(4.) The doctrine of the unsuccessive existence of the DEITY reinoves also some of the difficulty from the subject of prescience. That the DEITY possesses, in an unlimited degree, what we, speaking with relation to ourselves, call foreknowledge, is very generally agreed. All the events that lie hid in the unfathomable depths of eternity, where human thought attempts in vain to penetrate, are perfectly known to Him. Admit that they are present with Him; or that He, through His mysterious mode of existence, is present with them ;-admit that His acquaintance with them is knowledge, and not, as it is to us, foreknowledge; -then the difficulty is considerably lessened. We venture to assert, that it is not so incomprehensible, that GoD should be present with things which to us are future, as it is, that not being present to them, but having literally foreknowledge of them, He should know them perfectly. For how stands the case with those who look upon the existence of GOD as successive? Must they not repre. sent Him as looking forward, like themselves;-as waiting for the coming of future events;-as obtaining foreknowledge by connecting the future with that which precedes, and thus arriving at the result? Must they not represent Him as never stationary nor permanent, but, from the present instant, as from a point of view, looking along the line of coming events, and ascertaining future contingencies by a consideration of their causes ;-which causes, be it observed, (or even the causes of those causes,) will not yet exist for ages to come? There are many minds that will hesitate before they thus represent the mode of the Divine Prescience as being so exactly similar to that of man. Yet to this we are reduced by the doctrine of the successive existence of GOD. Upon the whole, we are disposed to come to this conclusion,-willing, at the same time, to receive clearer light on the subject,-that the ancient way of stating this point is attended with the least difficulties ;-and that, of two hypotheses, both of which are somewhat obscure, greater light seems to dawn from that which says, that "the DEITY exists in an eternal now." D. W. WE insert the above as an innocent, and not uninteresting speculation. Many divines have used the phrase, au eternal now, rhetorically; but few of them, we believe, have made it an opinion. Our Correspondent is correct in considering it as speculative; and if we are taught humility by our demonstrated incapability to grasp the Infinite," the only thing which, after all, such speculations do demonstrate, an important moral purpose is accomplished, D. W.'s motto is rather ad captandum; but it leaves the point untouched. He imagines that there is an essential difference between the duration we ought to ascribe to Gop, and that which we ascribe to creatures; and his motto assumes that creatures do in no instance shadow forth the nature and properties of their CREATOR. If this be universally true, then man was not made, in any sense, in "the image of Gon; and retains no traces of that image in his spirituality, knowledge, &c.; if it be not universally true, it may not be true of duration, the point in question. D. W. seems to quote two passages of Scripture in proof of the doctrine of the eternal now of the Divine existence, neither of which can, in the least, serve his purpose. The phrase to "inhabit eternity," is manifestly rhetorical; and, if understood literally, it no more proves that the Divinity fills eternity, in the sense D. W. contends for, than that one who “ inhabits” a house, should necessarily fill every part of it with his bodily presence." One day is with the LORD as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day," clearly refers not to the mode of the Divine existence, but to the accomplishment of the Divine purposes. If it referred to the duration of GOD, it would lie against the doctrine of the standing now. Days and years are, in that passage, associated with the divine duration, and are equalled, not annihilated. But the "eternal now" annihilates them; and they can only be reduced to a comparative equality, the kind of equality intended, by comparing both with an eternal succession:-for that only makes a day and a thousand years equal, without destroying the distinction between them. D. W.'s argument from the Ubiquity of GOD, is a spurious one. It is, in substance," That we cannot urge it against the doctrine of the unsuccessive existence' of the DEITY; that this is a mode of existence of which we know nothing by experience, and therefore that we cannot couceive of it: because there is great difficulty in conceiving how God can be present to all places at the same time." Now if the argument had been rightly stated, its fallacy would have been apparent. It should have been, "That it is no objection to unsuccessive duration, that we know nothing of such a mode of duration by experience, and cannot, therefore, conceive it; because we admit the doctrine of the Divine Ubiquity, though we know nothing of such a property by experience; and