and means, that there will be in the treasury, on the 1st day o

Jan. 1818,

Deduct one year's interest, payable on the

7,000,000 bank stock in 1817, at 5 per cent.

$3,650,000

350,000

3,300,000

It is, however, expected, that the sales of land will give more than its usual amount in 1820, but not more, in my opinion, than will be met by new and increased expenditure. Under this

view of our finances, I cannot, at this time, said Mr. S., consent to any new plan of expending the public money.

In fine, I am for appropriating our funds, when we can act advisably on the subject, to the making such roads and canals as have for their object, national advantages; not to be divided into small and insignificant sums, to be applied to objects within the power and means of the states individually.

Mr. SHEFFEY, of Virginia. The subject presents two propositions for our consideration: First-Does the constitution authorize congress to make provision by law to attain objects such as are contemplated by this bill? Secondly-If such power exists, is it expedient to exercise it now, and in the manner proposed? On the first question, though I accord in sentiment with the honourable gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) that we have the power, yet I do not agree with him that we derive it from that clause in the constitution to which he referred it; that which empowers congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare." I do not view the latter sentence as containing a distinct substantive grant of power. It must be taken in connexion with the other provisions in the constitution; and, in my opinion, ought to be understood in this sense-that congress shall have power to levy to provide for the common defence and general welfare," so far as the common defence and general welfare are confided to them by this constitution.

35 money

If we possess the power in question, it must be, as incidental to some one or more of the powers expressly delegated to us; as an instrument the more effectually to attain some or all of the great ends for which this government was instituted. It is here where those who contend for the existence of this power, and those who deny it, separate. It has been said by some, and stated to-day by an honourable gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin) as his opinion, that congress could employ no means to carry into effect the delegated powers, but such as were ABSOLUTELY necessary. [Mr. Pitkin here rose and said he had stated it not as his own, but the opinion of others, with which he disagreed.] Mr. Sheffey said he was glad to find he was mistaken. It was an opinion, however, seriously entertained, and often uttered on this floor. If such is really the fact, then this government is without any power whatever. As in the physical and moral, so in the political world, there is scarcely an end which may not be attained by different means. If the objects confided to you, can be effected only by such means as are absolutely necessary, how will you effect any? If to execute the power" to lay and collect taxes," you direct that my land shall be sold for non-payment of a direct tax, I may say the law is un

constitutional, because it is not absolutely necessary that you should sell my land: you might sell my house, or obtain the tax by many other means; all of them, perhaps, equally certain to attain the end, but none of them absolutely necessary. If to execute and provide proper sanctions to your laws, embracing subjects expressly delegated to congress, you impose imprisonment on the delinquent, may he not say that you are guilty of usurpation; that the privation of his liberty is not absolutely necessary to execute your law? In fact, sir, there is no imaginable case where this doctrine would not unnerve you, and render this government, formed for great purposes, and ostensibly invested with great powers, utterly imbecile and a subject of derision and contempt.

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Those who formed this government, acted like wise and practical statesmen. They designated the objects of your jurisdiction; the means which you should employ to secure those objects, they did not, because they could not prescribe. They left the selection of the instruments to those who should be appointed to use them. They invested you with all the means necessary and proper" to carry into effect the delegated powers, and left you to determine what was necessary and proper." Hence I contend that if the object itself is within your control, a measure which tends to promote or effectuate it, is not limited by any constitutional restriction, but is a matter of discretion, for the abuse of which, we are responsible to our constituents, as in those cases where the power is unquestionable.

There are some objects vitally interesting to several states; to the accomplishment of which private means and enterprize are perhaps not competent, and which it would be unjust to expect to be effected by the state who has the local jurisdiction; such for instance is the cutting a canal round the rapids of the Ohio. All the immense region above and below is equally interested in effecting this great object. Shall Kentucky or Indiana alone bear the burthen, when many others are alike benefitted by the result? Can those states effect it whose territories are distant? Certainly not. Who then is to provide for this great object? The government of the United States, which has under its exclusive control the commerce between the several states.

