soon got together again and doubled cape Finisterre. The English admiral had sailed with the same northerly wind; but the tempest having overtaken him before he had cleared the channel, he was obliged to regain a port, by which means the French convoy got considerably the start. Our voyage, after having passed to the south of the Azores, was easy, but slow and protracted by calms. On the 20th of June, being to the south of the Bermudas, we descried a squadron of six ships making towards the convoy under a press of sail; the chevalier de Ternay ranged his transports behind his line and moved towards the enemy, who was astonished to see seven sail of the line come forth from a groupe of merchant vessels, in order of battle. The bulk of their squadron kept the wind; one of their vessels however, fell within reach of our line, which pursued her so closely that she was very near being taken. The chevalier de Ternay observing that one of his ships Le Provence, although crowded with canvass, could not keep up, and occasioned a gap in our line, and fearing that the enemy's squadron which was to windward, might take advantage of the circumstance to cut her off, and afterwards fall upon the convoy, made signal to slacken sail to the two ships which preceded him: the English vessel took advantage of this to tack and join her squadron, receiving the fire of all our line, which however, did not disable her. The two squadrons kept up a cannonade until sunset. The chevalier de Ternay continued his route with the convoy, the security of which he preferred to the personal honour of capturing an enemy's ship.

We learned afterwards that this English squadron was commanded by captain Cornwallis, and was returning to Jamaica, after having escorted fifty merchant vessels, as far as the Bermudas.

Some days subsequent the French squadron took an enemy's cutter conveying a number of officers from Charleston to the West Indies. We learned from them the siege and capture by the English of that capital of the Carolinas. We found soundings on the 4th of July, and concluded that we were only a short distance from the coast of Virginia. We took another enemy's vessel, the papers on board of which confirmed the capture of Charleston, and the return to New York of admiral Arburthnot's squadron with the body of troops who had maintained the siege under Gen. Clinton. He had left five thousand men at Charleston under the command of Lord Cornwallis. The passengers informed us that the garrison of New York, since the return of those troops, amounted to fourteen thousand men, and that Arburthnot expected every day to be joined from England by admiral Graves, and to operate afterwards with their united forces. On the evening of the same day the chevalier de Ternay observed, within the capes of the

Chesapeake, eleven large ships which our oldest sailors took for ships of war. We conjectured that they were the six ships which we had already encountered on the 20th, united to the force of Arburthnot or of Graves, and which were waiting to attack us in their turn. The orders of the chevalier de Ternay directing him to disembark at Rhode Island, he tacked about, changed his course in the night, and steered for Rhode Island. It was a fine opportunity which we had missed, for the eleven sail, as we were afterwards informed, were a convoy on their way from Charleston to New York, escorted by a few frigates. But the chevalier de Ternay, anxious only for the arrival of his convoy at the place of destination, studiously avoided every engagement which could only redound to his personal glory.

He entered at last, on the 12th of July, a harbour of Rhode Island, after a navigation of seventy days. The squadron of admiral Graves followed close upon us, and arrived the next day at New York. The storm which we had encountered in the bay of Biscay, obliged that officer to return to Plymouth, where he was detained fifteen days. In the neighbourhood of the Western Islands he captured a ship belonging to the French India company, which being richly laden he took in tow: this retarded his arrival and saved our convoy, which would have been roughly handled if the squadron of Graves, united to that of Arburthnot, had encountered us.

The troops debarked at Newport the capital of the island, and were encamped with their left to the sea and their right towards the anchorage of the squadron, which was protected by the land batteries that I planted at the most eligible points. I fortified also several points on which the enemy might land, and opened roads by which I might march to attack him at his first appearance. ******

The capture of Charleston had thrown the American finances into great discredit. The paper money had depreciated so far that sixty dollars of it were given for one of silver. General Washington, after detaching to Carolina the troops of the southern states under General Gates, was reduced to act on the defensive in the Jerseys with his army composed of the northern troops. The arrival of the French forces, although inferior in numbers to what they had expected, was welcomed by General Washington and the congress with great joy and gratitude. It was hoped that we should soon see the second division which was announced to congress by the French minister, with an augmentation of naval force accompanying it, that should restore to us the maritime superiority, so necessary for acting on every part of the coast in possession of the English.

Ten days after our landing, the combined English squadrons to the number of twenty sail, twelve of which were of the line, appeared in sight, and advanced to the island to attack the

French at their anchorage; but they renounced that project until they should be seconded by the land forces of which the English general was hastening the embarkation in the sound. General Washington, who watched all their movements, gave me frequent advices of them, and on account of the diminution of our little army and the weakened state of the squadron, from sickness, he authorized me to put in requisition the militia of the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, to assist us in our works and in the defence of the island. These states sent four or five thousand men assembled by General Heath, who all took the field with great ardour and perfect willingness. This American general had been dispatched by Washington to procure for the French all the succours which he might be able to command, and he acquitted himself of his charge with a truly patriotic zeal. I kept only two thousand men, of whom I gave the command to La Fayette, whom Gen. Washington sent to me at the same time. I requested General Heath to send the rest back to their harvests, which they had suspended to come to our assistance.

