly entitled to the merit of acting on the impulse of a generous sympathy with infant, oppressed, and struggling nations. The United States, in the contingencies which have been stated, would have been compelled to fight their own proper battles, not less so because the storm of war happened to range on another part of this continent,

Documents relative to the Panama Mission.