The same clause which gives to congress the power to "regulate" commerce between the several states, gives the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and with the Indian tribes. Under the first of these powers, Congress, to give external commerce all possible facilities, have erected light houses, piers and beacons; they have established regulations for seamen in the merchant service; they have levied a capitation tax on these seamen contrary to the rule of the constitution, (as being a case not embraced by it) to create a hospital fund for the

sick and disabled. Congress under this power have suspended commerce entirely. Under the power to 'regulate' commerce with the Indian tribes, trading houses have been erected, and roads opened. Did any person ever object to these acts, (the one suspending commerce excepted) as transcending the constitutional powers of this government? For myself I can say I never heard of any such objection. This detail contains a practical construction of the word "regulate," and furnishes, moreover, a complete answer to the idea often repeated on this floor, that we can employ only such means as directly tend to execute the delegated powers; that we dare not without usurpation depart one step out of a direct line in moving towards our object.

I cannot subscribe to a doctrine which we have heard from a respectable source in the course of this discussion, that the consent of the states is necessary, to enable us to make roads and canals. If we have the power at all, it is the supreme power, which will execute itself, not only without such consent, but in opposition to the will of the states. The consent of the states certainly can give us no power where the constitution has not vested it, otherwise it might happen that we might do in one state what we could not do in another. The idea that the consent of the states is necessary, arises from blending two distinct subjects. If the exclusive jurisdiction over the roads and canals when constructed, should be desired by the United States, the states must first relinquish their jurisdiction. But this has no connexion with the act of making the roads and canals. You build custom houses without the consent of the states; but their territorial sovereignty over them is not lost; all crimes committed there, are cognizable by the state authorities. So it would be in relation to roads and canals made by your authority.

The honourable gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Smith) has given us a detail of our finances, from which he infers, that however useful and proper, in itself, this measure may be, our means do not authorize the undertaking at this time. I will not now enter into the question, whether his inference is correct, though I incline to think that the honourable gentleman has given a picture of our resources too unfavourable. But I would rather retrench in other expenditures than permit this great object to be neglected. Reduce your army; introduce a system of rigid and well regulated economy, (not parsimony,) into the administration of your finances, instead of the waste and disorder which now prevail, and your means for effecting the purpose contemplated by this bill will be ample. Indeed, so important is this subject to the country, in my opinion, that rather than see it fail, I would consent to borrow money at eight per cent. or lay a tax on the country. The capacity of the people to pay taxes would be increased in proportion as the price of transportation of

their products to market would be diminished; a result which must follow a well organized and liberal system of internal improvement.

On the discussion of this bill in the Senate, the following remarks were made by Mr. DAGGETT, of Connecticut.

He would point the attention of the senate to some of the objections in his mind to the bill. 1st. It is not authorised by the constitution; and, if it were, secondly, it is inexpedient. He should with much reluctance urge any objections arising out of the constitution, for he had long since learned that the constitution is made to change with the times. It was one thing yesterday-it is another to-day. It is to be enlarged as the nation increases in greatness and glory-it must yield to the pressing exigencies of the moment. He need not say there is no power in the constitution expressly authorising the congress to construct roads and canals, and to tax the people to defray the expense. No one asserts the existence of such power. There is not a word upon the face of the instrument on the subject, except that it is declared, art. 1, sec. 8, that "the congress shall have power to establish post offices and post roads." This, so far from authorising the establishment by congress of all roads, limits, if it bear at all on the point, the power to post roads only; otherwise it must be shown that an instrument which gives a special power over post roads, in terms, gives, by implication, a general power over all roads. Such absurdity should not be imputed to the wise men who framed this constitution. The reverse of all this is unquestionably true. By sound rules of interpretation, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. The constitution declares "The congress shall have power to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities of the United States -to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court-to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions-to exercise exclusive legislation over ten miles square, &c." In the cases mentioned, is not the congress prohibited from providing for the punishment of counterfeiting private securities-from establishing tribunals superior to the supreme court-from calling forth the militia to garrison forts in time of peace-and from exercising exclusive legislation over the city of Baltimore? Again: The states, at the adoption of the constitution, possessed the entire control over all the roads and canals within their respective limits. On this point there can be no doubt. Each state always has, and now does, exercise this power. Is it taken away by any express prohibition? Certainly not. Is it taken away "by implication? Certainly not; unless the power is given to the