of that, therefore, can conceive as little." The ground, however, on which we admit omnipresence, is the explicit testimony of GOD in his word, that this is an attribute of his nature; but he has no where said, that in like manner as he is present to all space, he is present to every point in eternity; and, there fore, if the one were not more incomprehensible than the other, we should not be bound to withdraw the objection. But, further: It is not true that, to be present to more places than one at the same time, is a mode of existence of which we know absolutely as little by experience, as we know of unsuccessive existence. Of pluripresence, which is a great step in enabling us faintly to conceive of omnipresence, we have some knowledge by experience. We are ourselves present to a larger portion of space than an animalcule is, and to the several beings within that space at the same time. Omnipresence is an extension of this idea; but of a standing duration, that is, of a continual moment, a moment of a hun dred, or a thousand years, an eternal moment, or an eternal now, which means the same thing, we can form no conception, except that it contra dicts, not transcends our own experience. D. W.'s next argument is one of sentiment, not of "logic" it is a matter of feeling, that it better comports with our idea of infinite perfection, that the existence of DEITY should be unsuccessive, than that it should be said of GoD, that as to him "to-morrow is not yet arrived." Certainly to our minds, it no more derogates from infinite perfection to say, To-morrow is future to him, than to say, To-day is present to him. If there is no to-morrow with GoD, there is no to-day, and no yesterday; if no past or future, no present; and so the only light we get from such metaphysics is a plunge into palpable and total darkness, and by refining on the DEITY, we lose him altogether. The question is, whether in the reality of things there is a past, a present, and a future? and this question is answered by another, Is there order and succession in events themselves, is one action done, another doing, and a third to do? If so, the action done is included in our idea of past; the action doing, in our idea of present; the action to be done, in our idea of the future. Now we ask, whether we attach more "perfection" to the Divine Being, when we conceive him to exist in a manner which corresponds with the reality of things, than in a manner which contradicts them? Certainly, if there be neither past nor future with GOD, the reality of things (if we admit order and succession in them to be real and not delusive circumstances) is not apprehended by him; if his existence be an eternal now, ADAM, to him, is now eating the forbidden fruit, and he himself is, in his own perceptions, judging the quick and dead, and putting an end to the world and time. This, to us, appears much less like "infinite perfection," than the commonly received, and common-sense opinion. The perfection of GOD, as to the future, is, not that there is no future; but that he knows the future:-that the future, which to us is dark, is to Him all light; and that, not because he is present to the future,-an odd metaphysical fancy surely ;-but because he sees through it, and calls things D. W. argues, that the doctrine for which he contends, removes some difficulties from our conceptions of eternity. We are apt, however, to suspect these easy modes of conceiving of infinite subjects, as we suspect all "Royal roads " to learning. "Let any one attempt to conceive of a successive eternity." True; but whoever talked of a “suc cessive eternity?" which would be as absurd as an eternal moment. We speak of successive duration, and of limitless duration, as constituting eternity. But then, says D. W. "eternity, à parte ante,-what we are obliged to call past eternity,-will then admit of having applied to it our measures of days, and years, and ages. If then the question be asked, what is the number of days in eternity? the answer is, The number is infinite; of hours? The number is infinite. And so we fall into the absur'dity of making one infinity twentyfour times as great as another infinity." The whole of this is fallacious, as many of the dilemmas of scholastic logic are ;—a mere metaphysical mouse-trap. The fallacy lies in conceiving of an infinite number of days, and an infinite number of hours, as of definite quantities, to be compared, and to be greater or less than the other. But both being infinite in number, both are indefinite; and they are incapable of any comparison but between infinite and infinite, in which respect they are equal, and can only be equal. A day and an hour are unequal; a thousand days and a thousand hours are unequal; for being definite periods made up of unequal portions, when compared, the excess of one above the other appears in the comparison; but an infinite number of days and an infinite number of hours are equal periods, both being infinite, and no excess of the one above the other being possible, either in the nature