"Q. Have you ever talked with any one who was present at the Haymarket at the time the bomb was thrown? A, No, sir.

Q. Have you ever talked with any one who professed, of his own knowledge, to know anything about the connoction of the defendants with the throwing of that bomb? A. No.

"Q. Have you ever said to any one whether or not you believed the statements of facts in the newspapers to be true? A. I have never expressed it exactly in that way, but still I have no reason to think they were false. "Q. Well, the question is not what your opinion of that was. The question simply is-it is a question made necessary by our statute, perhaps A. Well, I don't recall whether I have or not.

"Q. So far as you know, then, you never have? A. No, sir.

"Q. Do you believe that if taken as a juror you can try this case fairly and impartially, and render a verdict upon the law and the evidence? A. Yes."

At this stage of the examination the court remarked in reply to some suggestion of counsel as follows:

"The COURT. The defendants having challenged for cause, which is overruled, can, of course, stand where they are without saying anything more; but the effect of that, in my judgment, is that they accept the juror because they can't help themselves. They have got no peremptory challenge; the challenge for cause is overruled, and, necessarily, the question now is for the State to say whether they will accept this juror or not. The common law is that all jurors not challenged, or to whom the challenge is not sustained, are the jurors to try the case. If they are not challenged for a cause which is sustained, and if they are not challenged peremptorily, then they are necessarily the jury to try the case. Now, in this instance, the defendants have no more peremptory challenges, and the challenge which they have made for cause is overruled; therefore, so far as the defendants are concerned, he is a juror to try the case."

This was accepted by both parties as a true statement of the then condition of the case, and after some further examination of the juror, which elicited nothing of importance in connection with the present inquiry, no peremptory challenge having been interposed by the State, Sanford was sworn as a juror, and the panel was then complete.

This, so far as we have been advised, presents all there is in the record which this court can consider touching the challenges of these two jurors by the defendants for cause.

In Reynolds v. The United States, 93 U. S. 145, 156, we said, "that upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by" a challenge to a juror in a criminal case on the ground that he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the issues to be tried, "the court will practically be called upon to determine whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily

to raise the presumption of partiality. The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried, as far as the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character, upon the evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court unless the error is manifest. It must be made clearly to appear that upon the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed impartial. The case must be one in which it is manifest the law left nothing to the 'conscience or discretion' of the court." If such is the degree of strictness which is required in the ordinary cases of writs of error from one court to another in the same general jurisdiction, it certainly ought not to be relaxed in a case where, as in this, the ground relied on for the reversal by this court of a judgment of the highest court of the State is, that the error complained of is so gross as to amount in law to a denial by the State of a trial by an impartial jury to one who is accused of crime. We are unhesitatingly of opinion that no such case is disclosed by this record,

We come now to consider the objection that the defendant Spies was compelled by the court to be a witness against himself. He voluntarily offered himself as a witness in his own behalf, and by so doing he became bound to submit to a proper cross-examination under the law and practice in the jurisdiction where he was being tried. The complaint is, that he was required on cross-examination to state whether he had received a certain letter, which was shown, purporting to have been written by Johann Most, and addressed to him, and upon his saying that he had, the court allowed the letter to be read in evidence against him. This, it is claimed, was not proper cross-examination. It is not contended that the subject to which the crossexamination related was not pertinent to the issue to be tried, and whether a cross-examination must be confined to matters pertinent to the testimony-in-chief, or may be extended to the matters in issue, is certainly a question of State law as administered in the courts of the State, and not of Federal law.

Something was said in argument about an alleged unreasonable search and seizure of the papers and property of some of the defendants, and their use in evidence on the trial of the

Special reference is made in this connection to the letter of Most about which Spies was cross-examined; but we have not been referred to any part of the record in which it appears that objection was made to the use of this evidence on that account. And upon this point the Supreme Court of the State, in that part of its opinion which has been printed with the motion papers, remarks as follows:

"The objection that the letter was obtained from the defendant by an unlawful seizure is made for the first time in this court. It was not made on the trial in the court below. Such an objection as this, which is not suggested by the nature of the offered evidence, but depends upon the proof of an outside fact, should have been made on the trial. The defence should have proved that the Most letter was one of the letters illegally seized by the police and should then have moved to exclude or oppose its admission on the ground that it was obtained by such illegal seizure. This was not done, and therefore we cannot consider the constitutional question supposed to be involved."

Even if the court was wrong in saying that it did not appear that the Most letter was one of the papers illegally seized, it still remains uncontradicted that objection was not made in the trial court to its admission on that account. To give us jurisdiction under § 709 of the Revised Statutes because of the denial by a State court of any title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of the United States, it must appear on the record that such title, right, privilege, or immunity was "specially set up or claimed" at the proper time and in the proper way. To be reviewable here the decision must be against the right so set up or claimed. As the Supreme Court of the State was reviewing the decision of the trial court, it must appear that the claim was made in that court, because the Supreme Court was only authorized to review the judgment for errors committed there, and we can do no more. This is not, as seems to be supposed by one of the counsel for the petitioners, a question of the waiver of a right under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, but a question of claim. If the right was set up or claimed in the proper court below the judgment of the highest court of the State in the action is conclusive, so far as the right of review here is

concerned. The question whether the letter, if obtained in the manner alleged, would have been competent evidence is not before us, and, therefore, no foundation is laid under this objection for the exercise of our jurisdiction.

As to the suggestion by counsel for the petitioners Spies and Fielden-Spies having been born in Germany and Fielden in Great Britain-that they have been denied by the decision of the court below rights guaranteed to them by treaties between the United States and their respective countries, it is sufficient to say that no such questions were made and decided in either of the courts below, and they cannot be raised in this court for the first time. Besides, we have not been referred to any treaty, neither are we aware of any, under which such a question could be raised.

The objection that the defendants were not actually present in the Supreme Court of the State at the time sentence was pronounced cannot be made on the record as it now stands, because on its face it shows that they were present. If this is not in accordance with the fact, the record must be corrected below, not here. It will be time enough to consider whether the objection presents a Federal question when the correction has been made.

Being of opinion, therefore, that the Federal questions presented by the counsel for the petitioners, and which they say they desire to argue, are not involved in the determination of the case as it appears on the face of the record, we deny the writ. Petition for writ of error is dismissed.

The application made in this particular case was a last desperate attempt, so far as the courts of justice were concerned, to save the condemned anarchists from their well merited doom. The application to the Supreme Court of the United States failed, as almost every lawyer supposed would be the case. It is difficult to believe that the lawyers who made the application ever could have had any very great confidence that it would turn out otherwise; the truth of the matter being that there was really no

serious ground justifying the application. Before considering the legal points involved a brief reference to the facts of the case may prove of in

terest.

History of the Case.—On the night of Tuesday, May 4, 1886, the anarchists of Chicago were holding a meeting in Haymarket Square, in that city, when the police ordered the crowd to quietly and peaceably disperse. One of the anarchists thereupon flung a bomb into the first r. nk of the police, while others of the