we were entrusted to prepare, was a government over these thirteen states; but that in our proceedings, we adopted principles which would be right and proper, only on the supposition that there were no state governments at all, but that all the inhabitants of this extensive continent were in their individual capacity, without government, and in a state of nature-That accordingly the system proposes the legislature to consist of two branches, the one to be drawn from the people at large, immediately in their individual capacity; the other to be chosen in a more select manner, as a check upon the first-It is in its very introduction declared to be a compact between the people of the United States as individuals; and it is to be ratified by the people at large in their capacity as individuals ; all which it was said, would be quite right and proper, if there were no state governments, if all the people of this continent were in a state of nature, and we were forming one national government for them as individuals, and is nearly the same as was done in most of the states, when they formed their governments over the people who compose them.

Whereas it was urged, that the principles on which a federal government over states ought to be constructed and ratified are the reverse; that instead of the legislature consisting of two branches, one branch was sufficient, whether examined by the dictates of reason, or the experience of ages-That the representation instead of being drawn from the people at large as individuals, ought to be drawn from the states as states in their sovereign capacity

That in a federal government, the parties to the compact are not the people as individuals, but the states as states, and that it is by the states as states in their sovereign capacity, that the system of government ought to be ratified, and not by the people as individuals.

It was further said, that in a federal government over states equally free, sovereign, and independent, every state ought to have an equal share in making the federal laws

or regulations; in deciding upon them, and in carrying them into execution, neither of which was the case in this system, but the reverse, the states not having an equal voice in the legislature, nor in the appointment of the executive, the judges, and the other officers of government : it was insisted, that in the whole system there was but one federal feature, the appointment of the senators by the states in their sovereign capacity, that is by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it was said that this feature was only federal in appearance.

To prove this, and the senate as constituted could not be a security for the protection and preservation of the state governments, and that the senators could not be justly considered the representatives of the states as states, it was observed, that upon just principles of representation, the representative ought to speak the sentiments of his constituents, and ought to vote in the same manner that his constituents would do (as far as he can judge) provided his constituents were acting in person, and had the same knowledge and information with himself; and therefore that the representative ought to be dependant on his constituents, and answerable to them; that the connexion between the representative and the represented, ought to be as near and as close as possible; according to these principles, Mr. Speaker, in this state it is provided by its constitution, that the representatives in congress, shall be chosen annually, shall be paid by the state, and shall be subject to recall even within the year; so cautiously has our constitution guarded against an abuse of the trust reposed in our representatives in the federal government; whereas by the third and sixth section of the first article of this new system, the senators are to be chosen for six years instead of being chosen annually; instead of being paid by their states who send them, they, in conjunction with the other branch, are to pay themselves out of the treasury of the United States; and are not liable to be recalled

during the period for which they are chosen: Thus, sir, for six years the senators are rendered totally and absolutely independent of their states, of whom they ought to be the representatives, without any bond or tie between them : During that time they may join in measures ruinous and destructive to their states, even such as should totally annihilate their state governments, and their states cannot recall them, nor exercise any controul over them. Another consideration, Mr. Speaker, it was thought ought to have great weight to prove that the smaller states cannot depend on the senate for the preservation of their rights, either against large and ambitious states, or against an ambitious, aspiring president. The senate, sir, is so constituted, that they are not only to compose one branch of the legislature, but by the second section of the second article, they are to compose a privy council for the president; hence, it will be necessary, that they should be, in a great measure, a permanent body, constantly residing at the seat of government. Seven years is esteemed for the life of a man; it can hardly be supposed, that a senator, especially from the states remote from the seat of empire, will accept of an appointment which must estrange him for six years from his state, without giving up to a great degree his prospects in his own state. If he has a family, he will take his family with him to the place where the government shall be fixed, that will become his home, and there is every reason to expect, that his future views and prospects will centre in the favours and emoluments of the general government, or of the government of that state where the seat of empire is established :-In either case, he is lost to his own state. If he places his future prospects in the favors and emoluments of the general government, he will become the dependant and creature of the president, as the system enables a senator to be appointed to offices, and without the nomination of the president, no appointment can take place; as such, he will favour the wishes of the president,

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and concur in his measures, who, if he has no ambitious views of his own to gratify, may be too favorable to the ambitious views of the large states, who will have an undue share in his original appointment, and on whom he will be more dependant afterwards than on the states which are smaller. If the senator places his future prospects in that state where the seat of empire is fixed; from that time he will be in every question wherein its particular interest may be concerned the representative of that state, not of

his own.

But even this provision apparently for the security of the state governments inadequate as it is, is entirely left at the mercy of the general government, for by the fourth section of the first article, it is expressly provided, that the congress shall have a power to make and alter all regulations concerning the tinie and manner of holding elections for senators; a provision, expressly looking forward to, and I have no doubt designed for the utter extinction and abolition of all state governments; nor will this, I believe, be doubted by any person, when I inform you that some of the warm advocates and patrons of the system in convention, strenuously opposed the choice of the senators by the state legislatures, insisting that the state governments ought not to be introduced in any manner so as to be component parts of, or instruments for carrying into execution, the general government: Nay, so far were the friends of the system from pretending that they meant it, or considered it as a federal system, that on the question being proposed, "that a union of the states, merely federal, ought to be the sole object of the exercise of the powers vested in the convention; it was negatived by a majority of the members, and it was resolved, "that a national government ought to be formed”—afterwards the word "national" was struck out by them, because they thought the word might tend to alarm and although now, they who advocate the system, pretend to call themselves federalists, in conven

tion the distinction was quite the reverse; those who opposed the system, were there considered and styled the federal party, those who advocated it, the antifederal.

Viewing it as a national, not a federal government, as calculated and designed not to protect and preserve, but to abolish and annihilate the state governments, it was opposed for the following reasons, it was said, that this continent was much too extensive for one national government, which should have sufficient power and energy to pervade and hold in obedience and subjection all its parts, consistent with the enjoyment and preservation of liberty; that the genius and habits of the people of America, were opposed to such a government-That during their connexion with Great Britain, they had been accustomed to have all their concerns transacted within a narrow circle, their colonial district; they had been accustomed to have their seats of government near them, to which they might have access, without much inconvenience, when their business should require it-That at this time we find if a county is rather large the people complain of the inconvenience, and clamor for a division of their county, or for a removal of the place where their courts. are held, so as to render it more central and convenient -That in those states, the territory of which is extensive, as soon as the population increases remote from the seat of government, the inhabitants are urgent for a removal of the seat of their government, or to be erected into a new state-As a proof of this, the inhabitants of the western parts of Virginia and North-Carolina, of Vermont and the province of Maine, were instances, even the inhabitants of the western parts of Pennsylvania, who it is said, already seriously look forward to the time when they shall either be erected into a new state, or have their seat of government removed to the Susquehanna.—If the inhabitants of the different states consider it as a grievance to attend a country court or the