of things, or in our conceptions. More or less can only be predicated of two finite things when compared, or of things, one finite and the other infi nite; but of things infinite nothing is more and nothing less; they are infinite, and therefore equal. But this is not the only way of escape from this supposed dilemma. D. W. states the case as though it were supposed that eternity were composed and made up of these definite periods of days and hours; whereas all that is meant, is, as he elsewhere says, "that our measures of duration may be applied to eternity, but only to aid our conceptions." No one supposes that eternity is made up of days and hours. That is duration prolonged without limit; but however we attempt to measure it, it is distinct from the measures themselves which we apply to it. If, therefore, there would be any contradiction in our speaking of it sometimes under the phrases, an infinite number of days, and an infinite number of hours, or of ages, the contradiction would be in our language merely, and proves no contradiction in our conception of the thing itself; that is, of the eternity of any being as consisting of duration, or continuance of being without any limit whatever. This answers also D. W.'s quotation from DWIGHT: no very profound man. We may in our own minds measure eternity, by conceiving of days, or hours, or ages, running on without limit; but we never conceive of eternity as actually made up of such portions. This distinction totally escapes D. W., and his authority, DR. DWIGHT. : D. W.'s fourth reason for preferring the doctrine of Gop being present to all eternity, as he is present to all space, is, that it makes his "prescience" less difficult to be conceived. That is, it destroys it. There is no such attribute as foreknowledge, if all things future to us are present to him; and that not figuratively if they are not present by foresight, by being seen at a distance; which is all that is meant by many Divines, who have used the same terms;-but present by a sort of physical extension of his nature throughout eternity; or else by the annihilation of the succession of events, so that it is always now. Whatever difficulties there may be in conceiving of foreknowledge, there is much greater in grasping either of these two monstrous absur dities. Physical extension may apply to space; but surely has no conceivable relation to time:-an hour broad, or a year deep, would sound oddly in common ears; and yet these phrases would express precisely the same notion, as Metaphysicians of the opinion in question convey by the doctrine, that GOD is present to all eternity; present to every future moment; present to every future event. If this physical extension of the Divine nature is not admitted, then to make future things present, and to bring them within the "standing now," succession and futurity must be denied, all things are doing, but are never done, aud never to be done! Now we confess, that we are much better content with the noble attribute of foreknowledge, with all its difficulties, than with these truly marvellous, but legitimate conclusions from the doctrine in question; and especially since we are sure that the Scriptures attribute foreknowledge to GOD in the commonlyreceived sense of that term among men, and never intimate that it is not foreknowledge of the future which they mean, but simple knowledge of things actually present. This is the worst effect of these speculations, that they so often lead to forced and culpable modes of interpreting Scripture, in compliment to a favourite theory. To strengthen his view, D. W. supposes that the advocates of successive duration must neces sarily conceive of the Divine prescience of future events, as inductive; that is, that it is good guessing; but he gives no instance of this being actually the opinion of any who hold duration to be successive, and no reason why they "must" sink into so gross a conception. There is no connexion between the one and the other. We may surely be allowed to hold that there is a real and exact foreknowledge in Gon, without being called to annihilate it, either by the notion of the nunc stans, or by attributing to our MAKER the imperfections of a creature. D. W. concludes by thinking that "the ancient way of stating this point" is to be preferred. He, however, mistakes its antiquity, The" nunc stans," is not the ancient, but the modern doctrine; a refinement of late date, never adopted by the common sense or assent of Theologians, and chiefly employed to serve a purpose in the Calvinistic controversy; for which it was always unnecessary. It is the plain, scriptural, common-sense view of those subjects, as far as they are revealed, which we wish to maintain among our readers; certain, as we trust we have made it appear, that we escape no difficulty, and gain no light by departing from it. In poetry, and very incidentally in the writings of some eminent men, such phrases may be found, as those which D. W. and a few others have converted into sober opinion; but for the notion