peaceful, and secure. The example of England is her great, indeed her only authority; but we are afraid that she has run the parallel with more boldness than circumspection, and overlooked a variety of particulars in our case, to which she could not easily find any thing equivalent in that of her country. It might be invidious to dwell much on the opposite character and temper of the two nations; though it is no answer to say, that this character is the work of the government. But can Mad. de S. have forgotten, that England had a Parliament and a representative legislature for 500 years before 1648; and that it was by that organ, and the widely spread and deeply founded machinery of the elections on which it rested, that the struggle was made, and the victory won, which ultimately secured to us the blessings of political freedom? The least reflection upon the nature of government, and the true foundations of all liberty, will show what an immense advantage this was in the contest; and with what formidable obstacles those must have to struggle, who are obliged to engage in a similar conflict without it.

All political power, even the most despotic, rests at last, as was profoundly observed by Hume, upon Opinion. A government is just, or otherwise, according as it promotes, more or less, the true interests of the people who live under it. But it is stable and secure, exactly as it is directed by the opinion of those who really possess, and know that they possess, the power of enforcing it, and upon whose opinion, therefore, it constantly depends; that is, in a military despotism, on the opinion of the Soldiery;-in all rude and ignorant communities, on the opinion of those who monopolize the intelligence, the wealth, or the discipline which constitute power-the Priesthood-the landed proprietors-the armed and inured to war;-and, in civilized societies, on the opinion of that larger proportion of the people who can bring their joint talents, wealth and strength, to act in concert when occasion requires. A government may indeed subsist for a time, although opposed to the opinion of those classes of persons; but its existence must always be precarious, and it probably will not subsist long. The natural and appropriate Constitution, therefore, is, in every case, that which enables those who actually administer the government, to ascertain and conform themselves in time to the opinion of those who have the power to overturn it; and no government whatever can possibly be secure where there are no arrangements for this purpose. Thus it is plainly for want of a proper Despotic Constitution-for want of a regular and safe way of getting at the opinions of their Armies, that the Sultans and other Asiatic sovereigns are so frequently beheaded by their janissaries or insurgent soldiery: and, in like manner, it was for want of a proper

Feudal Constitution, that, in the decline of that system, the king was so often dethroned by his rebellious Barons, or excommunicated by an usurping Priesthood. In more advanced times, there is the same necessity of conforming to the prevailing opinion of those more extended and diversified descriptions of persons in whom the power of enforcing and resisting has come to reside; and the natural and only safe constitution for such soeieties, must therefore embrace a Representative assembly. A government may no doubt go on, in opposition to the opinion of this virtual aristocracy, for a long time after it has come into existence. For it is not enough that there is wealth, and intelligence, and individual influence enough in a community to overbear all pretensions opposed to them. It is necessary that the possessors of this virtual power should be aware of their own numbers, and of the conformity of their sentiments or views; and it is very late in the progress of society before the means of communication are so multiplied and improved, as to render this practicable in any tolerable degree. Trade and the press, however, have now greatly facilitated these communications; and in all the central countries of Europe, they probably exist in a degree quite sufficient to give one of the parties, at least, very decided impressions both as to its interests and its powers.

In such a situation of things, we cannot hesitate to say that a Representative government is the natural, and will be the ultimate remedy; but if we find, that even where such an institution existed from antiquity, it was possible so fatally to miscalculate and misjudge the opinions of the nation, as proved to be the case in the reign of our King Charles, is it not manifest that there must be tenfold risk of such miscalculation, in a country where no such constitution has been previously known, and where, from a thousand causes, the true state of the public mind is so apt to be oppositely misconceived by the opposite parties, as it is up to the present hour in France?

The great and cardinal use of a representative body in the legislature, is to afford a direct, safe and legitimate channel, by which the public opinion may be brought to act on the government: But, to enable it to perform this function with success, it is by no means enough, that a certain number of deputies are sent into the legislature by a certain number of electors. Without a good deal of previous training, the public opinion itself can neither be formed, collected, nor expressed in an authentic er effectual manner; and the first establishment of the representative system must be expected to occasion very nearly as much disturbance as it may ultimately prevent. In countries where there never has been any political elections, and few local magistracies, or occasions of provincial and parochial assemblages

for public purposes, the real state of opinion must be substantially unknown even to the most observant resident in each particular district;-and its general bearing all over the country can never possibly be learned by the most diligent inquiries, or even guessed at with any reasonable degree of probability. The first deputies, therefore, are necessarily returned, without any firm or assured knowledge of the sentiments of their constituentsand they again can have nothing but the most vague notions of the temper in which these sentiments are to be enforced-while the whole deputies come together without any notion of the dispositions, talents, or designs of each other, and are left to scramble for distinction and influence, according to the measure of their zeal, knowledge, or assurance. In England, there were no such novelties to be hazarded, either in 1640 or in 1688. The people of this country have had an elective Parliament from the earliest period of their history-and, long before either of the periods in question, had been trained in every hamlet to the exercise of various political franchises, and taught to consider themselves as connected, by known and honourable ties, with all the persons of influence and consideration in their neighbourhood, and, through them, by an easy gradation with the political leaders of the State;-while, in Parliament itself, the place and pretensions of every man were pretty accurately known, and the strength of each party reasonably well ascertained by long and repeated experiments, made under all variety of circumstances. The organization and machinery, in short, for collecting the public opinion, and bringing it into contact with the administration, was perfect, and in daily operation among us, from the most ancient times. The various conduits and channels by which it was to be conveyed from its first faint springs in the villages and burghs, and conducted in gradually increasing streams to the central wheels of the government, were all deep worn in the soil, and familiarly known, with all their levels and connexions, to every one who could be affected by their condition. In France, when the new sluices were opened, not only were the waters universally foul and turbid, but the quantity and the currents were all irregular and unknown; and some stagnated or trickled feebly along, while others rushed and roared with the violence and the mischief of a torrent. But it is time to leave these perplexing generalities, and come a little closer to the work before us.

