house is instituted, not to follow the example, but to watch over the proceedings of inferior courts. The House of Commons is composed chiefly of those who are not lawyers, in order that they may act on the plain and broad principles of reason and the constitution. It is their duty to inquire whether the result of legal subtilties be the furtherance of the ends of justice; and above all, to determine whether there be any reasonings or precedents received by other tribunals which may be dangerous to liberty. These are questions of far more importance than any discussions of mere law; and on them this house may decide with as much discernment as lawyers, and with much less prejudice. There are even occasions in which law itself, in order to be preserved, must be overruled by the great principles of justice and liberty, for which and by which it can alone exist.

Whatever may have been said of late, I shall always consider that, to prove the tendency of a claim to be unconstitutional, it is in the House of Commons the strongest of all legal arguments against it. It has been said, that “unconstitutional" can have no meaning, if it be not synonymous with "illegal." But the assertion is false and pernicious. Every single statute has a general object and intention which may be defeated by acts which do not offend against the letter of any of its clauses. Every class of statutes relating to one subject has a more general scope and spirit against which there may be many offences not prohibited in so many words in any one statute of the class. The most subordinate part of law, besides its literal provisions, has a spirit, an object, general principles, which extend be

yond the letter, and without which the letter cannot be rightly understood. Shall not the same be said of that grand body of written and unwritten law relating to the powers of government, and the rights of the subject, called the constitution? As that which defeats the purpose without infringing the words of an act of paliament is justly said to be inconsistent with its spirit and principles, so acts are with equal propriety termed unconstitutional which resemble in their mischief acts already condemned as contrary to the constitution, which obstruct the attainment of its universally acknowledged ends, weaken the authority of its most useful principles, and of which the example, if consistently followed in all like cases, would leave no constitution remaining. It is by the condemnation of practices and pretensions which are unconstitutional without being, in the strict and narrow sense of the word, illegal, that the House of Commons has most often performed its high function of preserving liberty. Illegal practices may be checked by courts of law -unconstitutional claims can be resisted only by parliament. This house may, indeed, animadvert on a breach of law, but only where that breach of law is in effect, or example, dangerous to the constitution.

This constitution has provided various means of check on that most unmanageable instrument of power-a standing army. Whether the union of all of them be an adequate security, may be doubted; but no man ever thought that all were more than enough. One of these controls is, the annual mutiny bill, which renders the means of maintaining discipline annually dependent on the pleasure of parliament. This check is held by the

whole legislature. Another, and the only control exclusively vested in the House of Commons is, the annual grant of money for the support of the army. It is in its nature the most effectual: it is the privilege of the House of Commons alone. The constitution allows the other house to reject our votes of supply; but neither to alter their nature nor to increase their amount. It is the peculiar characteristic of the Commons House: it is that which forms our strength and our pride: it is that which has given us a preponderating authority over all measures of state. On this subject we have ever thought that the smallest dangers are to be guarded against with the utmost vigilance. No jealousy has here appeared unreasonable: no encroachments, however slender and unintentional, have been thought too harmless to be repelled. Such, sir, has been our jealousy, and (I may add in justice) your jealousy, of this great privilege in our intercourse with the other house of parliament. What new term can be imagined adequate to the feelings with which we are bound to guard it as a control over a standing army?

I am well aware that in every human system, especially in a government so complicated as ours, and formed by the course of circumstances in a long series of ages, there are anomalies which must be owned to have the character of law, though they be utterly irreconcileable with the general principles of the constitution. These irregularities are, I am ready to admit, often balanced by similar deviations on the opposite side. So that the last result, the just counterpoise of constitutional authority, is maintained.The principles of the constitution

and the spirit of the people, when they cannot prevent an encroachment in one quarter, have often gained a compensation in another. But it is never too much to say, that those who contend for the exception must always prove it, and that those who rely on the constitution need only allege it. Where is the proof? It is no ordinary evidence which can outweigh such principles as those now under our consideration-the exclusive right of this house to grant supply, and the danger of every prerogative which may be a source of independent revenue.

It will probably be said, that ministers are responsible for the exercise of this like every other power of the crown. Wherever a power is proved to be legal, responsibility is doubtless our safeguard against its dangers: whereever the creation of a new power is shown to be absolutely necessary, there also we must content ourselves with such security as the responsibility of ministers may afford. But we must not speak of responsibility till either the legality or the necessity of the power be first made out. Responsibility is no reason either for recognizing or for granting political power; it is only a security of a certain value against the abuse of an authority which legal evidence proves to exist, or urgent danger renders it necessary to create.

Anciently while our kings defrayed their expenses from their own revenues, with occasional aid from parliament, there are but few traces of parliamentary interference in appropriating public money to particular objects. Afterwards, when the kings of England were reduced by a happy poverty to that dependence on the commons which preserved the

British constitution, they were still considered as contracting to defray the whole expense of the state, on condition of their receiving a certain gross annual revenue. They were allowed to apportion it according to their own judgment, unless where the appearance of great abuse called for investigation, rather for the pu nishment of delinquents, than for the better regulation of the expenditure. Attempts to improve this practice were made at various times under the princes of the

house of Stuart. It was not until the glorious era of the revolution, that the system was established of appropriating all parliamentary grants, by the authority of parliament, to services previously approved by parliament, which gave reality and energy to all the ancient constitutional principles, respecting the power of the purse, created a constant and irresistible control over the public expenditure in this house, and ought to be regarded as the most important reform in the practice of the British constitution which has been effected in modern times. Since that happy period, every part of public law and parliamentary usage on the subject of finance, is consistent and intelligible. We have only to open the journals of this house to comprehend the constitution.

ENGLISH POOR LAWS.

MR. CURWEN. The abuse of the poor laws has transferred from the individual to the public, not merely the charge of providing for the casualties and misfortunes incident to humanity, but for the direct consequences of men's vice and folly. Economy

and forethought are banished; improvidence and immorality encouraged. To restore the respectability and the happiness of the inferior classes, they must be brought back to those manners from which they have swerved. Their general good sense I think as highly of as any man, but, misled as they have been by depending on parochial relief, an immediate and complete reformation is not to be expected. From the debasement which has arisen out of that system, gradually operating for two centuries, half that period may perhaps be necessary before the stain can be removed,-until this can be effected, I would by no means recommend any other than a gradual change in the system. Evidence may there be adduced, that the effect of the present system is to degrade the poor man as well in his own estimation as in that of the persons on whom the charge of maintaining him is devolved, that his happiness is at an end-his existence embittered. The relief bestowed on him may remove indeed the cravings of hunger, but it is at the expense of all the best feelings of his nature. To restore independence of mind to the labouring classes is an indispensable ingredient in every plan for bettering their situation. Need there be any other proof requisite of this than the superiority of our people, on the whole, over every other nation. Whence does this arise? Is it not among the blessed fruits of our free constitution, inspiring independence of mind and action, giving consequence in his own eyes to every member of the community? Hence has arisen the glory, the pre-eminence of England. Extinguish the vital spark of liberty, destroy the political