of associations. If there be a district in Connecticut, having a majority of what is called republican opinions; or a district in Georgia, of opposite sentiment, I should like, in either case, to see such districts represented here. Though there might be no great difference in the general momentum on either side, by this change, it would afford most happy consequences. Disappointment, in any measure, is then reconciled by the reflection that there was a fair trial. Kindred sympathies would be happily blended between distant climates, and geographical divisions avoided. The contrary is the consequence, in any larger mode of division, and especially in a general vote of states. Disappointment is then sharpened by considering that a fair trial was not had; that the sentiments of the minor divisions of the states were not heard. Antipathies would naturally become sectional between whole states and regions, being united in opposition to each other, respectively.

Of all species of division, none is so truly to be deprecated, as that of a geographical character. And that the mode of general vote tends this way, is clear, and that in filling the electoral colleges, as well as this house: for the very appearance of this united opposition in colleges within whole states and regions, to other sections, equally united, and this frequently occurring, will naturally lead to the same kind of local feeling. And as certainly too in a federative system, where each state is left free to regulate its weight in the balance, does it tend toward the mode of entire suffrage; and our experience proves it. The evil, then, is a national one, and a growing one. Its only cure is by a constitutional provision.

It is said that by adopting this amendment in the case of electors, the federative principle in that particular will be decreased. What is that federative principle? It consists mostly in the two extra electors being allowed to the states without respect to their relative sizes; this was a concession to the small states. And this is still retained by the amendments as there is no alteration in the distribution or number of electors. The right of the states indeed to regulate the mode of appointment being of a federative character, may be an object with some. But when the state is so united in sentiment as to present an undivided front, it may still do so, and the object is retained. When this is not the case, the loss in any state will depend on the relative losses sustained by other states in the same way, and the fraction of loss in any case is not worth the expense of the many evils resulting from the present unsettled

course.

Mr. Root, of New-York, said that changes in the constitutions of governments ought never to be made on slight motives.

The first proposition contained in the resolution before the

house, was not, he said, to his mind, calculated to change the principles of the constitution, since it proposed nothing more than a modification of the manner in which a constitutional provision should be executed. That the people should elect their representatives in such a manner as to speak the voice of the nation most distinctly, was what the constitution intended.

But the other proposition, as now presented to us, contemplates an invasion of one of the great fundamental principles of our constitution. It was not so, as the honourable gentleman from North-Carolina seemed to suppose, that the great states had yielded to the smaller ones (at the formation of the constitution) two senators each. It was the small states that yielded a full representation to the large states in the popular branch according to their numbers. Before the adoption of the constitution, each state, large or small, had an equal voice in congress, as an independent state, confederated with others, on equal terms and with equal rights. But, the large states having to pay a share of the taxes in proportion to their numbers, the smaller states had conceded to the larger ones, that they should have a representation in one branch of the legisla ture in proportion to their numbers. One branch of the legislature, therefore, was representative-the other federative. The executive branch of the government was a compound of both; the people and the state sovereignties combining their powers to elect a President of the United States. Hence a small state containing sixty thousand souls, was entitled to four electors; while one of double the population had perhaps not five votes -because the electors are chosen on a principle which is a compound of the popular and federative principles, one of which this proposition proposes to invade. Those electors to be appointed to represent the people, Mr. Root said, he had no objection should be chosen by the people, and in the same districts as are laid out for the election of representatives; but the other two in each state, who were to represent the state sovereignties, ought to continue to be chosen as the legislature might direct.

Mr. HAMMOND, of New-York, said, that the resolution under consideration embraced two objects. The first part of it was intended to render the mode of electing the members of this house uniform throughout the United States; the other part was intended to produce a uniformity in the mode of choosing electors of the president and vice-president of the United States. He was in favour of both parts of the resolution.

The practice in many of the states under the constitution is, that the electors for president are chosen by the members of the state legislatures. This practice is, I think, inconsistent with the genius of our government. The American government is essentially a popular one. All power is declared to be derived

from the people. The voice of the people constitutionally pronounced at the poll of an election, is the only sovereign and independent exercise of authority acknowledged in this nation.

I contend that it is not right that the legislatures of the respective states should have the power of determining the mode of choosing electors for the president. The danger of a combination of great states to the prejudice of small ones, furnishes to my mind a strong objection to allowing to the respective state legislatures the power of determining the mode of choosing electors-one hundred and eleven votes will elect your president. The states of Massachusetts, New-York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, give one hundred and one votes.-These four states, therefore, connected with a comparatively small state, can elect a president. Thus a mere bald majority of one in the state legislatures of five states can impose a president on the fourteen states, even if the inhabitants of the remaining fourteen states were to a man opposed to him. It is unnecessary to pursue this part of the subject further, because it must appear evident that if the constitution is not altered the minority can and possibly, nay probably, will govern the majority. It may be objected against the proposed amendment, that if adopted it will diminish the influence of the great states. Be it so. I am willing, sir, that the influence of the great states in their corporate capacity in the election of a president should be diminished.

