national treasury, to be ineligible to any office established by a particular state, or under the authority of the United States, except those particularly belonging to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and under the national government, for the space of one year after its expiration.

4. That the members of the second branch of the legislature ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures, to be of the age of thirty years at least, to hold their of fices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency, namely, seven years, one third to go out biennially, to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service, to be paid out of the national treasury, to be ineligible to any office by a particular state, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service, and under the national government, for the space of one year after its expiration.

5. That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts.

6. That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in congress by the confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted, by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several states, contravening, in the opinion of the legislature of the United States, the articles of union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.

7. That the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national legislature, ought not to be according to the rule established in the articles of confederation, but according to some equitable rate of representation, namely, in proportion to the whole number of white, and other free citizens

and inhabitants of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each state.

8. That the right of suffrage in the second branch of the national legislature, ought to be according to the rule established in the first.

9. That a national executive be instituted to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the national legislature for the term of seven years, with power to carry into exccution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, to be ineligible a second time, and to be removeable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty, to receive a fixed stipend, by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service-to be paid out of the national treasury.

10. That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act which shall not afterwards be passed, unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legislature.

11. That a national judiciary be established, toconsist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which, to be appointed by the second branch of the national legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.

12. That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.

13. That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue; cases arising under the laws of the United

States, impeachments of any national officer, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony.

14. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government, territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national legislature less than the whole.

15. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the continuance of congress, and their authority and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the articles of union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements.

16. That a republican constitution and its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each state by the United States.

17. That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18. That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers, within the several states, ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of the union.

19. That the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by this convention, ought, at a proper time or times, after the approbation of congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies, recommended by the legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people, to consider and decide thereon.

These propositions, sir, were acceded to by a majority of the members of the committee-a system by which the large states were to have not only an inequality of suffrage in the first branch, but also the same inequality in the second branch, or senate; however, it was not designed the second branch should consist of the same number as the first. It was proposed that the senate should consist of twentyeight members, formed on the following scale-Virginia

to send five, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts each four, South-Carolina, North-Carolina, Maryland, New-York, and Connecticut two each, and the states of New-Hampshire, Rhode-Island, Jersey, Delaware, and Georgia each of them one; upon this plan, the three large states, Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, would have thirteen senators out of twenty-eight, almost one half of the whole number-Fifteen senators were to be a quorum to proceed to business; those three states would, therefore, have thirteen out of that quorum. Having this inequality in each branch of the legislature, it must be evident, sir, that they would make what laws they pleased, however injurious or disagreeable to the other states, and that they would always prevent the other states from making any laws, however necessary and proper, if not agreeable to the views of those three states-They were not only, sir, by this system, to have such an undue superiority in making laws and regulations for the union, but to have the same superiority in the appointment of the president, the judges, and all other officers of government. Hence, these three states, would in reality have the appointment of the president, judges, and all the other officers. This president, and these judges, so appointed, we may be morally certain, would be citizens of one of those three states; and the president as appointed by them, and a citizen of one of them, would espouse their interests and their views, when they came in competition with the views and interests of the other states. This president, so appointed by the three large states, and so unduly under their influence, was to have a negative upon every law that should be passed, which, if negatived by him, was not to take effect, unless assented to by two thirds of each branch of the legislature, a provision which deprived ten states of even the faintest shadow of liberty; for if they, by a miraculous unanimity, having all their members present, should outvote the other three, and pass a law contrary to their

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wishes, those three large states need only procure the president to negative it, and thereby prevent a possibility of its ever taking effect, because the representatives of those three states would amount to much more than one third (almost one half) of the representatives in each branch. And, sir, this government, so organized with all this undue superiority in those three large states, was as you see to have a power of negativing the laws passed by every state legislature in the union. Whether, therefore, laws passed by the legislature of Maryland, New-York, Connecticut, Georgia, or of any other of the ten states, for the regulation of their internal police should take effect, and be carried into execution, was to depend on the good pleasure of the representatives of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.

This system of slavery, which bound hand and foot ten states in the union, and placed them at the mercy of the other three, and under the most abject and servile subjection to them, was approved by a majority of the members of the convention, and reported by the committee..

On this occasion, the house will recollect, that the convention was resolved into a committee of the whole-of this committee Mr. Gorham was chairman-The honorable Mr. Washington was then on the floor, in the same situation with the other members of the convention at large, to oppose any system he thought injurious, or to propose any alterations or amendments he thought beneficial. To these propositions so reported by the committee, no opposition was given by that illustrious personage, or by the president of the state of Pennsylvania. They both appeared cordially to approve them, and to give them their hearty concurrence; yet this system, I am confident, Mr. Speaker, there is not a member in this house would advocate, or who would hesitate one moment in saying it ought to be rejected. I mention this circumstance in compliance with the duty I owe this honorable