It was the Cardinal de Richelieu, according to Mad.de S., who completed the degradation of the French nobility, begun by Louis XI.;—and the arrogance and Spanish gravity of Louis XIV., assumed, as she says, pour eloigner de lui la familiarité des jugemens,' fixed them in the capacity of courtiers; and put an

end to that gay and easy tone of communication which, in the days of Henri IV., had made the task of a courtier both less wearisome and less degrading. She has no partiality, indeed, for the memory of that buckram hero-and is very indignant at his being regarded as the patron of literature. Il persécuta Port-Royal, dont Pascal étoit le chef; il fit mourir de chagrin Racine; il exila Fénélon; il s'opposa constamment aux honneurs qu'on vouloit rendre à La Fontaine, et ne professa de l'admiration que pour Boileau. La littérature, en l'exaltant avec excès, a bien plus fait pour lui qu'il n'a fait pour elle.' (I. p. 36.) In his own person, indeed, he outlived his popularity, if not his fame. The brilliancy of his early successes was lost in his later reverses. The debts he had contracted lay like a load on the nation; and the rigour and gloominess of his devotion was one cause of the alacrity with which the nation plunged into all the excesses and profligacy of the regency and the succeeding reign.

That reign-the weaknesss of Louis XV.-the avowed and disgusting influence of his mistresses and all their relations, and the national disasters which they occasioned-together with the general spread of intelligence among the body of the people, and the bold and vigorous spirit displayed in the writings of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, created a general feeling of discontent and contempt for the government, and prepared the way for those more intrepid reformers who were so soon destined to succeed.

Louis XVI, says Mad. de S., would have been the mildest and most equitable of despots, and the most constitutional of constitutional kings-had he been born to administer either an established despotism, or a constitutional monarchy. But he was not fitted to fill the throne during the difficult and trying crisis of a transition from the one state to the other. He was sincerely anxious for the happiness and even the rights of his people; but he had a hankering after the absolute power which seemed to be his lawful inheritance; and was too easily persuaded by those about him to cling to it too long for his own safety, or that of the country. The Queen, with the same amiable dispositions, had still more of those natural prejudices. M. de Maurepas, a minister of the old school, was compelled, by the growing disorder of the finances, to call to his aid the talents of Turgot and Necker about the year 1780. We hear enough, of course, in this book, of the latter: But though we can pardon the filial piety which has led the author to discuss, at so great length, the merit of his plans of finance and government, and to dwell on the prophetic spirit in which he foresaw and foretold all the consequences that have flowed

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from rejecting them, we have too much regard for our readers to oppress them, at this time of day, with an analysis of the Compte Rendu, or the scheme for provincial assemblies. As an historical personage, he must have his due share of notice; and no fame can be purer than that to which he is entitled. His daughter, we think, has truly described the scope of his endeavours, in his first ministry, to have been, to persuade the King to do of himself that justice to the people, to obtain which they afterwards insisted for representatives.' Such a counsellor, of course, had no chance in 1780; and, the year after, M. Necker was accordingly dismissed. The great objection to him was, that he proposed innovations- et de toutes les innovations, celle que les courtisans et les financiers detestent le plus, c'est l'ECONOMIE. Before going out, however, he did a great deal of good; and found means, while M. de Maurepas had a bad fit of gout, to get M. de Sartine removed from the ministry of Marine-a personage so extremely diligent in the studies belonging to his department, that when M. Necker went to see him soon after his appointment, he found him in a chamber all hung round with maps; and boasting, with much complacency, that he could already put his hand upon the largest of them, and point, with his eyes shut, to the four quarters of the world!'

Calonne succeeded-a frivolous, presumptuous person,-and a financier, in so far as we can judge, after the fashion of our Poet-laureate; for he too, it seems, was used to call prodigality a large economy;' and to assure the King, that the more lavish he and his court were in their expenses, so much the better would it fare with the country. The consequence was, that the disorder soon became irremediable; and this sprightly minister was forced at last to adopt Turgot's proposal of subjecting the privileged orders to their share of the burdensand finally to advise the convocation of the Notables, in 1787. The Notables, however, being all privileged persons, refused to give up any of their immunities-and they and M. de Calonne were dismissed accordingly. Then came the wavering and undecided administration of M. de Brienne, which ended with the resolution to assemble the States-General ;-and this was the Revolution!

Hitherto, says Mad. de S., the nation at large, and especially the lower orders, had taken no share in these discussions. The resistance to the Court-the complaints-the call for reformation, originated and was confined to the privileged orders -to the Parliaments-the Nobles and the Clergy. No revolution indeed can succeed in a civilised country, which does not begin at least with the higher orders. It was in the