The President is an officer who exists for the benefit of the people of the United States, and not for any one state or any part of the states. He ought not, therefore, to be created by the states, but by the people. The personal merit and political principles of the candidate are the only proper objects to which the attention of the electors ought to be directed. A great state, therefore, can not claim because she is great that she should furnish a chief magistrate for the nation. But so long as the legislatures of the respective states choose or direct the mode of choosing the electors, so long state claims, as they are called, will enter more or less into consideration in the selection of a president. Mr. Hammond said he had another objection against the choice of electors being made by order of the state legislatures. It was the danger arising from the influence of the executive of the United States on the state legislatures exerted for the purpose of continuing himself in office or of selecting his successor. And, sir, can it for a moment be doubted but that the state legislatures present bodies of men on whom the executive influence can be brought to bear with more effect than on the whole mass of the American people? I think not.

Mr. Ross, of Pennsylvania, said, that, for his own part, he had not given to this subject that attention which it merited, and was not prepared to vote on it at this moment. He was not

satisfied, if an amendment in regard to the mode of choosing electors was necessary, that one greatly preferable to that now before the house might not be adopted. When the constitution had been originally framed, it had been supposed, he said, that the members of the electoral colleges would get together, and consult as to the best persons upon whom to bestow their votes; but the practice under the constitution had shown this expectation to be idle, and that the election did not in fact turn upon the principle on which the Convention had intended to fix it. On the contrary, the presidential candidates were fixed and . announced before the election of electors. Mr. R. thought the mode of election ought to be changed, but doubted whether the mode proposed would be the best.

Mr. RANDOLPH, of Virginia. To this proposition, he was opposed in toto, and would deliver his principal reasons as succinctly as he could.

It was not necessary, he said, to remind the house, that from the commencement of the federal government, the people of the United States had been divided into two great hostile parties. Although individuals had changed, the presumption was, that the parties remained pretty much the same at the present dayalthough deserters came and went from the one to the other, as suited their interests or their views of political advancement, the principles of the parties were not much changed. One of the great leading causes of the division of the American people, was the greater or less regard they were disposed to show to the powers of the states. It had been often said before on this floor, but perhaps it might not be amiss again to state it, that the difference between the two great parties consisted, on the one hand, of a devotion to the general in opposition to the state governments, and, in the distribution of the powers of the government, of a leaning, a bias, an attachment to the executive branch of the government-to that branch more remote from, and apparently independent of, the people, than this house. I, said Mr. Randolph, was brought up in the school, and have never yet been expelled from it, which upheld the rights of the states in opposition to the rights of this masked monarchy-for such our government is; of the rights of the popular branch of the government, in opposition to the other branches of the government, in all cases (be it remarked) of doubtful construction.

Mr. Randolph said, then, he was opposed to this resolution for the simple reason that it contemplated an abridgment of the powers of the states-that was enough for him. He was not one of those, who made new and great discoveries in politics -such as, that the powers of the states were too great and ought to be diminished. If there were no other objection to this proposition, it would be sufficient for him that it went to abridge the powers of the states.

He was against this proposition on another ground. Because it went not merely to abridge the rights of the states, but because it did go to change the terms of the compromise upon which these states had come into the confederation; to diminish very much the power of the large states, without in the same ratio diminishing that of the smaller. This constitution might be, as the gentlemen had told the house, a popular government; but, said Mr. Randolph, I deny the fact. It is not, it never was, a popular government.

If this were a popular government, why not introduce a resolution to this effect-That for every representative on this floor an elector should be chosen by the people? Why have we two additional electors in each state? Because of the compromise at the commencement of the government between the large and small states.

We must view this constitution as a compromise among the confederated states; which, he said, was the only principle on which a sound and practical statesman could find himself justified in acting in regard to it. Whenever that compromise was touched, if the balance was not nicely adjusted, if the centre of gravity was removed no matter how little, it would be impossible for any member of this house to divine the con

sequences.

This proposition, appeared to him to strike at the very root of the constitution of the United States. To that constitution many of the ablest and best men in the country had been strongly opposed, on the ground that the powers of the states would be too feeble to cope with the powers of the general government.

As long as he had a seat on this floor, he should feel it his duty to oppose any proposition, which would in any degree tend, first, to diminish the actual powers of the states; and, secondly, any proposition which went in any degree to change the existing compromise of weight and influence in this government, between the greater and smaller states. The truth was, if the large states had a proposition to make, affecting their weight in the government, so as to make it less in proportion to their wealth and population, it became the duty of the small states to enquire what they could give the large ones as an equivalent. In all public matters, where previous proportions have been settled, upon which the government of a country is to be carried on, any proposition going to change the fundamental state of the parties, is and ought to be met by a corresponding proposition of so much, by way of equivalent. He had a full, a firm persuasion, that this matter had not received the consideration to which it was entitled, and which he hoped it would receive before the house determined it.