of the extension of DEITY to every point in eternity, there is almost as little support from authority as there is from reason. KINGSWOOD AND WOODHOUSE-GROVE SCHOOLS. To the Editor of the Wesleyan-Methodist I HAVE lived in the world about thirty years, nearly fifteen of which I have had my name amongst the Wesleyan-Methodists: but though I have attended many Quarterly Meetings, and have been at the making of several collections for the Kingswood and Woodhouse-Grove Schools, I never knew, till I read the piece by your Correspondent Z, inserted in the last Number of your Magazine, that our Preachers gave any thing out of their allowance to wards the support of those. Institutions. I am sure that this might be prevented in future, if the matter were candidly laid before our people: but it has been, I think, treated with some neglect by the Preachers themselves, in seldom or never employing a stranger to preach when the collection was to be made, and in not being sufficiently active in their endeavours to obtain regular subscriptions. In the Circuit where I reside, I think there are not six subscribers; the reason of which must be, that others are not solicited; though I allow, there are some who do not consider, that what they give is only lent, and that the LORD to whom they lend it, will pay them again, even in this life. For my part, I always looked upon what I gave to the cause of GOD in this light; for which reason I have, in my youthful days, often borrowed money to give away, believing that GOD would give me time and strength to labour with my hands to pay it again: and he always did. On two occasions I have borrowed a pound, with nothing to pay it but my work. But the LORD saved me more at one time, a few weeks past, than ever I gave in all my life, in preserving my dear little child, when neither I nor my wife could save it. We had the affliction of seeing it thrown down by a horse, and another horse and large cart go over it. In great distress I took it up, thankful that its life was spared; but expected that its bones were broken, and that the accident would cost me twenty or thirty pounds, besides many a painful hour. But what were my surprise and joy when I found that it would not cost me a sixpence, as the child had received no hurt, except a small bruise! O how did I feel my littleness of love to GOD, and the greatness of his love to me! I am determined to love him more, and to give more to his cause; remembering that the LORD loveth a cheerful giver. I hope, Sir, we, as a body of professing Christians, shall be more diligent in putting our shoulders to the ark of GOD, and shall help it forward with all our might; and especially that we shall use means to pay off the Three Thousand Pounds, to the amount of which the Schools are in debt. It will be but a small sum amongst us all. Set a Subscription on foot, and I will pay my part, and the part of twenty more; for I love to have the cause of GoD out of debt. ON A DIVINE CALL TO THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY. To the Editor of the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine. ON few subjects have the Wesleyan-Methodists laid greater stress, than on that to which the subjoined extract refers. They have always considered it to be the work of the HOLY GHOST to make men Overseers in the Christian Church; and, in their regular examinations of Candidates for the ministry among them, they have laid this down as a principle from which they are never to depart. It is well known, that in the Ordinatión-Service of the Church of England, the same truth is distinctly recognized; the first question proposed to the candidates who offer themselves being,-"Do you trust that you are inwardly moved by the HOLY GHOST, to take upon you this office and ministration, to serve God for the promoting of his glory, and the edifying of his people?" BISHOP JEWELL, the learned Apologist of the English Church, has, in his Exposition of the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, (ch. ii. ver. 4,) recorded his sentiments very pointedly on this important subject. His lan S. guage illustrates the question just cited, and clearly shows, that the doctrine of an "inward call " to the ministry, too frequently derided in modern times, is yet a doctrine of the Established Church; and that the opinion of the Methodists on this subject, is no more enthusiastic than that of BISHOP JEWELL, and the Authors of the Ordination-Service. Oxford. G. C. "The Apostle saith, he was allowed of GOD. They that enter into the Ministry must be allowed, not of men only, but of God. Therefore, whosoever taketh that charge over the people, must look narrowly into himself, and see whether his calling be of GOD. If he have not a testimony that God hath called him inwardly, all other outward calling is to small purpose. He will say to the conscience, and to the heart of such a one, Friend, how camest thoa in hither without thy wedding garment? Who brought thee in ? Give an account of thy stewardship. Thine account is great."" |