General Clinton had, in fact, embarked at a port in Long Island, with ten thousand of his best troops, a quantity of heavy artillery and mortars, for the purpose of attacking us on Rhode Island; but whether it was that he was informed of our preparations to receive him, or that a recent movement of General Washington towards New York, made him afraid to commit the safety of that place to too small a garrison, he resolved to land his troops and to form camps on Long Island. It is said that there were at the time sharp altercations between the military and naval commanders: this was, without doubt, the occasion of the different demonstrations which they made at the end of August and during the month of September, but which were always too dilatory to give any uneasiness to the French troops. In the mean time, however, the enemy's squadron did not cease to blockade ours, and appeared to be waiting for a reinforcement to attack us.

I will here speak of a small misunderstanding in my correspondence with General Washington, which was stifled in its origin. After he had answered my first letter in the most polite manner, I observed that under the pretext of being slightly acquainted with our language, he spoke but little of business in his succeeding letters; but he sent La Fayette to me with full powers. The latter had occasion to witness the vigour of our defensive measures against the preparations of the enemy, and to observe how effectually the army protected our small squadron against the superiority of the English. With regard to offensive operations, the chevalier de Ternay and myself deferred them until one of the three following events, of which we had great hopes, should take place:-1st, The arrival of my

second division. 2d, A reinforcement of ships from M. de Guichen, a requisition for which had been made by the chevalier de Ternay, in consequence of an authority granted to him for that purpose. 3d, Or, in fine, that the enemy by drawing his forces towards the south, might weaken New York so far that we should have nothing to fear for our squadron at Rhode Island, and leave us at liberty to attempt something with the army upon the Island of New York.

Immediately after his return to Washington's head-quarters, La Fayette wrote me a most pressing despatch, in which, after recalling our conversations, he concluded, in the name of the General, by proposing that I should join him immediately to undertake an attack on New York; his letter finished by a sort of summons founded on the political state of the country, and the apprehension that this campaign was the last effort of her patriotism. We were still further dissatisfied with this despatch, because General Washington, in his letter to me by the same messenger, did not say a word of this project; but he made no answer to my request for an interview, at which, by an hour's conversation, we could settle more than by volumes of writing. I took occasion to write a letter to La Fayette, in which, after reminding him that, by his own showing, there were fourteen thousand regular troops in New York independent of the militia, and that the French squadron was blockaded in Newport by a force more than double, I proved to him that if I should abandon the squadron under these circumstances, the English admiral would be the most pusillanimous of men if he did not burn it immediately upon our departure, and afterwards attack our communications on the different bays which separate the continent from Long Island and the island of New York, supposing that we had effected a descent on them.

I wrote to General Washington at the same time, in English; I expressed my satisfaction at the letters which I had received from him, and requested that all correspondence on business might be direct between us: I at the same time renewed my request for a conference.

I ought however, to mention, in justification of La Fayette, that he conveyed in substance, the sentiments of General Washington, who availed himself of his youth and ardour to express them with greater energy. This commander, in fact, thought at that time, and not without some foundation, considering the total discredit of the finances of congress, that this campaign was the last effort of expiring patriotism. He was desirous at any rate of hazarding an attack on the stronghold of the enemy, while he could count upon the assistance of the French troops. He felt, however, the difficulty of it, and acquiesced in all the reasonings of my letter. From the moment that our corresVOL. II. X

pondence became direct, I was uniformly pleased with the solidity of his judgment and the amenity of his style.

At length, in the beginning of September we had news of the squadron of M. de Guichen, who had appeared on the southern coast of America. After having gained several battles in the West Indies, he undertook a large convoy for France. The chevalier de Ternay, when he found himself blockaded by a superior force, had required of him a reinforcement of four sail of the line. The letter did not arrive at cape François until after the departure of M. de Guichen: it was delivered to M. de Monteil who could not decypher it, and who, besides, had engaged in an expedition against Pensacola in conjunction with the Spaniards.

We received, in the beginning of September, very unfavourable accounts from the southern states. Lord Cornwallis had advanced as far as Camden where he was met by General Gates: the latter was beaten, and the American army put completely to the rout. Cabb, a French officer, was killed at the head of an American division which sustained the whole weight of the day; General Gates retired with the remnant of his army as far as Hillsborough, in North Carolina.

In the mean time, on the news of the approach of M. de Guichen, I at length obtained the desired meeting from General Washington to determine upon the operations which our expected maritime superiority might warrant; it took place at Hartford on the 20th September; we there agreed upon all our movements, in the event of the arrival of the second division, or of an increase of naval force brought or sent by M. de Guichen. But these appearances soon vanished upon the arrival of admiral Rodney's fleet at New York, which tripled the English force. We hastened the conclusion of our conference, the French generals wishing to be at their posts where they were wanted. We found, however, that the baron de Viomenil had made every proper arrangement to secure the anchorage of the squadron against this new peril. General Washington was also in haste to join his army, where his presence became very

necessary.

*** **

I shall venture to interrupt here the regular narrative, in order to relate an anecdote fitted to exemplify the character of the good republicans of Connecticut. In going to this conference, the carriage which conveyed admiral the chevalier de Ternay and myself, broke down. I sent Fersen, my first aide-de-camp, in search of a wheelright who resided at the distance of a mile from the place where the accident happened. Fersen returned to inform me, that he had found a man sick of a quartan fever, who had answered him that his hat full of guineas would not tempt him to work in the night. I requested the admiral to go